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This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive investigation of the reformed British militia 
between its reconstitution in 1852 and its abolition (and replacement by the Special 
Reserve) in 1908, addressing one of the major remaining gaps in our understanding of the 
auxiliary forces of this period. The post-1852 militia has generally been overshadowed by 
its eighteenth and early nineteenth century predecessor, and of the few major works that 
do examine the force after its reform, most do so as part of broader studies examining it 
from the point of view of the regular army, or as an epilogue to a much broader study of 
the militia of the earlier period, or the wider amateur military tradition as a whole. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to provide the first dedicated study of the reformed 
British militia in recent years. It will move beyond the limited µtop-down¶ approach 
characteristic of many works examining the wider Victorian army and instead tap into a 
more recent methodological trend which utilises a range of national and local archival 
material to examine the nuances of what remained a locally organised force. It will 
examine not just the role of the militia and the way in which it was organised, but also 
study the nature and composition of its officer corps, its rank and file, and will investigate 
areas which have been hitherto largely ignored such as the way discipline was maintained 
LQZKDWUHPDLQHGDQDPDWHXUIRUFH,WZLOOFRQFOXGHZLWKDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHPLOLWLD¶V
unprecedented service during the South African War before going onto examine the 
process by which the militia was ultimately abolished and replaced by the Special 
Reserve (and ask whether or not this represented a moment of continuity, or an outright 
break with the past.) 
TKLVVWXG\UHMHFWV WKH LGHD WKDWGXULQJ WKLVSHULRG WKHPLOLWLD ODUJHO\EHFDPHµDQ
anachronistic auxiliary¶ WR WKH UHJXODU DUP\ There can be no doubt that it became 
increasingly centralised under the control of the War Office and that it also provided a 
vital role as a source of both officers and men for the regular army. Yet by looking at a 
mix of both national and local archival material, a more nuanced picture emerges. Several 
units managed to retain a degree of organisational independence and a social 
distinctiveness from the wider army. Furthermore, many of the reforms which altered the 
organisation of the force had important benefits. Compared to the 1850s and 1860s, 
during which the newly reconstituted force was forced to yield to the exigencies of the 





regular army, the militia of the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s was arguably better trained, 
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This study aims to provide a comprehensive investigation of the reformed British militia 
RIWKH9LFWRULDQDQG(GZDUGLDQSHULRGDNH\SDUWRI WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VODQGIRUFHV
DQG ZKDW ,DQ %HFNHWW WHUPHG DQ µDPDWHXU PLOLWDU\ WUDGLWLRQ¶ RI DX[LOLDU\ IRUFHV
However, whereas there is a large degree of historiographical awareness of many of the 
other auxiliary forces (the Rifle Volunteers, Yeomanry and, after 1908, the Territorial 
Army), our understanding of the militia remains incomplete. The two principal existing 
stXGLHV%HFNHWW¶VAmateur Military Tradition DQG'XQFDQ$QGHUVRQ¶VWKHVLVKDYHJRQH
some way to rectifying this, but both are far from comprehensive studies. The broad 
focus of the former, placing the militia within a wider amateur military tradition from the 
sixteenth century until the present day, means it is unable to examine the reformed militia 
DIWHU LQ VXIILFLHQW GHWDLO&RQYHUVHO\$QGHUVRQ¶VDFFRXQWKDVEHHQPRUH IRFXVHG
bridging the gap between earlier works on the militia of the Georgian period and its 
reconstitution in 1852; yet it fails to examine the force after the implementation of 
(GZDUG &DUGZHOO¶V DUP\ UHIRUPV GXULQJ WKH HDUO\ V VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW KHQFHIRUWK LW
was little more than a part of the regular army).1  Some recent scholarship examining the 
Edwardian Army has gone some way to redressing the lack of any modern analysis of the 
militia during this period (and its eventual replacement, the Special Reserve).2 By 
comparison the other auxiliary forces have all been the focus of more recent scholarship 
ZKLFK DLPV WR EHWWHU XQGHUVWDQG WKHLU SODFH ZLWKLQ FRQWHPSRUDU\ VRFLHW\ DQG %ULWDLQ¶V
defensive arrangements.3 
 Therefore, this study will fill one of the major remaining gaps in our 
understanding of the auxiliary forces of the Victorian and Edwardian period, providing a 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHH[DPLQDWLRQRIZKDWUHPDLQHGWKHPRVWPLOLWDULO\LPSRUWDQWRI%ULWDLQ¶V
auxiliary forces. It will not only test the conclusions of the existing historiography, but 
                                                 
1
 I. F. W. Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV7KHDPDWHXUPLOLWDU\WUDGLWLRQ-1945, (Barnsley: Pen 
	6ZRUG'$QGHUVRQµ7KH(QJOLVK0LOLWLDLQWKHPLG-Nineteenth Century: A study of its military, 
VRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOVLJQLILFDQFH¶XQSXEOLVKHG'3KLO8QLYHUVLW\RI2[IRUG 
2
 T. Bowman and M. Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British 
Army, 1902-1914, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
3
 For the two principal studies of the Victorian Rifle Volunteers, see H. Cunningham, The Volunteer Force: 
A Social and Political History 1859-1908, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1975), and I. F. W. Beckett, 
Riflemen Form: A Study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement 1859-1908, (Aldershot: The Ogilby Trusts, 
)RUWKH\HRPDQU\FDYDOU\VHH*+D\µ7KH%ULWLVK<HRPDQU\&DYDOU\-¶XQSXEOLVKed 
PhD, University of Kent, (2011).  





also tread new ground by acknowledging the variations in what remained until the end a 
force predominantly organised and recruited upon a local county basis. This means it is 
essential to survey local archival material in addition to that located in central archives in 
order to build up a more representative picture and to avoid a simple analysis from the 
µWRS GRZQ¶ VRPHWKLQJ PXFK RI WKH H[LVWLQJ KLVWRULRJUDSK\ KDV IDLOHG WR GR 6XFK DQ
approach will help to broaden our understanding of a variety of issues. This includes the 
debate over the militia¶s changing function and its place within the wider defensive 
arrangements of the UK, highlighting some of the continuity in official attitudes to such. 
Although organised primarily for defence against invasion and periodically as an aid to 
the civil power, the militia also played a more proactive role in supporting the regular 
army throughout the period. In wartime they allowed the regular army to concentrate 
abroad by relieving them from domestic garrison duties within the UK. However, such a 
role also saw militia units serve abroad, a role which culminated in their unprecedented 
service en masse during the South African War. It is also important to acknowledge that 
by the end of the century the militia arguably provided the single most important source 
of manpower for the line, a function which was increasingly pressed upon the force in the 
wake of the reforms of the late 1860s and 1870s and an issue which dominated much of 
the debate over its function until its reformation in 1908. Yet aside from charting the 
PLOLWLD¶V FKDQJLQJ UROH DQG RUJDQLVDWLRQ WKH VWXG\ ZLOO H[SORUH WKH FKDQJLQJ VL]H DQG
nature of both the officer corps and the rank and file. This is an area where the localised 
nature of the force is particularly prevalent as variation existed which had only been 
hitherto alluded at. Similarly this will be aided by closer examination of the way 
discipline was enforced in what remained an amateur force and the sometimes turbulent 
relationship between the militiamen and the local population, both issues which have 
been largely ignored by much of the contemporary and more recent historiography. This 
analysis will also examine the experience of the officers and men during their embodied 
service during the Crimean War, Indian Mutiny and later the South African War. Finally, 
it will bring these threads together by charting the debate over the future of the militia as 
part of the wider reform of the army and its subsequent reform and conversion into the 
Special Reserve in 1908, although the study will continue until 1914 so it can explore the 
degree of continuity between the two.   
 
* * * 






Before further exploring these lines of enquiry, one must establish where they sit in 
relation to the wider historiography. Most contemporary accounts of the Victorian and 
Edwardian Militia suffer from the same problem: they examine the force from an insular 
perspective without putting it into a wider context. This was particularly true of the 
myriad of regimental histories which were largely written by serving or retired militia 
officers. The first were published in the late 1860s and 1870s in the wake of the first 
period of significant militia reform since 1852, although the bulk dated from the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Far from uniform in the quality of their scholarship, 
they varied greatly in both length and depth despite following a similar narrative and 
GHVFULSWLYHIRUPDWZLWKDWEHVWRQO\DFXUVRU\DWWHPSWWRSODFHWKHUHJLPHQW¶VH[SHULHQFH
within that of the wider militia.4 For example, in 1876 a serving Captain of the 3rd West 
York Light Infantry published a year-by-year narrative of its service and the service of its 
RIILFHUV /DWHU LQ  WKH DFWLQJ FKDSODLQ WR WKH UG .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 6FRWWLVK %RUGHUHUV
published a similar account immediately prior to the establishment of the Special 
Reserve. Militia regimental histories were not limited to infantry battalions; in 1913 a late 
Captain of the Cornwall and Devon Royal Garrison Artillery published a history of the 
unit up to its disbandment in 1908.5 Some regular regimental histories also paid account 
to their associated militia units after they were unified into territorial regiments in 1881. 
For instance, in his history RIWKH5R\DO6XVVH[5HJLPHQW¶VVHUYLFHLQWKH6RXWK$IULFDQ
War the author also covers, albeLWLQIDUOHVVGHWDLOWKHVHUYLFHRIWKHUHJLPHQW¶VPLOLWLD
battalion.6  
 There were also several contemporary accounts by serving and retired militia 
officers which aimed to examine the militia more widely. Some simply offered their 
authors the chance to voice their own opinions on the direction of militia reform, 
particularly in relation to recruitment and the fact that the militia was increasingly a 
                                                 
4
 For a comprehensive bibliographical list see A. S. White, A Bibliography of Regimental Histories of the 
British Army, (The Society for Army Historical Research, 1965), pp. 149-61, 300. 
5
 Additional regimental histories cited throughout the text can be found in the appropriate section of the 
bibliography. G. A. Raikes, Historical Records of the First Regiment of Militia, or Third West York Light 
Infantry, (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1876); R.W. Weir, History of the 3rd %DWW.LQJ¶V2ZQ6FRWWLVK
Borderers, 1798-1907, (Dumfries: Courier and Herald Offices, 1907); G. Cavenagh-Mainwaring, ³7KH
5R\DO0LQHUV´$+LVWRU\RIWKH6WDQQDULHV5HJLPHQWRI0LQHUVODWH&RUQZDOODQG'HYRQ0LQHUV5R\DO
Garrison Artillery Militia, cRPPRQO\FDOOHG³7KH5R\DO0LQHUV´¸ (London: Harrison and Sons, 1908).  
6
 Du Moulin, Two Years on Trek, Being Some Account Of The Royal Sussex Regiment In South Africa , H. 
F. Bidder ed., (London: Murray and Co., 1907). 





source of manpower for the line.7 A rather different perspective was provided by an 
anonymous account satirising the experience of a single regiment from its reconstitution 
in 1852 to its embodied service at home and in the Ionian Islands.8 One trend which 
spanned across the period was an attempt to frame the contemporary militia as a 
µFRQVWLWXWLRQDO IRUFH¶Zhich could trace a direct line back to the militia tradition of the 
Anglo-Saxon and medieval period. In 1857 an officer of the East Norfolk Regiment 
SXEOLVKHGD OHFWXUH LQZKLFKKHKDGDWWHPSWHG WR WUDFH WKHFRQWHPSRUDU\PLOLWLD¶V URRWV
back to the Anglo-Saxon period.9 Even in 1908 militia officers were still attempting to 
frame the militia in such a light. The only contemporary study of the militia as a whole, 
E\&RORQHO*HRUJH+D\PDGH WKHVDPHGLUHFW OLQN+D\¶VFKURQRORJLFDO RXWOLQHRI WKH
PLOLWLD¶VZLder history was largely a reaction to what he perceived as the decline of public 
familiarity with such a tradition and on the whole somewhat of a manifesto for the 
efficacy of the militia. As he saw it ± Hay was himself a militia colonel for nearly twenty-
five years, commander of the 3rd The Prince of Wales Own West Yorkshire Regiment ± 
WKHIRUFH¶VXWLOLW\KDGEHHQGHPRQVWUDWHGE\ LWV µDFWLYHDQGPDWHULDO¶VHUYLFHGXULQJ WKH
6RXWK $IULFDQ :DU ZKLOH DW KRPH PLOLWLDPHQ KDG JRQH µEH\RQG WKHLU REOLJDWLRQ RI
seUYLFH¶ E\ YROXQWHHULQJ IRU RYHUVHDV GHVSLWH WKH IDFW WKDW WKHRUHWLFDOO\ LW ZDV VWLOO DQ
emergency force for home defence. He made no attempt to deny the increasing 
importance of the militia as a recruitment mechanism for the line, although he maintained 
suFK ZDV IDU IURP D EOHPLVK XSRQ WKH UHSXWDWLRQ RI WKH IRUFH LQ IDFW LW µHQDEOHG WKH
&RQVWLWXWLRQDO)RUFH WRFRQWLQXH LWVFRQQHFWLRQZLWK WKH0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\RI(QJODQG¶10 
To his credit, Hay did attempt to go beyond other contemporary accounts by also 
examLQLQJ WKH IRUFH¶V FRPSRVLWLRQ SD\ GLVFLSOLQH HTXLSPHQW DQG WKH OHJLVODWLYH EDVH
upon which it was regulated, while also providing details upon the lineage of each unit 
and their service during the South African War.11 Despite this his work is preoccupied 
                                                 
7
 For examples see E. Finch Hatton, The Militia and the Recruiting Service. With Suggestions for their 
Reorganization¸ (London: Bosworth & Harrison, 1859); E.C. Strode, The Line and the Militia, (London: 
William Ridgeway, 1869); and G.A. Raikes, Militia Reform. With special reference to the Militia Reserve 
and new Organisation Scheme, (London: W. Mitchell & Co., 1873). 
8
 Emeritus, The Militiaman at Home and Abroad; Being the History of a Militia Regiment, from its First 
Training to its Disembodiment; with Sketches of the Ionian Islands, Malta and Gibraltar., (London: Smith, 
Elder & Co., 1857).  
9
 W. Haggard, The Militia: Its Importance as a Constitutional Force, (London: Longman, Brown, Green, 
Longmans & Roberts, 1857).  
10
 G. J. Hay, An (SLWRPL]HG+LVWRU\2I7KH0LOLWLD7KH³&RQVWLWXWLRQDO)RUFH´, (London: United 
Services Gazette, 1908), pp. 1-3, 166. 182-3. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 185-444. 





with demonstrating the link between the contemporary force and its ancient roots and is 
therefore less concerned with providing any real analysis of the contemporary militia. 
After the abolition of the force in 1908 very little was published regarding the 
militia aside from several regimental histories. There were however a few exceptions. 
$OWKRXJK WKH ODVW YROXPH RI 6LU -RKQ )RUWHVFXH¶V VHPLQDO KLVWRU\ RI WKH %ULWLVK $UP\
paid only a cursory nod to the militia and the auxiliary forces, his previous examination 
of the county lieutenancies during the Napoleonic War helped to explore the role played 
by the militia in the wider mobilisation of manpower during the period.12 Exploring both 
the machinery of the militia ballot and the role of the lieutenancy to the PLOLWLD¶V
UHFUXLWPHQWKHFDPH WR WKHFRQFOXVLRQ ODWHUFKDOOHQJHGE\'XQFDQ$QGHUVRQ¶V WKHVLV
WKDWWKHPLOLWLD¶VUROHZDVSULQFLSDOO\DVDQDX[LOLDU\WRWKHOLQH$IXUWKHUH[FHSWLRQZDV
&RORQHO -RKQ 'XQORS¶V LQIOXHQWLDO VWXG\ RI WKH %ULWLVK $UP\ EHWZHHn 1899 and 1914, 
which although primarily concerned with the regular army also contained a chapter 
examining the auxiliary forces.13 Concerned primarily with explaining the relationship 
between the auxiliaries and the various attempts at army reform, he concluded that by 
1899 there was far from a coherent system of amateur forces within the UK. He argued 
WKDW WKHPLOLWLDµZDVDFROOHFWLRQRIXQLWV¶DQGLQFDSDEOHRI WDNLQJWKHILHOGDVDXQLILHG
force. A key problem was that the localised basis upon which the force was organised 
meant there was a comparative lack of units based and recruited in growing urban, 
compared to rural, areas. This meant that hitherto the militia had consisted of a large 
proportion of agricultural labourers while the officers were drawn from among the local 
landed gentry. Like Hay he also rightly acknowledged the supportive role the militia 
SOD\HG LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH UHJXODUV E\ RIIHULQJ \RXQJ RIILFHUV D µEDFNGRRU¶ WR D UHJXODU
commission (due to the fact that a fixed number of commissions were offered to militia 
officers each year, meaning potential candidates could circumvent the need to attend 
either Sandhurst or Woolwich) and the opportunity for many recruits to make the 
required standard for entry into the line ± he also attributed the high rates of crime, which 
KHWHUPVDVµXQXVXDOLQD9ROXQWHHUIRUFH¶WRWKHKLJKSHUFHQWDJHRIPHQWUDQVIHUULQJWR
the regulars; although he does not explain this point, it most likely relates to the issue of 
fraudulent enlistment. Crucially, he acknowledged that the standard of training within 
                                                 
12
 J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, vol. XIII, (London: Macmillan, 1930) and The County 
Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-1814, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1909).  
13
 J. K. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army 1899-1914: From the Eve of the South African War 
to the Eve of the Great War, with Special Reference to the Territorial Force, (London: Methuen, 1938), pp. 
42-52. 





each militia unit varied considerably, showing that they cannot be treated simply as a 
homogenous force and that variation between units existed.14 2Q WKH ZKROH 'XQORS¶V
account of the militia and the other auxiliaries does little more than set out their 
organisational structure at the moment prior to the South African War, although some 
interesting points were raised which later historians have further developed.  
It has only been since the 1960s that some attempt has been made to redress the 
lack of scholarship examining the Victorian and Edwardian Militia and to try and place it 
ZLWKLQDZLGHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI%ULWLVKVRFLHW\'XQFDQ$QGHUVRQ¶VWKHVLVRQWKH(QJOLVK
Militia of the mid-nineteenth century attempts to do just this by largely examining the 
force as a social institution. Rejecting the assertion laid down by Fortescue, later 
reaffirmed by Richard Glover and by J.R. Western, that by the early nineteenth century 
WKHPLOLWLD¶VUROHKDGODUJHO\GHJHQHUDWHG to an auxiliary to the line, he contends that there 
ZDV LQ IDFW D VWURQJ µPLOLWLD SDUW\¶ SULQFLSDOO\ IURP DPRQJ LWV RIILFHU FRUSV ZKR
PDLQWDLQHG D SURORQJHG UHVLVWDQFH WR VXFK YLHZV ,QVWHDG WKH\ DUJXHG WKDW WKH PLOLWLD¶V
role was as a home defence force alongside, not submissive to, the regular army. In fact 
he argues that it was their resistance which ensured the survival of the force in the years 
after the Napoleonic Wars in a political environment which was becoming increasingly 
hostile. Thus when it was reconstituted in 1852 the militia remained a force organised for 
KRPHGHIHQFH DQG µDV D PHFKDQLVP IRU VRFLDO UHIRUP¶ ,WV HYHQWXDO VXEVXPSWLRQ WR WKH
OLQHµZDVLPSRVHGRQLWE\WKHH[FHSWLRQDOFRQWLQJHQFLHVRI WKH¶V± it was not the 
logical termiQDWLRQRIWKHPLOLWLD¶VKLVWRU\¶,WZDVRQO\IURPWKHPLG-1860s onwards that 
political resistance to greater integration faltered and not until after the reforms of 
(GZDUG &DUGZHOO WKDW WKH PLOLWLD EHFDPH LQ HIIHFW µDQ DQDFKURQLVWLF DX[LOLDU\¶ WR WKH
line.15 In explaining his wider thesis Anderson also examines the composition of the 
RIILFHU FRUSV ZKLFK ZLWKLQ HDFK UHJLPHQW UHVHPEOHG µFOXEV¶ ZKHUH IDPLO\ FRQQHFWLRQV
and landed wealth were paramount. He also charts attitudes towards the militia, 
specifically the grievances and resistance of three groups: those advocating greater 
enfranchisement for whom the militia ballot represented enforced military service upon a 
population still largely without the vote; the concerns of anti-militarist and nonconformist 
gURXSVZKRIHDUHGPLOLWLDVHUYLFHZRXOGGDPDJHWKHQDWLRQ¶VPRUDOLW\DQGWKRVHLQ the 
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Horse GXDUGV DQG WKH :DU2IILFHZKRZHUH VFHSWLFDO RI WKH IRUFH¶V HIILFDF\ IRUKRPH
defence, yet who were also aware that it could act as a conduit through which military 
virtues were disseminated to the population.16 However, by concentrating on explaining 
WKHUHFRQVWLWXWLRQDVDQµHYHQW¶$QGHUVRQ¶VWKHVLVKDVVRPHPDMRUGUDZEDFNV%\
ending his study in the 1870s he is guilty of the same short-sighted understanding for 
which he criticises Fortescue, Glover and Western. He is without doubt correct that the 
Cardwell reforms marked a defining moment when the militia became more closely 
associated with the regulars, yet, as will be argued, his cut-off date implies that 
afterwards the militia had little or no independence from the line whatsoever. 
Examination of the force on a localised regimental basis, something lacking in his study, 
shows that this is a gross oversimplification. For instance, during the South African War 
most militiamen served abroad in their own units and under the command of their own 
officers, while in a broader sense its role garrisoning the UK and various Mediterranean 
stations was essentially the same role as experienced during the 1850s. However, the 
greatest drawback is that his thesis contains little consideration of the recruitment and 
social composition of the rank and file, or an examination of the way in which the force 
was organised and trained.  
Ian Beckett has also partially examined the Victorian and Edwardian militia as 
part of a wider study examining the British amateur military tradition. Building upon 
$QGHUVRQ¶VZRUN%HFNHWW LGHQWLILHV IRXUVWDJHVRIGHEDWHRYHUSRWHQWLDOPLOLWLD UHIRUP
all resulting from mounting concerns over French naval ambitions and in 1851 a coup 
G¶pWDWby Napoleon III. Largely such debate was split between two sides with competing 
ideas over the direction of such reform: one side suggested that there should be a return to 
DµORFDOPLOLWLD¶RUJDQLVHGIRU WKHGHIence of each county and on the other, a belief that 
the militia should be regulated as a national force in order to resist invasion anywhere 
within the UK.17 He also argues that the bulk of recruits in the regiments he surveyed 
were agricultural labourers, while the composition of the officer corps remained stable as 
60 per cent of officers held their commissions from before the reform. Like Anderson he 
argues that it was their embodied service during the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny 
ZKLFKVDZWKHPLOLWLD¶V role transform into a recruitment mechanism for the line, a role 
that a high proportion of militia colonels resented and as a result meant its social 
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composition quickly began to decline as lower elements of society were used to fill the 
gaps.18 He also concurs with Anderson that a militia lobby within Parliament prevented 
the greater integration of the militia until the Cardwell reforms, the result of which was 
that from 1882 to 1904 over a third of regular recruits had previously served in the 
militia, a trend also evident among the officers through the use of the militia as a 
µEDFNGRRU¶WRDUHJXODUFRPPLVVLRQ,QWHUPVRIWKHUHDVRQVIRUHQOLVWLQJ%HFNHWWDUJXHV
that aside from allowing men the chance to achieve the necessary fitness for joining the 
line, the militia also acted as a form of temporary refuge for the unemployed in times of 
economic hardship. He also concludes that, by the South African War, the militia and the 
auxiliary forces were a significant contributing factor to the military conditioning of 
%ULWLVKVRFLHW\)LQDOO\KHDUJXHVWKDWGHVSLWHWKHXQSUHFHGHQWHGQDWXUHRI WKHPLOLWLD¶V
VHUYLFHGXULQJ WKH6RXWK$IULFDQ:DU WKHPLOLWLD¶VVWUHQJWKUDSLGO\GHFOLQHGSURPSWLQJ
both the Unionist government and Liberal opposition to recognise it required urgent 
reform alongside the army and auxiliary forces as a whole. However, the attempts to 
reform the force by the successive Secretaries of State for War, St John Brodrick and 
Hugh Arnold-Forster, were unsuccessful, due mainly to the intransigencHRI WKHIRUFH¶V
supporters in Parliament. It was their continued intransigence which, in 1908, forced the 
new Liberal successor, Richard Haldane, to abolish the force entirely and replace it with 
the Special Reserve.19 7KHUHIRUH %HFNHWW¶V VWXG\ LV DORQH Ln that it examines militia 
across the entire period. However, by focussing upon the amateur military tradition more 
generally it is unable to provide sufficient details with regards to the nuances of what 
remained a highly localised force. By comparison to his investigation of the volunteers, 
his analysis of the militia is narrowly sourced while it is clear much of the initial 
DVVHVVPHQWUHOLHVKHDYLO\RQ$QGHUVRQ¶VWKHVLVZKLFKLWVHOIKDVLWVRZQLVVXHVUHJDUGLQJ
the breath of its source material). Illustrating this is that aside from a discussion of the 
impact of the Cardwell reforms, there is very little on the militia between 1859 and 1899. 
In fact, the chapter examining the period is concerned almost entirely with the volunteers 
GXHWR%HFNHWW¶VEHOLHI WKDWWKHUHYLYHGYROXQWHHUPRYHPHQWZDVµWKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWRI
WKHDX[LOLDU\IRUFHV«LQWHUPVRILWVHIIHFWXSRQVRFLDOSROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\DIIDLUV¶20   
David French has also considered the auxiliary forces as part of his study of the 
British regimental system. Aside from coming to a similar conclusion to Beckett over the 
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importance of the militia as a source of manpower for the regulars, French notes that 
increased integration with the line caused tensions between the militia and the regular 
army.21 FUHQFKGLVDJUHHVZLWK$QGHUVRQ¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWUHVLVWDQFHWRIXUWKHULQWHJUDWLRQ
KDG HIIHFWLYHO\ GLHG DIWHU &DUGZHOO¶V UHIRUPV LQ IDFW WKHUH UHPDLQHG D KLJK GHJUHH RI
suspicion between militia officers and their regular counterparts, as well as suspicion 
over the growing importance of the volunteers, who it was feared attracted the kind of 
respectable working class candidates the militia wished to attract (a point Beckett also 
makes).22 French believes that the key reason behind these strained relations were the 
often subtle social distinctions between the regulars and militia, although to a degree this 
began to narrow as the proportion of militia officers from among the local landed gentry 
fell due to the effect of the agricultural depression upon land rents and as a result the 
shortfall was increasingly met by those who, with little concern for the regiment itself, 
VDZ D PLOLWLD FRPPLVVLRQ DV D µEDFNGRRU¶ WR WKH UHJXODU DUP\ +H DOVR DJUHHV ZLWK
Beckett that many militiamen joined because they saw the force as a temporary relief 
from unemployment, or as a means of achieving the necessary fitness to join the line, 
though he does acknowledge many from urban areas also joined simply out of boredom.23 
Finally, he also briefly examines their training and discipline, arguing that efficiency 
varied dramatically between units and that the best had managed to create a tangible 
sense of regimental community. However, many other battalions were characterised by 
varying standards as they were limited by short periods of training, a lack of formation-
level training and insufficient firing ranges and ammunition for effective musketry 
practice.24 Although going some way to expanding upon the social distinctions within the 
PLOLWLD DQG WKH VRFLDO DVSHFW RI WKH IRUFH¶V UHODWLRQVKip with the regular army, as with 
many other pieces it is again a rather piecemeal examination and again reliant upon a 
small sample of local sources.  
Recent scholarship has also extended to the important role played by the militia 
and the auxiliary forces more generally during the South African War.25 In the same way 
D UHFHQW VWXG\ RI WKH UHJXODU DUP\ H[DPLQHV WKH ZDU IURP WKH µERWWRP XS¶26 Stephen 
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Miller has charted the experience of the various auxiliary forces in South Africa by 
utilising a range of personal testimonies.27 He argues that for the vast majority the 
experience of the war was often monotonous, consisting primarily of duties behind the 
OLQHV LQVXSSRUWRI WKHUHJXODUVGXH WR WKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶V UHOXFWDQFH WR ULVNXVLQJ
them in action en-masse. Though Miller should be credited for his extensive use of 
personal accounts, his study largely ignores the role of the militia and tends thus to focus 
upon the experience of the volunteers and yeomanry. He also failed to explore the 
wartime service of the majority of auxiliary soldiers who served either in overseas 
garrisons, Ireland, or mainland Britain itself. Therefore, Miller cannot lay claim to a full 
understanding of the auxiliary forces during the South African War. In attempting to 
explain the wider reasons why so many young working class men volunteered for foreign 
service, Miller rejects the conclusions of revisionist historians such as Henry Pelling, Eric 
Hobsbawm and Richard Price who maintained that patriotism only drove the middle 
classes to volunteer,  the majority only doing so due to economic hardship and 
unemployment. Instead Miller argues that patriotism penetrated all areas of society and 
that unemployment did not force men to volunteer for service abroad,28 a point supported 
by others such as Andrew Thompson and Ed Spiers, the latter arguing local factors could 
explain anomalies in the recruitment pattern.29 However, 0LOOHU¶VEHOLHILQWKHLPSRUWDQFe 
of patriotism as a motive can be challenged %\ FLWLQJ RFFDVLRQV VXFK DV µ0DIHNLQJ
NigKW¶ DVHYLGHQFH IRUZRUNLQJFODVV VXSSRUW IRU WKHZDUKH IDLOV WRDSSUHFLDWH WKDW WKH
working class were happy to shake off middle-class sensibilities; thus such spontaneous 
yet short lived outpourings of celebration cannot be used as concrete evidence of an 
entrenched mass patriotism.  
 Wider examinations of army reform have also begun to acknowledge the 
importance of the militia. Building on previous work by Brian Bond and Edward 
Spiers,30 a recent study by David French examines the creation and development of the 
regimental system resulting from the reforms of Cardwell and his successor Hugh 
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Childers. He argues that both Cardwell and Childers hoped that by creating a system in 
which regular soldiers and militiamen were trained together at a single depot, it would 
ERWKLQFUHDVHWKHODWWHU¶VHIILFLHQF\DQGHQFRXUDJHPLOLWLDPHQWRWUDQVIHUGLUHFWO\WRWKHLU
associated line battalions. In addition, transferring the militia from the authority of the 
lords lieutenant to the War Office was also expected to increase the ease with which the 
regular and auxiliary forces could be directed and administered.31 However, these studies 
pay little regard to whether or not the reforms had a positive or negative effect upon the 
militia and particularly whether or not closer association with the line contributed to an 
increase in their military efficiency.  
Similarly, the historiography has also acknowledged the importance of the militia 
within the wider debate upon army reform in the wake of the South African War. Dunlop 
quickly recognised that militia reform was a central facet of each of the three schemes 
presented for the reform of the army by Brodrick, Arnold-Forster and Haldane, an issue 
which remained controversial for both the Unionist and Liberal governments.32 More 
recent work has reaffirmed this by recognising how within the Unionist government a 
significant degree of the opposition towards the reforms of Brodrick and Arnold-Forster, 
both from within the cabinet and Parliament, centred on what future role the militia 
would, or would not, have as part of a secondary line in support of the army; indeed it 
was this issue more so than any other which prevented Arnold-Forster from even 
formally introducing his army reform scheme to Parliament.33 Scholars have also 
acknowledged tKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHPLOLWLDLQGHWHUPLQLQJ+DOGDQH¶VGHFLVLRQWRDEROLVK
the force and instead bind its most efficient units more firmly to the regular army through 
the creation of the Special Reserve.34 However, most of these works tend to gravitate 
towards the successful reforms of Haldane ± he is the only one of the three to receive a 
recent biography ± at the expense of those of his less successful predecessors, those 
examining the latter tending to examine the militia in the broadest sense (of how they fit 
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into the wider reform of the army) and in limited detail. 
In addition to the academic scholarship several amateur studies have also partially 
examined the Victorian and Edwardian militia, although they vary significantly in terms 
of the depth, breadth DQGTXDOLW\RI WKHLU UHVHDUFK%U\Q2ZHQ¶V VWXG\ RI WKH DX[LOLDU\
units of Wales, published in six volumes, provides a narrative account of each militia 
regiment based upon a sampling of primary material from local archives and the regional 
press.35 AlthouJKXVHIXO LQFRQVROLGDWLQJWKHQDUUDWLYHRIHDFKXQLW¶VVHUYLFHPXFKOLNH
contemporary regimental histories Owen makes little attempt to place each unit into the 
PLOLWLD¶VZLGHUFRQWH[WPXFKRIWKHDFFRXQWJLYHQRYHUWRVLPSO\GHVFULELQJHDFKXQLW¶V
lineage, uniform and badges. Similarly, T. L. Hewitson has briefly charted the history of 
the Northumberland Light Infantry as part of a wider study examining the auxiliary 
forces of Northumberland until the present day, although it suffers from similar 
drawbacks.36 %\ FRQWUDVW *UDKDP :DWVRQ¶V VWXG\ RI WKH 5R\DO 0RQPRXWKVKLUH 5R\DO
Engineers, building upon three previous histories of the regiment, uses a wide variety of 
material from regimental and county archives, personal papers and the local press 
(although many of the references to such are rather vague) to provide a relatively in depth 
investigation which moves beyond a simple narrative account.37  
Despite the fact that the Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers have received a 
recent assessment, there has been D UHODWLYHO\ OLWWOH H[SORUDWLRQRI WKHPLOLWLD¶V DUWLOOHU\
and engineers. The only recent examination of the militia artillery by Norman Litchfield 
SURYLGHV D XVHIXO EXW XOWLPDWHO\ EULHI QDUUDWLYH DFFRXQW RI WKH DUWLOOHU\¶V VWUXFWXUH DQG
organisation alongVLGHDVKRUWVXPPDU\RIHDFKXQLW¶VOLQHDJH+RZHYHULWLVHVVHQWLDOO\
a popular work which fails to explore the artillery in more than a superficial manner.38 
Other works examining the Royal Artillery more widely have barely touched upon the 
militia. For instance, there is only the briefest mention of the militia artillery as part of 
Colonel Maurice--RQHV¶ DFFRXQW RI WKH DUP\¶V FRDVWDO DUWLOOHU\39 Therefore, one of the 
hopes of this thesis will be that it expands upon our understanding of the significant 
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minority of units which were in many respects distinct from the majority of the infantry.  
 Clearly the existing historiography of the Victorian and Edwardian militia is 
fragmented. This is even clearer when it is considered that, by comparison, the militia of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has received a far greater depth of scholarship. 
In his study of the Elizabethan militia, Lindsay Boynton outlined the first steps towards 
the establishment of a national militia.40 In an examination of the militia from the 
restoration until the beginning of the nineteenth century, J.R. Western has explored the 
IRUFHDVD µSROLWLFDO LVVXH¶)URP WKH ODWH VHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\ WKHPLOLWLDZHUHDFUXFLDO
factor in a battle between the monarchy and local authorities who both saw control of the 
armed forces as a means of ensuring and executing their power, although by the 1750s it 
became less of a defining issue among those agitating for militia reform.41 Therefore, 
when it was reconstituted in 1757 the militia was largely organised and controlled upon a 
local basis and led by prominent local landowners, a point which has also been 
subsequently argued by Stephen Conway and E.H. Gould in their own studies.42 Aside 
from its wider organisation, Western also makes a number of conclusions about the 
nature of the post-1757 militia. Firstly, he argues that despite being recruited via the 
ballot, most militiamen were either substitutes or volunteers. Secondly, its more 
IDYRXUDEOHWHUPVRIVHUYLFHPHDQWWKDWLWEURXJKWµXQGHUDUPVPDny men who would not 
KDYH HQWHUHG WKH DUP\¶ SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ UXUDO DUHDV DOWKRXJK RQ WKH ZKROH LWV UHFUXLWV
largely came from a similar class base to that of the regulars.43 Thirdly, he concludes that 
the militia were generally well trained but poorly led, the standard of its officers 
comparatively poor due to their amateur nature, although he argues that if trained by 
competent professional NCOs and junior officers the men could reach a reasonable level 
of technical proficiency.44 Finally, he claims that by the late eighteenth century there was 
an increasing sense that the militia was becoming subsumed by the line as a recruitment 
and training mechanism; indeed he ends his study in 1802 due to his claim that during the 
Napoleonic War the militia were subsumed into an enlarged and complex military system 
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which precludes them from being studied as an independent force.45  
 There have also been two accounts dedicated to the Irish militia of the Napoleonic 
period. In his investigation of the formation, expansion and embodied service of Irish 
militia regiments from 1793 to 1816, Sir Henry McAnally argues that, in Ireland, the 
militia had a variety of functions: principally they acted as the chief means of defence 
after the majority of regular regiments were posted overseas; as in Great Britain they also 
provided the authorities with a means of dealing with civil unrest.46 In recent years Ivan 
Nelson has undertaken a further study, a reaction to what he regards as the wealth of 
primary material left previously untouched. He argues that the Irish militia were of great 
importance to the regulars as on average 53 per cent of Irish regiments from 1793 to 1802 
were composed of militiamen.47 However, the fact that his study ends in 1802 means it 
acts as only a partial reassessment of the IRUFHFRPSDUHGWR0F$QQDOO\¶V1HYHUWKHOHVVD
recently completed thesis examining the Irish amateur military tradition should go a long 
way to furthering our understanding of the Irish militia, and therefore this thesis will 
focus primarily upon English, Welsh and Scottish units.48 
More recent investigations into the Georgian militia have broadened its study 
even further and attempted to offer new perspectives upon the force. Stephen Conway has 
suggested that the social composition of English anG:HOVKUHJLPHQWVµLQFOXGHGPRUHRI
a cross section of society than has been LPDJLQHG¶7KHRIILFHUFRUSVFRQWDLQHGDORQJVLGH
landed gentlemen, many junior officers from rather obscure backgrounds, many of whom 
had only recently acquired land. The same social distinctions were evident in the rank 
and file as a significant minority of substitutes were from more stable and respectable 
working class backgrounds.49 Furthermore, a recent article by Mathew McCormack has 
examined the Militia Act of 1757 in terms of gender issues which, he argues, were at the 
KHDUWRIFRQWHPSRUDU\%ULWLVKVRFLHW\µ7KHDVVRFLDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\VHUYLFHZLWKPDVFXOLQH
valour; its juxtaposition with women in sentimental and dependant roles; the focus upon 
sexual virility; and the concerQV«DERXW QDWLRQDO VWUHQJWK DQG PRUDO GHFD\«ZHUH NH\
LVVXHV LQV%ULWDLQZKLOH GHEDWHVRYHU WKHPLOLWLDZHUH µIXQGDPHQWDOO\JHQGHUHG¶
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indeed, militia service was equated with citizenship and therefore became equated with 
masculinity.50 More specifically, J.E. Cookson has examined the militia as part of what 
KH UHIHUV WR DV WKH µ%ULWLVK DUPHG QDWLRQ¶ GXULQJ WKH 1DSROHRQLF :DU WKH  PDVV
participation of a significant proportion of the population in the auxiliary forces and the 
effect of such participation upon contemporary society.51 
 Compared to the militia the other auxiliary forces have received far more 
awareness from scholars. The Victorian Rifle Volunteer movement has been the subject 
of two studies: one by Hugh Cunningham and a more comprehensive analysis by Ian 
Beckett. Cunningham examined not just the origin of the Rifle Volunteer movement, but 
DOVR H[SORUHG LW LQ D ZLGH UDQJH RI FRQWH[WV LQFOXGLQJ WKH YROXQWHHUV¶ SROLWLFDO
involvement with the state, changing social composition and the degree the movement 
originated and was sustained by patriotism; indeed he uses the volunteers as a means to 
further discuss the nature of Victorian patriotism in Britain. The studies principle 
drawback, albeit self-confessed, is that its sparse sourcing means it is far from a 
comprehensive study.52 %HFNHWW¶VRiflemen Form has taken a far wider sample of official 
and local sources. He maintains the most significant role of the volunteers was in helping 
to condition British society towards military matters during the late nineteenth century. 
Although the force was originally a product of middle class patriotism, it soon became a 
channel for the respectable working class who were unwilling to commit to the regular 
army or militia. Compared to the regular army and the militia, the volunteers were more 
socially representative despite only ever having the direct support of a small percentage 
RIWKHSRSXODWLRQ7KHPRYHPHQWµHPEUDFHGDOOFODVVHVDQGSHUVXDVLRQVDQGWHQGHGWREH
DFRKHVLYHIDFWRULQVRFLHW\¶RQHZKLFKDYRLGHG involvement in politics until the 1880s, 
after which developed a narrow-minded volunteer interest resistant to change.53 
)XUWKHUPRUH LQ DGGLWLRQ WR &RRNVRQ¶V DERYH PHQWLRQHG ZLGHU VWXG\ RI WKH µ%ULWLVK
DUPHGQDWLRQ¶WKHUHKDYHEHHQPRUHVSHFLILFVWXGLHVexamining the volunteers of the late 
eighteenth century and the Napoleonic War by J.R. Western and more recently by Austen 
Gee.54 Furthermore, until recently the yeomanry cavalry had also been lacking a 
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comprehensive analysis, although this has been recently rectified in a thesis by George 
Hay examining the yeomanry from 1794 to 1920 in which he has placed them into the 
wider amateur military tradition.55 
The Territorial Army has also been the subject of dedicated studies. Peter Dennis 
traced it from its creation by Haldane until the Second World War, illustrating the 
problems of creating a national part-time reserve controlled by the war office yet 
organised on a local basis.56 +H FRQFOXGHV WKDW +DOGDQH¶V ILQDO UHIRUP VFKHPH ZDV D
compromise. Originally he conceived the Territorial Force as a second line which could 
be used to support the regular army in the field, not as a force for home defence; yet 
pressure from the volunteers and yeomanry, from which the Territorial Army had been 
created, forced him to drop this obligation. However, this was a tactical move in order to 
gain their support for the bill as he believed an adequate number would sign the overseas 
Imperial Service Obligation allowing them to be sent overseas.57 By contrast, John Gooch 
argued that thH7HUULWRULDO$UP\ZHUHGHVLJQHGWRIXQFWLRQµDVDSRROIRUWKHSURYLVLRQRI
UHVHUYHV¶ IRU WKH H[SHGLWLRQDU\ IRUFH 7KH UROHV RI ERWK ZHUH HQWZLQHG ZLWK D JURZLQJ
distrust of Germany in British diplomatic circles, effectively complementing each other 
in the run up to 1914.58 There have also been a number of more recent studies of the 
Territorial Army, both academic and popular, as a result of the centenary of its 
establishment in 2008.59 
 In addition to studies examining the British and Irish amateur military tradition, 
there has also been scholarship examining the auxiliary forces and citizen soldiers raised 
throughout the British Empire.60 Arguably a large part of this has been with regards to the 
Canadian Militia, a force which, much like its American counterpart, was founded upon 
the same principals of citizen soldiery as underpinning the British militia tradition. In 
addition to narrative accounts charting the history of the force published prior to the 
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Second World War,61 more recent post-war scholarship has examined the important role 
of the Canadian Militia within the wider tradition of citizen soldiery which has formed a 
NH\ SDUW RI D PXFK YHQHUDWHG µPLOLWLD WUDGLWLRQ¶ DUJXDEO\ GDWLQJ IURP WKH SHUFHLYHG
success of the force during the American War of Independence and the War of 1812.62 
There have also been works examining auxiliary forces raised in Australia and New 
Zeeland which acknowledge the wider nature of an amateur military tradition within 
settler communities across the Empire.63  
 
* * * 
  
An assessment of the existing historiography shows that the Victorian and Edwardian 
militia lacks a comprehensive analysis which focuses upon the militia as a military and 
social institution in its own right. This study aims to provide such an analysis. In 
conjunction with other studies, it will also help to provide a richer understanding of the 
amateur military tradition. In terms of its methodology it draws upon recent studies, such 
as those by Beckett and Spiers, which have examined the auxiliary forces and regular 
army in a multifaceted manner, utilising a wide range of official correspondence and 
local archival records. Primarily this study aims to test some of the existing conclusions 
identified above. Most notably it seeks to dispel the assertion that its increasing 
association with the regular army, particularly from the early 1870s onwards, means there 
is little value in a dedicated assessment of the militia as an institution in its own right and 
that instead it should, for all intents and purposes, be regarded as part of the regular 
army.64 7KLVYLHZFDQEHFKDOOHQJHGE\H[DPLQLQJWKHIRUFHIURPµWKHERWWRPXS¶6XFK
an approach recognises that, right across the period, the militia was far from one 
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homogeneous force; instead, its localised basis meant there remained a significant degree 
of variation between units. That is not to say broader conclusions cannot be made: it is 
without doubt that, as a whole, the force became increasingly integral to providing both 
officers and men for the regular army. However, in order to provide a richer 
understanding it is vital one appreciate the nuances present in a force which even by 1908 
continued to exercise a degree of organisational and social distinctiveness, albeit even if 
diminished, from the regular army.   
 In order to do this the aim is to split this study into six chapters. Chapter one will 
explore the organisational history of the militia from the lead up to its reconstitution in 
1852 until the beginning of the South African War. Not only will it provide the context in 
which the militia was reconstituted in 1852 (outlining the governmental debates over the 
direction of its reform, illustrating exactly what its role was to be after decades of 
suspended animation and how this changed in relation to the embodiments of the 1850s), 
it will also examine the legislation which regulated the force, illustrate how it was 
organised and assess the extent to which the Cardwell reforms transformed the force into 
an adjunct to the regular army. It will be argued that although the Cardwell reforms have 
ULJKWO\EHHQDSSUHFLDWHGDVDWUDQVLWLRQDOPRPHQWLQWKHPLOLWLD¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQWKLVKDVLQ
fact been overstated as his predecessors had also attempted to bring the force under more 
central control with the aim to improve the efficiency of the force. On the whole this was 
a success ± in the period after the reforms the militia was on the whole stronger and more 
professionally trained than before ± although not all units were able to benefit as much as 
others, while many units continually lacked suitable barracks and facilities necessary to 
DOORZ D KLJKHU VWDQGDUG RI WUDLQLQJ )LQDOO\ WKLV FKDSWHU ZLOO H[DPLQH WKH PLOLWLD¶V
artillery, engineers and submarine miners, illuminating their organisational 
distinctiveness and the more specialised nature of their training compared to the vast bulk 
of the infantry.   
 &KDSWHU WZR ZLOO VWXG\ WKH PLOLWLD¶V RIILFHU FRUSV )LUVWO\ LW ZLOO DVFHUWDLQ WKH
degree to which the militia lacked effective leadership, both in terms of the shortage of 
officers and the extent to which they were efficient. By using a sample of officers from 
several regiments it will establish the social distinctions between the officers of different 
units. Aside from a significant minority of former regular officers, initially many units 
were officered by members of the landed gentry and often commanded by a leading 
landowner from within the county. From the late 1870s onwards their stranglehold upon 





WKHIRUFHEHJDQWRGLPLQLVKGXHLQQRVPDOOSDUW WR WKHRQVHWRIWKHµ*UHDW$JULFultural 
'HSUHVVLRQ¶$VODQGUHQWVIHOOPDQ\LQGHSHQGHQWJHQWOHPHQZHUHIRUFHGLQWREXVLQHVVRU
to undertake a profession; thus they had little time to dedicate to a militia commission. 
This meant that junior commissions were increasingly held by those seeking to use the 
militia as a means to gain a regular commission, an avenue which was made permanent 
DVSDUWRI&DUGZHOO¶VUHIRUPSDFNDJHZLWKWKHUHVXOWEHLQJWKDWE\WKHHQGRIWKHFHQWXU\
the militia was increasingly lacking in officers. However, it is also important to 
acknowledge that not all units fit this pattern; from the beginning units based in or near 
large cities and industrial areas usually contained a higher proportion of former regular 
officers, professionals and businessmen. In addition to this the chapter will examine the 
nature of promotion, which was usually by seniority, and then test the extent to which the 
PLOLWLDEHFDPHDµEDFNGRRU¶WRDUHJXODUFRPPLVVLRQ$VZLOOEHVHHQWKHPLOLWLDEHFDPH
a vital source of officers for the regular army to the extent that by the end of the South 
African War the militia were responsible for providing one-third of all officers for the 
regular army, while a small proportion also sought service in colonial forces such as 
those in Africa.  
 Chapter three will take a similar methodological approach to the preceding 
chapter by examining the nature of recruitment, the conditions of service and the social 
composition of the other ranks. It will assess the inherent difficulties of the decision to 
abandon recruitment by ballot in favour of voluntary enlistment, the latter meaning the 
militia was largely reliant on financial inducements to recruit, something which was 
simply insufficient to enable many units to reach their establishment ± thus at no point 
after its reconstitution did the enrolled strength of the militia as a whole meet its 
establishment. It will also show that these problems were particularly damaging during 
the 1850s: some units were prohibited by the activities of nonconformist and peace 
advocateVKRVWLOHWRPLOLWLDVHUYLFHDOWKRXJKLWZDVWKHUHJXODUDUP\¶VLQVDWLDEOHGHPDQG
for manpower during the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny (a period in which the enrolled 
strength of the force reached its lowest ebb) which caused the greatest difficulties in 
maintaining strength. By the 1860s this had largely recovered and in the subsequent 
decades the proportion wanting to complete remained relatively stable, in fact it was only 
in the wake of the South African War that the total enrolled strength fell to a level 
comparable with the 1850s. Combating wastage (caused by desertion, the ability to 
SXUFKDVH RQH¶V GLVFKDUJH DQG WKH UHRSHQLQJ RI WUDQVIHUV WR WKH OLQH ZDV D FRQVWDQW





VWUXJJOHRQHPDGHZRUVH LQPDQ\XQLWVE\&DUGZHOO¶VDOWHUDWLRQ WR WKHSD\PHQWRI WKe 
enrolment bounty and the loss in many units (but not all) of the ability to recruit and train 
their own men after they were relocated to their joint brigade depots (although some 
managed to maintain their independence by retaining their own headquarters and staff). 
Furthermore, the success of recruitment was linked to the changing social background of 
those entering the force. It will be shown that there was a general decline in the 
proportion of agricultural workers and skilled artisans (seen by many officers as the most 
suitable classes from which to recruit) so that by the end of the century many units were 
increasingly reliant upon young unskilled labourers, just the sort who made up the bulk of 
recruits entering the regular army. Unsurprisingly it became easier for units recruiting in 
urban and industrial areas to maintain their strength meaning that, as a whole, the militia 
became increasingly an urban force with a broad reduction in the strength of regiments in 
rural areas by the late 1890s. However, one thing the existing historiography has largely 
failed to appreciate is that in many units the reliance upon urban workers was not a 
wholly new trend; many in fact recruited skilled or semi-skilled industrial workers, 
artisans and tradesmen right across the period, with little or no reliance upon agricultural 
DUHDV 7KHUH ZDV DOVR D VLJQLILFDQW YDULDWLRQ LQ WKH VRFLDO FRPSRVLWLRQ RI WKH PLOLWLD¶V
artillery, engineers and submarine miners which, largely, relied upon more skilled 
workers.  
 Chapter four will explore discipline within the militia and the impact it had upon 
the relationship of the force with society. Firstly, it will explore how discipline was 
maintained in what remained, unless embodied, a part-time force, arguing that most 
disciplinary matters were dealt with informally, either through summary trial before local 
magistrates or a system of minor punishments, as opposed to courts-martial. It will also 
explore the nature of and reasons behind the high rates of desertion identified in the 
previous chapter and how the rates of such varied on a regimental basis. Crucially, it will 
explore the particularly controversial issue of billeting which in many areas was the chief 
cause of conflict between the militia and the wider population on account of poor 
discipline in many units. Finally, the chapter will also examine discipline within the 
context of the South African War. Indiscipline among militiamen remained a major 
concern, although it was dealt with in much the same manner as the regular army as most 
military crimes (most common of which were those relating to drunkenness) were dealt 
with by courts-martial. 





  Chapter five will chart the embodied service of the militia during the Crimean 
War and the Indian Mutiny, and later during the South African War. It will demonstrate 
WKDWWKHPLOLWLD¶VVHUYLFHERWKDEURDGDQGDWKRPHGXULQJWKH6RXWK$IULFDQ:DUZDVIDU
from an aberration; in fact it was the extreme culmination of a tradition of limited foreign 
service and a more established domestic role dating back to the Napoleonic War. The 
chapter will therefore initially chart the first two embodiments in which the militia was 
principally tasked with relieving regulars units from domestic garrison duties, although it 
also saw the utilisation of ten infantry battalions for service in the Mediterranean. 
However, the bulk of the chapter will explore the role and experience of the militia 
during the South African War, both abroad and domestically. It will show that the 
existing historiography is right to characterise their service as largely supportive in 
nature, dominated as it was by garrison duties upon the lines of communication. 
However, it will demonstrate that the militia played a more active role than hitherto 
acknowledged due to the increasingly open nature of a guerrilla conflict. It will also 
examine the day-to-day experiences of life on campaign for many who had never seen 
any form of previous military service. Yet the focus will not just be upon those serving in 
South Africa itself as most militiamen served at home or, once again, in the 
Mediterranean.  
 The final chapter will place the militia within the context of the drive for the 
reform of the army in the wake of the South African War and provide an overarching 
account of the process which led to the destruction of the force and its replacement by the 
Special Reserve in 1908. Not only will it explore in further detail the nature of the reform 
schemes proposed by Brodrick, Arnold-Forster and Haldane, but it will also demonstrate 
how important the militia was as an issue within the wider debate over the defensive 
arrangements of the UK. It will also chart the attempts to resist reform from within what 
remained an influential Parliamentary militia lobby, one which successfully halted the 
proposed reforms of Arnold-Forster, yet was effectively side-tracked by Haldane. Finally, 
WKH FKDSWHU ZLOO H[SORUH WKH WUDQVLWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH PLOLWLD¶V DEROLWLRQ DV D UHVXOW RI WKH
Territorial and Reserve Forces Act and the creation of the Special Reserve, a force which 
finally formalised the role of supplying manpower to the regular army.  
 In order to achieve the above this study will make use of a wide range of primary 
and secondary material. One thing that unites many of the existing studies is their 
examination of thH PLOLWLD IURP D µWRS GRZQ¶ SHUVSHFWLYH RQH ZKLFK UHOLHV KHDYLO\ RQ





official archival material and that centralised at The National Archives (TNA). This is 
problematic as such an approach discounts the wealth of local archival material to be 
found in county archives and regimental collections throughout the UK, much of which 
helps to build a picture of a more nuanced force than hitherto appreciated. An over 
reliance upon centralised material at TNA has its own potential setbacks: a 
disproportionate amount of the material was collected by the War Office in 1908 and thus 
comes from units which were disbanded at time, thus those deemed the least efficient. 
That is not to say such material is not useful: simply it is important one does not use it to 
the exclusion of sources distributed elsewhere which will help to provide a more 
representative assessment of the militia across Great Britain as a whole. Therefore, the 
primary methodological aim of this study will be to utilise archival material held both in 
central archives in London and Edinburgh, while at the same time exploring a wide 
sample of material held in local collections across the country. It is in such collections 
that many of the papers pertaining to the lieutenancy are held, crucial due to their value in 
building an understanding of, for instance, the process and patronage networks through 
which potential officers gained their commissions. Similarly, such papers also illuminate 
KRZHDFKXQLWZDVRUJDQLVHGWKHQDWXUHRIWKHRIILFHU¶VPHVVDQGWKHQDWXre of discipline 
within a unit. Many local and regimental collections also house personal correspondence 
relating to a wide variety of topics including, for instance, letters to and from the 
regimental adjutant and personal accounts of embodied service. Additionally, many of 
the enlistment records, vital to building up a picture of the social composition of each 
XQLWDUHKRXVHGLQORFDODUFKLYHVDVDUHUHFRUGVGHWDLOLQJRIILFHU¶VVHUYLFH 
 The acknowledgement of the importance of local records does not mean that this 
study will ignore more centralised material and official sources. A wide variety of 
material relating to the militia is located in the papers of the Home Office and War Office 
housed at TNA. These include similar regimental accounts to those housed in local 
archives, but importantly also include cabinet records, militia attestation papers (from the 
1870s onwards), papers relating to the South African War and the correspondence of key 
individuals, most notably for this study, those of Cardwell and Brodrick. In addition, 
individual correspondence can be found within the British Library ± it is also a useful 
source of contemporary regimental histories. Parliamentary command papers are also 
crucial if one is to build a wider picture of where individual regiments fit into the militia 
as a whole. Similarly important are the official records of Parliamentary debates which 





provide details of the importance of the militia in a political context.  
 This study will also make use of contemporary published material. Although 
contemporary regimental histories vary in depth and quality, they nonetheless provide an 
LQWHUHVWLQJDFFRXQWRIHDFKUHJLPHQW¶VVHUYLFH+RZHYHURQHGRHVQHHGWRFDXWLRQDJDLQVW
over use of such histories; it stands to reason that the least effective units would not be 
those that could afford to publish a regimental account. Furthermore, national and local 
newspapers provide an additional source of information. Many officers both from within 
and outside the militia used The Times and contemporary journals such as that of the 
Royal United Services Institute as a forum in which to air their views. Local papers are 
particularly useful in filling in the narrative gaps within the documentary evidence as 
many reported avidly upon their local militia units. They also act as a useful source of 
personal accounts of militiamen and officers serving whilst embodied, mostly during the 
South African War, and provide a record of the way disciplinary offences were dealt with 
through local magistrates. 
 By examining such a wide variety of primary source material, in addition to the 
existing secondary accounts examined above, this study will provide the reconstituted 
Victorian and Edwardian militia with the dedicated study it warrants. It will demonstrate 
that some of the broad conclusions about the British militia identified in the 
historiography are correct. The force without doubt became increasingly centralised 
under the control of the War Office, the reforms of Cardwell and Childers placing it into 
more a subservient, yet often uneasy, relationship with the regular army, particularly 
when it came to providing both officers and men for service in the line. Furthermore, 
there was a falling reliance, firstly, upon independent landed county gentlemen as officers 
and, secondly, upon agricultural workers as members of the rank and file, meaning other 
sources of manpower increasingly filled the void. By the eve of the South African War, 
militia officers were more likely to be those using the force as a means of obtaining a 
regular commission, while the rank and file became increasingly reliant upon unskilled 
urban labourers. However, any idea that its increasing centralisation under War Office 
control and the changes in its social composition meant the militia steadily declined 
across the period is unfounded; in fact, its strength peaked during the 1890s. It was not 
until after the South African War that many of the issued already identified began to 
severely damage the efficacy of the force, amplified by the unprecedented service of 
many units serving abroad during the war itself. Most importantly, it must be 





remembered that right across the period the militia remained a force organised upon a 
local basis. Therefore, it is erroneous to think of it simply as a homogeneous force. 
Initially comprised entirely of infantry prior to 1852, several units post reconstitution 
were reorganised so as to provide the militia with a range of capabilities: this primarily 
involved the creation of garrison artillery, and later, engineers and submarine miners. 
Furthermore, not all units exhibited the same patterns of change identified above. Several 
managed to maintain a degree of local character and independence, principally those 
which were based apart from (after 1881) their territorial regimental depots. Similarly, 
several units (principally those based in urban areas) never relied upon the landed gentry 
as a source of officers, instead relying upon retired regular officers, professionals or those 
in business. Neither did they rely upon agricultural workers for the rank and file, instead 






























1. The Reconstitution and Organisation of the Militia 
 
Existing scholarship has failed to provide a comprehensive overview of the organisation 
of the militia across the Victorian and Edwardian period. Most works argue that the 
militia became increasingly integrated into the regular army, particularly as a result of the 
reforms of Edward Cardwell and his successors, in turn leading to a slow decline during 
which it was stripped of its most effective officers and men and transformed into what 
amounted to a recruitment mechanism for the line.1 There has also been some debate over 
how the militia was able to initially resist calls for greater integration and how deeply 
held such views were. Historians such as Olive Anderson, Duncan Anderson and Ian 
Beckett have argued that greater integration was effectively resisted during the late 1850s 
and HDUO\ V RQO\ RFFXUULQJ ODWHU DV WKH PLOLWLD¶V VXSSRUWHUV ZLWKLQ 3DUOLDPHQW
declined in number. Conversely, both Hew Strachan and Edward Spiers have stressed a 
GHJUHH RI FRQWLQXLW\ EHWZHHQ WKLV SHULRG DQG WKDW RI &DUGZHOO¶V ODWHU UHIRUPV ZKLFK
formally bound the militia and line together for the first time.2  
The reality of the reconstitution and organisation of the reformed militia was more 
nuanced. While it is true that, by the end of the century, the militia was far less 
independent than in 1852, by examining the force upon a regimental basis one can see 
that this process was more piecemeal than hitherto recognised. In 1852 the militia was 
largely reconstituted upon legislation laid down in 1802. Prior to this, a period of 
prolonged military retrenchment following the Napoleonic Wars quickly gave way to 
renewed support for militia reform due to resurgent fears of invasion.3 Four separate 
ministries in turn grappled with the issue, two opposing views emerging as to how best to 
reconstitute it. PreviousO\ GXULQJ WKH 1DSROHRQLF :DUV WKH µUHJXODU¶ PLOLWLD UHPDLQHG
liable for national defence and was organised to serve anywhere within the UK whilst 
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from 1808 (until 1816) a µORFDO¶ PLOLWLD ZDV DOVR HVWDEOLVKHG RUJDQLVHG SULQFLSDOO\ IRU
service within each county. These competing ideas continued to influence debate over 
what path reform would follow during the 1840s, leading to the decision, in 1852, that the 
µUHJXODU¶ PLOLWia was to form the basis for that reconstituted in 1852.4 This was soon 
challenged by the insatiable needs of the regular army for manpower during the Crimean 
War and Indian Mutiny which included the direct transfer of both officers and men to the 
regular army. Although this was not unprecedented ± they had performed a similar role at 
times during the Napoleonic Wars ± this prompted some calls for greater integration 
between the two in peacetime, although these largely were negated by the disembodiment 
of the last units from 1860 to 1861 and the desire of the Secretary of State for War, 
6LGQH\+HUEHUW¶VGHVLUHWRSURKLELWGUDIWLQJIURPWKHPLOLWLDLQRUGHUWRVHFXUHDUHYLYDO
in its strength. Despite measures to centralise control of the force under the War Office, it 
ZDV &DUGZHOO¶V UHIRUPV SULQFLSDOO\ ORFDOLVDWLRQ DQG WKH UHLQYHVWPHQW RI FRQWURO RI WKH
militia with the War Office, which did more to formally link it to the line. Yet Cardwell 
was not just motivated by the needs of the regular army, but also a desire to improve the 
efficiency of the militia, although some units benefitted more than others. There remained 
opposition, albeit largely unsuccessful, from units whose traditions and local ties were 
threatened by wider organisational changes. Yet one cannot claim that the successful 
implementation of his reforms was only achieved due to the weakness of the 
Parliamentary militia lobby; in fact, their representation remained relatively strong, thus 
hinting that many militia officers within Parliament acquiesced or supported greater 
LQWHJUDWLRQSRVVLEO\EHOLHYLQJLWWREHRQWKHZKROHEHQHILFLDOIRUWKHIRUFH¶VHIILFLHQF\
,Q DGGLWLRQ KLV DQG KLV VXFFHVVRU¶V UHIRUPV ZHUH IDU IURP XQLIRUPO\ LPSOHPHQWHG LQ
practice, there remaining some units which continued to operate largely autonomously.  
The result of the numerous reforms demonstrates that closer association with the 
line was not automatically a bad thing for the militia. By the end of the century, it was, on 
the whole, better trained and equipped, and had at its disposal better facilities than 
compared to the 1850s and 1860s, a period in which training was comparatively limited. 
Indeed, from the 1870s onwards, in addition to the prior expansion of the number of 
artillery corps, dedicated units ± two engineer regiments, submarine miners and Royal 
Army Medical Corps (established in 1898) ± were established to provide at least some 
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militiamen with specialist training, enabling the militia to provide a more effective 
secondary line for the regular army as a whole during wartime. That is not to say there 
were not problems: brigading units for field training was undoubtedly more useful than 
square-bashing, but it also made service with some recruits very unpopular. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that qualitatively many units were in arguably better shape in the decade 
preceding the South African War than during the 1850s and 1860s. 
 
* * * 
 
The militia of 1852 to 1908 formed part of a far longer amateur military tradition. Many 
militia units liked to claim an unbroken lineage going back to the Anglo-Saxon period, 
but the truth was that the militia, revitalised by the Tudors and early Stuarts, went into 
sharp decline in the 1680s and was effectively a moribund force by the early eighteenth 
century. Considering the re-establishment of the militia in the 1850s, legislators used the 
µQHZ¶PLOLWLDHVWDEOLVKHG LQ*HR ,,FGXULQJ WKH6HYHQ<HDUV:DUDVD
practical template. The 1757 legislation established militia regiments across England and 
Wales, organised and recruited upon a county basis and the ultimate responsibility of the 
lords lieutenant in each county. Initially there was great difficulty in establishing 
regiments in several counties due to opposition from lords lieutenant and those opposed 
to the force more generally; therefore, in June 1758, further legislation was required to 
coerce (through fines) those still resistant to it. Similarly, the militia was not permanently 
established until April 1769 (9 Geo. III, c. 42) as the original act only provided for it 
upon a temporary basis, this having been extended for seven years in March 1762. In 
1802 the legislation governing the militia was consolidated by a new Militia Act (42 Geo. 
III, c. 90) which later would form much of the foundation for that passed in 1852. Yet 
this legislation only applied to the militia in England and Wales. Although there were 
attempts to extend the scheme to Scotland in 1760, its opponents were able to prevent it 
being established there until 1797 (principally over fears arms would pass into Jacobite 
hands).5 
$UJXDEO\WKHPRVWQRWDEOHIHDWXUHRIWKHµQHZ¶PLOLWLDZDVWKHIDFWWKDWUHFUXLWLQJ
was carried out by ballot. Each county was required to draw up a census of all able 
bodied men aged between 18 and 50 years (reduced to 45 from 1762 onwards) from 
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which a quota would be apportioned so that each county, theoretically, would provide the 
same proportion of manpower. Those selected to serve were legally bound to do so, 
although each man was permitted to either purchase his release through payment of a £10 
fine (although until 1782 anyone paying a fine would automatically be appointed for 
service the following year), or through the provision of a willing substitute to take his 
place. Therefore, the ballot represented, as Ian BecNHWW DUJXHV D µWD[ XSRQ PDQSRZHU¶
rather than any real form of conscription. However, this did not stop the implementation 
of the ballot from being one of the most divisive politically sensitive issues of the period 
due to misguided fears that it did, in fact, represent conscription, with the possibility that 
there could be some liability for foreign service (not helped by a lack of explanation from 
the government). Hostility was so great that it led to serious rioting in several counties at 
various points across the period. It was the legacy of such division that ensured the ballot 
would remain a controversial aspect of the debate over militia reform prior to 1852, 
remaining upon the statute book across the Victorian and Edwardian period, although it 
was suspended on an annual basis before finally being abolished in 1921 (11 and 12 Geo. 
V, c. 37).6  
In the decades following the Napoleonic Wars, the government was preoccupied 
by the need to make substantial savings from the estimates. Savings were secured from 
both the regular army and Royal Navy, the former finding its strength reduced from a 
wartime establishment of 247,000 men to just 100,000 by 1823. Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that the militia also faced significant cuts: in 1815 direct enlistment was 
restricted, and although the following July a new ballot was ordered, the decision was 
taken to suspend the annual training until 1820.7  Although the militia subsequently 
assembled for training in 1821, 1825 and 1830, with attempts to implement a new ballot 
in October 1828, efforts to revive the force on a more permanent footing faltered. In 
April 1829 the Duke of Wellington implemented legislation (10 Geo. 4, c. 10) which 
suspended the ballot on a rolling yearly basis and reduced the permanent staff by 37%, its 
VWUHQJWK IDOOLQJ IURP  PHQ WR MXVW  WKURXJK WKH UHGXFWLRQ RI µLQHIIHFWLYH
FRUSRUDOV¶ +RZHYHU WKLV GHFLVLRQ ZDV QRW DLPHG DW SXVKLQJ WKH IRUFH IXUWKHU WRZDUGV
abolition. Although never ardent militia advocates, both Wellington and Sir Henry 
                                                 
6
 Western, English Militia, pp. 128-9, 212-5, 245-54, 290-302; Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW-Time Soldiers, pp. 
62-7.  
7
 H. F. A. Strachan, :HOOLQJWRQ¶V/HJDF\7KH5HIRUPRIWKH%ULWLVK$UP\Ü30-1854, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 181; Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV, pp. 127-8. 





Hardinge, Secretary at War, recognised that retaining the militia was the least 
objectionable solution to the organisation of the auxiliary forces; both were aware of their 
wider utility in supporting the regulars during the Napoleonic Wars. Duncan Anderson 
has also argued that the reduction of the permanent staff was partly a reaction to their use 
by those militia colonels opposed to Catholic Emancipation, many of whom had become 
associated with either the Brunswick Clubs or Orange Lodges which in some parts of 
,UHODQG UHVHPEOHG VWDWH VSRQVRUHG DQG VWDWH DUPHG µ3URWHVWDQW JDQJV¶ 'HVSLWH WKHVH
attacks, the militia managed to maintain its existence due to a strong parliamentary lobby, 
aided by the fact that a House of Commons select committee, instead of the Secretary at 
:DUZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUGUDZLQJXSWKHHVWLPDWHVPHDQLQJWKHIRUFH¶VVXSSRUWHUVFRXOG
ensure it avoided the worst of the cuts.8 Consequently between 1816 and 1832 the 
amount voted to the estimates remained substantial, ranging between £250,000 in 1816 to 
as much as £429,845 in 1820, and £422,836 in 1831.9 
7KH PLOLWLD¶V H[LVWHQFH EHFDPH OHVV FHUWDLQ DIWHU WKH IDLOHG annual training of 
 WKH ODVW DWWHPSWHG EHIRUH  ,Q 'HFHPEHU  :HOOLQJWRQ¶V UHODWLYHO\
sympathetic government was toppled by a Whig party determined to make further 
savings from the estimates. Worryingly for the militia, the change of government saw the 
number of militia officers serving as MPs drop from 64 to just 23. It was not long before 
Edward Ellice, the new Secretary at War, proposed a further reduction of the permanent 
staff the following year. Yet these plans were thwarted due to the opposition of the King 
and those militia colonels seated within the Lords. Therefore, the following May, Ellice 
was forced to compromise: he presented his plans to the House of Commons committee 
tasked with examining the estimates which, although no longer dominated by militia 
VXSSRUWHUVRQO\DJUHHGIRUWKHLQVSHFWLRQRIHDFKUHJLPHQW¶VSHUPDQHQWVWDIIE\UHJXODU
officers in order to determine their efficiency. Far from providing Ellice with the 
ammunition necessary to significantly reduce the staff across the board, their report found 
that the efficiency of the permanent staff varied considerably between regiments. For 
instance, in Hampshire, Lancashire, Norfolk and Tower Hamlets the inspecting officer 
found the majority of the staff to be efficient in their duties and knowledge of drill, with 
only a few exceptions generally deemed unfit. By contrast, Cornwall was one of only a 
few counties in which the permanent staff was almost universally deemed to be 
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unsuitable for active service due to their age and lack of military experience.10  
7KH IDOO RI WKH :KLJ JRYHUQPHQW LQ 1RYHPEHU  PHDQW (OOLFH¶V SURSRVDOV
were indefinitely postponed. It was not until their return to power in April 1835, with a 
new Secretary at War, Viscount Howick, that efforts were renewed to find savings. 
Arguing that from 1816 to 1834 the total cost of the militia to the public purse amounted 
to £6,084,406, Howick assuaged opposition from MPs towards further reductions by 
asserting that his proposals were aimed at simply removing ineffective sergeants from the 
permanent staff, much the same way Hardinge had previously removed what were 
deemed to be the least efficient corporals. However, once again the militia lobby within 
the House of Lords (including the Duke of Wellington and the Duke of Richmond) rallied 
and, once again supported by the King, refused to back the bill unless the government 
wedded itself to the promise of future legislation putting the militia on a more efficient 
footing. As a result, the amended bill limited the reduction of the staff to at least one-third 
of the established number of sergeants, although all drum-majors and drummers were to 
be reduced, the filling up of any new vacancies prohibited, and all arms and stores were 
to be handed back to the Ordnance Department. The bill also authorised the continued 
suspension of the ballot, although only until the end of the next Parliament (as opposed to 
indefinitely). The result was that although the legislation (5 and 6 Will. IV, c. 37) 
prevented the outright destruction of the force, it effectively placed the militia into a state 
of suspended animation, lacking equipment and manpower, and shorn of the ability to 
recruit.11 
The issue of further militia reform fell off the political agenda for the next eight 
years. However, this changed once both Wellington and Lord Palmerston highlighted 
concerns over growing French naval ambitions in 1845 and 1846. On 30 July 1845 
Palmerston pressed the Prime Minister, Robert Peel, to consider the reintroduction of the 
militia ballot on account of his fear that technological advancement rendered the Channel 
µQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQD ULYHUSDVVDEOHE\DVWHDPEULGJH¶$Othough Peel initially refused, 
by December the government began to instruct militia colonels and the lords lieutenant 
that the permanent staff should be brought up to the established strength laid down by the 
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1835 legislation and that all officer vacancies should be filled as soon as possible.12 This 
decision caused a surge of activity by peace activists who voiced their opposition through 
the press, at local meetings across the country and through directly petitioning Parliament 
± by contrast it prompted militia officers across the country, through the local press, to 
proclaim the need to reform the militia. It also prompted the re-HVWDEOLVKPHQWRIµPLOLWLD
FOXEV¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHRILQVXULQJPHPEHUVDJDLQVWSRWHQWLDOVHOHFWLRQLQWKHEDOORW13 By 
the following January the government was forced to reassure MPs that there were no 
immediate plans to call out the militia, and although Peel remained on the whole sceptical 
he announced the intention to press ahead with legislation aimed at reforming the force. 
Therefore, Peel tasked Sidney Herbert and Sir James Graham, Secretary at War and 
Home Secretary respectively, to devise a reform package, resulting in proposals for a 
force of 100,000 men drawn from those aged 18 to 40, enlisted for seven years and 
trained for XS WR WKUHH PRQWKV HDFK \HDU 1HYHUWKHOHVV WKH IDOO RI 3HHO¶V PLQLVWU\ WKDW
June meant the plans were shelved.14  
3HHO¶VVXFFHVVRU/RUG-RKQ5XVVHOOZDVLQLWLDOO\LQIOXHQFHGE\ERWK:HOOLQJWRQ
DQG 3DOPHUVWRQ WR JR IRUZDUG ZLWK +HUEHUW DQG *UDKDP¶V SUHYLRus scheme. However, 
5XVVHOO ZDV DOVR SUHVHQWHG ZLWK DQ DOWHUQDWLYH E\ +HUEHUW¶V VXFFHVVRU )R[ 0DXOH LQ
December 1847 ± he was himself influenced by the noted army reformer Alexander 
Tulloch. This called for a smaller regular militia of 50,000 unmarried men under the age 
of 30, recruited by ballot, and trained for up to 60 says at a time. The key difference, 
however, was that in addition he proposed a revival of the local militia (suspended in 
1816 and abolished outright in 1836) which would number 150,000 men raised by ballot, 
would be trained for 28 days in the first year, 14 in subsequent years, but each regiment 
would only be liable to serve within their own county. He faced clear opposition from 
Palmerston who instead desired the militia to resemble, wKDW KH WHUPHG DQ µDUP\ RI
UHVHUYH¶ OLDEOH WR VHUYH DQ\ZKHUH ZLWKLQ WKH 8. DQG ODUJH HQRXJK to concentrate and 
outnumber a plausible invasion force of 30,000 French troops. The following January 
Russell proposed a compromise, a 200,000 strong force of regular and local militia, 
raised annually by a ballot of 40,000 men aged between 18 and 25, serving three years in 
the regular militia with a further two in the local militia, and trained for 28 days in the 
                                                 
12
 HC Deb., 30 July 1845, vol. 82, cc. 1223-34; The Times, 13 and 25 December, 1845. 
13
 For examples of opposition to a revived militia, see Newcastle Courant, 30 January 1846, and Northern 
Star and Leeds General Advertiser, 17 January 1846; HC Deb., 29 January 1846, vol. 83, cc. 367-70. 
14
 Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV, pp. 145-6. 





first two years, 21 days in the third and 14 days in the fourth and fifth. The draft bill was 
introduced to the Commons by February, although the news of revolution in Paris meant 
again the passage of the bill was suspended.15  
Debate over militia reform remained dormant for the next four years until fears 
over the prospect of invasion were renewed upon the ascension of Napoleon III in 
December 1851. Initially Russell weighed up both previous schemes, although following 
3DOPHUVWRQ¶VGLVPLVVDOIURPJRYHUQPHQW5XVVHOOSUHVVHGDKHDGZLWKKLVRZQSODQVIRUD
revived local militia. This would comprise of 150,000 men, 72,000 raised in the first year 
through both voluntary enlistment and the balloting of those aged 20 to 23, with the total 
increasing to 100,000 and 150,000 in the second and third years respectively through 
balloting those aged 20 to 21. They were liable to serve for five years and were to be 
trained for 28 days in the first year and 14 thereafter. Crucially, and in opposition to 
3DOPHUVWRQ¶VSODQVHDFKUHJLPHQWZDVRQO\OLDEOHWRVHUYHRXWVLGHLWVFounty in case of 
imminent invasion. Palmerston, however, was to have his revenge in what he termed his 
µWLW-for-WDW¶ ZLWK 5XVVHOO 7KH IROORZLQJ )HEUXDU\ KH VXFFHVVIXOO\ EURXJKW IRUZDUG DQ
DPHQGPHQW ZKLFK VWUXFN WKH WHUP µORFDO¶ IURP WKH ELOO DQG UHJXODWHG the militia as a 
µQDWLRQDOIRUFH¶EDVHGXSRQWKHOHJLVODWLRQDQGXQGHUDJUHDWHUGHJUHHRIFHQWUDOLVHG
control. Although the government opposed the amendment, it passed with Conservative 
support by a majority of just 13 votes, after which Russell was forced to resign.16 
 Unlike their predecessors, the succeeding Conservative administration, headed by 
the Earl of Derby, was finally able to solve the issue of militia reform including the 
divisive issue of the ballot. Spencer Walpole, the new Home Secretary, managed this by, 
in essence, changing very little of the way in which the force was organised; much like 
3DOPHUVWRQ¶VSUHYLRXVDPHQGPHQWKHDLPHGWRUHWXUQWRWKHOHJLVODWLRQRIWRIRUP
the basis of a reconstituted force. However, the controversy over the ballot which had 
plagued the previous three schemes pushed Walpole to take the unprecedented step of 
adopting a system of voluntary enlistment. This was achieved by claiming the 1802 
legislation already enabled parishes to raise volunteers through means of a bounty, 
something which had been permitted during the Napoleonic Wars in order to allow 
regiments to replace those who had transferred to the regular army. Furthermore, 
voluntary enlistment was, on the whole, cheaper and more time efficient to implement. 
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Sections 56 and 59 of the Militia Act, 1802, required the ballot machinery to be brought 
into operation for any vacancy no matter how small, at great cost and time to the county 
involved. In fact, if even one vacancy remained after three months the county was liable 
to a fine of £10 annually until it was filled. Although Walpole had, in effect, 
PDQXIDFWXUHGZKDW,DQ%HFNHWWWHUPHGDµFRQYHQLHQWILFWLRQ¶LWQHYHUWKHOHVVPDGHWKLV
idea of voluntary enlistment more palatable to its critics, particularly when combined 
with the fact that a recourse to the ballot would remain as a last resort if voluntary 
enlistment failed. Despite this, the draft bill remained deeply divisive, taking 200 hours to 
debate and involving 32 divisions in the Commons alone. Russell, who believed the bill 
WREHµH[SHQVLYH LQHIILFLHQW	RSSUHVVLYH¶DWWHPSWHGWRWKURZLWRXWGXULQJWKHVHFRQG
reading, although ultimately he failed to gain enough support from other Whig MPs, 
many perceiving his opposition as partisan and factious, resulting in the loss of the vote 
165 to 315 after which the opposition to the bill collapsed.17  
Therefore, when it finally received royal assent on 30 June 1852, the Militia Act 
(15 and 16 Vict., c. 50) reconstituted a force which, in many ways, had changed little to 
that of 1757. It remained in essence a national force designed for home defence, but 
organised and recruited upon a local county basis. As mentioned above, recourse to the 
ballot was retained, legislation introduced in 1853 (16 and 17 Vict. c. 133) setting the 
precedent for its annual suspension (although it remained on the statute book until 
abolished 1921 (11 and 12 Geo. V, c. 37). In total 80,000 volunteers were to be raised in 
England and Wales principally from those aged 18-35, 50,000 in 1852 and a further 
30,000 in 1853.  They were to be engaged for an initial period of five years and trained 
annually for 21 days, although new recruits would also face a period of preliminary drill. 
Further acts were passed reconstituting both Scottish (17 and 18 Vict., c. 106) and Irish 
regiments upon the same grounds (17 and 18 Vict., c. 107) in 1854, authorising 15,000 
men and 30,000 respectively. The cost of the total £6 bounty offered to each volunteer 
was to be born not by each lieutenancy through the county rates, as was the ballot, but by 
the government through the consolidated fund.18 Although organised on a local basis, 
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regiments were liable to be transferred out of their own county, riding or place by order 
in council for the purposes of training or exercise.  
$OWKRXJKWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRIWKHPLOLWLDLQHDFKµFRXQW\ULGLQJRUSODFH¶UHPDLQHG
the responsibility of the county lieutenancy, as it had since the restoration, the militia as a 
whole continued to be administered centrally from Whitehall. In 1852 this was the 
responsibility of the Home Office, with powers only transferring to the War Office when 
HPERGLHG <HW DV D UHVXOW RI WKLV DUUDQJHPHQW DQG WKH JUHDW GHJUHH RI µFRQIXVLRQ DQG
LQFRQYHQLHQFH¶LWFDXVHGZKHQWKHIRUFHZDVHPERGLHGIURm 1854 to 1855, a War Office 
circular authorised that, henceforth, it was to be administered by the War Office 
exclusively.19 On a county level, the lord lieutenant was expected to oversee the general 
provision of their militia (and all other auxiliary forces) raised within their lieutenancy 
area and to formally nominate potential candidates for commissions. Each was assisted in 
their duties by a vice-lieutenant and a number ± depending on the population size ± of 
personally appointed deputy lieutenants, most of whom tended to be members of the local 
landed gentry and persons of local significance who would encourage recruitment. The 
day-to-day administration of the lieutenancy was entrusted to a clerk whose primary 
duties included the preparation of commissions for deputy lieutenants and militia officers. 
Furthermore, the clerks of the general and subdivision meetings were also traditionally 
tasked with preparing for the implementation of the ballot, and who remained useful due 
to the fact that the ballot remained upon the statute book due to legislation passed in 
1853. (16 and 17 Vict. c. 33.) Voluntary enlistment meant the chief role which continued 
to be performed by the clerks of the subdivision meetings was the issuance of precepts to 
the local chief constable requesting him to distribute notices to enlisted militiamen 
informing them of an impending training (for which they could receive from 5s to £1 
depending on the number of names on each precept). This did not stop some from 
attempting to claim financial compensation for work which they were no longer supposed 
to undertake, something the government was quick to crack down upon. Furthermore, 
voluntary enlistment meant that overseers and parish officers were expected to collect the 
names of men in the several parishes of each lieutenancy area who were willing to be 
enrolled so that the commanding officer of each regiment could find the most suitable 
time and place for them to be attested by the adjutant and surgeon before being sworn 
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before a magistrate or Deputy Lieutenant.20 
In addition to reconfirming the continued role of the lieutenancy in the 
organisation of the militia, the new act recognised that some militia regiments were 
organised upon separate legislative grounds, although generally it attempted to bring 
them under more centralised control. Since 1797, separate legislation (37 Geo. 3, c. 27 
and 42 Geo. 3, c. 90.) required the Constable of the Tower (who fulfilled the role of lord 
lieutenant of the Tower Hamlets) to raise, arm and train a regiment of militia. Similarly, 
legislation (36 Geo. 3, c. 92 and 39 Geo. 3, c. 82) in 1796 and 1799, later consolidated 
under one act in 1820 (1 Geo. 4, c. 100), authorised for a separate regiment of militia for 
the City of London, distinct from that raised in Middlesex. Outside of London, in 1798 
legislation (38 Geo. 3, c. c. 74) permitted that a separate regiment of militia was to be 
raised from among the mining classes of Cornwall and Devon under the authority of the 
Lord Warden of the Stannaries, a position which traditionally reserved the right to 
provide for the defence of the area separately from either the Lord Lieutenant of 
Cornwall or Devon. These legislatively distinct regiments continued to be recognised by 
the new act, although it extended its provisions to those raised in the Tower Hamlets and 
from among the Cornish and Devon Stannaries, for the first time counted their strength as 
part of the overall quota for English regiments. Nevertheless, the Royal London 
Regiment remained independently regulated by the previous act of 1820, the new 
legislation merely including its strength in the wider quota.21  
Outside of the broader legislative framework governing the militia on the 
mainland, there were also four regiments of militia raised in the Channel Islands: the 
Royal Jersey Light Infantry, Royal Guernsey Light Infantry (both consisting of three 
battalions each, the former, in 1890, augmented by two field artillery companies and four 
garrison artillery companies), the Royal Alderney Light Infantry (converted to artillery 
from 1855) and, until 1875, the Royal Sark Light Infantry (both consisting of a single 
company). Each of the regiments were administered by the lieutenant governors of Jersey 
and Guernsey (both Alderney and Sark coming under the authority of the latter) and 
raised by laws enacted by the local legislatures, while service remained unpaid and 
compulsory from the age of 16 meaning that a disproportionate number of men could be 
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maintained despite the island¶s small population.22 
Prior to its reconstitution the militia was a force consisting entirely of infantry 
regiments. However, by 1856 a total of 22 new garrison artillery corps had been formed 
either from existing or newly raised units.23 For instance, the Hampshire Artillery was 
primarily formed from three officers and 396 men of the South Hampshire Regiment. 
Similarly, an artillery corps was formed in Devon during the reorganisation of its existing 
three regiments, the East and South being converted into the 1st and 2nd Devon 
Regiment respectively, while the North Devon Regiment was disbanded entirely ± this 
was in addition to the total conversion of the neighbouring Royal Cornwall and Devon 
Miners Regiment into an artillery corps at the same time.24 In the north-east two new 
DUWLOOHU\ FRUSV¶ ZHUH UDised in addition to the existing infantry regiments in 
Northumberland and County Durham, the latter in which a second infantry regiment was 
also raised. The newly established Northumberland Artillery was partially formed 
through the transfer of men from the Northumberland Light Infantry Regiment (instead of 
WKH /RUG /LHXWHQDQW¶V RZQ VFKHPH DV H[SORUHG LQ &KDSWHU  ZLWK LWV KHDGTXDUWHUV DW
Tynemouth so as to enable it to be easily inspected by members of the Royal Artillery 
also stationed there.25 
The severity of the manpower shortage experience by the regular army during 
both the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny demonstrated how limiting it was to frame the 
militia simply as a force for home defence. Therefore, in order to enable the regular army 
to concentrate its strength in the Crimea, the decision was taken to embody the militia in 
May 1854. Theoretically the existing legislation (42 Geo. 3. c. 90. s. 111, 42 Geo. 3. c. 
91. s. 197 and 42 Geo. 3. c. 120. s. 55) only authorised the embodiment of the militia  
when the country was threatened with invasion, or in times of civil insurrection. Yet there 
could be no doubt, unlike during the Napoleonic Wars, that Russia presented no credible 
threat of invasion. Therefore, Herbert, once again Secretary at War, was forced to take a 
rather selective interpretation of the existing legislation (explored in detail in Chapter 5) 
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in order to justify the embodiment ± ultimately that the issue came down to the question 
RIH[DFWO\ZKDWDµWKUHDWRILQYDVLRQ¶FRQVWLWXWHG+RZHYHU, due to the ambiguity both he 
DQG3DOPHUVWRQ:DOSROH¶VVXFFHVVRUDV+RPH6HFUHWDU\WKRXJKWLWQHFHVVDU\WRFODULI\
this issue, and consequently in May 1854 a new act (17 and 18 Vict. c. 13) authorised the 
PLOLWLD¶V HPERGLPHQW ZKHQHYHU D VWDWH RI ZDU H[Lsted, a move in keeping with 
3DOPHUVWRQ¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKHPLOLWLDZDVHVVHQWLDOO\DQDWLRQDOµDUP\UHVHUYH¶26  
Aside from its domestic role, the government also took the step of drafting a bill 
which would take the emergency measure of using militia regiments to replace regular 
units abroad. However, this was far from an unprecedented measure. In November 1813 
the government passed legislation which for the first time permitted overseas service, 
aimed at combating the dwindling number of regular recruits avDLODEOHIRU:HOOLQJWRQ¶V
army. It permitted a total of 30,000 militiamen to volunteer for service in Europe until the 
end of the war (or for up to a maximum of 6 months), with regiments up to 900 in 
strength liable to serve as whole units under the command of their own officers, the 
remainder forming a depot at home, so long as no less than three-quarters of the men 
agreed. Regiments unable to find the requisite volunteers could form provisional 
battalions up to 600, so long as they were accompanied by two field officers, or 300 men 
with, one field officer; units  unable to find more than 100 could still serve together as 
distinct companies attached to line regiments. As an incentive a bounty of 8 guineas was 
offered for each volunteer, while each man was assured that, if subsequently wounded, he 
would receive a pension which was also applicable to the widows and orphans of those 
killed. Although Wellington initially rejected the scheme, preferring instead to wait for a 
large draft of militiamen (which he felt were of greater use than whole units), the 
government pushed on regardless, although to appease him they proposed to try and 
persuade a further 40,000 militiamen to pass directly into the line.27 However, the scheme 
failed to find the requisite support as several militia colonels reneged upon their promise 
to serve at the last minute. One key problem was that militiamen were on the whole 
reluctant to serve as part of a provisional battalion unless under the command of their 
own officers. For instance, the Denbighshire Regiment was eager to serve, but only under 
its commanding officer, Colonel Sir Watkin Wynn. Yet crucially, it also failed to gain the 
broad support of militia officers who felt service abroad would threaten an important 
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mechanism for their own advancement: the direct transfer of men to the line which, for 
every 50 men, they could gain a regular commission. As a result few regiments 
volunteered. By early 1814 a militia brigade numbering just 2,800 men had been sent to 
EROVWHU:HOOLQJWRQ¶VIRUFHs in Southern France, formed from three provisional battalions, 
the bulk provided by the Royal Buckinghamshire and Worcestershire Regiments, and 
commanded by the Marquis of Buckingham, Lieutenant-Colonel of the former.28 
Despite the fact that plans for foreign service in 1854 had no intention of sending 
militiamen to serve in the theatre of war, the bill, introduced in December 1854, was not 
without it critics. Firstly, there were concerns over the threat foreign service would have 
upon a force designed for home defence, a point argued by both the Earl of Derby and 
Earl Grey. Secondly, there were fears that service abroad would negatively impact 
recruitment for the militia at a time the army was increasingly reliant upon it as a source 
of recruits. Finally, assurances were sought from militia officers that those who could not 
spare the time to serve abroad would not face any shame in declining to do so; such 
assurances were also desired for married militiamen and those whose civil employment 
could be threatened by prolonged foreign service. Nonetheless, such opposition was 
tempered as both Palmerston and the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for War, 
argued the proposals were in fact less far-reaching than those passed during the 
Napoleonic Wars; no units would serve in the theatre of war itself, limited simply to 
garrison duty within the Mediterranean ± the possibility of such duty in Canada was also 
mooted, but never undertaken. They also assured that service abroad would be on a 
strictly voluntary basis for both officers and men. As a result the bill passed onto the 
statute book (18 and 19 Vict., c. 1) with relative ease and ultimately led to the despatch of 
ten militia regiments to Gibraltar, Malta and the Ionian Islands.29  
The continued shortage of manpower in the regular army meant there was also 
increasing pressure to use the militia as a direct source of recruits. Measures had already 
been taken to encourage the limited transfer of militiamen to the line, as had been the 
case during the Napoleonic Wars. However, the scale of the manpower shortage pressed 
the War Office to take the unprecedented step of issuing a circular in November 1854 
requiring each regiment to provide at least 25% of its strength directly to the line, 
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although it was stressed to commanding officers that the men were not to be coerced. 
Most militia officers accepted that while the country was at war such a move was a 
military necessity; indeed one militia officer, Major George Walker, who later went on to 
command the Dumfries, Roxburgh, Kirkcudbright and Selkirk Regiment (after 1860 
UHQDPHG WKH6FRWWLVK%RUGHUHUV5HJLPHQW DQGDIWHU WKHUG.LQJ¶V2ZQ6FRWWLVK
Borderers) informed Parliament that it had been only right that the needs of the militia 
had been deferred for the good of the line.30 
In just a few years since its reform the militia had seen its role shift from a force 
reconstituted primarily for home defence to, in effect, a reserve for the regular army. Far 
from immediately returning to the pre-war status-quo, in October 1856 the Secretary of 
State for War, Fox Maule (now Lord Panmure), began to consider maintaining the militia 
DV µWKH JUDQG UHVHUYHRI WKH DUP\¶ LQRUGHU WR DOORZ WKH UDSLG H[SDQVLRQRI WKH UHJXODU
army in the event of a similar crisis. To do this would requLUHWKHPLOLWLDWREHµPRUHLQ
FRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHDUP\WKDQLWKDVKLWKHUWREHHQ¶DQGWKDWLWVWUDLQLQJZRXOGKDYHWREH
extended to the maximum period of 56 days permitted, although he admitted the cost of 
such a move would mean the possibility of only calling out a portion of the force each 
year. He also suggested that half of this period would consist of the current course of 
regimental drill (detailed below), yet the second half would see regiments brigaded at 
major military stations for large scale manoeuvres which, it was hoped, would increase 
WKHLUHIILFLHQF\DQGJLYH WKHPLOLWLDD µPRUHPLOLWDU\FKDUDFWHU¶7KHPHPRUDQGXPDOVR
advocated that when embodied the militia should continue to allow men to volunteer to 
the line and that such a principal would enable the army to be kept up to strength in 
wartime, although to allow this it required the militia to maintain a far higher proportion 
of effectives than it had hitherto been able to ± an almost impossible arrangement to 
reconcile. However, by the following March there was evidence of growing pressure 
from militia officers in Parliament resisting his plans. Panmure even feared that his desire 
to call out the militia for its annual training could lead to Parliamentary opposition 
towards the militia estimates.31  
$OWKRXJK 3DQPXUH¶V SODQV IRU D PRUH LQWHJUDWHG PLOLWLD ZHUH QRW IRUPDOO\
implemented, the subsequent Indian Mutiny saw the militia used in much the same way 
                                                 
30
 HC Deb., 25 July 1867, vol. 189, cc. 87-103 (c. 99). 
31
 NRS. GD45/8/388, Horse Guards memorandum on the peace establishment of the regular army and 
SURYLVLRQIRUWKHPLOLWLD2FWREHUDQG*'µ&DELQHWRSLQLRQVLQUHJDUGWRFDOOLQJRXWWKH
PLOLWLDIRUWUDLQLQJ¶0DUFK 





as it was during the Crimean War, albeit with militia regiments limited to service within 
the UK. Yet by the end of decade it was becoming increasingly clear that supporting the 
UHJXODUDUP\ZDVKDYLQJDODUJHO\QHJDWLYHLPSDFWXSRQWKHPLOLWLD¶VVWUHQJWK%\
the force was 41,525 men below its establishment and it was estimated that fewer than 
40,000 had attended the annual training the previous year. Therefore, in May 1858 a 
royal commission was established to ascertain how the militia could be reorganised to 
place it upon a more efficient footing. Yet before it had even begun the commission was 
dealt a serious blow when the new Secretary of State for War, Jonathan Peel, requested 
that any consideration of feeding recruits to the line was dropped due to the establishment 
of a separate commission examining recruitment within the army and auxiliaries more 
widely (and for which a militia officer had been formally attached). Nevertheless, it made 
several recommendations most notably those aimed at curbing high rates of desertion 
(explored in Chapter 3): it recommended that the enrolment bounty should be withheld 
until after the completion of a recruits training and that each regiment should arrange 
their training on corresponding days each year to prevent fraudulent enlistment. The 
report also recommended that small regiments under 500 men in strength should be 




ZDV IDU IURPDFRPSUHKHQVLYHRYHUKDXORI WKH IRUFH¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQ LWGLG WDNHVWHSV WR
ensure the Secretary of State for War played a more prominent role. Most notably, it 
stripped the lords lieutenant of the right to fix the date upon which their units would 
assemble for training, vesting that power with the Secretary of State. Hitherto he had only 
been able to request that lords lieutenant ensured their units trained at the same time. For 
instance, in July 1858 the War Office asked the Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, the 
Marquess of Winchester, to fix the date of the trainings of both the Hampshire Regiment 
and Hampshire Artillery to mitigate the amount of fraudulent enlistment. Additionally, 
the act also enabled him to amalgamate units from different counties or areas and ensured 
all new recruits were liable to serve in any part of Great Britain and Ireland for an 
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indefinite period.33 Additional legislation (23 and 24 Vict., c. 94, and 23 and 24 Vict., c. 
120.) passed the following year made further minor alterations to the provision of 
storehouses and the operation of the ballot machinery (in effect suspending the making of 
all ballot lists), yet the decision to disembody the remaining regiments in order to reduce 
the burden upon the estimates meant that much of the imperative for wider reformation 
was lost. In fact, far from being welcomed as a relief, the decision was one that was 
opposed by some embodied regiments. For instance, the Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire, 
Lord Hatherton, requested the disembodiment of the 2nd Staffordshire Regiment be 
delayed due to the poor state of the local iron trade, while likewise the commanding 
officer of the Forfarshire Artillery professed similar fears over the likelihood of future 
employment for his men.34 Yet Herbert was undeterred. Unlike Panmure and Peel, he was 
aware that prolonged embodiment and the transfer of so many militiamen to the line was 
WKHURRWFDXVHRIWKHPLOLWLD¶VLQHIILFLHQF\7KHUHIRUHKHDUJXHGWKDWµ7KHEHVWWKLQJ«IRU
WKH0LOLWLDZDV«WRIROORZWKHROGFRQVWLWXWLRQDOV\VWHPRIQHYHUFDOOLQJWKHPRXWH[FHSW
RQ JUHDW HPHUJHQFLHV¶ DQG WKDW KDOWLQJ WKH WUDQVIHU RI PLOLWLDPHQ WR WKH UHJXODU DUP\
would be of great benefit for its efficiency. After considerable consultation with militia 
colonels and other ministers, he formally suspended the practice in June 1860.35 
'HVSLWHKLVGHVLUHWRVHFXUHWKHPLOLWLD¶VUHFRYHU\+HUEHUWGLGQRWHQWLUHO\GHIHUWR
their concerns; indeed, when the need for greater efficiency came into conflict with their 
local sentiments he was more often than not willing to favour the former. Such a conflict 
occurred as a result of the recommendation of the 1859 Royal Commission to 
amalgamate small regiments (now permitted by section 7 of the Militia Act, 1859) a 
practice already successfully implemented in Scotland. In 1860 the Galloway Rifles, 
consisting of just four companies, was disbanded. Raised in Kirkcudbrightshire and 
Wigtownshire, subsequently the two companies recruited in the latter county were 
incorporated within the Royal Ayrshire Regiment, while the two Kirkcudbrightshire 
companies were amalgamated with the Dumfriesshire Regiment which, as a result, 
changed its name to the Scottish Borderers Regiment in 1864.36 It was hoped that the 
same principle could be extended to regiments elsewhere, particularly among some 
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smaller Welsh units.37 Therefore in June he set out his plans for further amalgamations, 
although unsurprisingly this caused a great deal of anger among those officers who felt 
such a move would jeopardise their position in command of independent regiments. For 
instance, the Rutlandshire Regiment was successfully merged into the neighbouring, and 
far larger, Northamptonshire Regiment in 1860, but not without the protestation of its 
officers. Similar complaints were voiced by the Colonel of the Royal Cumberland 
Regiment over its proposed amalgamation with the Royal Westmoreland Regiment, 
although subsequently both regiments remained independent. Opposition was also voiced 
by the commanding officer of the Royal Caernarvonshire Rifles over the decision to 
amalgamate his regiment with the neighbouring Royal Anglesey Light Infantry, although 
his protests could not stop both regiments being unified until March 1867 after which 
they again were separated.38  
'HVSLWH+HUEHUW¶VEHVWHIIRUWVKHFRXOGQRWHVFDSH WKHIDFW WKDWPDQ\UHJLPHQWV
remained highly deficient. Two decades of suspended animation prior to 1852 meant 
many of the existing militia depots were no longer suitable for the secure storage of each 
XQLW¶VDUPVFORWKLQJDQGHTXLSPHQW)RULQVWDQFHWKHVWRUHKRXVHRIWKH&DPEULGJHVKLUH
Regiment was described as being in such a dilapidated state that they were forced instead 
to purchase and convert another set of buildings into an entirely new depot.39 Due to such 
difficulties, and as a temporary measure to allow the force to train in 1853, the War 
Office permitted that all arms, clothing and equipment were to be sent to a local ordnance 
stores upon the termination of training if a regiment did not have a suitable and secure 
storehouse of its own.40 Despite this, some regiments were forced to make temporary 
arrangements for the first two trainings in 1852 and 1853. Such was the case in 
Monmouth whereby a temporary storeroom, orderly room, guards room and staff 
accommodation was established. Similarly, the 1st, 3rd and 5th Royal Lancashire 
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Regiment also hired facilities before later constructing their own.41 
Nevertheless, it was clear that a more permanent solution was required. 
According to the new Militia Act, each lord lieutenant was expected to find waste or 
common ground on which their regiments could train. If there was no suitable location 
available in their vicinity they were instead authorised to hire such, for which, with the 
approval of the Home Secretary, they would be financially compensated ± for corps of 
800 men or above in strength the rate of £8; for corps of 500 but less than 800 men in 
strength, £6; and for those under 500 men in strength, £4.42 Furthermore, legislation (16 
and 17 Vict., c. 116, ss. 37-41) passed in 1853 stated that every regiment was required to 
provide suitable stores for their arms, clothing and other equipment alongside an orderly 
room, guard room and sufficient space on which the men could be mustered for the issue 
and return of their arms, clothing and equipment. They were also expected to provide 
sufficient quarters for a proportion of the permanent staff deemed necessary for the 
defence of the stores, totalling not less than half or fewer than six of the staff, except in 
corps consisting of less than three companies, in which case the entire staff were to be 
quartered. On the whole this proved somewhat of a controversial issue as it was expected 
that the renovation, construction or hire of all buildings used were to be paid for by the 
lieutenancy out of, or mortgaged against, the county rates, and not by the government. 
When the government attempted to clarify the issue, numerous MPs complained about 
the costs faced by regiments in their constituencies. One such MP, William Egerton, 
complained that in Cheshire the estimated cost of providing for both regiments amounted 
to between £12,000 and £14,000. Another, Robert Christopher, MP for North 
Lincolnshire, protested how the current relatively modest cost of £50 per year, which 
provided storehouses for both regiments in his county, could rise to as much as £20,000, 
a sentiment echoed by the Kentish MP, William Deedes, who stated that the current cost 
of £80 per year could rise to IRUERWKKLVFRXQW\¶VLQIDQWU\UHJLPHQWVDORQH43 As 
a result, an amendment was tabled and successfully passed making the lieutenancies 
liable for just half the total cost, the rest to be borne by the government. This in turn 
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forced the government to rework the bill so that when it finally gained royal assent in 
August 1854, the decision to provide accommodation for the permanent staff was to be at 
the discretion of local magistrates, meaning that if they decided to forgo the additional 
accommodation they could be spared the worst of the financial burden.44 The uncertainty 
over the issue led some local officials to delay any decision over whether or not to 
provide new facilities for their regiments. For instance, in Devon, Kent, Sussex, 
Warwickshire and Wiltshire no provision was made for new buildings until it was clear 
exactly what would be required and who would be liable to fund it.45 
 The provision of facilities for militia regiments represented a substantial expense 
upon the lieutenancies. In Middlesex, the rather more extensive set of facilities provided 
for the 2nd Middlesex Rifles on two acres of purchased land at Barnet ± consisting of a 
SDUDGH JURXQG WZR VWRUHURRPV IXPLJDWLRQ URRP TXDUWHUPDVWHU¶V VWRUH DQG RIILFH
DUPRXU\DGMXWDQW¶VTXDUWHUVRIILFHU¶VSULYDWHURRPJXDUGURRPRUGHUO\URRPGHIDXOWHUV
room, cells, wash-closet, bread room and coal house ± enabled the regiment to store all of 
its 1,050 arms securely at a total cost of £7,516. A similar, albeit slightly smaller, set of 
facilities constructed as the headquarters of the 3rd Royal Westminster Regiment at 
Turnham Green came to a total cost of just £5,886 because of the lesser expense incurred 
in raising a boundary wall due to the parade ground being enclosed on three sides. 
SimilaUO\LQ$SULOWKH/DQFDVKLUHOLHXWHQDQF\SXUFKDVHGµ\DUGV¶RIWKHIRUPHU
house of correction in Preston for £2,000 as the storehouse of the 3rd Lancashire 
Regiment. In 1855 the Bedfordshire lieutenancy were forced to borrow £5,000 in order to 
fund the construction of a depot for the county regiment.46 
Some regiments managed to forgo the worst of such costs. Fortunately for the 
Royal Monmouthshire Light Infantry, the Duke of Beaufort gifted the use of the Great 
Castle House as a depot on the provision that the castle ruins remained undamaged. 
Similarly, despite a lack of suitable waste ground near the depot of the Bedfordshire 
Regiment, in 1862 it was able to hire land for the duration of its training from the Duke 
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of Bedford for £6 each spring. In Scotland, the Forfar and Kincardine Regiment was 
fortunate that the lieutenancy was able to share some of the costs, for the provision of a 
new depot, with the government due to the fact that Panmure, the Secretary of State for 
:DUZDVDOVRWKHFRXQW\¶VOord lieutenant, although he was sceptical as to the amount he 
could persuade them to fund.47 Not all regiments were as fortunate, however. The depot 
of the Hampshire Regiment remained inadequate for over a decade: not only was the yard 
too small on which to assemble their full strength, but the depot lacked a magazine, a 
sufficient storehouse (which was poorly ventilated), accommodation for the permanent 
staff, or anywhere for the men to change except in the open yard.48 Even in 1864 the War 
Office, summarisiQJ WKH ILQGLQJ RI DQ LQVSHFWLQJ RIILFHU IRXQG WKDW µ1R FRXQW\ VWRUHV
[were] so utterly inadequate for the requirements of a militia regiment as the premises in 
RFFXSDWLRQ RI WKH +DQWV 0LOLWLD¶49 They were not alone. Similar concerns were also 
voiced over WKH SRRU VWDWH RI WKH QHZ VWRUHKRXVH RI WKH .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 7RZHU +DPOHWV
Regiment, the adjutant complaining on several occasions at the state of the plumbing.50  
It was not just suitable facilities which were initially lacking, but also a sufficient 
quantity of effective arms and equipment. In January 1836 a War Office circular directed 
that all arms, clothing and equipment were to be returned to the various ordnance depots, 
excepting those retained for one-half of the strength of the permanent staff. Two decades 
later it was unsurprising that what little militia regiments did possess was in poor 
condition, and a fraction of what was to be required by the new quota. For instance, the 
Royal West Middlesex Regiment possessed just 17 muskets and 20 bayonets, one of the 
IRUPHUDQGHLJKWRIWKHODWWHUGHVFULEHGDVLQDµEDG¶FRQGLWLRQDORQJVLGHMXVWURXQGV
of ammunition and a somewhat motley assortment of old uniforms which was barely 
enough for the existing staff. Similarly, the 1st Surrey Regiment possessed enough 
clothing and obsolete flintlock muskets for just eleven members of the staff, meaning that 
at the first annual training there were no arms with which to train the men.51 To remedy 
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this, a War Office circular of October 1852 stated that arms, clothing and accoutrements 
required would be supplied by the Board of Ordnance, with commanding officers only 
liable to purchase their own equipment if enough could not be provided.52 However, 
much of what was initially provided was of such a poor quality that the War Office was 
forced to acknowledge the deficiencies and, in the case of what was sent to the regiments 
in Hampshire, despatch inspectors to examine the complaints. Officers of the Royal 
Monmouthshire Light Infantry also complained, firstly due to the fact that the regiment 
received the wrong pattern of shoulder straps and caps, and secondly because 75 pairs of 
boots required for new recruits did not arrive until after the commencement of the 
training of 1853, which in turn forced the adjutant to purchase replacements at his own 
expense. Furthermore, after regiments were embodied there continued to be difficulties in 
supplying sufficient arms in several units. For instance, the Edinburgh Light Infantry 
continued to experience delays over the issuance of additional rifles in May and June 
 7KH .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 7RZHU +DPOHWV 5HJLPHQW DOVR H[SHULHQFHG GLIILFXOWLHV WKH
following November when there was a delay issuing 400 stand of arms, while a year later 
there were also delays in requisitioning additional uniforms on account of the their 
embodiment.53  
It is also unsurprising that the arms provided to the militia were generally of an 
older pattern than those of the line. Due to the premium placed upon the latest arms by 
the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny, many militia regiments experienced delays in 
replacing their smooth bore percussion muskets with the new Enfield rifle, first 
developed in 1853. It was not until 1858 that the War Office began to distribute them to 
the militia, although they were limited to embodied regiments meaning many, including 
the Edinburgh Light Infantry, for instance, were forced to continue using the old pattern 
muskets. It was not until the following November that the decision was taken to supply 
the remainder. For instance, the 1st Surrey Regiment only received the new rifles the 
following year. When the Enfield was, in turn, replaced by the breech loading Snider rifle 
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in 1866, it was only towards the end of the following year that they were first issued to 
militia regiments, and even then only to the permanent staff. For instance, the permanent 
staff of the Bedfordshire Regiment only began to receive the new rifles early in 1868. It 
was not until later in the year that the 1st Surrey Regiment began to receive enough to 
equip their rank and file, while the Royal Monmouthshire Light Infantry had to wait a 
further year.54 
Additionally, the training provided during the 1850s and early 1860s was rather 
basic. All recruits were liable to attend a period of preliminary training initially lasting 14 
days (although this was liable to be extended or shortened) before they would join the 
remainder of their regiment. In principle it was meant to resemble the basic course of 
instruction provided for the regulars. However, the short period available ± by contrast, 
their regular counterparts undertook a course of basic instruction lasting two and a half 
months55 ± meant that training was limited to a course of instruction covering just the 
basics of drill, the handling of their arms and manoeuvres at company level, although it 
ZDV UHFRJQLVHG WKDW OHVV HPSKDVLV ZRXOG EH SODFHG XSRQ WKHLU DWWLWXGH DQG µSRVLWLRQ¶
compared to regular recruits. A War Office memorandum established that recruits were 
to be drilled three times a day for periods lasting between one and a half hours to one and 
three-quarter hours in groups no larger than 20. After two or three days they would be 
armed and taken through basic manual and platoon exercises. The initial delays 
experienced in providing arms meant, if necessary, groups of recruits would rotate every 
quarter-hour between instruction in the basic handling of their arms and other aspects of 
their drill. This meant that, in theory, just 20 firearms would be sufficient to train up to 
100 men. By the tenth day it was expected that recruits would be proficient in their basic 
platoon manoeuvres and after two weeks able to perform basic drills as a company.56 
Upon the recommendation of the 1859 militia commission, the preliminary training was 
extended to 21 days. However, by 1861 this had again been reduced to just 14 days, 
while in the following year it fell to just seven. It was not until 1867 that recruits were 
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once again drilled for 14 days.57 
The short length of the preliminary training was partially mitigated by the fact 
that it was expected to immediately precede the annual training of the regiment. 
However, that too suffered from similar drawbacks. The majority of regiments trained 
their men for between 21 and 28 days each year despite the fact that the Militia Act of 
1852 authorised a maximum period of 56 days per-annum (and a minimum of just three). 
Herbert explored the financial implications of setting the minimum period of annual 
training at 27 days for all regiments, as suggested by the 1859 militia commission, 
although it seems he swayed against the idea on account of the additional expense upon 
the estimates.58 Therefore, it was not until 1865 that the Earl de Gray and Ripon, 
+HUEHUW¶VVXFFHVVRUH[WHQGHG WKHSHULRGZLWKRXW WKHDGGLWLRQDOH[SHQVHE\FDSSLQJ WKH
strength of large regiments to 700 privates. The experience of the 1st Surrey Regiment 
was typical of the majority of regiments in that between 1859 and 1864 it assembled for 
21 days training during the Spring (excepting that for 1860 whereby it assembled for 27 
days) and between 1865 and 1868 for 27 days.59  
Although the annual training focussed largely upon drill exercises and parade 
upon the barrack square, there was an increasing emphasis upon a practical instruction in 
musketry. Immediately after the reform it was difficult for militiamen to actually fire 
their weapons unless they had access to suitable range facilities, or land which could 
substitute for such. Yet after the establishment of the School of Musketry at Hythe in 
1853, this began to change. Regiments were invited to send officers to undertake a course 
of instruction which would enable them to oversee musketry practice in their own units. 
)RU LQVWDQFH LQ 1RYHPEHU  WKH .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 7RZHU +DPOHWV 5HJLPHQW VHQW D
subaltern to undergo the course.60 Nevertheless, some regiments continued to encounter 
difficulties in finding suitable facilities. For instance, in August 1854 the Royal 
Monmouthshire Light Infantry was unable to find a suitable location after a local 
landowner forbade the use of his land. By comparison, in 1861 the whole of the 1st 
Surrey Regiment was able to undergo a course of musketry on land in a local 
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ODQGRZQHU¶VGHHUSDUN61 The 1859 militia commission was fully aware of the difficulties, 
although all they could suggest was that regiments with no access to a suitable range 
should periodically send detachments to the nearest facilities, and that the opportunity to 
undertake the school of musketry should be extended to the members of the permanent 
staff. Many NCOs took this opportunity, and far from being inferior to their regular 
FRXQWHUSDUWVPDQ\ZHUHSUDLVHGIRUWKHLUµH[HPSODU\FRQGXFW¶62  
There were other major limitations to peacetime training. Firstly, there was 
initially little provision for inter-unit training or large-scale manoeuvres. The 
Hertfordshire Regiment was a rare exception in that they took part in a day of field 
manoeuvres and a mock engagement alongside the West Essex Yeomanry and a Royal 
Artillery battery on 11 June 1853, during which the regiment demonstrated its musketry 
and the ability to form up by line, column and square. Similarly, those units which when 
embodied had served at a major military station, such as Aldershot, had some experience 
of brigade level manoeuvres.63 However, it was not until 1867 that disembodied 
regiments were brigaded in peacetime for such purposes (explored below). A further 
concern was that many regiments lacked sufficient NCOs to enable the effective 
instruction of their men. As a result, particularly during the first two annual trainings, 
several had to appoint regular instructors upon a temporary basis. For instance, the 
Hampshire Regiment relied on the assistance of 25 NCOs from the 48th Regiment, which 
MXVW KDSSHQHG WR DOVR EH VWDWLRQHG LQ :LQFKHVWHU WKH IRUPHU¶V headquarters; this was 
again the case in 1861 when 12 regular NCOs were attached to assist in the training. 
Similarly, on account of their having only four NCOs appointed to the permanent staff 
during the trainings of 1852 and 1853, the Royal Monmouthshire Light Infantry 
Regiment attached 20 regular NCOs as instructors, while both the South Devon and 
Somerset Light Infantry Regiments also employed regular instructors, the former a total 
of 30, during their initial training periods.64  
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On the plus side, militia artillery corps were provided with specialist training, 
even if, once again, insufficient time and facilities limited its complexity. Those corps 
created from the conversion of existing infantry regiments faced the added difficulty of 
adjusting their training techniques to their new role. For instance, it took the Royal 
Cornwall and Devon Miners Artillery two years to replace the sergeants on the 
permanent staff, who hitherto had all been infantrymen, with discharged sergeants from 
the Royal Artillery. Prior to this the regiment had been able to do little other than hire the 
services of a retired major from the Royal Artillery to instruct the men in the basic use 
and exercise of their heavy ordnance.65 As the Militia artillery were initially expected to 
provide service as garrison artillery units, it is unsurprising that their training focussed 
upon the use and manipulation of heavy ordnance, although they were also expected to 
cover the basics of the drill yard. For instance, at the annual training of the Hampshire 
Artillery in 1867 the inspecting officer assessed their basic platoon drill and musketry, in 
addition to their use of heavy ordnance.66 By 1890 the standard daily timetable 
UHFRPPHQGHGIRUWKHDQQXDOWUDLQLQJKDGFKDQJHGOLWWOHFRQVLVWLQJRIDQKRXU¶VIRRWGULOO
each morning followed later in the afternoon by two hours of gun drill, including how to 
manipulate ammunition and the theory behind gunnery, and by two further hours of target 
practice and repository exercises.67 However, despite the specialist nature of their 
training, three to four weeks was insufficient time for gunners to become proficient with 
anything more than the basic manoeuvring of their heavy guns. Such was the conclusion 
of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Royal Artillery who, in giving evidence to the 
1859 militia commission, bemoaned that a lack of suitable barrack accommodation meant 
some units had failed to train with any heavy ordnance whilst embodied. He also argued 
that even if the men were given the maximum regulated 56 days of annual training it 
would still be insufficient to enable them to become effective gunners; in his opinion at 
least a year of continuous embodiment was required before 56 days of annual training 
would suffice to maintain the necessary skills.68 The 1859 militia commission therefore 
suggested that in future all artillery corps should give over as much time as possible 
towards practical gunnery drill, that each corps should be provided with adequate heavy 
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guns and that their headquarters should be located as near as possible to coastal defences 
so as to enable them to train each company successively.69 
 
* * * 
 
Without doubt the first decade since reconstitution represented a particularly tumultuous 
period for the militia. Even though Herbert had been motivated by a desire to halt the 
further LQWHJUDWLRQRIWKHPLOLWLDDQGWKHOLQHLQRUGHUWRLQFUHDVHWKHIRUPHU¶VHIILFLHQF\
his successors were far more open to the concept. In fact there was a far greater degree of 
FRQWLQXLW\ EHWZHHQ WKHLU DWWHPSWV WR UHRUJDQLVH WKH PLOLWLD DQG &DUGZHOO¶V ODter more 
extensive reforms than has hitherto been appreciated.70 Firstly, in May 1866 Peel issued a 
FLUFXODUZKLFKUHYHUVHG+HUEHUW¶VGHFLVLRQWRKDOWWKHWUDQVIHURIPLOLWLDPHQWRWKHUHJXODU
army. Peel had remained a committed and fervent advocate of such a policy and hoped 
that by reopening direct enlistment it would help alleviate poor rates of regular 
recruitment. Subsequently he encouraged militia officers to persuade as many men to 
transfer as possible.71  
6HFRQGO\ LQ3HHO¶V VXFFHVVRU6LU -RKQ3Dkington sought to further reform 
the command structure of the auxiliary and reserve forces in reaction to concerns over the 
lack of control over the auxiliaries by the general officers commanding the various 
military districts. Building upon an idea that had been mooted by his predecessors, 
Pakington abolished the existing office of Inspector-General of Militia alongside those 
for the other auxiliary and reserve forces and created instead a new position, the newly 
titled Inspector-General of Reserve Forces (Major-General James Lindsay being the first 
to be appointed to the position). This individual was to be directly accountable to the 
Secretary of State for War and would thus enable the auxiliary forces to be directed more 
easily when embodied or assembled for training by acting as an intermediary between the 
War Office and the general officers commanding each district. Although the arrangement 
prefigured some of the more radical changes to come, Pakington was quick to reassure 
the lords lieutenant that it would not jeopardise their authority over the militia and that he 
would continue to personally correspond with them over the day-to-day running of the 
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of Auxiliary Forces was attached to the staff of the Commander in Chief in order to 
enable himself and the Secretary of State to successfully co-ordinate their direction.72  
Thirdly, Pakington also fulfilled his predecessor¶s desire to form a militia reserve 
for service with the army, solving the question of how militiamen who opted to remain 
with their regiments could still be used as a means of augmenting the line. In the spring 
of 1867 Peel drafted plans for the temporary transfer of up to one-quarter of the entire 
militia to the line during wartime, a measure which was designed to provide for the rapid 
expansion of the line without permanently draining the militia. Although in March he 
resigned before he could introduce the scheme to Parliament, it was swiftly taken up by 
Pakington and introduced to the Commons in May, passing onto the statute book with 
little opposition in August. The Militia Reserve Act enabled militiamen to volunteer their 
services to join the army as regular soldiers temporarily when the country was at or 
threatened by war, although no more than one-quarter of the total quota of each regiment 
were permitted to enrol at any one time. Entry into the reserve was open to all militiamen 
aged 30 and under, at least 33 inches across the chest and 5ft 4in in height. All reservists 
were to enlist for a period of five years in receipt of a bounty of £1 in addition to that for 
their militia service, and during peacetime were liable to be trained with the regulars for 
up to 56 days per year either in addition to, or substituted for, the annual training of their 
militia regiment.73 Critics, including the former Secretary of State for War, Ripon, 
recognised that by taking the most efficient men from the militia just when the force was 
liable to itself be embodied was hardly conductive to its own efficiency. However, 
according to its supporters, including the Duke of Cambridge, the scheme was, from the 
PLOLWLD¶VSRLQWRIYLHZSUHIHUDEOHWRWKHSHUPDQHQWORVVRIYROXQWHHUVDVH[SHULHQFHGLQ
previous embodiments and allowed for the augmentation of the army at little permanent 
cost to the militia.74  
 Clearly there had been a policy by predecessors to both simplify the command 
structure of the militia by placing it under more centralised control, and bring it into 
greater association with the regular army. Both Ian Beckett and Duncan Anderson have 
argued that a key reason such reforms were accepted, unlike in 1861, was due to a decline 
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LQ WKH PLOLWLD¶V UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQ 3DUOLDPHQW DQG WKH GHDWK RI D QXPEHU RI VLJQLILFDQW
supporters of the force in the intervening years, including both Palmerston and Herbert.75 
What is clear, from an examination of the militia interest within Parliament, is that one 
cannot claim that representation of the force collapsed entirely towards the end of the 
1860s. As illustrated by figures given in Appendix 1, the number of serving and retired 
militia officers sitting in the Commons actually increased, from 43 in 1852 under a 
coalition government to 59 in 1859 and 64 in 1870, both under Liberal governments. 
Conversely representation within the Lords fell to just 23 peers by 1870 from a high of 50 
in 1852. Therefore, although such figures are not an exact indicator of the size of the 
effective militia lobby within Parliament, it does nonetheless illustrate a far more 
nuanced picture, illustrating that the militia continued to be represented among the 
benches of both the Conservatives and Liberals, although more heavily among the 
former. 
&DUGZHOO¶VPRWLYDWLRQIRUUHIRUPZDVGULYHQE\WKH/LEHUDO3DUW\¶V wider desire 
to achieve savings from the estimates. Nevertheless, he was also influenced by the desire 
to make the militia itself a more united, professional and more effective force through 
closer association with the regulars. In presenting the army estimates to the Commons in 
March 1869, he announced that he desired the regular and auxiliary forces of the country 
to be consolidated so as to provide a united front against any potential invader, and that in 
DQ HPHUJHQF\ KH UHJDUGHG µWKH ROG FRQVWLWXWLRQDO IRUFH¶ DV QRW RQO\ WKH EHVW VRXUFH RI
manpower to fill-up regular battalions, but also to act as a secondary line of defence in its 
own right. Yet initially Cardwell was reluctant to appear too radical: he made it clear the 
JRYHUQPHQWKDGµQRWWKHVPDOOHVt intention of in any way depriving it [the militia] of its 
ORFDOFKDUDFWHUDQGRILWVFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHFRXQW\¶DYLHZDOVRVKDUHGE\WKH4XHHQ
In effect he was framing the militia as able to both fulfil a traditionally perceived role as a 
locally organised force for home defence, while at the same time acknowledging his 
desire for it to become a de facto auxiliary to the line upon a national basis.76 Cardwell 
began to implement such a strategy, subsequently introducing legislation in May (32 and 
33 Vict., c. 13) which placed the force under the direct command of the general officers 
commanding each military district when assembled for training (in addition to abolishing 
property qualifications for militia officers). The following year additional legislation (33 
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DQG  9LFW F  ZDV SDVVHG SHUPLWWLQJ WKH HPERGLPHQW RI WKH PLOLWLD µLQ FDVH RI
LPPLQHQWQDWLRQDOGDQJHURURI JUHDW HPHUJHQF\¶ DVRSSRVHG WR VLPSO\ LQ FDVHVZKHUH
either a state of war existed or the country was threatened by invasion. Cardwell also 
stated his intention to retain the Militia Reserve, despite the concerns of many militia 
officers over the potential wartime loss of its most able manpower and which, in essence, 
meant two bounties were paid for each reservist, one for his enrolment as a militiaman 
and one for his entry into the reserve. Subsequently he planned to raise 20,000 men for 
the coming year (rising to 30,000 in 1871) despite hitherto only attracting 2,700 men.77 
Furthermore, in 1871 Cardwell introduced plans to increase the establishment of the 
militia by as much as 45,000 men so that it would be better able to weather the loss of the 
planned 30,000 reservists in the event of war. That April he announced his intention to 
raise the additional 45,000 at an additional cost of £237,216 to the estimates, with the 
first increase planned over the course of the following year. Cardwell faced opposition 
from those who feared there was not the accommodation for the extra recruits, and those 
who felt the money would be better spent on the regulars, and although he managed to 
secure the additional expense the increase to the establishment was not forthcoming.78  
Cardwell also planned to further centralise the auxiliaries under the control of the 
War Office as part of his proposed Army Regulation Bill. Introduced to the Commons in 
February 1871, it firmly threatened the link between the lieutenancy and the militia, 
withdrawing the lords lieutenant¶ KLVWRULF MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU WKH IRUFH DQG WKHLU ULJKW WR
award commissions, instead vesting control with the Secretary of State for War.79 Despite 
relative quiet in the press, the bill faced a rough passage through Parliament owing 
chiefly to opposition over the proposed abolition of purchase. Nevertheless, aside from 
the concern of some militia colonels, and their supporters, over the loss of local control 
and the refusal of the government to bear all expenses paid out of the county rates, there 
was surprisingly little opposition considering the number of militia MPs; Appendix 1 
shows that, in 1870, there were 64 retired  or serving militia officers in the Commons. 
There was more concern from among the benches of the Lords. Two amendments were 
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proposed which aimed to avoid the transfer of the power to appoint commissions to the 
Secretary of State, although both ultimately failed on the understanding that the right to 
nominate first appointments was to be retained by the lords lieutenant.80 The Regulation 
of the Forces Act (34 and 35 Vict., c. 86), which passed onto the statue book in August 
1871, authorised the Secretary of State to direct by an order in council that the lords 
lieutenant¶ MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU WKH PLOLWLD ZRXOG EH ZLWKGUDZQ RQ  0DUFK 
Henceforth the War Office could formally direct when and where the militia were to 
assemble for training, while Parliament gained the power to directly increase or decrease 
WKHIRUFH¶VVL]H<HWVRPHRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDOFKDQJHVZHUHQRWDVIXQGDPHQWDODVWKH\
first appeared. In addition to retaining the right to nominate individuals for first 
appointments, they were also permitted to continue to appoint deputy lieutenants and in 
the event of a reversion to the ballot, to hold authority over its implementation.81 
 Cardwell went even further by proposing that regular and militia battalions should 
be formally linked as part of his wider scheme for localisation. One of the primary 
motives behind this was that it would encourage militia recruits to transfer to the regular 
army. However, he also hoped that it would benefit the militia by increasing their 
efficiency through training alongside the regulars. Introduced into the Commons in 
February 1872, the Localisation Bill proposed to formally divide the country into 66 sub-
districts, each of which would house two line battalions alongside their associated militia 
infantry battalions and rifle volunteer corps, forming an administrative brigade under the 
command of a regular colonel, although under his command militia battalions would 
remain under the command of their own officers. The much maligned practice of billeting 
regiments while assembled for training was to be avoided by encamping militia units at 
WKHLUGHSRW$OORIWKHPLOLWLD¶VDUPVDFFRXWUHPHQWVDQGFORWKLQJZHUHWREHFHQWUDOLVHGDW
the new depot as were the permanent staff, with the eventual aim that new staff 
appointments would be made from regular NCOs among their linked battalions. In order 
to make the scheme a reality Cardwell requested that an additional £3,500,000 be raised 
in order to pay for the construction of 26 new depots and the conversion of 40 already 
occupied, a substantial investment of public expenditure in a government dominated by 
the desire for savings from the estimates. Despite the unprecedented nature of the scheme 
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the measures passed through Parliament, reaching the statute book in July with far less 
KRVWLOLW\WKDQ&DUGZHOO¶VSUHYLRXVELOOGHVSLWHIDPLOLDUFRQFHUQVIURPDPLQRULW\RIPLOLWLD
officers over a loss of control, recruitment, the further transfer of men to the line, the role 
of the permanent staff, and the added pressure of a possible influx of ex-regular officers 
upon promotion prospects.82  
It soon became clear, however, that actually delivering localisation was easier 
said than done. One major concern was that it effectively challenged the right of the 
PLOLWLD¶VFRPmanding officers to oversee their own recruitment once relocated to the new 
GHSRW ZKLFK LQVWHDG EHFDPH WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI HDFK EULJDGH¶V FRPPDQGLQJ RIILFHU
Nevertheless, there were also difficulties owing to the sheer scale of the construction 
programme for the new depots. By 1876 only 40 of the 70 brigade depots had been 
formed, and of these just eight had a completed set of facilities, while a further 54 were in 
the process of constructing them.83 This meant that for some units it could be many years 
before localisation became a reality. There were also concerns over the financial impact 
upon the county authorities. The Localisation Act itself had authorised that local officials 
were able to transfer to the War Office any lands or buildings they owned for the use of 
the militia. However, the act made no provision to compensate them for the significant 
expenditure of originally purchasing or constructing the facilities. As a result Cardwell 
was forced to pass additional legislation which ensured the county authorities could be 
compensated for any buildings or land transferred to the jurisdiction of the War Office, 
and that if such were not required local officials had the right to sell them in order to 
regain their investment.84   
 Before leaving the War Office after the Liberal defeat in August 1873, Cardwell 
further brought the militia into line with the regulars by passing legislation (36 and 37 
Vict. c. 68) which extended the term of enlistment from five to six years, the same period 
most regulars would serve before joining the army reserve under the new scheme of short 
                                                 
82
 Spiers, Late Victorian Army, p. 19; TNA, PRO 30/48/3, Cardwell papers, correspondence with the 
Queen, 1871, letter from Cardwell to the Queen, December 1871; PP, Memorandum by His Royal Highness 
the Field-Marshal Commanding in Chief on the proposal of the Secretary of State for war for the 
organization of the various military land forces of the country; and report of a committee on the details 
involved therein., C. 493, (1872), pp. 3-13; HC Deb., 22 February 1872, vol. 209, cc. 879-916 (cc. 893-
906); Ibid., 4 March 1872, vol. 209, cc. 1328-81 (cc. 1365-8, 1370-1, 1378-9), 
83
 PP, Report of the committee appointed by the Secretary of State for War to enquire into certain 
questions that have arisen with respect to the militia and the present brigade depot system; together with 
minutes of evidence, appendix, and index., C. 1654, C. 1654-I, (1877), p. iii. 
84
 See 35 and 36 Vict., c. 68, s. 10, 36 and 37 Vict. c. 68, s. 8, and, 36 and 37 Vict. c. 84, s. 2. 





service enlistment.85 )DU IURP GLYHUJLQJ IURP KLV VWUDWHJ\ &DUGZHOO¶V &RQVHUYDWLYH
successors Gathorne Hardy and Frederick Stanley continued to implement his reforms, 
hardly surprising considering the considerable public expenditure which had been 
earmarked for the scheme. Firstly, in June 1874 Hardy passed legislation (37 and 38 Vict. 
FSHUPLWWLQJ WKHPLOLWLD WR LQ IXWXUHEHRUJDQLVHGDQGGLUHFWHGµE\ UR\DOZDUUDQWV
orders and regulations to the same extent as the regular army, instead of through 
Parliament.86 Secondly, the following August he consolidated much of the existing 
legislation into a single Act (38 and 39 Vict. c. 69), repealing in whole or in part 29 
individual pieces of legislation dating back as far as 1803, and uniting the regulation of 
the militia across the entirety of the UK, although its most significant feature was that for 
the first time it permitted militia units to serve abroad ± they were now not only able to 
volunteer for service in the Channel Islands (permitted since 1859), but henceforth also 
Malta and Gibraltar ± without the need for temporary enabling legislation, although 
commanding officers were reminded that such offers were voluntary and, as clarified in 
1882 (45 and 46 Vict. c. 49), required at least three-quarters of the men to consent. 
 +DUG\¶V RQJRLQJ FRQFHUQV RYHU WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI ORFDOLVDWLRQ OHG WR KLV
establishment in 1876 of a royal commission which would investigate the impact of the 
scheme upon the militia, concluding that localisation should be taken to its logical 
conclusion through the unification of linked regular and militia battalions into single 
territorial regiments. The findings were later echoed by another committee aimed 
specifically at examining the feasibility of the recommendations, although it was 
acknowledged there could be difficulties amalgamating some regular and militia 
battalions into single regiments.87 Yet despite the recommendation, it was left to 
&DUGZHOO¶V/LEHUDl successor Hugh Childers to take such a step despite some pressure to 
abandon the linking principal entirely.88 In March 1881 he proposed to create 67 new 
territorial regiments within which the militia would for the most part form the third and 
fourth battalions. Controversially, they were to abandon their own uniform and assume 
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the identity of their new regiment, distinguished simply through beDULQJ WKH OHWWHU µ0¶
upon the shoulder straps. It was also reconfirmed that the responsibility for recruitment 
for both the regular and militia battalions was formally invested in each GHSRW¶VUHJXODU
VWDIIXQGHU WKH VXSHULQWHQGHQFHRI WKH UHJLPHQW¶V FRPPDQGLQJRIILFHU 5HFUXLWV XQOHVV
their headquarters were located away from the territorial depot, were to be trained 
immediately upon enlistment at the depot and under the supervision of the regular staff, 
and in 1882 a general order prohibited the system of recruit training at preliminary drill 
outright.89 
 Despite its successful implementation, there were some difficulties which arose 
from the reality of forcing regular and militia battalions with their own separate identities 
into single regiments. Firstly, not all regular and militia regiments were included in the 
territorialisation scheme. BRWKWKHWK.LQJ¶V5R\DO Rifle Corps and the Rifle Brigade 
were exempt owing to their recruiting upon a national basis, the headquarters of which 
were located at Winchester. This created an anomaly whereby their associated militia 
battalions (the Huntingdonshire, Royal Flint, 2nd Royal Middlesex, North Cork, and 
&DUORZ 5HJLPHQWV DQG WKH .LQJ¶V 2ZQ DQG 4XHHQ¶V 2ZQ 7RZHU +DPOHWV 5HJLPHQWs 
respectively) were, in effect, without an associated sub-district. Secondly, as with the 
more modest localisation scheme, there were also practical concerns that if regiments 
were forced to leave their traditional headquarters then it might adversely affect not just 
their esprit de corps, but also their ability to recruit. By 1880 there were still 23 English 
and Welsh regiments which had not relocated to their brigade depot despite the fact that 
all, with the exception of that in Newcastle, were ready to receive them. The residents of 
Hertford, unhappy at the proposed relocation of their regiment to Bedfordshire (on 
account of it becoming the 4th Bedfordshire Regiment), founded a private company 
aimed at raising funds for the construction of a permanent barracks in the town, 
successfully collecting £6,000 through the issue of 600 shares price at £10 each. They 
succeeded and subsequently rented the new depot back to the War Office as the 
EDWWDOLRQ¶VGHSRW)XUWKHUPRUHLWZDVEHOLHYHGVRPHXQLWVZRXOGEHQHILWIURPUHPDLQLQJ
at their existing headquarters. For instance, the 4th Norfolk Regiment continued to train 
in Great Yarmouth as it had in the majority of years since 1852, only transferring its 
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headquarters to the regimental depot at Norwich in 1888.90  
Territorialisation was not just limited to militia infantry battalions. In April 1882 a 
general order reorganised the Royal Artillery into two brigades of horse artillery, four 
brigades of field artillery and eleven territorial divisions of garrison artillery. The 37 
militia garrison artillery corps were henceforth divided between ten of the eleven districts 
according to their location, the exception being London where no militia artillery units 
had been raised. Within each division the first brigade consisted of a regular unit, the 
militia forming the junior brigades. As a result of this each unit was forced to drop its 
FRXQW\ WLWOH LQFOXGLQJ DQ\ µUR\DO¶ prefix, assuming instead the brigade number and 
divisional title. For instance, the Hampshire Artillery became the 2nd Brigade Southern 
Division, and the Edinburgh Artillery the 3rd Brigade Scottish Division. Nevertheless, 
due to the unpopularity of the move some corps, including the Royal Carmarthen 
Artillery and Royal Pembroke Artillery, unofficially rejected the new designations, 
preferring instead to continue using their county titles. The main problem with the new 
arrangement was that the distribution of militia artillery corps allotted to each division 
bore no relation to the coastal defences they were supposed to garrison, instead 
depending, firstly, upon how many brigades could be raised in each division and, 
secondly, whether or not there were already Royal Garrison Artillery Volunteer units 
raised in particular areas. This meant that of 37 militia artillery brigades only six were 
allotted to the four divisions responsible for defending a stretch of coast extending from 
.LQJ¶V/\QQWRWKH,VOHRI:ight; by comparison 14 alone were raised in Ireland, six in 
Scotland and four in Wales. The militia artillery was again reorganised in 1889 after the 
eleven territorial divisions were abolished and the entirety of the force redistributed into 
three new large divisions, while each brigade was again permitted to once use their 
county titles, although none of the brigades which had previously been designated as 
µUR\DO¶ZHUHDOORZHGWRUHWDLQWKHWLWOH7KLVPHDQWWKDWIRULQVWDQFHERWKWKH+DPSVKLUH
Artillery and Edinburgh Artillery were henceforth allotted to a greatly enlarged Southern 
Division.91  
 The closer association of the artillery shows there was a belief the militia as a 
whole could become an auxiliary for the whole of the army, not just the infantry. Yet one 
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area of growing importance which had no affiliated reserve in the militia was the Royal 
Engineers.92 2ZLQJWRWKHLQFUHDVLQJO\WHFKQLFDOQDWXUHRIWKHDUP\¶VVHUYLFHLWZDVFOHDU
the Royal Engineers required the same auxiliary support provided for the other parts of 
the army. Therefore, in 1876 both the Royal Anglesey and Royal Monmouthshire Light 
Infantry were selected for conversion into engineers. Although remote from the Royal 
Engineers headquarters at Chatham, both units had access to surrounding countryside 
suitable for training purposes and a pool of recruits from more technical backgrounds in 
mining and heavy industry ± it has also been suggested that the prior success of raising 
volunteer engineer corps in industrial parts of England and Scotland precluded a further 
reliance upon such areas. In the case of the Royal Monmouthshire Light Infantry, Garnet 
Wolseley, the Assistant Adjutant-General, was familiar with the regiment after inspecting 
it in 1874, during which he praised its officers, internal economy, discipline and drill. 
This may have also influenced his decision to select the regiment for conversion. The fact 
that it went ahead was testament to the consent of the commanding officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel John Francis Vaughan, and his belief that his officers and men were highly 
suitable for the role and could be instructed in their new duties with relative ease. 
However, not everyone connected to the regiment was happy about the change. Most 
notably the Duke of Beaufort, Lord Lieutenant RI0RQPRXWKVKLUHFKDVWLVHG9DXJKDQ¶V
acquiescence to the conversion and his lack of consultation with the other officers over 
WKHGHFLVLRQ ODPHQWLQJ WKDW WKH\ZRXOGQR ORQJHUEHD µVPDUW OLJKW LQIDQWU\5HJLPHQW¶
There is also evidence to suggest that the officers were not particularly enthusiastic; one 
anonymously voiced his feelings through a poem published in The Sapper lamenting the 
almost leisurely nature of their existing training and bemoaning the more technical nature 
of the engineers.93 
The following years also saw the establishment of militia submarine mining 
corps. Tasked with defending key waterways against naval attack, the first corps was 
established in November 1878 when the Hampshire (later Portsmouth Division) 
Submarine Miners was establisKHGIURPDPRQJORFDOµDUWL]DQVDQGPHFKDQLFV¶ZKRZHUH
to be trained in the use of torpedoes and submarine mines. It remained the only such unit 
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until two additional companies were raised in Devon and Kent in 1884, the new units 
based at Plymouth and Chatham respectively. That year the force was also reorganised 
upon a divisional structure similar to that of the artillery. Further units were subsequently 
established across the country: in 1888 three new divisions were formed at Harwich, 
Milford Haven and the River Severn, while in 1891 and 1892 two existing volunteer 
submarine mining corps were converted into militia units at Hull and Falmouth. By 1902 
a total of ten divisions were stationed along a stretch of coast from Milford Haven to the 
Humber, although it was deemed unnecessary to raise additional units in the North of 
England or Scotland as volunteer corps had already been established there for the same 
purpose. By comparison to the engineer regiments in Wales, the submarine mining 
divisions were relatively small in size. For instance, in 1884 the Hampshire Submarine 
Miners had an establishment of just two companies consisting of five officers, seven 
permanent NCOs, twelve volunteer NCOs and 148 sappers. However, compared to others 
they were comparatively large as both the Kent and Devon Submarine Miners consisted 
of just a single company.94 
 Furthermore, in keeping with the growing importance of the support service to the 
operation of the regular army, in 1891 a company was established at Aldershot to provide 
the militia with a dedicated unit for the provision of medical support. By 1902 this had 
expanded to twelve companies organised across the country, their purpose to support the 
Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC), recently formed in 1898, and extending to them 
the same expansionary and supportive capability in times of war afforded to the rest of 
the army. This meant that in the event of the RAMC proceeding abroad to support the 
regular army in the field there would continue to be a reserve providing medical support 
for those forces remaining in the UK.95 
One of the main themes of militia reforms from the mid-1860s onwards was that 
WKH\VWURYHWRZDUGVWKHLPSURYHPHQWRIWKHPLOLWLD¶VWUDLQLQJ,QLWLDOO\IXUWKHUDWWHPSWVWR
increase the length of the annual training faltered mainly due to concerns over the impact 
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XSRQ HPSOR\HUV¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR WROHUDWH D PLOLWLDPDQ¶V DEVHQFH ,Q  LW ZDV EULHIO\
extended to 56 days, but despite being observed by every battalion except those in 
Berkshire (on account of the proportion of agricultural labourers who were required for 
the harvest) the following year it was once again reduced to 27 days.96 Crucially, 
however, the period of preliminary training was extended significantly. The Regulation 
of the Forces Act gave the mLOLWLD¶VFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHUVWKHDELOLW\WRLQFUHDVHWKHSHULRG
of their preliminary drill up to a maximum of six months. In reality no unit extended its 
recruit training to the maximum permitted due to the impact such a move would 
undoubtedly have had upon discouraging potential recruits, again over fears for job 
security.97 Nevertheless, during the 1870s the majority of units did increase their recruits 
training to 56 days which from 1883 became the standard length of recruit training 
whether or not they were trained on enlistment at the depot or by their own battalion 
away from the headquarters.98  
Extra provision was also made for militia units to undergo brigade level training 
in peacetime. In 1867 the War Office experimented by inviting regiments near Aldershot 
to serve out their annual training at the camp. Five units duly accepted (the Royal 
Berkshire, 1st and 2nd Royal Surrey, Oxfordshire, and Hampshire Regiments) and as a 
result were able to take part in more advanced manoeuvres in conjunction with other 
militia regular units, most notably as part of a field day comprising the entire division 
stationed at the camp. The good conduct of the militia despite the poor weather prompted 
the Commander in Chief to recommend that the system be extended to other camps 
including those at Shorncliffe and the Curragh. As a result in the following year a War 
Office circular authorised the formation of brigades at the principal military stations, 
while any militia units whose headquarters coincided with a regular regiment could also 
train together for a few days during the last week of their annual training. Both the 1st 
and 2nd Royal Surrey Regiment and the Hampshire Regiment again proceeded to 
Aldershot, while in the following years other regiments, such as the Bedfordshire 
Regiment at Woburn Park in 1869, took the opportunity to partake in brigade field 
exercises for the first time.99  
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Therefore, from 1868 onwards there was a clear drive towards a more collective 
and comprehensive training regime. From 1869 the annual trainings of the East Kent 
Regiment were not simply limited to the parade square, but encompassed outpost duty in 
WKHVXUURXQGLQJFRXQWU\VLGHDVZHOODVILHOGH[HUFLVHVPRFNVNLUPLVKHVDQGµVKDPILJKWV¶
with other units garrisoned at either Dover or Canterbury, and later at the military camp 
at Shorncliffe. For instance, in 1880 they frequently marched into the surrounding 
countryside to practice outpost duty before joining a brigade field day at Canterbury, 
while in 1881 they partook in a simulated attack XSRQµLPDJLQDU\KHLJKWV¶DORQJVLGHPHQ
of the regimental depot, the East Kent Rifle Volunteers, the cavalry depot and a battery of 
Royal Horse Artillery. Urban units including the 7th Rifle Brigade also frequently trained 
away from headquarters, principally at Aldershot and on some occasions Shorncliffe. 
Units such as the 3rd Bedfordshire Regiment were fortunate enough to have ample 
suitable ground on which to encamp and practice field exercises. For instance, after 1896 
they frequently assembled for training at Ampthill Park, the estate of the later 
commanding officers of the battalion, Lord Ampthill. In Scotland the Edinburgh Light 
Infantry was brigaded at Glencorse. Although training largely continued to centre on 
traditional drill and parade, in 1878 it WRRNSDUWLQDµJUDQGVKDP¶EDWWOHLQ4XHHQ¶V3DUN
Edinburgh. Nevertheless, the condition of the camp concerned the Lord Lieutenant and 
Colonel of the regiment, the Duke of Buccleuch, who commented that the station was too 
small to act as an effective brigade headquarters with insufficient room to draw out the 
entire regiment for drill in line at any one time, and that owing to poor weather it was a 
thoroughly unpleasant experience for the encamped men.100 However, any chances that 
the localisation scheme would enable militiamen to train alongside their linked regular 
battalions, fostering greater links between the two, was tenuous at best. From 1873 to 
1881 the East Kent Regiment did not once train with either, one of which was stationed 
in Bengal and the other at Limerick. Instead, when in May 1875 the regiment was at 
Dover for field exercises, it trained alongside men from 7th Royal Fusiliers, 90th Light 
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Infantry and 104th Bengal Fusiliers.101 
 The military authorities recognised that enabling the militia to train alongside 
other units was beneficial to both the efficiency of the officers and men. However, not all 
units were able to reap the benefits of such an arrangement. Initially such was limited to 
only a handful of suitable, and predominantly urban, locations (Winchester, Plymouth, 
Colchester, Salford, Sheffield, Dover, Edinburgh, Perth, Sterling, Preston and 
Chichester).102 Although the establishment of brigade depots went some way to give 
others the opportunity to train alongside regular units, it became increasingly clear that 
the best opportunities to do so were afforded at one of the principal military camps at 
Aldershot, Shorncliffe, Colchester, Strensall and the Curragh. However, such 
opportunities were largely monopolised by just a handful of units. For instance, of the 11 
annual training periods held from 1879 up to and including 1889, just 13 (out of a total of 
139) units were brigaded with the regular army in more than five of the recorded years, 
while a further 49 did so at least once; even more concerning was that 77 were never able 
to do so. During this period the 3rd East Surrey Regiment was stationed at Aldershot for 
all but two of their annual training periods, while the 4th Oxfordshire Regiment did so in 
each year over the same period. Shorncliffe was frequently used by the 3rd East Kent 
Regiment and, from 1882, both the 3rd and 4th Royal West Kent Regiment. By 
comparison, only a handful of northern militia battalions managed to brigade at Strensall, 
the 3rd West Yorkshire Regiment doing so on three occasions and the 3rd Derbyshire 
Regiment twice during the 1880s, while others including the 4th and 5th Derbyshire and 
3rd and 4th Manchester Regiments did so once. In 1890 it was recognised that, aside 
from the political objections some had to withdrawing militia battalions from their 
headquarters, the main thing that precluded over half of all battalions from having the 
opportunity to brigade was the cost of transporting the men over large distances. As a 
solution the royal commission examining the militia in 1890 suggested that a roster 
should be established so that each battalion could take turns in proceeding to the principal 
camps. As an alternative they suggested, if the situation permitted, that battalions form 
their own brigade camps alongside regular battalions garrisoned within their own district, 
a practice that some such as the 3rd Royal Scots Regiment (late Edinburgh Light 
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Infantry) had already undertaken since the 1870s.103 This appeared to have had some 
success. For instance, prior to 1890 the 4th Norfolk Regiment conducted recruit musketry 
GULOODQGWKHEDWWDOLRQ¶VDQQXDOWUDLQLQJDWWKH6RXWK'HQHVLQ*UHDW<DUPRXWKDVLWKDG
most years since 1852. Afterwards the battalion was twice sent to Colchester in 1890 and 
1896 while later, in 1899, it formed part of a militia brigade encamped at Great Yarmouth 
itself; they again proceeded to in 1903.104 
 There were also attempts to increase the amount of time devoted to musketry 
practice at both the recruit and annual trainings in an attempt to close the gap between 
militiamen and the line. In 1872 a general order introduced the practice of awarding good 
shooting badges as already issued in the line, while two years later the militia regulations 
were updated to allow prizes to also be issued for proficient musketry.105 By 1890 it was 
recognised, according to the officer commanding at Hythe, that the standard of musketry 
in militia battalions had on the whole increased, although it still remained inferior to that 
of the line. The main drawback was that militiamen simply had fewer chances to practice 
firing their weapons: not only did they fired fewer rounds each year than a regular 
soldier, 40 compared to 100, but the limited training period meant any bad weather could 
reduce time spent at the ranges even further. Despite such improvements, there were 
some battalions which were inconvenienced by lacking access to adequate range facilities 
near their headquarters. There were no sufficient range facilities in Newcastle-upon-Tyne 
for the use of the 3rd Northumberland Fusiliers, although fortunately the battalion was 
able to access those situated 13 miles to the east at Tynemouth. In the South the 3rd and 
4th Oxfordshire Light Infantry undertook their musketry training at Aldershot, 45 miles 
from their regimental depot. Nevertheless, the UK¶s extensive rail network meant units 
which hitherto would have lacked sufficient facilities at least had some access, even if it 
required them to travel.106  
 Greater provision was also given over to more specialised training to be offered to 
ERWKWKHRIILFHUVDQGPHQRIWKHPLOLWLD¶VDUWLOOHU\DQGQHZO\IRUPHGHQJLQHHUXQLWVZLWK
the effect that they were arguably better trained than their infantry counterparts. Both 
field artillerymen and engineers received longer periods of training than their 
counterparts within the infantry and garrison artillery due to the more specialised nature 
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of their training. By the end of the century engineer recruits would be expected to 
assemble for 104 days training prior to their annual training which, depending on the year 
and unit, lasted between 41 and 56 days. Submarine miners were trained for even longer, 
recruits undertaking 132 days of training prior to joining their units after which they 
would be expected to undertake 55 days of annual training. Additionally the engineers, 
submarine miners and field artillerymen trained on average for eight hours each day 
meaning that in each year the number of hours devoted to training was far in excess of 
that for the infantry and garrison artillery, both of which trained for on average just five 
hours each day.107  
The training programmes of both the artillery and engineers were also tailored to 
their specific roles. For instance, after their conversion the Royal Monmouthshire Royal 
Engineers began to conduct exercises in the construction of field fortifications, such 
duties were to be undertaken in addition to the basic drill expected of an infantry 
battalion and an altered course of musketry. The conversion itself was far from seamless: 
despite the fact that a new adjutant was appointed from the Royal Engineers, in March 
1877, to oversee the first annual training since the conversion, that year the regiment 
continued to train as light infantry due to a delay in receiving the necessary equipment. 
Both engineer regiments initially remained at their existing headquarters although they 
were later permitted to proceed to Chatham for more extensive training. For instance, due 
to the initially inadequate facilities at Monmouth the regiment trained away from their 
headquarters on five separate occasions (1885, 1887, 1889, 1893 and 1898), returning to 
Monmouth only once the training facilities had been improved. Furthermore, after the 
South African War the internal structure of both regiments was altered so that individual 
companies were tailored to specific roles. This meant that by April 1902 the two 
regiments consisted of two field companies, three railway companies, three bridging 
companies and two depot companies.108  
 
 * * * 
 
By the eve of the South African War the militia had without doubt changed significantly 
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compared to the 1850s. The Militia Act of 1852 was the culmination of eight years of 
debate over what form a renewed militia would take, set against the backdrop of public 
and governmental paranoia over invasion resulting from French aggrandisement. In the 
HQGLWZDV3DOPHUVWRQ¶VFRQFHSWRIDPLOLWLDRUJDQLVHGXSRQDQDWLRQDOEDVLVZKLFKZRQ
RXWDJDLQVW3HHO¶V µORFDOPLOLWLD¶7KLVPHDQW WKHPLOLWLDFRQWLQXHG WREHRUJDQLVHGDVD
national militia for home defence, yet organised and recruited upon a local basis. 
However, this was soon challenged by the insatiable demands of the regular army for 
manpower during both the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny. Temporarily at least, the 
militia was forced to take on a role as a second line in support of the regular army, 
supplanting and expanding the manpower available to the regular army. Such was not 
without some precedent as the militia had been forced to undertake a somewhat similar 
role during the Napoleonic Wars. By the early 1860s Herbert attempted to return 
somewhat to the status-quo by prohibiting the enlistment of militiamen to the line and 
maintaining its organisational independence. However, this was not based upon a desire 
to defer to the concerns of the milLWLD¶VVXSSRUWHUVLOOXVWUDWHGE\KLVDSSDUHQWZLOOLQJQHVV
to amalgamate small units. Instead, Herbert was more concerned with ensuring the quick 
UHFRYHU\ RI WKH IRUFH¶V VWUHQJWK DQG LPSURYLQJ LWV HIILFLHQF\ )LQDQFLDO UHVWULFWLRQV
prevented him from making any major improvements to their training which was often 
substandard in quality and lacking sufficient facilities, arms and equipment.  
By the 1870s this had all changed, although it would be wrong to suggest 
&DUGZHOO¶VUHIRUPVZHUHDORQHLQVXFFHVVIXOO\ centralising the militia under War Office 
control and integrating it with the regular army. Indeed, he was preceded in many 
respects by the reforms implemented by Peel and Pakington, continuing a trend started by 
Peel in mid 1860s. However, there can be nRGRXEW&DUGZHOO¶VUHIRUPVDQGWKRVHRIKLV
VXFFHVVRU ZKLFK EXLOW XSRQ KLV VFKHPH ZHUH LQVWUXPHQWDO LQ HURGLQJ WKH PLOLWLD¶V
independence. That is not to say such integration was universal, as it is clear this varied 
upon a regimental level, with many maintaining a greater degree of autonomy. It is also 
clear many militia officers were apathetic to such changes as the proportion of militia 
officers represented in Parliament remained comparatively stable, even though most were 
Conservatives. Finally, it is important one acknowledges the fact that Cardwell was also 
motivated by the drive for the greater effectiveness of the militia, not just the line. For 
many units training improved so that it was not just on the whole longer, but also more 
comprehensive through the provision of greater opportunities for inter-unit manoeuvres 





and more complicated training exercises, not just basic drill upon the barrack square.  It 
also gave many units access to a far greater range of facilities than hitherto available. 
That is not to say these improvements were universal: far from it, as a significant 
proportion of the force continued to face obstacles to their improvement, a point which 
illustrates the high degree of variability between the efficacy of individual units. Yet 
there is no doubt that from the 1880s onwards the militia was far superior in the way it 
was trained, equipped and organised than prior, no longer simply comprising infantry and 
garrison artillery, but also field artillery, engineers, submarine miners and a small 
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2. The Officer Corps. 
 
6LQFH WKH V WKHUH KDV EHHQ DQ XSVXUJH RI VFKRODUO\ LQWHUHVW LQ WKH %ULWLVK $UP\¶V
officer corps during the Victorian and Edwardian periods, charting its rising 
professionalism, social composition and place as a social institution in contemporary 
Victorian and Edwardian society.1 %\ FRPSDULVRQ RXU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH PLOLWLD¶V
officer corps is severely lacking. In the 1930s J. K. Dunlop argued that the officer corps 
was largely dawn from among the local landed gentry. He acknowledged that, after 1872, 
the militia played an important role in supplying candidates for the regular army through 
ZKDW ZDV FRQWHPSRUDULO\ WHUPHG WKH µPLOLWLD EDFNGRRU¶ ZKLFK DOORZHG SRWHQWLDO
candidates to circumvent the need to attend either Sandhurst or Woolwich).2 This 
DVVHVVPHQWZDV VXSSRUWHGE\ ODWHU VFKRODUVKLS$FHQWUDO WKHPHRI'XQFDQ$QGHUVRQ¶V
WKHVLV LV WKH LGHD WKDW WKH RIILFHU FRUSV HIIHFWLYHO\ IRUPHG D µPLOLWLD SDUW\¶ ZKLFK
maintained the survival of the force in the years before the 1852 reform. He later argues 
WKDW WKH UHFRQVWLWXWHG PLOLWLD¶V RIILFHU FRUSV HVVHQWLDOO\ UHVHPEOHG µFOXEV¶ ZKHUH IDPLO\
FRQQHFWLRQV DQG ODQGHG ZHDOWK ZHUH SDUDPRXQW ,W ZDV µFRPPDQGHG E\ D JURXS ZKR
were socially and economically of a higher order than that demanded by the legal 
PLQLPXP TXDOLILFDWLRQV¶ ZKLOH LWV MXQLRU RIILFHUV WHQGHG WR EH PHPEHUV RI WKH µOHVVHU
JHQWU\¶RUµJUHDWHU\HRPDQU\¶$VDUHVXOWIRUPHUUHJXODURIILFHUVDQGSURIHVVLRQDOVZHUH
unable to make any significant inroads into gaining commissions. He also rejects the 
impression given by regimental histories that, in 1852, the whole officer corps had been 
reconstituted, arguing that there were in fact many officers retained their commission 
after the reform.3 /DWHU ,DQ%HFNHWWHFKRHGPDQ\RI$QGHUVRQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQV VLPLODUO\
arguing that sixty per cent of militia officers had been commissioned before the reform 
and also that many middle-class professionals and former regulars missed out upon 
taking commissions.4 
This chapter will show that some of the existing conclusions regarding the 
PLOLWLD¶V RIILFHU FRUSV DUH FRUUHFW DOWKRXJK DV HOVHZKHUH LQ WKLV VWXG\ WKH ORFDOLVHG
nature of the force meant there were many units which bucked national patterns. When 
reconstituted in 1852, the Militia Act did little to radically alter the source and means by 
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which militia officers were obtained. Initially the authority to appoint commissions 
remained with the lords lieutenant, although it was largely left to commanding officers to 
nominate individuals. It was not until 1872 that this power was formally stripped 
(although they retained the right to nominate candidates to a first appointment). 
Patronage remained a crucial means by which potential candidates were able to secure 
commissions. Promotion within regiments was largely by seniority, although property 
qualifications meant vacancies for the rank of captain and above were, before 1869, 
technically out of reach of officers who did not qualify (unless they had previously served 
in the regular army). It will also be seen that the degree of continuity between the 
PLOLWLD¶VRIILFHUFRUSVEHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHUHIRUPKDVEHHQODUJHO\H[DJJHUDWHGDOWKRXJK
there did remain a useful nucleus of senior officers around which units could reconstitute. 
Furthermore, although as a whole there remained only a small proportion of former 
regular officers, amongst the senior ranks there was a far higher proportion than has been 
argued.  
It will also be seen that the officer corps had serious problems in terms of 
maintaining its strength despite some concessions towards opening up commissions to a 
more diverse talent pool. At no point between 1862 and 1907 did the officer corps meet 
its establishment, a key reason being the weakening of the traditional social ties with the 
landed gentry (itself decreasing due to the impact of agricultural depression).  The 
abolition of property qualifications in 1869 as a means of trying to encourage more 
candidates for commissions, combined with the openiQJRIWKHµPLOLWLDEDFNGRRU¶WRWKRVH
VHHNLQJDUHJXODUFRPPLVVLRQ OHGWRDUHYLYDO LQWKHRIILFHUFRUSV¶VVWUHQJWK+RZHYHU
this came at the price of further severing its traditional ties with the landed gentry. Such 
independent gentlemen were increasingly supplanted by professionals, businessmen and 
those simply looking to join the regular army. Yet the social makeup of the officer corps 
was even more nuanced than has been acknowledged, as several units based in urban 
areas had never been reliant upon the landed gentry as a source of officers. Also it is 
important not to overplay the decline of landed gentlemen as some units bucked the wider 
decline owing to the circumstances of the local economy and the personal links of the 
commanding officers.  
It will also be seen that the opening of line commissions to militia officers was 
itself not as wholly successful, or indeed as unique, as it may first appear (having been 
used as a temporary expedient during the 1850s and earlier during the Napoleonic Wars). 
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Although it accounted for the greatest single source of regular officers, highlighting the 
inability of the Royal Military Academy (RMA) and Royal Military College (RMC) to 
supply sufficient candidates, the esprit de corps and close links so desired by Cardwell 
and Childers failed to appear, as most officers simply did not opt to transfer to their 
linked battalions (some even deciding to seek commissions in colonial corps).  
Finally, it will also be shown that pay and allowances were wholly inadequate to 
enable militia officers to survive without a considerable private income. The cost of 
equipping oneself and the high costs of messing, and maintaining one¶s social position 
within the regiment, continued to inhibit many of more humble means from opting for a 
militia commission (at least not without some considerable difficulty). 
 
* * * 
 
When reconstituted in 1852, in many respects, the way in which the PLOLWLD¶V officer 
corps was organised and recruited remained the same as it had since the last century. 
Before Parliament the Home Secretary, Spencer Walpole, was FOHDUµQRFKDQJHZKDWHYHU
ZDV FRQWHPSODWHG E\ WKH SUHVHQW %LOO¶5 The power to appoint militia officers was to 
remain with the lords lieutenant subject to the approval of the crown (although if such 
was not received after 14 days, the decision of the former was to be final), just as it had 
VLQFHWKHµQHZPLOLWLD¶was initially reformed in 1757. In order to maintain the connection 
between militia units and members of the local landed gentry, the bill reconfirmed that 
most officers would still have to meet property requirements for each step in rank which 
would continue to be based upon those established in 1802 (which themselves had largely 
remained unchanged since 1786). In most large English counties, possession of an estate 
valued at no less than £1,000 per annum was required for a colonelcy, £600 for a 
lieutenant-colonelcy, £400 for a majority, £200 for a captaincy, £50 for a lieutenancy, or 
£20 for an ensigncy. Heirs-apparent could also qualify although the amount required was 
double that compared to if they held it in person (for ensigns £50). Also, it was required 
WKDWDWOHDVWKDOIRIWKHSURSHUW\RUODQGYDOXHGWRZDUGVRIILFHUV¶TXDOLILFDWLRQVVKRXOGEH
located in the county of the unit for which they were applying. The only major changes 
introduced by the new bill were aimed at opening commissions to a more diverse pool of 
SRWHQWLDORIILFHUVDQGDV:DOSROHDUJXHGWRJHWµJRRGRIILFHUVWRFRPPDQGWKHPLOLWLD¶
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Therefore, all requirements for subalterns were abolished, while the existing 
qualifications would be dropped altogether for retired or half-pay regular officers, or 
those from the East India Company Service (EICS), who had served at least five years. It 
also reconfirmed a smaller set of qualifications for several English counties (Cumberland, 
Huntingdon, Monmouthshire, Westmoreland, Rutland and the Isle of Ely) and those in 
Wales: no less than £600 for a colonelcy, £400 for a lieutenant-colonelcy, £200 for a 
majority, or £150 for a captaincy (lowered to just £100 in Ely), with those for subalterns 
also abolished. A similar set of qualifications for cities and corporate towns regarded as 
legally separate from their surrounding counties was also upheld: no less than £300 for a 
colonelcy, lieutenant-colonelcy and majority, and £100 for a captaincy. Officers raised 
for units from the City of London were also given a lower set of qualifications.6 
When the Scottish militia was reconstituted in 1854, the legislation continued to 
recognise its own separate set of qualifications. Applicants for a colonelcy (or their heirs 
apparent) required an estate valued at no less than £600 per annum, £400 for a lieutenant-
colonelcy, or £300 for a majority or captaincy. Qualifications in the City of Edinburgh 
and its liberties were lower still, just £200 or more per-annum for a lieutenant-colonelcy, 
or £100 for a majority or captaincy. Members of the Royal College of Surgeons also 
retained their exemption from such qualifications altogether.7  
Property qualifications would remain in force until finally abolished in 1869. 
However, that did not mean there were not changes made to those laid down by previous 
legislation. Panmure admitted that there was little merit for the continued discrepancies 
between the property qualifications in the various parts of the UK. Therefore, in 1855, he 
successfully introduced legislation which ensured qualifications were standardised across 
the UK, fixing them at the same rates as already applied in Scottish, Welsh and in several 
small English counties. This meant those applying for a colonelcy would now only 
require land or an estate valued at no less than £600 per annum, while just £400 was 
required for a lieutenant-colonelcy, £300 for a majority or £200 for a captaincy; the same 
qualifications were required of heirs-apparent. The only exceptions were to be those for 
the cities of London and Edinburgh, which were to remain separate. There was also the 
provision for younger sons to qualify for commissions to a captaincy and majority if they 
were the son of anyone meeting the requisite qualification (£200 and £300 respectively). 
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7KH ILUVW VWHSZDVDOVR WDNHQ LQRIILFLDOO\EUHDNLQJGRZQ WKH OLQNEHWZHHQ WKHPLOLWLD¶V
officer corps and local county society, as the landed estate which qualified an individual 
for a commission could now be located anywhere.8 
One further change, which was laid down in a War Office circular of March 1853, 
was that all new appointments to the rank of colonel were to be henceforth honorary only 
and appointed at the discretion of the lords lieutenant. This meant that the day-to-day 
command of a regiment would be exercised by the lieutenant-colonel, although all 
colonels still serving were able to retain command until they retired. Honorary colonels, 
who were expected to be influential members of the local landed gentry, would retain a 
role in assisting the lords lieutenant in the superintendence of their units and to encourage 
the recruitment of local gentlemen, but not in any way to take active command of the 
regiment.9 Unsurprisingly there was some resistance to the scheme due to the fears that it 
could lead to confusion over who would have ultimate authority over the regiment. This 
was echoed by the Lord Lieutenant for County Durham, the 3rd Marquess of 
Londonderry, who fHDUHGFRORQHOVZRXOGEHµSXWRQWKHVKHOI¶DQGWKDWZLWKRXWIXOOSD\
and lacking in any real responsibilities towards the running of their regiments, they would 
have little interest in encouraging potential officers and men to join the regiment.10  
The changes made to property qualifications beg the question as to the degree of 
FRQWLQXLW\ EHWZHHQ WKH PLOLWLD¶V RIILFHU FRUSV SULRU WR DQG LPPHGLDWHO\ DIWHU
reconstitution in 1852. Nonetheless, this is a key question which has been unsatisfactorily 
answered by existing works. The existing historiography largely argues that the majority 
of officers present after reconstitution were commissioned prior to the reform. Duncan 
Anderson rejects the impression given by regimental histories that, in 1852, the whole 
officer corps had been reconstituted, arguing that key sources, such as the army lists, had 
been misinterpreted by chroniclers lacking experience with such material. For instance, 
the author of a regimental history examining the West Kent Regiment gave the 
imprHVVLRQWKHUHJLPHQW¶VRIILFHUVZHUHSUHGRPLQDQWO\QHZDSSRLQWPHQWV ,QIDFWPDQ\
officers had been promoted, a detail that was missed because the army lists showed the 
date on which an officer gained their current rank and not the date they joined the 
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regiment. As a result it gave the false impression that the regiment was almost entirely 
reconstituted. He argued that those able to use further source material saw, instead, a 
gradual, not sudden, change of the junior officer corps. Later, Ian Beckett also argued that 
sixty per cent of militia officers had been commissioned before the reform.11 
More detailed analysis shows that any assertion of a gradual change is 
FKDOOHQJHDEOH%HFNHWW¶VDVVHUWLRQPD\ZHOOKDYHEHHQDFFXUDWHLQDQGEXWE\
1854 the vast majority of officers had, in fact, been only recently commissioned, although 
there was a great variation depending on rank. Table 2.1 illustrates that, in 1854, only 33 
per cent of officers in England and Wales were commissioned prior to 1852. In Scotland, 
in 1856, the proportion was slightly less, at 29 per cent. What is clear, however, is that 
there were a far larger proportion of senior officers commissioned before 1852 when 
compared to the junior ranks, amounting to 66 and 68 per cent in England and Wales 
respectively, and 53 per cent in Scotland. By comparison only 28, 26 and 25 per cent of 
junior officers had been commissioned before the reform.  
:KDW ERWK $QGHUVRQ DQG %HFNHWW¶V VWXGLHV DOVR IDLOHG WR H[SORUH ZDV WKH ZLGH
disparity between different units. The 1852 reform saw the creation of 17 new English 
and two new Scottish regiments which were officered by new appointments, although a 
small but significant minority had been commissioned prior to the reform with other 
units. Of those units predating the reform, some were almost entirely officered by those 
commissioned prior to the reform, while others had almost none. The Royal Denbighshire 
Regiment had the highest proportion of officers commissioned prior to 1852, both field 
officers and seven of the ten junior officers (amounting to 75 per cent RIWKHUHJLPHQW¶V
officers). Similarly both the Leicester and Suffolk Artillery Regiments had very high 
proportions, all three field officers and six of the ten junior officers in the former, and two 
of the three field officers and seven of the ten junior officers in the latter (69 per cent of 
WKH UHJLPHQW¶V RIILFHUV LQ ERWK FDVHV ,Q FRPSDULVRQ WKHUH ZHUH VL[ UHJLPHQWV ZKLFK
possessed no officers commissioned prior to 1852, two in England (the Huntingdon Light 
Infantry and Rutland Light Infantry, of which the latter had an extremely small 
establishment of one Captain, a Lieutenant and an Ensign), and four in Wales (the Royal 
                                                 
11
 The author claimed that only three officers remained in 1852 who had served in the 1814-6 embodiment, 
while the remainder had accepted the retired allowance. This gave the impression the regiment lacked any 
officers commissioned before 1852. J. Bonhote, Historical Records of the West Kent Militia: with some 
account of the earlier defensive levies in Kent, (London: Hudson and Kearns, 1909), cited in Anderson, 
µ(QJOLVK0LOLWLDLQWKHPLG-1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\¶ pp. 63-4, 249-59; Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV, 
p. 151. 
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England Wales Scotland Total 
Field 
Officers 
Total 190 25 49 264 
Commissioned 
prior 1852 125 17 26 168 
Percentage 66 68 53 64 
Captains & 
Subalterns 
Total 1,115 128 285 1,528 
Commissioned 
prior 1852 307 33 72 412 
Percentage 28 26 25 27 
Total 
Officers 
Total 1,305 153 334 1,792 
Commissioned 
prior 1852 432 50 98 580 
Percentage 33 33 29 32 
 
Anglesey, Royal Carnarvon, Royal Merioneth and Royal Montgomery Regiments). 
Anderson was right to be wary of the regimental history of the West Kent Regiment, as in 
1854 there were in fact nine officers commissioned prior to the reform, one senior and 
eight junior, even after three veterans of the Peninsular War had retired. This suggests 
that, although there were many officers still commissioned with their regiments in 1852, 
many had chosen to retire soon after the reform so that, by 1854, the majority of junior 
vacancies were filled by new appointments. It is difficult to establish why certain 
regiments had such a high proportions of officers commissioned prior to the reform, 
although certain minor patterns do emerge. Geographically East Anglian regiments and 
WKRVHIURP<RUNVKLUHKDGRQDYHUDJHDORZHUSURSRUWLRQRIRIILFHU¶VFRPPLVVLRQHGSUH-
reform than other areas. For instance, in 1854 the Huntingdon Regiment had no officers 
commissioned prior to 1852 (although this was a regiment with a small peace-time 
establishment of two companies and a major-commandant pre-185213), while both the 
Essex Rifles and West Essex Regiment had only 13 per cent, and the West Suffolk and 
Cambridgeshire Regiments 17 and 20 per cent respectively. By comparison the 1st, 2nd 
and 3rd Royal Middlesex Regiment were all well above average with 65, 60 and 57 per 
cent RIWKHLURIILFHU¶VFRPPLVVLRQHGSUH-reform respectively.  
                                                 
12
 This table excludes battalions created in 1852. Names of officers sourced from +DUW¶V$QQXDO$UP\/LVW, 
1854, pp. 553-70; Ibid., 1855, pp. 648-51; and A. Sleigh, The Royal Militia and Yeomanry Cavalry Army 
List, (London: British Army Dispatch Press, 1850), pp. 45-167. 
13
 Sleigh, Royal Militia and Yeomanry List, p. 46. 
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Of those officers that were commissioned before the reform, the vast majority had 
gained their commissions after 1830. Of the total 482 officers remaining in the force by 
1854 in England and Wales, only 73 were commissioned prior to 1830. A small minority 
of senior officers had, in fact, served in their units for some time. For instance, Colonel 
John H. Manners, the 5th Duke of Rutland, had commanded the Leicester Regiment since 
1798 and continued to do so until his death in 1857, a total of over 58 years service. 
Similarly Colonel Thomas Wood, of the Royal East Middlesex Regiment, had 
commanded his regiment since 1803 and by the time he retired, in 1860, had served for 
over 56 years.14 Nevertheless the vast majority of officers commissioned before the 
reform had joined during the 1830s or 1840s. In December 1845 a circular was issued 
from Whitehall demanding that both the permanent staff and any vacancies were to be 
filled by the spring of the following year, owing to the possibility that the militia could be 
embodied. This led to a frantic attempt to fill regimental vacancies and a wave of new 
officers joining the force.15 In Huntingdonshire the Lord Lieutenant, the 7th Earl of 
Sandwich, was informed that the local regiment was deficient one captain and, in the 
event of embodiment, a further lieutenant, while the commanding officer, Colonel T. W. 
Vaughan, commented that it was difficult to find adequate candidates because of the 
µORQJ SHDFH¶ DQG D ODFN RI ODQGHG FRXQW\ IDPLOLHV16 It is thus wrong to suggest that 
immediately prior to 1852 new appointments and promotions had been entirely 
suspended. Although the militia had not trained since 1831 and been in a state of 
effective suspension, clearly the force was able to maintain a wider presence through its 
offLFHU FRUSV 7KLV ZDV LGHQWLILHG E\ 'XQFDQ $QGHUVRQ WHUPHG D µ0LOLWLD DWWLWXGH¶
allowing the officers and their supporters to preserve the existence of the force in the face 
of public and government hostility.17  
To ensure that regiments were as efficient as possible the government ensured that 
those deciding to remain or leave would be able to do so without hindrance. Although it 
was made clear officers would not be at a disadvantage if they were to decide to continue 
± the new provisions allowed them to continue in the force and confirmed that they 
would not be at any disadvantage in terms of rank to those commissioned under the new 
                                                 
14
 +DUW¶V$QQXDO$UP\/LVW, 1854, pp. 553-70; Ibid., 1855, pp. 648-51; Sleigh, Royal Militia and Yeomanry 
List, pp. 45-167. 
15
 Huntingdonshire Archives and Local Studies (HALS), HINCH 9/36, Circular letter, 9 December 1845; 
Sleigh, Royal Militia and Yeomanry List, pp. 45-167.  
16
 HALS, HINCH 9/152, letter, J. G. Green to 7th Earl Sandwich, 12 Dec. 1845; HINCH 9/154, letter, Col. 
T. W. Vaughan to 7th Earl Sandwich, 30 Dec. 1845.  
17
 $QGHUVRQµ(QJOLVK0LOLWLDLQWKHPLG-1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\¶ pp. 5-6. 
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legislation ± it was also made clear those officers choosing not to continue would not 
have any entitled allowances rescinded and that they would retain their ranks upon 
retirement.18 Many officers who had initially remained availed themselves of the chance 
to retire citing that they were no longer fit for embodied service, or were either too old or 
unwilling to turn out for training. In the 1st Somerset Regiment it was remarked by the 
commanding officer, Colonel H.C. Henley, that the senior subaltern was an old man who 
was retained on tKHUHJLPHQW¶VVWUHQJWKVLQFH LW was last assembled in 1816. He further 
concluded that of those officers who turned out in 1852, but yet were commissioned 
SULRUWKHYDVWPDMRULW\µIURPDJHRULQILUPLW\ZHUHTXLWHXQILWIRUPLOLWDU\VHUYLFH¶,QWKH
West Kent Regiment two of the officers commissioned prior to 1852 had served during 
the 1814-1816 embodiments. Both would have been at least in their mid-fifties by 1852 
and far older than the majority of the other subalterns; subsequently both left the regiment 
in 1853. Similarly, three of the five officers of the Royal East Middlesex Regiment, 
commissioned during the Napoleonic Wars, cited poor health, deteriorating sight and 
hearing, and their age as reasons for resigning their commissions. Even four years after 
the reform the adjutant of the Huntingdonshire Regiment decided he was no longer fit for 
the job.19 
$ IXUWKHU TXHVWLRQ LV ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHVLUH WR DWWUDFW PRUH
retired and half-pay officers from the regular army and EICS succeeded or not. As Figure 
1.2 illustrates, their efforts were a partial success: as desired over half of all field officers 
serving in 1854 had previously served in the regular army or EICS, although this 
accounted for just 21 per cent of officers when taken as a whole.  It is also of note that the 
field ranks of the Scottish militia appear to have been particularly attractive to ex-
regulars. The proportion of retired and half-pay officers also varied on a regimental basis. 
On the whole there was a loose correlation that suggests regiments with a higher 
proportion of senior officers with prior service in the Army or EICS were more likely to 
contain a higher overall proportion than those commanded by those without previous 
service (although this was far from always the case). For instance, all three senior officers 
of the 4th Royal South Middlesex Regiment had only recently retired from the regular 
                                                 
18
 15 & 16 Vict., c.50, s. vii. 
19
 W. J. W. Kerr, Records of the 1st Somerset Militia (3rd Battalion Somerset Light Infantry), (Aldershot: 
Gale and Polden, 1930), p. 60; Bonhote, Historical Records of the West Kent Militia, pp. 249-50; LMA, 
//LHXWHQDQF\SDSHUVµ5RXWLQHFRUUHVSRQGHQFHFRQFHUQLQJDSSRLQWPHQWHWFLQUHJLPHQWV	¶
letter, anonymous to Col. Wood, Feb. 1853; letter, to Col. T. Wood, 9 Feb. 1853; letter, to Col. T. Wood, 
17 Feb. 1853; HALS, HINCH 9/239, letter, Capt. J. G. Green to 7th Earl of Sandwich, 6 Aug. 1856. 
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army, while eleven junior officers had also previously served in the regulars; overall 56 
per cent RIWKHUHJLPHQW¶VRIILFHUVZHUHIRUPHUUHJXODUV6LPLODUZDVWUXHLQVHYHUDORWKHU
units including the 5th Royal Elthorne Middlesex Regiment, Shropshire Regiment, 
Cambridge Regiment,  Devon Artillery, and Lancashire Artillery to name a few. One of 
the attractions to those who did seek to continue their military service in the militia was 
that they could supplement their retirement pay or half-pay. A peculiar anomaly meant 
that half-pay officers engaged in the militia were also entitled to draw their full pay if the 
regiment was embodied, meaning they were effectively being paid twice. An example 
given in The Times in 1854 deplored that a half-pay captain serving as a major in a militia 
regiment while indefinitely embodied would earn 7s more per day than an equivalent 
major serving in the Crimea.20   
Property qualifications and previous service aside, personal connections and 
patronage remained a crucial means by which prospective officers (or, if young, their 
fathers), secured commissions in the militia. Usually applicants would directly approach 
either the commanding officer of the unit to which he wished to apply, or directly to the 
lord lieutenant himself (or by someone else on their behalf). After the reform Lieutenant-
Colonel Edward Bagot, commanding the 4th Royal South Middlesex Regiment, informed 
the lord lieutenant, the 2nd Marquess of Salisbury, of his support for the application of 
&KDUOHV7\QGDOHWRWKHYDFDQWPDMRULW\RZLQJWRKLVNQRZOHGJHRIWKHODWWHU¶VVHUYLFHLQ
the 51st Foot. He also recommended a particular applicant to become surgeon as he was 
the son of his own personal doctor.21 The adjutant of the Huntingdonshire Regiment, 
Captain J.G. Green, informed the lord lieutenant for Huntingdonshire, the 7th Earl of 
Sandwich, that on the possibility of the regiment being called out for training he knew of 
a suitable candidate to fill the vacant lieutenancy. Such was also the case in the Royal 
Lanarkshire Regiment whereby an outgoing officer nominated his own nephew as a 
potential candidate.22 Elsewhere, the lord lieutenant of County Durham, the 3rd Marquess 
of Londonderry, corresponded with the 2nd Earl of Durham (his successor as lord 
lieutenant in 1854) and Rowland Burden, a local landowner, offering them the senior and 
junior majorities in the county regiments before advertising them to other local 
 
 
                                                 
20
 The Times, 26 Dec. 1854. 
21
 LMA. L/030a, letter Lt.-Col. E. Bagot to Salisbury, 31 March 1853. 
22
 HALS, HINCH 9/189, letter, J. G. Green to 7th Earl Sandwich, 10 Feb. 1852; South Lanarkshire Leisure 
and Culture Museum, 2011.46.34, letter, D. O. Stewart to 10th Duke of Hamilton, 26 Dec. 1845. 
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England Wales Scotland Total 
Field 
Officers 
Total 233 25 49 307 
Ex-Regulars 
& EICS 126 14 34 174 
Percentage 54 56 69 57 
Captains & 
Subalterns 
Total 1,327 128 285 1,740 
Ex-Regulars 
& EICS 194 20 42 256 
Percentage 15 16 15 15 
Total 
Officers 
Total 1,560 153 334 2,047 
Ex-Regulars 
& EICS 320 34 76 430 
Percentage 21 22 23 21 
 
JHQWOHPHQ /DWHU /RQGRQGHUU\¶V VHFRQG VRQ /LHXWHQDQW-Colonel George H. Vane-
Tempest (commanding the North Durham Regiment), took responsibility for nominating 
potential candidates to the lord lieutenant, usually upon the suggestion of his second in 
command, Major Edward Johnson, who appears to have taken over the practical 
responsibility of managing potential candidates.24 Similar familial ties were evident in the 
neighbouring Northumberland Light Infantry, the Dukes of Northumberland being 
intimately connected with the regiment since Colonel George Percy (later the 5th duke) 
took command in 1804. His eldest son and heir, Earl Algernon George Percy (later the 
6th duke), who was first commissioned in 1842, went on to also command the regiment 
from 1862 to 1874, as did his eldest son and heir Henry George Percy (later the 7th duke) 
between 1875 and 1895, and his second son Algernon Malcolm Arthur Percy thereafter; 
WKHODWWHU¶VVRQDOVRVHUYHGDVDVXEDOWHUQIURPXQWLO$OWKRXJKQRRWKHUIDPLO\
ZDVDVLQWLPDWHO\FRQQHFWHGWRWKHUHJLPHQWDVWKH3HUF\¶VRWKHUIDPLOLHVGHPRQVWUDWHG
similar connections. Two younger sons of the 2nd Marquess of Salisbury, Arthur and 
                                                 
23
 +DUW¶V$QQXDO$UP\/LVW, 1854, pp. 553-70; +DUW¶V$QQXDO$UP\/LVW, 1855, pp. 648-51; Sleigh, Royal 
Militia and Yeomanry List, pp. 45-167. 
24
 '&52'/R&ER[¶¶'XUKDP/LHXWHQDQF\DQG0LOLWLD3DSHUVOHWWHUUG0DUTXHVVRI
Londonderry to 2nd Earl of Durham, 17 March 1853; letter, 3rd Marquess of Londonderry to R. Burden, 17 
0DUFK'&52'/R&ER[¶¶1RUWK'XUKDP0LOLWLD3DSHUV-1864, letters, E. Johnson 
to Lt.-Col. G. H. Vere, 1 Dec. 1863; 8 Dec. 1863; 12 Dec. 1863; 14 Dec. 1863. 
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Lionel Cecil, and a grandson, Reginald Edward Cecil, were also connected with the 
regiment. Similarly, two sons of Major Alexander Browne later served in the regiment as 
captains while two sons of Major Alfred Grey served as lieutenants.25  
Once successful, applicants were required to pass details of their property 
qualifications to the clerk of the lieutenancy, the individual responsible for the physical 
process of drawing up the commission. For this they were expected to pay a fee which at 
first was determined separately by each lieutenancy, yet this led to an unfair system 
whereby the cost of obtaining a commission could significantly vary across the country. 
Further complicating this was that some lieutenancies also included the cost of the stamp 
duty and any additional costs, such as those for gazetting the commission, whereas others 
paid them out of the county rates. Some of the highest rates were found in Derbyshire 
where all commissioned officers were require to pay £10 6s regardless of the rank. 
Similarly in Huntingdonshire the fee ranged from 10 Guineas for field officers to 7 
Guineas for a captaincy and 5 Guineas for subalterns. By comparison, in Shropshire the 
fee was fixed at 1 Guinea, while in Westmoreland it was just 5s regardless of rank. One 
officer in Middlesex was particularly incensed by the fact that in his county a lieutenancy 
cost £4 16s whereas in neighbouring Tower Hamlets it could be secured for only £3 3s. 
Due to the level of anger among militia officers, in May 1853 the government decided to 
fix the fees at a rate of two guineas for field officers and one guinea for captains and 
subalterns.26  
 
* * * 
 
Despite the fact that the mechanisms through which militia officers were recruited 
remained similar to that prior to the reform, there were clearly problems in its ability to 
find the requisite number of officers. Figure 1 shows that at no point between 1862 and 
 GLG WKH PLOLWLD¶V RIILFHU FRUSV PHHW RU LQ PRVW \HDUV JHW DQ\ZKHUH QHDU LWV
establishment (reliable national figures prior to 1862 are unfortunately not available). 
                                                 
25
 R. Scott, The Services of the 27th Northumberland Light Infantry Militia, now 3rd Battalion 
Northumberland Fusiliers, (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Andrew Reid & Co. ltd., 1914), pp. 74-8, 145-52.  
26
 War Office circular, 23 May 1853, cited in Raikes, Historical Records of the First Regiment of Militia, p. 
158; PP, Deputy lieutenants, &c. Abstract of return of all fees charged on the commissions of deputy 
lieutenants and officers of militia, in each county in England and Wales., 998, (1852-53); HALS, Hinch 
µ3HWLWLRQWRWK(DUORI6DQGZLFK¶1RYHPEHUDQGHinch 9/222, Letter, Clerk of the 
Lieutenancy to 7th Earl of Sandwich, 7 June 1853; LMA, L/29, Lieutenancy correspondence, 1854-5, and 
L/34(a), Militia correspondence, 1855-7.  
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Superficially this appears to have been particularly bad up until 1874 when the 
establishment was reduced considerably. Yet until then the official figures failed to 
account for the fact, in 1860, the commissioning of ensigns (and second-lieutenants in 
militia artillery) was officially suspended, units instead being assigned two 
supernumerary lieutenants. Despite this, official figures continued to show the full 
establishment, including the previously abolished ensigncies, which gives the impression 
the deficiency was in fact far worse than in reality. However, it would be wrong to 
suggest the deficiency was wholly the result of an administrative quirk. Prior to 1869 the 
militia as a whole was finding it increasingly difficult to find enough officers, declining 
more sharply in the decades prior to and after the South African War.  
A key reason for this was that the militia found it increasingly difficult to secure 
officers from what was regarded as the typical source: the local landed gentry. As seen 
above, the principal reason why property qualifications were reintroduced in 1852 was in 
order to preserve the link between militia units and their county through their officers. 
Yet before and after the reform of 1852, there is evidence to suggest some units were 
already struggling to make this link a firm reality. In 1845 Colonel Vaughan of the 
Huntingdonshire Regiment complained that he found difficulty in finding suitable men 
willing to serve as officers in the PLOLWLDGXHWRµ«WKHlong peace and because the county 
IDPLOLHV DUH QRZ D JRRG GHDO GLVSHUVHG¶27 In 1853, the Lord Lieutenant of 
Northumberland, the 3rd Earl Grey, complained to Sidney Herbert that he found great 
difficulty in finding suitable officers for the Northumberland Light Infantry.28 Later, in 
1868, the Inspector-General of Reserve Forces, Major-General James Lindsay, lamented 
WKHGHFOLQHRIµWKHFRXQW\FRQQHFWLRQ¶DUJXLQJWKDWFRXQW\JHQWOHPHQQRORQJHUIRXQGD
militia commission an attractive proposition. The result of this was a growing deficiency 
in the number of subalterns and captains.29  
Despite some initial signs that the link between the landed gentry and officer 
corps was weakening, property qualifications meant the highest ranks continued to be 
dominated by independent landed gentlemen. As explored later, the significant costs 
UHTXLUHGWRPDLQWDLQRQHVHOILQDVHQLRUUDQNPHDQWPLOLWLDXQLWVµWHQGHGWREH 
 
                                                 
27
 HALS, HINCH 9/154, letter, Col. T. W. Vaughan to 7th Earl of Sandwich, 30 Dec. 1845. 
28
 WSHC, 2057/F8/III/A/26, Papers of Sidney Herbert, 1st Baron Herbert of Lea, 1853-5, letter, 3rd Earl 
Grey to Sidney Herbert, 9 July 1853. 
29
 These comments were made to the RoyDO8QLWHG6HUYLFHV,QVWLWXWHDWDOHFWXUHE\0DM$/HDK\µ2XU
,QIDQWU\)RUFHVDQG,QIDQWU\5HVHUYHV¶SDVTXRWHGLQ)UHQFKMilitary Identities, p. 207.  
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28
 See Appendix 2 for the figures upon which this is based. Note that from 1880 onwards all figures exclude 
adjutants.  
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commanded by a group who were socially and economically of a higher order than that 
GHPDQGHG E\ WKH OHJDO PLQLPXP TXDOLILFDWLRQV¶30 As Table 2.3 demonstrates, this 
effectively helped to keep the force one dominated by local landowners who could spare 
the wealth and time necessary for service. Every senior officer of the Northumberland 
Light Infantry appointed or promoted prior to 1869 possessed, or was directly related to, 
individuals with considerable landed estates. As Dukes of Northumberland (possessing 
extensive estates totalling over 186,000 acres), the Percy family provided four 
commanding officers during the period. Another commanding officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel William Bigge, possessed a comparably minor estate of over 375 acres. The 
same was true in the Cornwall and Devon Miners Artillery Regiment. Commanding for 
30 years between 1853 and 1883, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Colman Rashleigh possessed an 
estate of nearly 800 acres in Cornwall, while Major Sir Charles Brune Graves-Sawle 
succeeded to an estate of over 3,300 acres situated across Cornwall and Devon. Both 
individuals also appear to have additional income derived from mining on their estates. 
Even a regiment with a higher than average proportion of retired regular officers such as 
the Essex Rifles was initially dominated by landed families. Upon reform the regiment 
was commanded by Colonel Charles Maynard, the eldest son and heir of 3rd Viscount 
Maynard, who possessed an estate of over 8,600 acres in Essex. Under his command both 
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Jocelyn, heir apparent of the 3rd Earl of Roden, and Major 
Thomas Spitty, were from landed families with considerable estates, the former heir 
apparent to over 14,500 acres (with over 1,100 acres located in Essex), and the latter heir 
to an estate of over 3,000 acres located in the county. The same was true in Scotland 
where the commander of the Royal Aberdeenshire Highlanders, Colonel Alexander 
Fraser, the 17th Baron Saltoun, possessed over 10,000 acres in the county, and was 
succeeded in 1855 by Henry Erskine, a landowner with an estate of over 3,200 acres.  
As a result of the continued dominance of the peerage and landed gentry many 
emerging middle-class professionals and those who were involved in business and 
industry were unable to reach above the rank of captain in any significant proportions.31 
Table 2.3 shoes that in the first two decades since reform there were no professionals 
recorded from among the sampled regiments, while only one was recorded as being 
involved in industry, Colonel William Thompson of the Royal London Regiment, whose 
                                                 
30
 D. $QGHUVRQµ(QJOLVK0LOLWLDLQWKHPLG-1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\¶ p. 11. 
31
 Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV, p. 151; D. $QGHUVRQµ(QJOLVK0LOLWLDLQWKHPLG-Nineteenth 
&HQWXU\¶ pp. 8, 11. 
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Table 2.3: The Social Background of Field Officers in a Sample of English, Welsh and 
Scottish Units, 1852-1908.32 
 
  
1852-1869 1870-1889 1890-1908 
Title holders and heirs 6 1 2 
Younger Sons  1 « 2 
(Total Peerage) 7 1 4 
     
Greater Landowners  5 3 6 
Lesser Landowners 9 13 7 
(Total Landowners) 14 16 12 
     
Retired and Half-Pay Officers* 13 15 5 
Clergy « « « 
Professionals « 7 9 
Business and Industry 1 6 9 
Other Occupations « 1 « 
Unknown 3 4 6 
Total 39 50 46 
*Includes retired and half-pay officers from the regular army and EICS with minor estates or no other 
apparent source of income. Those who only briefly served and those with major landed estates are counted 
as landowners. 
 
family had made their fortune through Iron smelting. In some units this was also due to 
outright hostility towards anyone whose income was not derived from the traditional 
source of independent landed wealth. For instance, in October 1852 one unsuccessful 
applicant for a commission was informed by the Marquess of Salisbury, the Lord 
Lieutenant for Middlesex, that his employment in the General Screw Steam Navigation 
&RPSDQ\ ZDV DQ µLQVXSHUDEOH REVWDFOH¶ WR D PLOLWLa commission.33 This was far from 
isolated to regiments based in predominantly rural areas. Even in the Royal London 
Regiment and Edinburgh Artillery the proportion of professionals, businessmen and 
industrialists was at first practically non-existent, with the vast majority of officers retired 
professionals from either the army or EICS.  
As part of his wider reform package, in 1869 Cardwell abolished the remaining 
property qualifications in the hope of opening up the highest ranks to a wider pool of 
potential officers.34 Table 2.3 shows that there was a notable increase in professionals, 
businessmen and industrials who, from 1890 to 1908, accounted for 40 per cent of the 
total proportion of senior officers compared to almost no representation in the first two 
                                                 
32
 See Appendix 3. 
33
 D. Andersonµ(QJOLVK0LOLWLDLQWKHPLG-1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\¶ p. 77; Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH
Soldiers, p. 151. 
34
 HC Deb., 11 March 1869, vol. 194, cc. 1111-77, (c. 1125); Ibid., 15 April 1869, vol. 195, c. 941. 
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decades after reform. It tended to be units located in or near urban centres which often 
contained a higher proportion of retired regular officers, professionals and individuals 
connected to business and industry. Even though many of these also possessed landed 
estates, their primary income had been derived from sources other than land rents. The 
Essex Rifles contained a higher than average proportion of retired regulars, six of the 
nine officers reaching field rank prior to 1869 having previously served in the regulars. 
Some had landed estates that were supplemented by business connections in London. 
Both Majors Capel Coape and Evelyn P. Meadows came from traditional gentry families 
with landed estates which were supplemented with additional sources of income. The 
former possessed over 1,100 acres in Essex despite his directorship of the London & 
Liverpool Hotel Company. Meanwhile the latter had previously farmed 250 acres in 
Suffolk before moving to London where he derived an income from the interest and 
dividends received from various investments. In the Royal London Regiment three of the 
senior officers prior to 1869 were retired regulars. This trend continued so that only one 
of the senior officers, Colonel Lorenzo George Dundas, was from a family possessed of 
landed estate of over 2,000 acres (belonging to his father in Ireland). The same was true 
in the Edinburgh Artillery Regiment where both of the commanding officers appointed 
prior to 1869, Lieutenant-Colonels William Geddes and Henry Rolland, retired directly 
from the EICS at that rank. Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Moncrieff, commanding the 
regiment from 1878 to 1883, was an engineer by trade (and also inventor of the Barbett 
Gun Carriage) and later the director of two banks, the proceeds from which he was able 
to purchase a substantial landed estate. Furthermore, in giving evidence to a Royal 
Commission examining the militia 1877, Captain William Hill, adjutant to the 
:RUFHVWHUVKLUH5HJLPHQWFRPPHQWHGWKDWWKHUHJLPHQW¶VVHQLRURIILFHUVZHUHFRPSULVed 
of men that had previously served in the regulars, with county gentlemen limited to the 
subaltern ranks.35 
However, the peerage and landed gentry remained the single greatest source of 
field officers, even by the end of the century. In many respects this is unsurprising as it 
tended to be the greater landowners and titled families possessed of large estates that 
were able to survive the worst impact of the agricultural depression. The Cornwall and 
Devon Miners RGA (Militia), despite the arguably more technical nature of an artillery 
UHJLPHQW¶V WUDLQLQJ UHPDLQHG ODUJHO\ FRPPDQGHG E\ PLQRU ODQGRZQHUV 7KH RQO\
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 PP, Report of the committee¸ C. 1654, C. 1654-I, (1877), qq. 6073-4. 
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exceptions were Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas M. A. Horsford who in addition to owning a 
small 145 acre estate in Cornwall also had links to the local coal industry, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis J. Hext who, despite his 490 acre estate in the county, was a 
practicing barrister. In Scotland the 3rd Gordon Highlanders was commanded from 1891 
until 1908 by Lieutenant-Colonel Algernon H. Thomas, heir of the 8th Earl of Kintore 
who possessed an estate of over 25,000 acres in Aberdeenshire. Serving under him was 
Major Alexander W. F. Fraser, the heir to the 17th Baron Saltoun, who possessed an 
estate of over 10,700 acres in the county and who had briefly commanded the battalion 
(as the Royal Aberdeenshire Highlanders) from 1854 to 1855.  
By comparison the social composition of the junior officer ranks was more 
complex than has been hitherto understood. As a whole there was a similar increase in the 
proportion from professional families and those connected to business and industry at the 
expense of the landed gentry, alongside an increase in the sons of regular officers hoping 
to achieve a regular commission through the force. However, Table 2.4 illustrates that 
from 1852 until 1869 most reaching the rank of captain continued to be drawn from 
largely landed families, much like the senior officers, on account of the necessary 
property qualifications. On the other hand, officers who spent their entire commissioned 
service with the militia as subalterns were more likely to come from either a professional 
background or have connections to business and industry, particularly in units in or near 
urban and industrial areas.  
Despite the national trend, there was a wide degree of regimental variation in the 
composition of their junior officers. The availability and sources of potential candidates 
ODUJHO\GHSHQGHGXSRQWKHQDWXUHRIWKHORFDOHFRQRP\DQGWKHLQIOXHQFHRIDUHJLPHQW¶V
commanding officer. For instance, the 3rd (later 5th) Northumberland Fusiliers managed 
to maintain small proportion of officers from among the landed gentlemen largely due to 
the influence of the commanding officer Lord Algernon Percy, whose position as the 
second son of the 6th Duke of Northumberland gave him considerable influence to attract 
gentlemen from Northumberland and beyond. For instance, gentlemen such as Gerard F. 
T. Leather, who joined the regiment on the way to gaining a line commission (as did his 
younger brother), was heir to a major fortune and estate of over 7,900 acres built on his 
JUDQGIDWKHU¶V SURSULHWRUVKLS RI ORFDO FROOLHULHV <HW GHVSLWH 3HUF\¶V LQVLVWHQFH WR WKH
1RUIRON&RPPLVVLRQLQWKDWKHµDOZD\V«>WULHG@DVIDUDVSRVVLEOHWRJHWWKHP 
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Table 2.4: The Social Background of Captains and Subalterns in a Sample of English, 
Welsh and Scottish Units, expressed as a Percentage, 1852-1908.36 
 




















Title holders and heirs 1.2 1.7 1.6 « 1.4 2.0 0.7 1.5 1.9 
Younger sons  2.4 1.7 0.0 1.5 0.7 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.2 
(Total Peerage) 3.7 3.4 1.6 1.5 2.1 3.5 2.7 2.5 3.1 
  
         
Greater landowners  7.3 11.9 4.9 1.5 9.2 6.1 4.8 10.0 5.8 
Lesser landowners 29.3 20.3 4.9 7.7 15.6 6.1 19.7 17.0 5.8 
(Total landowners) 36.6 32.2 9.8 9.2 24.8 12.1 24.5 27.0 11.6 
  
         
Retired and half-pay Officers* 17.1 18.6 13.1 « « « 9.5 5.5 3.1 
Sons of serving or retired officers « « « 3.1 14.2 18.2 1.4 10.0 13.9 
Clergy 1.2 1.7 3.3 4.6 5.7 6.6 2.7 4.5 5.8 
Professionals 6.1 8.5 13.1 23.1 16.3 12.1 13.6 14.0 12.4 
Business and industry 15.9 23.7 31.1 21.5 16.3 20.2 18.4 18.5 22.8 
Other occupations « « 1.6 « 2.8 « « 2.0 0.4 
Unknown 19.5 11.9 26.2 36.9 17.7 27.3 27.2 16.0 27.0 
Total Sampled 82 59 61 65 141 198 147 200 259 
* Includes retired and half-pay officers from the regular army and EICS with minor estates or no other 
apparent source of income. Those who only briefly served and those with major landed estates are counted 
as landowners. 
 
connected with the county', it was local industry that enabled him to attract a steady of 
junior officers. 37 Nevertheless, by the end of the period the majority of junior officers 
within the battalion came from families connected in some way to business and industry, 
principally in local collieries, ship building, and businesses operating out of the port of 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Elsewhere, Colonel H. D. Fryer of the 4th Suffolk Regiment 
stated (in 1904) that there was no difficulty in getting officers and that of these they are 
'mostly county men', while the senior officers were chiefly men of property. One unit 
which did appear to significantly buck the wider trend was the 3rd Hampshire Regiment. 
Its commanding officer, the Earl of Selborne, noted that 27 out of 30 of the officers 
present while the battalion was embodied at Aldershot (during the South African War) 
were what he deemed as 'county' men; in fact, unlike many other battalions, there was a 
waiting list for officers joining the battalion with only two vacancies after the South 
African War.38 By comparison, the Edinburgh RGA (Militia), which had historically 
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 See Appendix 3. 
37
 PP, Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, vol. 1, Cd. 2062, (1904). q. 4841. 
38
 PP, Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, vol. 2, Cd. 2063, (1904), qq. 15043, 15065, 17663-
4, 17672, 17710. 
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relied largely upon urban professionals and businessmen, saw little change in the source 
of their officers. 
There were other more fundamental reasons why landed gentlemen were refusing 
to take commissions as they once had. By far the greatest factor was the wider 
agricultural depression and its impact upon land rents, and thus the entire landed gentry 
itself. Owing to the influx of cheap imported grain primarily from the United States of 
America and Russia from the 1870s onwards, estates whose tenants could no longer 
afford their rents began to collapse. Small estates were particularly susceptible, with 
many families forced to sell their land, marry into money or diversify their assets by 
investing their money into business and finance. The South and East of England were 
particularly hard-hit due to a greater concentration of arable farming compared to the 
more pastoral Northern, Wales and Scotland, meaning these countries were more 
susceptible to impact of cheap to cheaper imports.39 The effect of this was frequently 
cited by senior officers as the chief explanation for the decline in landed gentlemen. For 
instance, both Colonel W. A. Hill, commanding the 3rd Gloucester Regiment, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. M. Holden, of the 4th Rifles, argued that although in many 
counties there were still landed gentlemen willing to serve in the militia, they no longer 
had the time to devote to a commission because they had been forced to take some form 
of employment. This was echoed by Lord Raglan, commanding officer of the Royal 
Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (Militia), who went as far to suggest that county 
gentlemen had all but disappeared from many English counties, and that in 
Monmouthshire those who remained did not have the sons to come forward to service as 
they once had. Similarly, Lord Lovat argued that the problem was worse in agricultural 
districts, and that those gentlemen who remained had to spend more time working.40 
Many also argued that in combination with this the workload of the militia officer had 
increased so as to make it unattractive for gentlemen who had been forced into 
employment.41 As will be examined later, it was also increasingly difficult for many 
gentlemen to bear the financial impact of service in the militia.  
Further compounding the shortage of county gentlemen was competition from not 
                                                 
39
 G. E. Mingay The Gentry: The Rise and Fall of a Ruling Class, (London: Longman, 1976), pp. 165-78; 
3-3HUU\µ:KHUHZDVWKH³*UHDW$JULFXOWXUDO'HSUHVVLRQ´"$*HRJUDSK\RI$JULFXOWXUDO%DQNUXSWF\LQ
/DWH9LFWRULDQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHV¶Agricultural History Review¸ 20, I, (1972), pp. 30-45; Spiers, The Late 
Victorian Army, p. 94. 
40
 PP, Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, vol. 2, Cd. 2063, q. 15470, qq. 16789, 16940, q. 
17175. 
41
 PP, Report of the committee, C.1654 C.1654-I, (1877), q. 7631.  
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only the regular army and EICS, but also the other auxiliary forces. Traditionally both the 
militia and yeomanry competed with each other as they principally drew their officers 
from the landed classes. The wide scale revival of a volunteer movement in 1859 
provided further competition as they were at first officered by the same class. 42 This was 
echoed by Major Garnham of the 6th West York Regiment who argued that potential 
candidates were now attracted to the volunteers instead of the militia.43 Although towards 
the end of the century there were an increasing proportion of middle-class professionals 
and businessmen officering volunteer corps, in London and other large urban centres 
landed elites continued to officer certain prestigious units.44 
The changing social composition of the militia was not the only reason why it 
struggled to maintain the strength of its officer corps. Linked to this was the fact that 
PDQ\\RXQJRIILFHUVZHUHQRZVLPSO\XVLQJWKHIRUFHDVDµEDFNGRRU¶PHDQVRIREWDLQLQJ
a regular commission without the need to attend either Sandhurst or Woolwich. As a 
concept the transfer of officer from the militia to the line was nothing new; in fact, militia 
officers had been temporarily able to gain a regular commission without purchase since 
the eighteenth century, although this was largely a wartime expedient. During the 
Napoleonic Wars the 1st Royal Lancashire Regiment provided 19 officers to a variety of 
regular regiments including the guards, line, cavalry and rifles. In this regiment the 
tradition was even recorded prior to the 1757 reform, two officers recorded as 
transferring in 1716 and 1718 respectively.45 The practice was once again revived during 
the embodiments of the 1850s as a means of incentivising officers to encourage their men 
to themselves transfer to the line. In November 1854 the War Office permitted units to 
nominate one officer for a regular ensigncy without purchase for every 75 men provided 
by the regiment.46 Militia regiments frequently provided enough men to meet these terms 
meaning a small yet significant proportion of officers transferred to the line. The 2nd 
Royal Surrey Regiment provided a total of eight officers to a variety of regiments through 
this means during the two embodiments, the 1st Somerset Regiment a total of six officers, 
the West Kent Regiment a total of three, and the 1st Royal Lancashire Regiment five. 
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 French, Military Identities, pp. 206-7; Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV, p. 171. 
43
 PP, Report of the committee, C.1654, C.1654-I, (1877) q. 7090; p. 172-4; PP, Report of the 
committee¸1890, (C.5922), p. viii. 
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 Beckett, Riflemen Form, pp. 44-69. 
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 J. Lawson Whalley, Roll of Officers of the Old County Regiment of Lancashire Militia, late 1st Royal 
/DQFDVKLUH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5R\DO/DQFDVWHU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Scottish Militia regiments despite their ongoing reconstitution in 1854 also supplied 
officers during both embodiments. The Dumfries, Roxburgh and Selkirk Regiment had 
one subaltern nominated to a commission in the line and another appointed to the Cape 
Mounted Rifles during the embodiments, and a further three officers in the 1860s. 
Furthermore, the Edinburgh Light Infantry managed to nominate four subalterns between 
June 1855 and July 1856 and another two in 1866 and 1869 respectively.47  
Despite the precedent, it was not until February 1872 that this became a 
permanent option for those hoping to avoid the traditional and highly competitive route to 
a regular commission. Henceforth commissions were open to any subaltern which had 
been nominated by his commanding officer, had attended at least two annual trainings 
and had passed a literary examination. By 1900 the regulations were further clarified: 
candidates were to be unmarried and had to have served at least two annual trainings in 
distinct years with the same regiment (although those over the age of 23 would be 
accepted so long as they had served three annual trainings). He would also have to have 
µREWDLQHGWKHFHUWLILFDWH$UP\)RUP(UHTXLUHGRIDVXEDOWHUQRIILFHUEHIRUHWKHHQG
of the second trainiQJDIWHUKLVDSSRLQWPHQW¶DQGSURYLGHDFKDUDFWHUUHIHUHQFHIURPWKH
commanding officer of his regiment. Those wishing to gain a commission in the Royal 
Artillery were limited to subalterns of the militia artillery, and needed to have passed the 
school of instruction at Woolwich alongside the p.s. certificate (Army Form E 502). 
Examinations for line commissions were held half yearly in March and September, and 
the fee for the examination required of the candidates cost £2 in London and £3 
elsewhere. Furthermore, candidates were allowed three attempts at the examination 
before they were prohibited from attempting to gain a regular commission.48  
The decision was largely motivated by the hope that it would increase the 
attractiveness of militia commissions and arrest the decline in the strength of its officer 
corps. Yet it was also a means of helping to address the concerns over the abolition of the 
SXUFKDVH V\VWHP ZKLFK KDG µGLVUXSWHG WKH SURFHVV E\ ZKLFK RIILFHUV VHFXUHG WKHLU
commissions, promotions and retiUHPHQWV¶7KHDWWHPSWVRIERWK&DUGZHOODQGKLVODWHU
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Marcus Ward & Co., 1877), pp. 250, 272, 345; Kerr, Records of the 1st Somerset Militia, pp. 1-110; 
Bonhote, Historical records of the West Kent Militia, pp. 257, 262; Whalley, Roll of Officers of the Old 
County Regiment of Lancashire Militia, p. 103; Weir, +LVWRU\RIWKHUG%DWW.LQJ¶V2ZQ6FRWWLVh 
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 PP, Army (Militia). Regulations for the competitive examination of Militia candidates for commissions in 
the army, in September next, Cd. 300, (1900), pp. 3-4; Appendix LIII, PP, Royal Commission on the Militia 
and Volunteers. Appendices¸ Cd. 2064, (1904), p. 97. 
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successor, Childers, to maintain the flow of promotions in the regular officer corps 
helped to sustain the popularity of cadetships at Sandhurst and Woolwich.49 However, 
there were only a finite number of places available each year. By 1903 it was recognised 
that both could provide no more than 410 of the approximate total of 800 vacancies per 
year, the remainder having to be provided by the militia (and after 1908 from the Officer 
Training Corps established at universities across the country).50 
&DUGZHOO¶V UHIRUPV KDG VRPH HIIHFW RQ DWWUDFWLQJ PRUH FDQGLGDWHV WR MRLQ DV
subalterns, increasing vastly the rates of turnover amongst the junior ranks and the 
difficulty of ensuring they served long enough to gain promotion. According to the 
regiments sampled in Table 2.4, the number of subalterns serving increased by over two-
fold from 1870-1889 compared to the previous two decades, and over three-fold from 
1890 to 1908. The majority of junior officers commissioned after 1872 therefore failed to 
go on to achieve promotion above the rank of lieutenant. This had the knock-on effect of 
decreasing the number of captains. It is no coincidence that during the first years in which 
line commissions were offered to militia officers the proportion of captains wanting to 
complete rose sharply, from 55 in 1871 to 136 by 1874.51 In 1873 Cardwell established a 
scheme which aimed to mitigate the shortage by allowing a limited number of regular 
captains (with at least twelve years experience) to transfer to the militia while drawing 
half-pay for ten years. However, the scheme was never fully put into operation despite 
the fact that, by 1890, 48 officers were recorded as serving who had transferred under the 
scheme. 52 
However, openiQJ WKH µPLOLWLD EDFNGRRU¶ RQO\ IXUWKHUHG WKH GLVFRQQHFWLRQ
between militia units and the local communities as those genuinely interesting in serving 
WKHLUORFDOFRXQW\ZHUHVZDPSHGE\µELUGVRISDVVDJH¶ZKRVHRQO\FRQFHUQZDVWRJDLQD
regular commission in the army.53 The benefit of such to the militia was that the overall 
proportion of landed gentlemen serving as junior officers between 1870 and 1889 rose 
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 Spiers, Late Victorian Army, pp. 90, 93. 
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 PP, Report of the committee, C.5922, (1890), p. viii.  
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 Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV, pp. 186-7; French, Military identities, p. 207. 
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slightly compared to the previous two decades. This was echoed by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sir Robert A. Cunliffe, Colonel of the Royal Denbighshire Regiment, who noticed that 
since commissions in the line were offered to subalterns, young county gentlemen were 
in fact more inclined to join his regiment.54 However, far from representing a sustained 
recommitment of the landed gentry to their local militia regiments, the connection was 
largely superficial. From 1890 until 1908 the total proportion of landed gentlemen 
collapsed while the proportion of businessmen, industrialists, and the sons of serving 
officers increased to take their place.  
&DUGZHOO¶V GHFLVLRQ WR DOORZ PLOLWLD VXEDOWHUQV WR FRPSHWH IRU UHJXODU
commissions meant that an increasing proportion of regular officers began their military 
careers with the militia. Despite not taking the traditional route, there was nothing to stop 
former militia officers from rising to the very highest ranks within the regular army. 
These included (among others) two future field marshals, Sir John French and Sir Henry 
Wilson, three future generals, Sir Bruce Hamilton, Bryan Mahon and Sir Horace Smith-
Dorrien, two future major generals, Sir Oliver Stewart Wood Nugent and Sir Edward 
Spears, and the future Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Hugh Trenchard. Its 
importance as a source of line officers should therefore not be underestimated.55 
Overall the proportion of Militia officers transferring to the regular army was 
considerable. By 1901 the militia provided nearly one half of all officers required for the 
regular army.56 It was the conclusion of the Deputy Adjutant-General, Major-General A. 
J. Lyon Fremantle, when questioned in 1890, that the majority of subalterns were now 
simply joining the force in order to gain a regular commission.57 In the first year that the 
scheme was operated (1873) there were a total of 3,225 applicants for commissions in 
England and Wales alone, with a further 222 in Scotland and 1,006 in Ireland, a total of 
4,453. In the event only 64 commissions were actually given, but the popularity of the 
scheme was clear from the beginning.58 The proportion only increased towards the end of 
the century. Of the 1,709 subalterns leaving the militia in the five years from 1880 to 
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1884 a total of 663 were transfers to the regular army, a total of 39 per cent, averaging 
out at 132 transfers per year and a considerable rise on the 1873 figure. This rose even 
further so that in 1890 a total of 172 subalterns transferred, rising to 260 by the end of the 
decade.59  Yet it was during the South African War that the numbers taking line 
commissions hit unprecedented heights. During the Norfolk commission Major-General 
Alfred Turner, Inspector General of Auxiliary Forces, noted that during the war the 
number of commissions given to militia subalterns jumped to 1,982 in just over three 
years. In particular battalions the transfer of officers hit even higher proportions. For 
instance, of the 21 subalterns of the 3rd Welsh Regiment which went out to South Africa, 
17 transferred to the line, while in total the battalion brought only six back to the UK.60 
A more detailed examination on a regimental basis shows that in all of the 
sampled units, except for the Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (Militia), over one 
half of the recorded number of subalterns transferred to the line. However, of those only a 
minority ever transferred to their linked line battalions. Both Cardwell and Childers had 
hoped localisation, and later territorialisation, would encourage militia officers to transfer 
into their local regular units helping to foster a greater sense of regimental esprit de 
corps; such was the recommendation of a Royal Commission examining the militia 
LQ ZKLFK VXJJHVWHG WKDW µZKHQHYHU SUDFWLFDEOH¶ VXEDOWHUQV WUDQVIHUULQJ VKRXOG
remain within the regiment by transferring to one of their linked line battalions.61 Yet of 
those sampled, only the Cornwall and Devon Miners Artillery (later RGA (Militia)) saw 
even half of their officers transferred to their linked regular units, in this case the Royal 
Artillery. Elsewhere, Colonel C. Healey, commanding the 3rd South Wales Borderers 
stated that onO\µWZRRXWRIWHQ¶RIKLVVXEDOWHUQVWUDQVIHUUHGWRWKHLUUHJXODUEDWWDOLRQV7R
him the reason for this was that many had family connections to other regiments and so 
wished primarily to transfer to such regiments, while others had simply joined the 
regiment with the express aim of gaining a commission in another part of the service, for 
instance the cavalry. Therefore, it was mainly just the Welsh officers who desired to join 
their line battalion.62 Unlike the infantry and artillery, officers from the engineers and  
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Table 2.5: The Transfer of Militia Subalterns to the Regular Army based upon a Sample 
of Nine Regiments, 1872 to 1908.63 
 





Royal Caernarvonshire Rifles / 4th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 55 28 9 
Cornwall and Devon Miners Artillery / RGA (Militia)* 39 21 11 
Royal Monmouthshire LI / RE (Militia) 112 34 « 
1st Lancashire / 3rd & 4th Royal Lancaster « 22 3 
Northumberland LI / 3rd (5th) Northumberland Fusiliers 105 61 23 
1st Somerset / 3rd Somersetshire LI 109 47 12 
3rd North Staffordshire / 4th North Staffordshire 78 43 11 
Dumfries, Roxburgh, Kirkcudbright and Selkirk (3rd 
Scottish Borderers) 61 32 7 
Edinburgh Artillery / RGA (Militia)* 58 34 13 
Total 617 322 77 
*For militia artillery corps outside the system of territorial regiments after 1881, this figure denotes those 
joining the Royal Artillery. 
 
submarine miners were not permitted to gain commissions in the Royal Engineers, which 
helps to explain why the total proportion of officers transferring to the line in the Royal 
Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (Militia) was comparatively low. Lord Raglan, the 
UHJLPHQW¶VFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHUODPHQWHGWKLVH[FOXVLRQQRWLQJWKDWWKH5R\DO(QJineers 
were hostile to the idea and believed militia officers were simply not up to the task 
despite that two commissions were offered annually to members of the Royal Indian 
Engineering CROOHJHDW&RRSHU¶V+LOO6XUUH\. It was his belief that allowing even just one 
commission from both engineer regiments, however difficult the examination, would 
HQFRXUDJHPRUHµ\RXQJPHQZLWKHQJLQHHULQJNQRZOHGJH¶ to enter the Royal Engineers 
via the militia.64  
Not all militia officers who transferred from their regiments ended up in the 
regular army. A small but steady number sought service with various colonial corps, most 
notably those in Africa, either on secondment or with the intention of securing a 
permanent posting. Within the sampled units, in Table 2.5, there were at least 23 officers 
who served abroad, principally with the Sierra Leone Frontier Force, Northern Nigeria 
Regiment and Gold Coast Constabulary (later part of the West African Frontier Force 
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(WAFF)), and the Bechuanaland Border Police. Indeed, four officers who had all been 
commissioned into the army from the Northumberland Light Infantry regiment all served 
together in Bechuanaland at the same time during the South African War suggesting that 
there was some personal link between the units. There were other notable expeditions 
which attracted militia officers such as the Burmese Expedition in 1886, Ruby Mines 
Expedition of 1887 and Hazara Expedition of 1888. In fact, while serving as a lieutenant 
the future commanding officer of the 3rd North Staffordshire Regiment, Francis Vere 
Wright, and Lieutenant John Gordon Davidson (of the Edinburgh Artillery) both 
WHPSRUDULO\ WUDQVIHUUHG WR WKH ,WDOLDQ$UP\¶V%ULWLVK OHJLRQ LQ WKHV WRVHUYH LQ WKH
Second Italian War of Independence under Garibaldi (costing the latter his life in 1865).65  
The varied and numerous opportunities for foreign service enabled by the South 
African War whetted the appetite of may officers who now desired foreign appointments 
in greater numbers. As a result there was an increase in the proportion of militia officers 
serving in colonial units, SDUWLFXODUO\WKH:$))DQG.LQJ¶V$IULFDQ5LIOHV.$57KH
latter was opened to militia officers in 1902 to appease the growing demand. By 1905 
there were ten militia officers serving, three more than was originally intended, so it was 
decided to cap the number where it stood so as to avoid the prospect of having too many 
in the regiment.66 Some militia officers seconded or transferred to colonial corps were 
able to reach influential positions. In West Africa the Aide de camp to the Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief of the West African colonies in 1899, Lieutenant J. F. N. Price, had 
been seconded from the 3rd Bedfordshire Regiment. However, some faced significant 
difficulties owing to their previous position within the militia. There were questions 
raised by the colonial governor, C. King Harman, over the quality and efficiency of 
militia officers serving in the WAFF including Major Blakeney, the commanding officer 
of the Sierra Leone Battalion until 1903. In fact the rising efficiency of the battalion as 
noted LQ 'HFHPEHU  ZDV DWWULEXWHG WR %ODNHQH\¶V UHSODFHPHQW ZLWK D UHJXODU
commanding officer. As a general rule officers in the WAFF were expected to serve for 
five years, after which they could be offered a further term of service if deemed 
efficient.67 The prospects of promotion for militia officers were limited as they struggled 
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to compete with regular officers who were deemed more efficient. It was therefore 
expected that the majority of secondments would cease after five years due to the 
negative impact of being away from home regiments for a prolonged period of time. 
There was also confusion as to whether a militia officer could count his seconded service 
towards a Colonial Office pension, as it was later clarified that WAFF secondments were 
given one at a time and therefore were not regarded as cumulative service for the 
Colonial Office.68 
 
* * * 
 
Of all the aspects of a commission that attracted potential officers to the militia, pay was 
not one of them. Whilst training with their regiments militia officers were entitled to a 
basic rate of pay augmented by a complex system of additional emoluments. Between 
1852 and 1868 this remained unchanged. The daily rate of pay ranged from 15s 11d for 
lieutenant-colonels (full colonels commanding their regiments were entitled to daily pay 
at the rate of £1 2s 6d), 14s 1d for majors, 10s 6d for captains, 6s 6d for lieutenants, and 
5s 3d for ensigns and second-lieutenants. Each officer was entitled to additional 
emoluments based on rank. All received a 1s allowance which was meant to cover mess 
expenses (although, as will be seen, in most units this was insufficient), while captains 
received a 2s contingent allowance for command of their companies (1s 6d for companies 
of 75 men and under in strength), and majors and lieutenant-colonels 2s forage 
allowance, with the latter entitled to 3s command pay if in command of their regiment. 
Further allowances could be claimed for travel expenses. Officers were liable to a 
maximum of 9d per mile for conveyance of their baggage (either by rail or otherwise) for 
all journeys of ten miles or more from their residence within the county, or if travelling 
from elsewhere from the border of the county, to the place of assembly (the same payable 
upon return unless they left the training early). However, all journeys from outside of the 
county were not liable to any financial assistance regardless of the distance, something 
which was frequently blamed by many officers as further compounding the shortage of 
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officers.69 To bring both basic rates of pay and total emoluments further into line with 
those for the regular army, in 1868 the basic rates of pay were increased, captains 
henceforth liable to 11s 7d per day, majors 16s, and lieutenant-colonels 17s (although 
that for subalterns was frozen). A War Office circular of 1868 also extended lodging 
money to militia officers to provide items such as furniture if they were unable to secure 
private quarters, although if in private quarters they were still liable to half. In 1869 the 
mess allowance was increased from 1s to 4s. This meant that when compared to the pre-
1868 rates, the overall amount an officer could theoretically receive had increased by 
between a total of 5s for ensigns and second-lieutenants, and 8s 1d for lieutenant-
colonels.70  
The total amount an officer could receive though his basic pay and emoluments 
remained largely unchanged from 1869 until 1908, matching a similar problem within the 
regular army (although the total payable to lieutenant-colonels had risen by a further 1s). 
The only major increases occurred in the technical arms of the service (again reflecting a 
trend evident within the regular army). Although subalterns in artillery corps were 
entitled to 4d per day more than their infantry counterparts, officers within engineer 
regiments and submarine mining corps had significantly higher pay due to the more 
technical nature of their service. Both lieutenant-colonels (commanding either of the 
engineer regiments) were liable to a daily total of pay and allowances totalling £2 5s 
(compared to just £1 11s in infantry regiments and artillery corps); indeed, submarine 
miners were entitled to the highest amounts, with a major entitled to £1 15s. Pay and 
allowances could on rare occasions be supplemented by one-off payments. Upon the 
disembodiment of militia units in 1856, subalterns were given an additional allowance 
equal to six months' pay, while the surgeon and assistant-surgeons were entitled to an 
allowance equal to one year's pay, from the date of disembodiment. Similarly, at the 
conclusion of the South African War all officers were entitled to a £100 allowance for 
embodied service.71 
 However, pay and allowances were often not enough to allow militia officers to 
live without also possessing a private income. Upon joining a militia regiment officers 
also had to pay for their uniform and equipment. In 1852 the same pattern of dress was 
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adopted as the line, with the exception that silver lace was substituted for  the gold lace of 
regular officers. During training and exercise officers were only required to wear the 
official undress uniform (unless specified otherwise by the commanding officer), 
although formal dress uniform was usually expected at all social events thus adhering 
militia officers to the same excessive expenses for uniform as their line compatriots. 
Additional costs included the purchase of a sword and its accoutrements and the furniture 
for his lodgings. Much like regular regiments these costs varied from unit to unit. In 1854 
one anonymous officer complained that it cost him £75 for uniform alone; by contrast, 
another officer argued that in his unit uniform could be purchased for just £39 and the 
basic furniture and equipment for as little as £13. Another officer estimated that in the 
2nd West York Regiment subalterns could fully equip themselves from £50 to £60.72 
Financially militia officers were disadvantaged by having to ensure their uniform 
matched the latest patterns for the regular army even though in each year militia officers 
might only wear their uniform for two months at most; they simply did not have the 
chance to wear their uniform out, as in the line. The frequency at which officers updated 
their uniform could vary, although one officer stated that minor alterations were required 
on a yearly basis. They received no financial assistance to make alterations meaning such 
had to be self-funded (unlike in the rifle volunteer corps where officers were liable to a 
£20 grant for the purchase of their uniform). The only exception came in May1881 when 
militia officers were expected to change their uniform to match that of their new 
territorial regiments (or in the case of the artillery, the uniform of the Royal Artillery) 
while the colour of lace was changed back to gold from silver. Units which completely 
overhauled their uniform (namely those altered from or to the rifle or highland pattern) 
were given a one-off sum worth £25 to compensate them.73 In some instance it appears 
the high cost of uniform was enough to push some officers towards resigning their 
commissions altogether. Colonel Hill, commanding officer of the 3rd Gloucestershire 
Regiment, stated that when he served with the regiment the officers were determined to 
wear out their existing uniform rather than purchase the updated pattern.74 
Militia officers also had to meet the necessary contributions towards the running 
                                                 
72
 The Times, 4 and 7 September 1857; PP, Militia regulations, 32, (1852-53), pp. 6-7; PP, Royal 
Commission, 2553, (1859), q. 3310. 
73
 PP, Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, vol. 2, Cd. 2063, qq. 13177; HC Deb., 3 April 
1882, vol. 268, cc. 539-40 (c. 540); HL Deb., 20 May 1881, vol. 261, cc. 933-6, (cc. 933-5). 
74
 PP, Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, vol. 1, Cd. 2062, (1904), qq. 747-50; PP, Royal 
Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, vol. 2, Cd. 2063, (1904), qq. 15679-85. 
     
 99 
of the mess which could be highly variable depending on the extravagance of the 
regiment.75 ,QWKHRU\WKH4XHHQ¶V5HJXODWLRQVOLPLWHGWKHDPRXQWWKDWFRXOGEHUHTXHVWHG
for messing. It stated that when appointed officers would be expected to make a 
contribution of up to 30s for the mess fund and up to 20s for the band fund. When 
SURPRWHGWKH\ZRXOGDJDLQEHH[SHFWHGWRPDNHDFRQWULEXWLRQRIµDVXPQRWH[FHHGLQJ
WKH GLIIHUHQFH RQ WKLUW\ GD\V¶ SD\ RI WKH UDQN DWWDLQHG DQG WKDW SUHYLRXVO\ KHOG¶ 7KH\
were also liable to annual subscriptions of up to eight days pay for the mess fund, and 12 
days pay for the band fund. Despite these limits, militia officers were frequently required 
to make additional contributions often well above the basic messing costs, while some 
seemingly flouted the regulations altogether.76 Upon the reconstitution of the 1st Durham 
Regiment a contribution of 30 days pay was required up front to form the initial mess 
fund, although from 1856 the payment could be spread over the year at a rate of three 
days pay per month until the date of the following training (upon which any remainder 
would be paid). By 1862 it was agreed to reduce the amount on appointment to just ten 
days pay and the amount on promotion to five days pay, and from 1886 onwards a fixed 
VXPRIZDV HVWDEOLVKHG IRU ILUVW DSSRLQWPHQWV2IILFHU¶V DQQXDO FRQWULEXWLRQVZHUH
also high and rose steadily across the period. From 1858 to 1864 as little as four days pay 
per annum was required for basic messing costs, rising to six days pay from 1865 to 
1867. Yet from 1870 to 1888 this had risen to an average of 12 days per annum before 
reaching a height of 26 days pay per annum in 1897, and an average of 20 days pay per 
annum between 1889 and 1899. The mess allowance (mentioned above) was far from 
sufficient to cover the total expenses and was appropriated directly by the mess 
committee for the supplement of the mess fund from 1859 onwards. By 1879 the mess 
committee of the 1st Durham Regiment carried a motion to require those using the 
regiment as a means to a regular commission should have to pay 20 guineas upon 
leaving. High initial contributions were also found in the East Kent Regiment. From 1867 
a total of 30 days pay was expected for the mess and band fund upon appointment, while 
they were also expected to pay a one-off payment of £25 towards the mess fund if 
transferring to the regular army. Similarly, upon the reconstitution of the Cambridgeshire 
Regiment the initial mess and band contributions were set at a flat rate of £2 10s each, 
regardless of rank, totalling £5 per officer, although this was quickly found to be 
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insufficient to meet expenses.77 
Militia regiments faced a dramatic rise in costs when first encamped or embodied 
owing to the necessity of purchasing the necessary accoutrements and equipment which, 
when disembodied, was usually simply hired or supplied by hoteliers during the annual 
training. One anonymous officer complained to The Times that upon appointment to the 
rank of captain he was required to pay a total of 90 days pay upon the embodiment of his 
regiment during the Crimean War, a result of having to purchase the equipment, 
furniture, additional uniform and accoutrements needed for the possibility of service 
abroad.78 These costs could be even higher if there was the need to purchase or hire huts 
or tents while encamped, although those stationed in larger towns and cities were able to 
take advantage of competition which enabled greater economy in messing costs. In the 
Royal Montgomery Rifles (later 4th South Wales Borderers) annual subscriptions rose 
throughout the 1880s owing to the frequent encampment of the regiment during the 
annual training and the subsequent need to purchase a mess hut. By 1889 subscriptions 
rates hit unprecedented levels at 13 days pay for messing and four days pay for the band, 
and although the following year the rates remained broadly the same (except messing 
costs had been reduced to 12 days pay), an additional four days pay was required to meet 
the interest payments upon the purchase of the new mess hut. However, the mess was 
once again located at a Welshpool hotel for the 1891 training meaning that the 
subscriptions were comparatively modest at four days pay for messing and five days pay 
for the band fund.79 
Some units intentionally sought economy. In 1854 officers of the Royal South 
Middlesex Regiment, messing at a local hotel, could purchase breakfast for only 1s 6d 
and dinner for just 2s 9d, while only the officers drinking wine were charged for such.80 
There also appears to have been some drive towards a fairer system of mess contributions 
within the 3rd East Surrey Regiment. For instance, from 1893 a graded scale of mess 
contributions was introduced so that field officers paid a proportionally larger share of 
the expenses: the lieutenant-colonel £10, both majors £5, captains £3, lieutenants £2 and 
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recently commissioned subalterns just £1.81 Certain regiments also made efforts to drive 
down the extravagance and cost of messing so that it was affordable to more modest 
means. In the Cornwall and Devon Miners Regiment, in 1860, dinner and board could be 
purchased for a total of 5s per night, while lunch and breakfast could be purchased for an 
additional 1s 6d each (with the cheapest room priced at just 1s per night). To avoid 
excessive drinking there was a rule laid down in 1858 that limited all officers to drink 
only one-third of a bottle of wine per day, although the fact that it was no longer noted in 
the mess minutes meant it was largely ignored by the 1870s (after which the wine bill 
was again split equally among the officers regardless). By the turn of the century there 
was another drive towards controlling mess bills with the decision to manage the catering 
in house as opposed to hiring a civilian caterer. This reduced the daily messing cost from 
7s 6d to 3s 8d per day.82 
 Even if an officer was able to make his pay cover his basic mess contributions 
there existed (as with the regulars) a standard of living which officers were expected to 
meet, and thus ample opportunities for additional expenditure. It was common practice 
for officers to buy gifts for the wider benefit of the mess upon special occasions. In the 
East Kent Regiment, in August 1858, a new candelabra was funded by subscriptions of 
one and a-half days pay each (although Colonel Brockman donated £25 out of his own 
pocket the following January) while in 1860 it was carried that each officer donate a days 
pay to pay for the purchase of a silver salt stand to be presented to the bandmaster upon 
his leaving the regiment. Later, in 1867 Lieutenant-Colonel Deedes and Captain (and 
adjutant) Knight presented a pair of silver claret jugs to the mess, while Captain Bury 
presented an oaken desk and writing stand. Similar gifts are also recorded as being 
presented to the mess in 1872, 1873, 1876 and 1878. In the 4th Norfolk Regiment gifts 
were usually given upon promotion or appointment, usually cases of wine and 
champagne, musical instruments, glassware, smoking paraphernalia and silverware. For 
instance, in 1887 one officer presented to the mess a cigar box, while in 1896, on the 
occasion of taking command of the regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey presented 12 
bottles of wine (part of a longstanding regimental tradition). In the 1st Durham Regiment 
a memorial fund was established in honour of the late commanding officer, open to both 
serving and retired officers, £167 9s being raised towards a memorial window at a local 
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church and a piece of silverware for the mess (£120 13s from among the serving officers 
alone). It was also the practice in many regiments for the officers to fund schemes for the 
benefit of the NCOs and men. In 1869 the officers of the Cornwall and Devon Miners 
Regiment agreed to fund a library for the use of the permanent staff. This was funded 
through annual subscriptions graded by rank so that field officers contributed £2, captains 
£1 and subalterns 10s each.83 
Additional contributions were also secured through a system of fines. These were 
not just a way of providing additional revenue; they were also a crucial tool in 
maintaining mess etiquette and ensuring the decorum of its officers. This was the case 
within the 3rd Durham Light Infantry, whereby officers were liable to a range of fines for 
various offences. Any regimental property broken or damaged was liable to a fine, fixed 
after 1877 at 2s 6d per offence. Officers could be fined 4s for omitting to remove their 
name from the mess sheet before 2.30pm if not attending, or for failing to notify the 
attendance of guests, and were liable to a pay a full share of all wine drunk if failing to 
update their wine sheet. Additional fines were liable for breaking etiquette by drinking or 
EHWWLQJ EHIRUH WRDVWLQJ WKH 4XHHQ¶V KHDOWK V LQWURGXFLQJ RU HQWLFLQJ D GRJ LQWR WKH
mess (2s 6d and 5s), drawing a sword in the mess, being late or leaving without 
permission before 10.30 pm, being inappropriately dressed, or taking  newspapers (2s 6d 
each). Far from strictly maintaining etiquette, it was common and apparently normal for 
officers (including the commanding officer) to break the rules rather regularly, providing 
another additional expense on top of the messing bill. For instance during the 1890 
annual training there were 72 individual fines totalling £10 18s, while in the following 
year they totalled £10 3s.84 
 The high cost of messing did not go unnoticed by the government and the press. 
:KLOHLWZDVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHVLUHWRFKHFNWKHZRUVWFDVHVRIRYHUH[WUDYDJDQFHWKHUH
were fears that over regulation could put-off county gentlemen from joining, and 
therefore the issue remained relatively neglected. Nevertheless, by 1881 the issue was 
deemed of such importance that a general order was issued attempting to clamp down 
upon excessive messing costs through providing guiding regulations for the proper 
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organisation of mess finances. Commanding officers were urged to discourage 
extravagant living in their regiments and to resist unnecessary subscriptions and expenses 
so officers of limited means could live comfortably. In line with this it forbade the 
custom of luncheon marquees at race meetings, and requested that all balls and 
regimental events needed the sanction of the commanding officer upon consultation of 
the General Officer Commanding (GOC) each district. There was to be no pressure put 
on officers to contribute to such events, therefore meaning they could only be funded by 
WKRVH DJUHHLQJ WR FRQWULEXWH SD\ ZKLFK LWVHOI ZDV WR EH GHWHUPLQHG LQ GD\V¶ SD\ DV
opposed to a fixed amount) in order to make it fairer to junior officers and those of lesser 
means. Furthermore, extra subscriptions required to defray the cost of unnecessary items 
were prohibited, while it was made clear gifts were not to be mandatory upon 
appointment or promotion. The order also insisted monthly mess subscriptions were to be 
paid by the 7th of each month, with failure to pay by the 14th meaning suspension from 
the mess and potential repercussions from the GOC; if still unpaid officers could be 
arrested or suspended from duty altogether at the discretion of his GOC, after which the 
case would be reported to the Adjutant-General. Similarly, if on leave for more than 
seven days an officer was required to ensure his mess bills were paid, while all expense 
accounts were to be audited at quarterly meetings examined by general officers during 
their inspections. Commanding officers could also face repercussions if they consistently 
failed to deal with undue inflation in messing costs with the possibility that in such 
instances they would not be recommended for further promotion.85 In reality this was as 
far as the government was willing to go in combating excessive mess bills. As an 
alternative measure, the government was unwilling to increase pay as they felt an 
RIILFHU¶VVWDWXVZDVGHWHUPLQHGQRWE\KLVOHYHORIKLVHDUQLQJV, but his social background 
(believed to be vital in maintaining order over the rank and file); therefore, they did not 
want pay to become the new arbiter of an officers suitability for a commission.86  
 
* * * 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that the Militia Act of 1852 did little to radically alter the source 
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and means by which militia officers were obtained. Initially the authority to appoint 
commissions remained with the lords lieutenant, although in practise it was often left to 
commanding officers to nominate individuals. Promotion was theoretically based upon 
seniority, although the retention of property qualifications for the rank of captain and 
above ensured the highest ranks were, before 1869, largely out of reach of officers who 
did not qualify. By 1854 PRVWVHUYLQJRIILFHUVKDGEHHQFRPPLVVLRQHGDIWHUWKHIRUFH¶V
reconstitution, although their remained a useful nucleus of field officers who were 
commissioned prior. County connections and patronage remained crucial for successfully 
securing a commission, although there were attempts to open commissions to retired 
regulars, while the abolition of qualifications for subalterns meant professional families 
and those connected to business, finance and industry were able to make some inroads. 
Yet throughout the period it became ever harder to find enough officers to meet the needs 
of the force. This was largely due to the changing social composition of the force itself. 
By the 1870s the traditional link between the militia and landed gentry began to weaken 
(except for in the senior ranks) meaning that landed gentlemen found it increasingly 
difficult to find the time and money necessary to maintain himself as a militia officer. 
This was largely due to the impact of agricultural depression which meant the number of 
independent landed gentlemen, who were reliant largely upon land rents for their income, 
decreased. Subsequently, they were replaced professionals and businessmen for whom a 
militia commission acted as a means of gaining respectability in local county society. 
Nevertheless, the biggest shift was in the number of young officers simply using the 
µPLOLWLDEDFNGRRU¶DVDPHDQVRIREWDLQLQJDUHJXODUFRPPLVVLRQZLWKRXWDWWHQGLQJHLWKHU
Sandhurst or Woolwich. This led to a high turnover amongst the junior ranks which 
contributed towards the growing deficiency of junior officers (particularly amongst 
captains). However, it is important not to overplay this national trend. There was 
variation in the proportion of gentlemen surviving in different units owing to the 
circumstances of the local economy and the personal links of commanding officer. 
Furthermore, the opening of line commissions to militia officers failed to foster closer 
links between the line and militia as officers frequently transferred to other units and in 
some cases even to colonial units. Finally, a further reason why the militia struggled to 
maintain its strength (and why many of more humble means could not afford to serve) 
was due to poor rates of pay and allowances, combined with the high costs of uniform, 
equipment and messing (although again there was variation between units).  
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3. The Rank and File 
 
 
What is clear from studies of the regular army during the Victorian and Edwardian period 
is that recruiting sufficient manpower to meet its needs was a constant concern, one 
which the military authorities often struggled to deal with.1 It is clear that, for the militia, 
recruitment was also a particular challenge across the later half of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. The adoption of voluntary enlistment signalled a clear break with 
the militia of 1757 to 1831 which was recruited by the ballot.2 Much like the regular 
army the militia had to rely on financial inducements in order to attract volunteers, which 
were increasingly far from sufficient to attract the sort of men many officers desired. 
Again, much like the regulars, wastage remained a constant drain on manpower which in 
most years surpassed the number of recruits enlisted, the chief causes being desertion and 
the transfer of men to the regular army. As a result of this it was increasingly difficult for 
militia regiments to retain their men, with many also choosing instead to purchase their 
discharge instead of serving their full term of enlistment. Both desertion and the transfer 
of men to the regular army were exacerbated during periods of embodiment meaning that 
recruitment often struggled at times when the militia was in most need of manpower. As 
a result there was always a significant deficit in the enrolled strength compared to the 
establishment in every year from 1852 to 1908, and aside from altering the entry 
standards, in much the same way as the regulars, there was little the military authorities 
could do to resolve this issue. It was hoped that through changing the way in which the 
enrolment bounty was paid, through the abolition of the 10s enrolment bounty, desertion 
and fraudulent enlistment could be reduced. However, this ended up making the militia 
less attractive to those unskilled and casual labourers (as well as seasonal agricultural 
labourers) for whom service was a form of temporary unemployment relief, a group 
which was increasing in many regiments. Similarly the creation of brigade depots failed 
to better enable militia regiments to recruit within their district; in effect localisation and 
the creation of territorial regiments in 1881 stripped the militia of the ability to recruit its 
own men, instead passing the duty to the regular NCOs of the brigade depot.  
However, it would be wrong to suggest that recruiting difficulties were uniform 
                                                 
1
 A. R. Skelley, Victorian Army at Home: the Recruitment and Terms and Conditions of the British 
Regular, 1859-1899, (London: Croom Helm, 1977), pp. 235-80; Strachan, :HOOLQJWRQ¶V/HJDF\, pp. 51-7; 
Spiers, Late Victorian Army, pp. 118-51; French, Military Identities, pp. 31-60; Bowman and Connelly, 
Edwardian Army, pp. 41-63. 
2
 Western, English Militia, pp. 245-300. 
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DFURVVWKHFRXQWU\+LWKHUWRKLVWRULDQVH[DPLQLQJWKHPLOLWLD¶VUDQNDQGILOHKDYHPHUHO\
hinted at the fact that recruitment could vary wildly between different regiments.3 In fact, 
the main factor which governed recruitment at a local level was the nature of the local 
economy, something which also influenced the social composition of each regiment. 
Generally speaking one can categorise militia regiments into three broad groups which 
best describe their shifting social composition. Firstly, there were those regiments that 
had historically recruited from among the agricultural workforce, but who were unable to 
compensate for the decreasing proportion enlisting into the force by recruiting instead in 
urban areas. Secondly, there were regiments which, although expected to recruit from 
across their county, instead relied heavily or exclusively on the urban workforce, initially 
from among skilled industrial workers, artisans and tradesmen, but increasingly from 
among casual unskilled labourers. Finally, there were regiments which had traditionally 
always recruited industrial workers, artisans and tradesmen from within large urban 
areas, some of which came to increasingly rely on casual unskilled labourers, although as 
will be seen, some managed to buck this wider trend. Various social groups tended to 
enlist in the militia for different reasons. For instance, agricultural workers in arable 
counties had always used the militia as a means of finding temporary relief when out of 
season. Similarly, casual unskilled labourers saw the militia as a form of temporary 
unemployment relief. On the other hand, many skilled or semi-skilled industrial workers 
often saw militia service as a form of paid holiday, particularly when employment was 
plentiful meaning that they could serve within the militia and have no fears that they 
would be unable to find employment when returning. Furthermore, there were those for 
which militia service acted a as a stepping stone towards service in the regulars, either 
through design or through acclimatisation to military life. This was exacerbated by the 
ORVV RI WKH PLOLWLD¶V DELOLW\ WR FRQWURO LWV RZQ UHFUXLWLQJ LQ  ZKLFK LQ WXUQ PDGH LW
easier for regular NCOs to poach the best recruits before they reached their regiments. 
 
* * * 
 
Overall, an analysis of recruitment figures demonstrates that voluntary enlistment meant 
it was extremely difficult for the militia to maintain a sufficient level of manpower. As 
demonstrated by Figure 2, at no point did the total enrolled strength of English and Welsh 
                                                 
3
 Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHrs, pp. 154, 186-7; French, Military Identities, pp. 210-1.  
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regiments meet the establishment voted by Parliament. This varied considerably across 
the period. In 1855 just 40.6 per cent of the establishment was enrolled at the height of 
the Crimean War, although by 1893 this had risen considerably to a high of 94.8 per cent. 
Scottish regiments faced similar difficulties, although on the whole they were better able 
to maintain their strength. For instance, in 1893 the Scottish militia had an enrolled 
strength of 99.6 per cent of its establishment. Recruiting difficulties were made worse by 
the fact that militia regiments were largely restricted from recruiting above their 
establishment, meaning that in areas where recruitment was plentiful (predominantly 
urban areas) no advantage could be gained in order to offset recruiting difficulties 
elsewhere; as a result in 1889 and 1890 there were repeated calls to abandon such a 
principle.4 Even more concerning was the fact that the proportion of men who actually 
attended the annual training was often significantly lower than the total enrolled strength. 
For instance, in 1853 only 51,561 men were present at the annual training, representing 
just 64.5 per cent of the total establishment. Similarly, of the 82,237 men enrolled in 
English and Welsh regiments LQ  MXVW  DWWHQGHG WKDW \HDU¶V DQQXDO WUDLQLQJ
representing 79.0 per cent of the establishment.  
Despite a consistent deficit in manpower it is possible to identify some general 
trends. Firstly, recruitment in the initial years was only partially successful, varying 
significantly between regiments. In 1852 the government set an establishment of 80,000 
men for English and Welsh regiments, with 50,000 being raised from September to 
December that year and the remainder in 1853. In total only 33,714 men volunteered by 
the end of 1852 and by the end of 1853 the total had only risen to 66,280.5 However, the 
government was not overtly concerned at the deficiency. Walpole dismissed concerns in 
Parliament over the difficulties acknowledging that although recruitment was slow ± 
stating that the machinery for raising the militia had only been recently established in 
August ± six counties had in fact completed their quotas by the end of September. 
Examined on a regimental basis it was indeed the case that the initial success of 
recruitment varied widely. Of the 75 initially tasked with raising volunteers, a total of 40 
were able to reach at least 80 per cent.6 What is clear is that many of the initial 
deficiencies were among regiments that recruited heavily from urban and industrial areas.  
                                                 
4
 PP, Army and militia, C. 5922, (1890),  p. xi. 
5
 PP, Militia. Return of the quota of militia men for each county in England and Wales for the year 1852, 
74, (1852-53); PP, Militia. Return of the quota of militia for each county in England and Wales for 1853, 
153, (1854). 
6
  HC Deb., 25 February 1853, vol. 124, cc. 670-92, (cc. 688-91). 
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 See Appendix 4 for the figures upon which this is based. 
     
 109 
In Lancashire only 2,802 of the 5,628 men set by the quota for the county volunteered in 
1852. To put this into perspective, in neighbouring Cumberland the whole of the quota of 
545 men was met by the end of the year despite it being more sparsely populated. 
Similarly in the West Riding of Yorkshire there were difficulties; only 1,672 men of the 
3,885 required were found.8 Indeed, Sidney Herbert noted that of the 5,175 absences 
recorded across 52 regiments, as many as 3,924 occurred in just 14 regiments all of 
ZKLFK UHFUXLWHG LQ WKH µPHWURSROLWDQ DQG PDQXIDFWXULQJ GLVWULFWV¶ %\ IDU WKH ZRUVW
deficiencies occurred in the 1st and 2nd Tower Hamlets Regiment where 1,221 men were 
recorded as deserters, nearly a quarter of the total.9 
However, there were other influences which negatively affected recruitment. 
Duncan Anderson has argued that anti-militia and pacifist resistance presented the 
greatest difficulty for recruiters as opposed to inefficiencies with the permanent staff 
which, as argued by J. R. Western, had always been present.10 One such impediment was 
the hostility of benefit and friendly societies which prohibited their members from any 
form of military service upon the threat of a withdrawal of financial support. Historically 
this had been a relatively minor issue as during the French and Napoleonic Wars only a 
small proportion of the population belonged to such organisations. However, by mid-
century they numbered over 14,000 while membership had increased to nearly half of the 
population.11 Ian Beckett noted how three privates of the Buckinghamshire Regiment had 
all been refused benefit after joining the regiment.12 A similar situation befell four 
recruits of the Royal Caernarvonshire Rifles who were denied not only the advantages of 
membership but also the cumulative sum of £58 3s paid into the society prior to joining 
the militia. The decision was made on the grounds military service would put them at 
greater danger and thus more likely to claim some form of benefit. Fortunately the 
magistrates found the society at fault believing it unreasonable to deny the men the 
benefits of membership when they were not liable to be in any great danger due to their 
                                                 
8
 PP, Militia. Return of the quota, 74, (1852-53). 
9
 WSHC, 2057/F8/II/G/4, Memorandum on the regiments of militia inspected, 1847-1852. 
10
 '$QGHUVRQµ(QJOLVK0LOLWLDLQWKHPLG-Nineteenth Century¶, pp. 319-22. 
11
 Ibid., p. 322. 
12
 The commanding officer (and Lord Lieutenant of Buckinghamshire) Lord Carrington was petitioned by 
the three in November 1852 who had all been refused benefit by societies in Sherrington, Langley Marsh 
and Stoke Poges. He found that there was no legal basis to force the societies into giving benefits to 
militiamen, although his decision to compensate each man out of his own pocket at least forced the 
Sherrington society into reversing its decision. Buckinghamshire Record Office, Carrington, 28/A/2, 
quoted in Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW-Time Soldiers, p. 149. 
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service as militiamen compared to those within the regular army or navy.13  
A further cause for concern came from the concerted efforts of the pacifist 
movement to attack the reconstituted militia through discouraging potential volunteers 
from enlisting. From August 1852 the Peace Society disseminated provocative anti-
militia hand-bills and placards in recruiting areas, particularly among rural towns and 
districts, the most notorious of which graphically depicted that militiamen could be 
flogged for certain disciplinary offenses. Local resistance often coalesced around 
Anglican clergymen; one such example in Rutland was recorded as hiring an individual 
to tear down all anti-militia bills. To combat this, the government decided to encourage 
PDJLVWUDWHVWRSURVHFXWHµUDQNDQGILOHSDFLILVWV¶UHVSRQVLEOHIRUGLVVHPLQDWLQJDQWL-militia 
literature for seditious libel.14 As a result local magistrates attempted to prosecute those 
found to be circulating anti-militia placards in Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire and 
Suffolk, while one individual, who could not afford bail, was imprisoned awaiting trial. 
The decision to attack the peace movement on the ground was an astute move as it played 
upon the reservations of tKH PRYHPHQW¶V OHDGHUVKLS DQG FHUWDLQ PHPEHUV WRZDUGV
resisting the government. In fact, the leaders of 62 societies promised the Home Secretary 
that they would bare responsibility for any attempts to disrupt recruitment, while 
furthermore two members of the Peace Society resigned over the issue. As a result, and 
after receiving multiple letters of complaint, the society ceased the distribution of all anti-
militia materials and agreed not to replace any hand-bills already removed. Despite the 
return to government of Palmerston (WKHSHDFHPRYHPHQW¶VSROLWLFDOQHPHVLV) as Home 
Secretary from 28 December 1852, by 1853 he decided to drop all charges against peace 
activists largely because their efforts to disrupt recruiting had been at best only of very 
limited success. There appeared to have been some success in disrupting recruitment in 
the West Riding of Yorkshire although, as Derby commented, this was due to a 
combination of high wages and the concerted activities of individuals such as the notable 
peace activist Richard Cobden who stood for and won unopposed his West Riding 
constituency. However, in all three counties in which peace activists were prosecuted 
recruitment had been very successful; the Royal Buckinghamshire Regiment and 
Hertford Regiment completed their full quotas by the end of 1852 while both the West 
                                                 
13
 North Wales Chronicle, 21 January 1853. 
14
 71$76µ0LOLWLD3ODFDUGVUHODWLQJWRIORJJLQJLQWKH0LOLWLD¶+2µ0LOLWLD)ORJJLQJ
LQIODPPDWRU\ELOOVLQWKH0LOLWLD¶0&HDGHOThe Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace 
Movement and International Relations, 1730±1854, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 487-9.  
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Suffolk Regiment and Suffolk Artillery Regiment found a total of 757 volunteers out of 
an establishment of 949 men for the county.15 
Similarly, potential volunteers were also dissuaded from service in parts of Wales 
due, in part, to non-conformist hostility towards military service. On the whole, those 
regiments which struggled to find sufficient recruits were located in the eastern and 
southern Welsh counties with particular difficulty found in Carmarthenshire, 
Cardiganshire, Glamorganshire, Pembrokeshire and Caernarvonshire. For instance, by 
early December 1852 both the Royal Carmarthen Rifles and Royal Cardigan Rifles had 
only enlisted 68 and 46 volunteers out of quota of 241 and 302 men respectively. The 
influence of non-conformist hostility to militia service was believed to be the chief cause 
of poor recruiting in both regiments. Indeed by the first annual training of the Royal 
Carmarthen Regiment in October 1853 (with over a year given over to recruiting) the 
number enlisted had risen to only 200 volunteers out of an established strength of 547 
men, owing in part to the enlistment of men from neighbouring counties. Similarly the 
Royal Caernarvonshire Rifles could only find 166 volunteers out of a quota of 241. One 
dissenting minister preached that the reconstitution of the militia was simply a means 
WKURXJK ZKLFK µWKH ROLJDUFKLFDO FODVV¶ FRXOG LPSRVH WKHLU ZLOO µDW WKH H[SHQVH RI WKH
FRPPXQLW\¶ $ IXUWKHU FRQFHUQ ZDV the potential use of flogging and the 
misapprehension that volunteers would be liable for foreign service. There were also 
fears that non-conformist recruits would be liable to attend Church of England services 
on Sundays as opposed to their own services. Recruitment was not aided by the fact that 
official recruiting material was only printed in English whereas many anti-militia posters 
were also available in Welsh.16 
A second trend evident in recruitment figures is that periods of prolonged 
embodiment were far from conductive to militia recruitment. All three major 
embodiments saw a corresponding drop in the enrolled strength. Figure 2 demonstrates 
that by 1855 the militia faced the greatest recruiting crisis of the reconstituted period 
despite the addition of Scottish and Irish regiments first reconstituted in 1854. In total the 
enrolled strength of the militia fell to just 58,287 men. A similar, albeit lesser slump in  
                                                 
15
 HC Deb., 21 February 1853, vol. 124, cc. 357-62, (cc.357-60); North Wales Chronicle, 22 October 1852; 
Letter, Earl of Derby to Spencer Walpole, 20 September 1852, quoted in $QGHUVRQµ7KH(QJOLVK0LOLWLD¶
p. 329; Ceadel, The Origins of War Prevention  ¸pp. 489-90. 
16
 Owen, History of the Welsh Militia and Volunteer, pp. 41, 80, 107; North Wales Chronicle, 10 
September 1852, 1 October 1852, 29 October 1852, 5 November 1852, 3 December 1852, 11 February 





















































































































































































































































1854 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1854 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905
Royal Carnarvon Rifles / 4th Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers 407 428 428 406 576 848 848 848 848 652 637 « 390 406 392 566 762 679 600 588 453 389
Royal Cornwall (and Devon) Miners 
Artillery 379 396 396 378 386 384 384 384 384 395 384 « 192 331 343 277 341 211 271 272 209 227
1st (Royal South) Gloucestershire / 3rd 
Gloucestershire 1,047 1,083 1,083 1,046 1,060 848 848 848 848 868 849 « 558 660 778 754 680 508 614 564 413 423
Hampshire / 3rd Hampshire Regt. 1,153 1,109 1,031 994 1,010 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,084 1,061 « 408 673 919 861 862 843 782 617 527 465
East Kent / 3rd East Kent 1,047 1,083 1,083 1,046 1,060 1,272 636 848 848 652 637 « « 660 823 738 994 582 652 496 574 517
4th East Kent « « « « « « 636 « « « « « « « « « « 124 « « « «
6th Lancashire / 3rd (5th) Manchester 1,257 1,299 1,299 1,256 1,272 1,272 848 848 848 868 849 « 461 710 752 815 1,036 718 656 542 576 723
4th (6th) Manchester « « « « « « 848 848 848 868 849 « « « « « « 719 669 632 484 737
Royal Monmouthshire R. Engineers (L.I. 
1855-1860) 785 815 815 784 798 798 798 798 798 797 1,000 « 407 627 663 713 650 469 586 692 793 885
2nd (East) Norfolk / 4th Norfolk 941 848 743 717 768 848 848 848 848 868 849 « 568 599 669 646 784 663 580 625 496 508
Northumberland L.I. / 3rd (5th) 
Northumberland Fusiliers 1,257 1,081 1,081 1,044 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,084 1,061 « 497 678 816 859 907 868 824 890 610 836
Nottinghamshire / 4th Sherwood 
Foresters (Nott's & Derb's Reg't.) 1,280 1,322 1,322 1,279 1,295 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,084 849 « 536 808 987 836 968 1,147 1,092 1,024 629 675
1st Stafford / 3rd South Staffordshire 1,012 « 1,048 1,011 1,272 1,696 848 848 848 868 849 « « 712 944 1,093 1,455 796 646 755 716 748
4th South Staffordshire « « « « « « 848 848 848 868 849 « « « « « « 743 629 687 874 715
1st (King's Own) Tower Hamlets / 7th 
Rifle Brigade 1,216 « 1,252 1,215 1,219 848 848 1,060 1,060 1,084 1,061 « « 777 767 583 734 720 829 826 508 699
2nd West Yorkshire / 3rd West 
Yorkshire 1,085 1,121 1,121 1,084 1,096 1,060 848 848 848 868 849 « 600 714 772 814 1,033 854 570 664 537 623
Royal Aberdeenshire Highlanders / 3rd 
Gordan Highlanders « 806 806 775 789 1,060 1,060 848 848 868 849 « 574 571 670 359 812 550 433 475 309 356
Dumfries, Roxburgh, Kirkcudbright and 
Selkirk / 3rd Scottish Borderers « 719 723 682 702 848 848 848 848 868 849 « 531 633 647 585 798 774 630 682 430 457
Edinburgh Artillery « « 250 235 516 516 516 516 672 838 672 « « 230 229 407 437 466 488 566 628 629




























                                
1854 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1854 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905
Royal Carnarvon Rifles / 4th Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers 308 425 448 413 618 848 741 704 647 455 409 75.7 99.3 104.7 101.7 107.3 100.0 87.4 83.0 76.3 69.8 64.2
Royal Cornwall (and Devon) Miners 
Artillery 333 206 375 371 313 365 224 314 344 209 277 87.9 52.0 94.7 98.1 81.1 95.1 58.3 81.8 89.6 52.9 72.1
1st (Royal South) Gloucestershire / 3rd 
Gloucestershire 1,035 606 688 861 827 730 574 716 619 469 435 98.9 56.0 63.5 82.3 78.0 86.1 67.7 84.4 73.0 54.0 51.2
Hampshire / 3rd Hampshire Regt. 1,116 500 761 972 956 901 1,027 856 669 539 495 96.8 45.1 73.8 97.8 94.7 85.0 96.9 80.8 63.1 49.7 46.7
East Kent / 3rd East Kent 922 « 748 902 859 1,213 616 749 551 633 567 88.1 « 69.1 86.2 81.0 95.4 96.9 88.3 65.0 97.1 89.0
4th East Kent « « « « « « 169 « « « « « « « « « « 26.6 « « « «
6th Lancashire / 3rd (5th) Manchester « 545 870 768 1,151 1,128 891 803 670 618 1,019 « 42.0 67.0 61.1 90.5 88.7 105.1 94.7 79.0 71.2 120.0
4th (6th) Manchester « « « « « « 883 803 776 521 960 « « « « « « 104.1 94.7 91.5 60.0 113.1
Royal Monmouthshire R. Engineers (L.I. 
1855-1860) 733 453 674 720 830 723 518 707 810 810 1,028 93.4 55.6 82.7 91.8 104.0 90.6 64.9 88.6 101.5 101.6 102.8
2nd (East) Norfolk / 4th Norfolk 885 597 636 697 672 797 690 588 656 496 539 94.0 70.4 85.6 97.2 87.5 94.0 81.4 69.3 77.4 57.1 63.5
Northumberland L.I. / 3rd (5th) 
Northumberland Fusiliers 1,118 600 795 925 992 1,012 1,024 983 1,012 612 901 88.9 55.5 73.5 88.6 93.6 95.5 96.6 92.7 95.5 56.5 84.9
Nottinghamshire / 4th Sherwood 
Foresters (Nott's & Derb's Reg't.) 1,004 695 877 1,034 919 1,115 1,279 1,185 1,127 682 745 78.4 52.6 66.3 80.8 71.0 87.7 100.6 93.2 88.6 62.9 87.8
1st Stafford / 3rd South Staffordshire 949 « 801 982 1,175 1,648 883 684 839 828 867 93.8 « 76.4 97.1 92.4 97.2 104.1 80.7 98.9 95.4 102.1
4th South Staffordshire « « « « « « 822 684 760 942 828 « « « « « 96.9 80.7 89.6 108.5 97.5
1st (King's Own) Tower Hamlets / 7th 
Rifle Brigade 911 « 864 831 712 800 792 1,064 1,030 515 809 74.9 « 69.0 68.4 58.4 94.3 93.4 100.4 97.2 47.5 76.2
2nd West Yorkshire / 3rd West 
Yorkshire 987 732 778 825 939 1,066 894 625 764 688 691 91.0 65.3 69.4 76.1 85.7 100.6 105.4 73.7 90.1 79.3 81.4
Royal Aberdeenshire Highlanders / 3rd 
Gordan Highlanders « 638 612 709 384 1,044 648 551 545 383 397 « 79.2 75.9 91.5 48.7 98.5 61.1 65.0 64.3 44.1 46.8
Dumfries, Roxburgh, Kirkcudbright and 
Selkirk / 3rd Scottish Borderers « 612 663 678 687 879 861 688 766 630 532 « 85.1 91.7 99.4 97.9 103.7 101.5 81.1 90.3 72.6 62.7
Edinburgh Artillery « « 256 240 510 499 544 571 670 636 700 « « 102.4 102.1 98.8 96.7 105.4 110.7 99.7 75.9 104.2
Percentage of Establishment EnrolledEnrolled Strength on Date of Inspection / Embodied
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the enrolled strength accompanied the second more limited embodiment during the 
Indian Mutiny, whereby in 1860 the total enrolled strength fell to 88,434 men. The same 
was again true towards the end of the century as a result of the South African War, the 
enrolled strength plummeting from 102,396 men in 1899 to just 88,859 in 1900. This 
trend was also seen widely on a regimental level as most units experienced a fall in their 
enrolled strength. For instance, the 4th Sherwood Foresters Regiment saw a fall in its 
strength from 89 per cent of its establishment in 1895 to just 67 per cent in 1900 before 
returning to a healthier level at 87 per cent in 1905. Similarly the Edinburgh Royal 
Garrison Artillery (militia) saw a drop from an almost complete establishment in 1895 to 
just 76 per cent in 1900. After 1902 the strength of the force dropped to a level 
unprecedented since the end of the previous embodiment in 1860 reaching a low of 
86,681 in 1907, representing just 71 per cent of the establishment. Nevertheless, this 
again varied between regiments, as demonstrated in Table 3.1. 
Thirdly, there also appears to have been a rapid collapse in recruiting from 1865 
to 1867. However, this can be explained as a statistical anomaly; recruitment was in fact 
not struggling, but had purposefully been relaxed. From August 1864 until October 1867 
regiments were prohibited from recruiting if their strength exceeded 600 privates. The 
government had hoped that a reduction in the overall establishment by 30 per cent would 
enable the militia to be trained for four weeks rather than just three, thus making it more 
efficient at no increased cost to the treasury and also making larger regiments more 
manageable. Despite this policy, returns detailing the strength of the force continued to 
show the original quota, thus giving the impression that regiments which had ceased to 
recruit above the new limit appeared to be well below their establishment. This was 
seized upon by those who desired to reform the force, including figures such as Lord 
Elcho, a prominent advocate of a return to the ballot.18 However, if one examines 
recruitment on a regimental basis it is apparent that recruitment continued to recover 
across the decade. Of 16 sampled regiments in 1865, twelve of which had an 
establishment of over 600 privates, all were recorded with an enrolled strength above the 
cap. For instance, the 6th Lancashire Regiment recorded a total enrolled strength of 870 
out of a recorded establishment of 1,299 men, 710 of whom were present at the day of 
inspection. Similarly the 2nd (East) Norfolk Regiment recorded an enrolled strength of 
                                                 
18
 HC Deb., 16 March 1865, vol. 177, cc. 1761-823, (cc. 1773-4);  HL Deb., 29 March 1867, vol. 186, cc. 
804-13, (cc. 805-6); Dublin Evening Mail, 3 October 1864, p. 2. 
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610 out of a recorded establishment of 743 men, 599 of whom were present at inspection 
and a further seven absent with leave.19  
Clearly, recruiting for the militia was as large and consistent a struggle as that for 
the regular army. Ultimately the key reason for this was due to the principle of voluntary 
enlistment which, unlike the ballot, relied simply upon financial incentives. To encourage 
recruitment each recruit was liable to receive a bounty payable by instalments over the 
term of their service. At first the total bounty of £6 was split so that volunteers received 
10s as an immediate incentive upon enlistment (with no guarantee they would attend the 
preliminary training in the spring). The remainder was payable at the completion of the 
annual training in instalments of £1 1s for the first four and £1 6s upon completion of the 
fifth or upon re-engagement ± there was some discretion available to commanding 
officers who, at first, could after enlistment pay a further 10s after completion of the first 
annual training and the remainder at a rate of 2s per month, payable in either monthly or 
quarterly instalments. (Additionally up to six months of the next instalment could be paid 
to men at the completion of the second training who were deemed worthy at the behest of 
the commanding officer.) In 1873 the terms of service were altered so that each 
militiaman could enlist for an additional year, although there was no increase to the 
overall bounty. This meant militiamen received just £1 after each training (as opposed to 
£1 1s, while the 10s upon enrolment was also withdrawn) meaning militiamen were year 
for year financially worse off (although the commanding officer could authorise the first 
\HDU¶VERXQW\ LQ WZRSD\PHQWV LQRUGHU WRSURYLGH more immediate financial relief). In 
1877 the 10s on enrolment (from 1883 payable only after the completion of the 
preliminary drill) was reintroduced, increasing the total bounty to £6 10s. An additional 
10s could be gained if a recruit chose to train upon enlistment (as opposed to during the 
preliminary drill) from 1881 onwards. Despite this, a PLOLWLDPDQ¶V bounty remained 
virtually the same throughout the late nineteenth century as it was not until 1901 that the 
bounty was significantly increased for the first time to £9 (an additional 10s continued to 
be liable to those drilling on enlistment) payable at a rate of £1 10s after every training. 
Significantly an additional non-training bounty totalling £3 was payable each year to 
militiamen after the completion of two annual trainings, as a means of encouraging men 
to remain in the force. As a result, those completing their term of service could 
theoretically earn a total bounty of £21 10s if they had trained upon enlistment.  
                                                 
19
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On top of the bounty there was an additional payment liable for former regular 
NCOs serving as sergeants in the militia of 30s (payable after each annual training), 
while militiamen who undertook a course at an authorised school of instruction received 
an additional payment of £1 upon completion. Additionally there were financial 
inducements to re-HQOLVWWRZDUGVWKHHQGRIRUDIWHUWKHH[SLUDWLRQRIDPLOLWLDPDQ¶VWHUm 
of service. From 1852 until 1873 each man could re-enlist after four trainings for a 
further five years¶ service where upon they received the remainder of their bounty 
alongside a further 10s and the 5s bringing money (as the recruit acted as his own 
bringer). After this they would once again receive the remainder of their bounty in 
instalments of £1 1s (£1 6s in the final year), although in addition they were entitled to a 
yearly gratuity of 10s meaning each re-enlisted man would receive a total of £8 15s if 
they served the entirety of the second enlistment, and once again after four trainings 
would be liable to re-enrol for a further five years. This was altered from 1874 so that a 
militiaman could re-enrol after serving for a period of five and a half years for a total 
bounty of £9 payable in instalments of £1 10s after each training, although this was 
reduced in 1877 to £7 10s when the period of re-enlistment was cut to just four years, £1 
10s payable upon re-enlistment and the remainder once again after the annual training. 
Special rates for re-enlisted men were finally abolished in 1901.20 
In addition to the bounty, militiamen were liable to the same rates of pay as 
regular soldiers when assembled for training or embodied. However, the rates of pay, in 
both the regular army and militia, remained largely unchanged since the beginning of the 
century amounting to a basic rate of pay of 1s for infantry privates and 1s 2d for gunners. 
Members of the permanent staff and NCOs received slightly higher rates. In total 
drummers received 1s 1d (1s when disembodied) while corporals received 1s 2¼d and 
sergeants 1s 6¾d (reduced to 1s 1d and 1s 6d respectively for disembodied drummers and 
sergeants of the permanent staff). The basic rate of pay was not increased until 1867, 
when each man received an additional 2s in line with an increase in pay for regulars. 
Militiamen were also able to supplement their pay with an additional 1d beer money for 
each day assembled for training or embodied and could claim lodging or billet allowance 
of 2d and later 4d per day for up to 28 days. It was also possible to receive 2s 
compensation if they could not be provided with a pair of boots and had to use their own. 
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 Appendix XIV, PP, Militia regulations, 32, (1852-53), pp. 1-2; PP, Report of the committee, C.1654, 
C.1654-I, (1877), p. 513; PP, Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers. Appendices, Cd. 2064, 
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When taken together with the cost of clothing, necessities and provisions provided free, it 
was estimated, in 1871, that an infantryman could receive as much as £2 18s 5d for the 
preliminary drill, and £5 1s 2¾d for each subsequent training; a gunner would earn 
slightly more at £3 3s 1d and £5 12s 11¼d respectively. If they re-enlisted then, due to 
the 10s gratuity, they could earn even more.21  
The fact that both pay and the bounty had not increased in any meaningful way 
meant militia service was decreasingly financially attractive. This was arguably a 
contributory factor as to why there was an acute shortage of NCOs across the period as 
their rates of pay were largely only attractive to former regulars drawing a pension which 
could supplement their income from service with the militia, of which there was a 
shortage joining from the army (see below).22 Furthermore, all militiamen were liable to 
numerous stoppages to their pay for replacement kit, necessities and provisions which in 
turn reduced the amount they received. This meant militia service compared poorly to all 
but the worse paid jobs. For instance, in 1867 it had been estimated that an unskilled 
labourer working in London could earn £4 9s for 28 days work; by 1899 this had risen to 
£5 16s 8d, an increase of 31.1 per cent. On first appearances the rates of pay received by 
militiamen appear competitive. However, when adjusted to exclude the cost of clothing, 
necessities and provisions, as well as any billet or lodging money payable, the 
comparison is less favourable. At best an infantry private could earn £2 5s over the 
course of a 28 day preliminary drill and £2 14s 9d after each annual training of 27 days, 
while a gunner could earn a little more at £2 9s 4d and £2 19s 3d for the same (both 
excluding the additional 10s gratuity for a re-enlisted man).23 Nevertheless, stoppages 
were less of an issue within the militia than the regulars due to the fact that four weeks¶ 
annual training and a relatively short period of preliminary drill for recruits meant kit and 
clothing often lasted longer than in the regular army. Indeed, militiamen were entitled to 
take items of clothing and their boots away at the end of each training period.24   
All recruits joining the militia had to meet basic entry requirements which on the 
whole were more lenient than those for the regular army. At first recruiting was restricted 
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 WSHC, 2057/F8/II/F/9, Details on the Estimates, including comparison of pay in regular army and 
militia in 1802 and 1852; PP, Militia regulations, 32, (1852-53), p. 7-10. 
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 WSHC, 2057/F8/III/A/11, Letter, Lord Salisbury to Sidney Herbert, 14 June 1853. 
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 PP, Army (yearly wage). Return showing what is the estimated equivalent yearly wage, and at what 
periods paid, and by what amount of service earned, of a private soldier in the militia artillery, militia, 
militia reserve, army reserve 1stclass, army reserve 2nd class, and yeomanry., 326, (1871), pp. 1-2; Spiers, 
The Late Victorian Army, pp. 133-5 
24
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to those between 18 and 35 years of age, although volunteers over 35 and discharged 
soldiers up to the age of 45 could be attested, if passed fit by a military or medical officer 
and subsequently recommended by the adjutant to the Secretary of State for War. 
Additionally all recruits were to meet minimum physical standards of 32in around the 
chest and a minimum height of 5ft 4in, although men of 5ft 3in could be enrolled with the 
permission of the Secretary of State for War. There were slightly higher standards set for 
the artillery and engineers, 5ft 6in for the former and 5ft 5in for the latter. 25 Much like 
the regular army, the militia was able to control the influx of manpower by tailoring its 
entry requirements, raising standards when recruitment was more plentiful and reducing 
them when not. In 1893, when the enrolled strength of the militia reached its peak, the 
decision was taken to raise the entry requirement as the strength of the force exceeded 
that laid down in the estimates. Therefore, the minimum height requirement was raised 
by an inch in November and the practise of accepting boys aged 17 was suspended, even 
if they met the physical standard.26 Nevertheless, the fact that entry requirements were 
normally more relaxed for the militia than the regulars meant many militiamen were 
comparably smaller in physical stature than their regular counterparts. For instance, in 
1880 a total of 60.2 per cent of regular NCOs and men measured more than 5ft 7in in 
height; by comparison, between 1879 and 1880 only 28 of the 156 militia regiments and 
artillery corps recorded an average above that height among their men.27 
Finding the required manpower to fill the county quotas remained the ultimate 
responsibility of the lords lieutenant. To estabOLVK HDFK FRXQW\¶V TXRWD WKH UHFHQW 
census was used as a guide so that one in 174 men would be required in 1852 and one in 
286 men in 1853. (Recruiting for Scottish and Irish regiments remained inactive as they 
were governed by separate legislation and thus were not reconstituted until 1854 owing to 
the mounting manpower requirements of the army during the Crimean War; subsequently 
their establishment was fixed at 10, and 30,000 respectively on top of the 80,000 for 
England and Wales.) The term of engagement was set at five years (rising to six in 1874) 
after which militiamen could either be discharged or re-engage for a further term of 
service, although they were liable to purchase their discharge at any time for a sum of £1 
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 PP, Militia regulations, 32, (1852-53), pp. 1-2; PP, Army and militia. Annual report of the Inspector 
General of Recruiting, C.2832, (1881), p. 12. 
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 PP, Army and militia. Annual report of the Inspector General of Recruiting for 1893., C. 7291, (1893-
94), p. 12; PP, Army and militia. Annual report of the Inspector General of recruiting for 1894., C. 7659, 
(1895), p. 12. 
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 PP, Army and militia. Annual report of the Inspector General of Recruiting for 1880, C.2832, (1881), p. 
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(later rising to £1 10s). Recruits had to be resident in either the county of the regiment 
they wished to join or an adjacent county, although men could expect to serve anywhere 
in the United Kingdom with their regiment. Any deficiencies in a particular regiment 
could be filled by recruiting men from another county. All potential recruits were to face 
medical examination and if approved recited the oath before a magistrate or deputy 
lieutenant in their county, riding or place.28  
On the ground recruitment was ultimately the responsibility of the adjutant who 
supervised the efforts of the permanent staff. Once Cardwell introduced brigade depots 
for regular and militia regiments in 1873, which in turn were consolidated by Childers as 
territorial regiments in 1881, the responsibility for recruiting both regular and militia 
recruits fell to the district commander. The methods by which regiments recruited varied 
depending on the ease with which recruits could be obtained at headquarters ± many 
recruits could be directly obtained from the headquarters or nearby towns if they 
contained sufficient willing volunteers. Members of the permanent staff were usually sent 
WRILQGYROXQWHHUVE\µEHDWRIWKHGUXP¶DWRXW-stations located in the surrounding towns, 
after which the adjutant, surgeon and often the sergeant-major would proceed from 
station to station to enrol recruits. Usually there would be a defined period in which 
recruiting was carried out, principally during winter and spring, although if recruits were 
slow to come forth sergeants could be posted at out-stations for the entirety of the non-
training period. In the 3rd Lancashire Regiment, the headquarters of which were located 
in Preston, there were ample men willing to enlist without the need to recruit beyond. 
Similarly, the Worcestershire Regiment also avoided sending recruitment parties away 
from the headquarters in Worcester, as sufficient recruits came from the surrounding 
countryside and manufacturing towns (namely Kidderminster, Droitwich and 
Stowbridge). By comparison, regiments with headquarters located in small towns usually 
recruited from elsewhere. For instance, in the North-East, regiments tended to recruit 
away from their headquarters: both the Northumberland Artillery, the headquarters of 
which were located in Berwick, and the Durham Fusiliers, whose headquarters were 
located in Barnard Castle, drew the majority of their recruits from the manufacturing 
areas around the Rivers Tyne and Tees. In the case of the Northumberland Artillery, the 
significant distance from Berwick to Newcastle and Tynemouth contributed in part to the 
high cost for the regiment of £7 per recruit. By comparison it cost the Durham Fusiliers 
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as little as 4s 6d per recruit, although this was largely due to the more efficient use of 
surgeons living in the recruiting areas.29 On top of their recruiting duties for the militia, 
members of the permanent staff were also briefly tasked with finding recruits for the 
regular army, a function authorised by the War Office from 15 August 1857 until finally 
being suspended on 7 May 1861.30 
All those involved in recruiting received not just financial compensation for their 
efforts, but also financial incentives to recruit as many men as possible. Adjutants were 
initially liable for a 5s allowance for every day spent undertaking recruitment duties, later 
altered to a yearly allowance of £3 per company. This was supplemented by 5s lodging 
money whilst stationed away from headquarters and 2s forage allowance to cover travel 
expenses. It was expected that a surgeon would accompany the recruitment party, 
receiving 15s a day if five or more recruits were examined (or 2s 6d per recruit if less 
than five whilst stationed at headquarters) and the same inn and forage allowances as 
adjutants. Recruiting sergeants and drummers received full compensation for travel costs 
by rail with an additional 10d to cover food expenses, or if travelling by road marching 
money at 1s 1d per day to cover expenses (in addition to their daily pay of 2s ¾d for a 
sergeant-major, 1s 6¾d for a sergeant, and 1s 1d for drummers, with the daily addition of 
1d beer money).31  
Supplementing the official recruiting parties was the payment of bringing money 
of 5s (later reduced to 2s 6d) to any individual deemed a bona fide bringer ± any 
individual that it was deemed had brought forth a volunteer in good faith. This was also 
aimed at incentivising militiamen to try and encourage others to volunteer, a practice 
which was widespread; for instance, in 1876 a total of 85 regiments encouraged or 
allowed militiamen to bring recruits.32 However, the system was open to widespread 
abuse and created a high degree of resentment within the force. In 1859 the lieutenant-
colonel of the 1st Derbyshire Regiment complained that many of the recruits for whom a 
bringer had been paid simply failed to attend the preliminary training, the bringer 
receiving the payment regardless. As a result it was not uncommon for half the bringing 
money to be paid when a recruit was first brought, the other half during the training. It 
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 PP, Militia regulations, 32, (1852-53), pp. 5-6. 
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was also common for those with every intention of enlisting to claim to have been 
brought by an individual who, upon payment, would pass a share onto the recruit. This 
was particularly resented by recruiting sergeants who felt they were in essence being 
cheated of the right to gain the bringing money for themselves. There were even 
µSURIHVVLRQDO WRXWV¶ZKRPDGHDKDELWRIFRQYLQFLQJDVPDQ\YROXQWHHUV WRGHIUDXG WKH
regiment.33 The dubious place that bringing money had in what was meant to be a system 
of voluntary enlistment, and the belief that such a system encouraged desertion, meant it 
was finally abolished for both the regular army and militia by Royal Warrant in April 
1888. In the following years calls from many militia officers for its reintroduction were 
rejected owing to the fact that abolition appeared to have had little effect upon the 
success of recruitment.34 
There is also evidence that in the years immediately after reform policemen were 
used as bringers, although this varied depending on the attitude of chief constables to the 
role of finding recruits. During 1852 and 1853 the chief constable of Lancashire was 
happy for his men to be intimately involved with recruiting for the militia and he actively 
encouraged them to collect the 5s bringing money, although in the 3rd Lancashire 
Regiment this had ceased by 1859. In Wiltshire the county constabulary was responsible 
for bringing three-quarters of recruits for the county regiment and continued to bring 
recruits throughout the 1850s. Additionally in both counties the police also assisted the 
clerks of the lieutenancy by filling out notices for attested militiamen.+ In both counties 
the burden of such rested heavily upon the police, as the clerks of lieutenancy were not 
paid to fill out notices, and in Lancashire the chief constable noted his men were forced 
to complete such notices in one night. The police involvement varied across the country 
however. In 1859 it was remarked that the police were not available for recruiting 
purposes in counties adjoining Wiltshire. Similarly in Caernarvonshire, Devon, 
Shropshire, Nottinghamshire and Forfar the police were of no assistance in bringing in 
recruits.35 
 
* * * 
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The inherent weaknesses of relying on voluntary enlistment, as opposed to the ballot, 
meant it was a constant struggle to combat manpower wastage. It is clear that wastage 
was a growing problem as between 1872 and 1907 there was a net decrease of enrolled 
militiamen in 22 of the 33 recorded years (see Table 3.2). This was primarily due to two 
reasons: high rates of desertion and the increasing reliance upon the militia as a source of 
recruits for the regulars, both of which contributed to poor rates of manpower retention.36 
Table 3.2 shows that in any one year desertion accounted for between 10.1 and 41.2 per 
cent of the total decrease in manpower (in 1901 and the year from 1 September 1878 to 
30 October 1879 respectively), although on average it accounted for 23.3 per cent of all 
wastage across the period. Table 3.2 also shows that very few deserters ever rejoined 
their units meaning the majority were permanently lost to the force. Yet rates of desertion 
were far from static: in fact, they could vary significantly from year to year. Table 3.2 
clearly demonstrates that the rate of desertion increased in the years militia units were 
embodied, doubling to 16,699 in 1854, reaching a peak of 26,166 in 1858 and rising 
significantly during the first year of the South African War reaching 11,920 in 1900 
(although this dropped considerably the following year). The reason for such an increase 
ZDVQRWVLPSO\GXHWRWKHKDUGVKLSRISURORQJHGHPERGLHGVHUYLFHLQ6LGQH\+HUEHUW¶V
view, it was also due to the fact that the labouring classes (both agricultural and 
industrial), from which the militia recruited a significant part of its manpower, were best 
disposed towards short-term disembodied service which would allow them to supplement 
irregular and often seasonal periods of employment. Lengthy embodiments simply made 
it harder for militiamen to retain or find employment, thus leading to the higher rates of 
desertion.37  
High rates of desertion during the Indian Mutiny prompted the government to try 
and mitigate its worst excesses, some of which appeared to have succeeded. Firstly, in 
1858 it was suggested that the most aggravated cases should, as a deterrent, be tried by 
courts-martial (instead of summarily by magistrates, explored in Chapter 4). Secondly, 
the Militia Act of 1859 transferred the power to decide when units would assemble from 
the Lord Lieutenant to the Secretary of State for War. With the disembodiment of the 
remaining embodied units in 1860 and 1861, these measures did help to limit desertion  
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1853 35,813 « « « « 
1854 35,014 « « « « 
1855 72,069 « « « « 
1856 28,247 « « « « 
1857 26,702 « « « « 
1858 27,507 « « « « 
1859 26,704 « « « « 
1861 32,737 « « « « 
1863 29,414 « « « « 
1865 22,680 « « « « 
1867 « « « « « 
1869 « « « « « 
1871 33,097 « « « « 
1873-4 25,324 « 644 312 26,280 
1876-7 40,821 « 816 1,048 42,685 
1877-8 42,561 « 769 3,541 46,871 
1878-9 34,032 « 943 19,600** 54,575 
1881 24,965 519 610 « 26,094 
1883 33,764 1,760 607 « 36,131 
1885 40,657 2,652 825 « 44,134 
1887 33,597 3,039 1,229 « 37,865 
1889 33,354 2,901 797 « 37,052 
1891 39,783 2,327 1,034 « 43,144 
1893 45,771 3,161 1,489 « 50,421 
1895 35,148 1,947 949 1 38,045 
1897 38,246 1,760 902 « 40,908 
1899 40,653 2,012 1,069 « 43,734 
1900 37,853 1,342 2,449 1,222 42,866 
1901 37,644 1,212 1,179 3,537 43,572 
1902 41,486 2,986 1,224 6,686 52,382 
1903 25,774 3,623 1,013 133 30,543 
1904-5 29,941 4,001 1,053 35 35,030 
1906-7 28,575 4,094 739 22 33,430 
*The transfer of militiamen to the regular army was suspended in 
October 1859. Additionally, Irish regiments were not trained from 1866 
to 1870 and 1881 to 1882. Furthermore, the figures for 1903 are from 1 
January to 30 September only. 
** The large number recorded as joining the regulars in 1877-8 was due 
to mobilisation of militia reservists for the Zulu War, who subsequently 
rejoined the following year. 
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1853 « « 8,616 « « « « « 
1854 « « 16,699 9,911 1,247 « « « 
1855 « « 12,132 17,864 979 « « « 
1856 « « 4,391 10,796 622 « « « 
1857 « « 13,865 5,742 167 « « « 
1858 « « 26,166 16,314 536 « « « 
1859 « « 9,402 5,695 1,669 « « « 
1861 « « 6,100 « « « « « 
1863 « « 7,700 « « « « « 
1865 « « 6,725 « « « « « 
1867 « « 3,963 « « « « « 
1869 « « 4,438 « « « « « 
1871 « « 8,186 « « « « « 
1873-4 14,044 511 9,105 4,876 2,736 31,272 -4,992 
1876-7 16,852 472 10,670 10,151 1,424 39,569 3,116 
1877-8 13,859 501 14,046 29,631** 1,686 59,723 -12,852 
1878-9 10,831 463 13,188 7,103 419 32,004 2,971 
1881 14,778 505 7,530 8,528 110 31,451 -5,357 
1883 18,078 511 11,330 12,450 321 55 42,745 -6,614 
1885 14,113 417 10,924 14,513 308 43 40,318 3,816 
1887 16,929 421 10,288 11,504 283 210 39,635 -1,770 
1889 17,283 363 8,670 12,599 523 462 39,900 -2,848 
1891 17,463 443 10,706 13,542 395 383 42,932 212 
1893 16,102 335 14,048 14,314 485 95 45,379 5,042 
1895 16,996 422 7,643 12,234 666 126 38,087 -42 
1897 19,647 412 8,417 14,052 699 28 43,255 -2,347 
1899 22,020 503 10,144 13,518 722 2,344 49,251 -5,517 
1900 12,064 813 11,920 10,715 247 12,496 48,255 -5,389 
1901 13,561 852 3,366 14,907 666 116 33,468 10,104 
1902 22,653 706 10,454 18,373 621 « 52,807 -425 
1903 21,004 352 9,435 11,870 559 « 43,220 -12,677 
1904-5 17,906 369 4,999 12,103 330 « 35,707 -677 
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rates in the following years; never again did such a large proportion of the militia fail to 
attend the annual training. However, by no means was the issue of desertion solved; in 
fact, it remained one of the largest single sources of annual wastage throughout the period 
(as shown by Table 3.2). The report of a second royal commission examining the militia, 
published in 1877, argued that little more could practically be done to further reduce 
desertion rates. They could only recommend increased vigilance by recruiters (to prevent 
fraudulent enlistment) and that the alteration of the law so that those frequently deserting 
automatically face a prison sentence without the possibility of a fine.39 
Desertion and absence without leave were particularly prevalent among recruits 
and militiamen undertaking their first year of service. Table 3.3 demonstrates that the 
number of recruits recorded as absent without leave from their preliminary drill, or their 
first annual training, accounted for a significant proportion of those recorded as deserters 
in Table 3.2 (although it is important to remember that not all of those recorded as absent 
necessarily went on to be permanently struck off as a deserter). For instance, between the 
trainings of 1873 and 1874 a total of 4,806 of those recruited were recorded as absent 
from the preliminary drill, compared to a  total of 9,105 men recorded as having deserted 
in the same period (in Table 3.2). The key reason desertion was most prevalent among 
recruits was that, before 1873, recruits were liable for 10s immediately upon their 
enrolment as an incentive for them to recruit, but without their need to spend a single day 
in training. This not only encouraged recruits to desert, but also to try and fraudulently 
enlist into several units as a means of gaining as many bounties as possible. It was also 
expensive: it was estimated that those who failed to attend the preliminary drill, or who 
were medically rejected, cost the exchequer between £8,000 and £10,000 per annum.40 
Although the report of the Royal Commission examining the militia in 1859 suggested 
that all recruits should be trained immediately upon enrolment, receiving their enrolment 
bounty after completing their recruit training, it was not until 1873 that the decision was 
taken to prohibit the payment of the enrolment bounty upon enlistment.41 Instead recruits 
ZHUH SDLG  DIWHU HDFK WUDLQLQJ SHULRG ZLWK WKH ILUVW \HDU¶V ERXQW\ VSOLW LQWR WZR
payments at the discretion of the commanding officer. However, despite the change, there 
was little tangible improvement. In fact, Table 3.2 shows that the number of deserters 
struck off increased after the change, while Table 3.3 also shows that the proportion of 
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recruits absent without leave, between the trainings of 1876 and 1877, had also increased. 
This failure was largely due to the fact that, at the same time as the 10s enrolment bounty 
was abolished, legislation (36 and 37 Vict. c. 68) increased the length of a militia 
UHFUXLW¶V service from five to six years without any additional increase to the amount of 
his bounty (as discussed above). The failure to control desertion meant that in 1877 the 
decision was taken to reintroduce the 10s enrolment bounty on top of the existing total of 
recruits (from 1881 onwards) the option of being drilled immediately upon enlistment, 
for which they would immediately receive a portion of their yearly bounty.  
By again offering recruits a bounty upon enrolment, so long as they trained 
immediately when enlisted, the government were able to bring the level of absenteeism 
and desertion amongst recruits down to more manageable levels. Table 3.3 shows that in 
the year after the 10s enrolment bounty was restored the proportion of recruits recorded 
as absent without leave from their recruit training dropped from 12.9 per cent (in the year 
1880 to 1881) to just 3.9 per cent (in the year 1881 to 1882). However, despite the 
conclusion of the Royal Commission of 1890 that the change in system had largely 
succeeded ± returns showed that 80 per cent of recruits preferred to train on enlistment42 
± the drop in absenteeism amongst recruits did not correspond to an overall drop in 
desertion rates. Table 3.2 demonstrates that in the corresponding years (1880 to 1882) the 
number struck off as deserters remained relatively stable; indeed, there was only a small 
drop to 7,530 in 1881 compared to 9,299 the previous year. Furthermore, it was later 
recorded that between 1902 and 1907 most of those who deserted continued to do so in 
the first year of their service. In 1902, half of all recorded cases occurred among recruits 
serving their first year, one-quarter serving in the second year and half as many again in 
their third year.43 Indeed it was the conclusion of Colonel Arthur Robson, commanding 
the Northern Division Royal Artillery (militia), that the possibility of desertion lessened 
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 PP, Report of the committee, C. 5922, (1890), pp. x, xiii.  
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 Table 6, PP, General annual report, Cd. 1496, (1903), p. 84; Table 7, Ibid., Cd. 1904, (1904), p. 123; 
Table 7, Ibid., Cd. 2268, (1905), p. 119; Table 7, Ibid., Cd. 2696, (1906), p. 119; Table 7, Ibid , Cd. 3365, 
(1907), p. 121; Table 7, Ibid., Cd. 3798, (1908), p. 111. 
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 PP, Report of the committee, C. 5922, (1890), q. 6182. 
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Table 3.3: Recruit's Absent Without Leave from the Preliminary Drill among the Militia 
of the UK, 1873-1894.45 
 
Year Recruits Raised AWOL  from Preliminary Drill 






     
1873-74 29,148 4,806 « 16.5 
1876-77 40,821 9,929 « 24.3 
1877-78 42,651 9,053 « 21.2 
1878-79 34,032 5,739 « 16.9 
1879-80 30,408 4,459 « 14.7 



















AWOL   
1881-82 15,482 7,950 23,432 200 716 916 1,118 3.9 
1882-83 19,434 12,615 32,049 236 1,291 1,527 1,456 4.8 
1883-84 26,872 9,195 36,067 428 125 553 2,271 1.5 
1884-85 32,994 7,923 40,917 576 85 661 3,768 1.6 










1885-86 « « 40,011 « 754 « 4,058 « 
1886-87 28,291 8,552 36,843 « 493 « 3,236 « 
1887-88 23,455 8,360 31,815 « 333 « 2,090 « 
1888-89 « « 32,348 « 386 « 1,685 « 
1889-90 24,878 8,469 33,347 « 534 « 1,717 « 
1890-91 28,015 9,472 37,487 673 646 1,319 3,026 3.5 
1891-92 34,049 10,750 44,799 989 783 1,772 3,883 4.0 
1892-93 39,425 10,936 50,361 1,170 814 1,984 5,594 3.9 
1893-94 29,392 8,430 37,831 624 495 1,119 3,281 3.0 
         
 
Although the level of desertion broadly decreased over the course of the period, it 
was increasingly supplanted by those leaving the militia for the regular army, Royal Navy 
and Royal Marines. Table 3.2 illustrates that by the 1880s this became consistently the 
largest cause of wastage (second only to the total of those formally discharged). Much 
like desertion and fraudulent enlistment, this had been a somewhat commonplace 
occurrence during the embodiments of the 1850s as the manpower needs of the militia 
were clearly subservient to the line. The impact was deemed to be of such damage to the 
efficiency of the force that in 1859 a Parliamentary commission suggested the immediate 
                                                 
45
 PP, Recruiting. Statistical tables relative to recruiting for the army and militia., C. 1205, (1875), XIV; 
PP, Army and militia Annual report, C. 2832, (1881); C. 3169, (1882); C. 3503, (1883);  C. 3911, (1884); 
C. 4314, (1884-85); C. 4677, (1886); C. 4984, (1887); C. 5302, (1888); C. 5652, (1889); C. 6275, (1890-
91).  
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suspension of the practice. Although their recommendation went unheeded (due to the 
6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHIRU:DU-RQDWKDQ3HHO¶VVXVSHQVLRQRIWKHUHPLWRIWKHFRPPLVVLRQWR
H[DPLQHWKHSUDFWLFH6LGQH\+HUEHUWDV6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHIRU:DULQ3DOPHUVWRQ¶VQHZ
administration) officially suspended all transfers in June 1860 despite the fears of some, 
such as the Duke of Somerset, that recruitment for the regular army would suffer as a 
result.46 However, there remained those who were convinced of the need for greater 
integration of the army and militia ± Peel remained a continued advocate in recruitment 
from the militia to the line. It was not long before calls for its reintroduction were heeded 
and in May 1866 a circular re-established recruitment from the militia to the line due to 
poor rates of recruitment within the army for which it was again hoped the militia could 
be a useful source of manpower. As a result militia officers were once again encouraged 
to persuade as many men to transfer as possible.47 After its re-introduction the militia 
found itself providing an increasing proportion of manpower for the regular army. For 
instance, from 1872 to 1873 a total of 4,324 militiamen enlisted into the regular army, 
navy or marines, 15.8 per cent of the total wastage of 27,549 men recorded for the year. 
By 1883 the number had increased threefold as 12,450 men transferred to the line, with 
321 to the navy or marines, representing 29.9 per cent of the total wastage of 42,745 men. 
In fact there were only three years in which the proportion of men transferring accounted 
for less than 30 per cent of the annual wastage, while in 1885 it hit a high (before the 
South African War) of 14,513 transferring to the line and 308 to the navy or marines, or 
36.8 per cent of the total wastage of 40,318 men for the year.  
Clearly the militia had become a vital source of manpower for the regular army. 
In total, 327,496 men passed to the regulars from the Militia from 1882 to 1904, 
representing 35.4 per cent RI WKH DUP\¶V WRWDO PDQSRZHU48 What was particularly 
concerning for the militia was not just simply that a large number of their existing 
manpower were being drawn into the regular army, but that regular recruiters were 
poaching militia recruits before they even had a chance to join their units. The creation of 
MRLQWEULJDGHGHSRWVDVSDUWRI&DUGZHOO¶VORFDOLVDWLRQVFKHPHPHDQWWKDWUHFUXLWPHQWIRU
both the regular and militia battalions (if the latter had its headquarters located there) fell 
under the responsibility of the regular depot staff. Combined with the abolition of the 
                                                 
46
 PP, Report of the commissioners, 2553, (1859 Session 2), pp. v, vii, xiv; WSHC, 2057/F8/V/B/414, 
Letter from the Duke of Somerset to Sidney Herbert, 1 June 1860; Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV, p. 
155. 
47
 HC Deb., 14 June 1866, vol. 184, cc. 378-9.  
48
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payment of 10s immediately upon enlistment, which meant most recruits elected to train 
when they enlisted at the depot, militia officers and NCOs had very little supervision and 
influence over their recruits. This meant they were easy targets for regular recruiters 
preying on their ever growing familiarisation with military life. This led to calls in 1890 
for militia colonels to supervise recruit drill and for a militia officer to always be present 
if at least 25 militia recruits were present.49 Nevertheless, this did not stop the regular 
army from making it even harder for militia units to replace serving militiamen who were 
increasingly likely to leave the force, many for the regular army; the militia was, in effect 
(to quRWH9LVFRXQW+DOGDQHLQµSOXQGHUHGDWRQHHQGDQGSLOODJHGDWWKHRWKHU¶50 
The consistent annual loss from desertion and the increasing transfer of men to 
the regular army meant it was unlikely any single militiaman would serve the full period 
of his enlistment. Although Table 3.2 demonstrates that in any one year a large 
proportion of the total decrease was accounted for by discharged men, in fact very few 
men actually served the full term of their enlistment. Table 3.4 illustrates that less than 
half of those discharged in each year completed their full term of enlistment. 
Furthermore, compared to 1880 and 1881, the number completing their full term of 
enlistment continually declined until the height of the South African War due to the fact 
that the DELOLW\WRSXUFKDVHRQH¶VGLVFKDUJHZDVIRUPDOO\VXVSHQGHGZLWKDUHVXOWWKDWDV
Table 3.2 shows, desertion increased) while continuous embodiment, and the pay it 
brought, encouraged a greater proportion of men to see out their full term of service. This 
meant that, before 1901, on average for every 100 militiamen serving only ten would 
complete their full term of service, and even during and after the South African War this 
only increased to an average of 23.  
What is also clear is that the ability for militiamen to purchase their discharge, 
prior to the completion of their full term of engagement, was a significant drain upon the 
PLOLWLD¶VPDQSRZHU3ULRU WR UHJXODWLRQVSHUPLWWHGPLOLWLDPHQ WRRQO\EH UHOHDVHG
early from their term of service upon the repayment of all enrolment expenses and if they 
could provide a substitute under the discretion of the commanding officer, which the 
majority facilitated. However, a committee examining the militia in 1877 successfully 
recommended that the requirement to provide a substitute should be dropped and that all 
disembodied militiamen should henceforth be allowed to purchase their discharge for a  
                                                 
49
 Hay, Constitutional Force, pp. 160-1; French, Military Identities, pp. 14-5, 24, 205-6; PP, Report of the 
committee, C. 5922, (1890),  p. xvii. 
50
 HL Deb., 10 August 1921, vol. 43, cc. 371-90, (c. 376). 
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Table 3.4: The Cause of those Formally Discharged within the Militia of the UK, 1880-
1907.51 
 
Year Termination of Engagement As Invalids 
By 
Purchase As Bad Characters Other Total  
1880 5,177 3,879 4,609 985 « 14,650 






Attestation  Conviction Misconduct   
1889 4,097 3,703 « 8,816 « 667 « 17,283 
1890 4,382 3,867 « 9,348 « 710 « 18,307 
1891 4,145 3,211 « 9,462 « 645 « 17,463 
1892 3,319 4,193 « 8,645 « 742 399 17,298 
1893 3,109 3,471 631 7,952 « 801 138 16,102 
1894 3,374 3,207 537 8,595 « 726 74 16,513 
1895 3,724 3,296 459 8,738 « 707 72 16,996 
1896 3,973 2,878 444 9,953 « 774 143 18,165 
1897 4,369 2,864 633 10,772 « 758 251 19,647 
1898 4,870 2,803 710 10,266 « 778 324 19,808 
1899 4,775 3,155 877 11,793 487 332 601 22,020 
1900 2,531 4,995 578 1,830 260 516 1,354 12,064 
1901 7,559 1,853 444 1,607 289 479 1,330 13,561 
1902 13,106 2,630 816 3,712 371 497 1,521 22,653 
1903* 9,518 2,293 933 6,793 439 434 594 21,004 
1903-4 10,714 2,529 1,011 5,578 563 558 571 21,524 
1904-5 7,740 2,554 1,323 4,442 523 521 803 17,906 
1905-6 8,383 2,506 887 4,078 508 376 707 17,445 
1906-7 7,569 2,291 658 3,932 570 525 701 16,246 
*Records for 1 January to 30 September only. 
 
fee of just £1 provided they had a good reason, such as if they were seeking employment 
and could no longer afford the time necessary for service. It was hoped such a change in 
policy would encourage men to enlist who had previously been put-off due to the fear it 
would hurt their chances of finding or retaining civil employment. However, the result 
was more damaging as in the last two decades of the nineteenth century the number 
purchasing their discharge grew from just 4,609 in 1881 to a high of 11,793 in 1899. 52 
Furthermore, a significant minority of wastage was accounted for by those 
rejected upon enlistment or later discharged on medical grounds, or upon misconduct or 
conviction. Indeed, between 1892 and 1895, Table 3.4 shows that the total number of 
those rejected on medical grounds exceeded the number of men who had served their full 
term of enlistment. For instance, in 1892 a total of 4,193 militiamen were rejected as 
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 PP, Annual report of the Inspector-General of recruiting, C. 2832, (1881); C. 3169, (1882); C. 6906, 
(1893-94); C. 8770, (1897); PP, General annual report, Cd. 3798, (1908). 
52
 PP, Annual report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting for the year 1900., Cd. 519, (1901), pp. 17, 20.  
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medically unfit, with a further 742 men discharged due to misconduct; by comparison 
only 3,319 men had completed their full term of service. To avoid this all recruits, prior 
to attestation, were expected to face inspection by the regimental surgeon or one of his 
assistants, or failing that by two private civilian practitioners, although if two were 
unavailable one would ultimately suffice. However, in some regiments, there were 
concerns from surgeons that civilian practitioners were passing as fit men who were 
ultimately unsuitable, thus contributing to an unnecessarily high rate of wastage. This 
DSSHDUV WR KDYH EHHQ D SDUWLFXODU FRQFHUQ IRU WKH VW .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 7RZHU +DPOHWV
Regiment which, of all those attested in 1870, saw just 34.5 per cent rejected as unfit 
prior to completing their term of service. Earlier LQ  WKH UHJLPHQW¶V DGMXWDQW
complained that from DEDWFKRIUHFHQWO\DWWHVWHGYROXQWHHUVWKUHHZHUHIRXQGWREHµQRW
WKHVWDPSRIPHQZLVKHGIRU¶DQGUHPLQGHGWKHFivilian practitioner who had passed them 
to be more thorough in his examination. Even by the late 1880s and 1890s when, as 
shown in Table 3.1, the battalion was able to recruit with relative ease, high rates of 
medical rejection meant the adjutant had to seek permission to recruit above the 
establishment in anticipation that many recruits would fail to meet the necessary 
standards. For instance, in 1890 the battalion was permitted to recruit 100 men in excess 
of their establishment due to the belief that as many as 150 recruits (of the 360 it was 
believed necessary for the year) would fail to attest, the vast majority on medical 
grounds.53  
Similar concerns were also voiced by the surgeon of the Royal Wiltshire 
Regiment who remarked in 1859 that, upon his appointment, he found a large number of 
the recruits previously passed by civilian practitioners to be unfit, particularly those 
recruited away from the headquarters; this included one individual whom he found under 
examination to have a fractured leg which the civilian practitioner had either missed or 
purposefully ignored. The surgeon of the Bedfordshire Regiment also complained of the 
recruits sent by civilian practitioners noting how one individual had been found, on 
subsequent investigation, to be flat footed and afflicted with ulcers making him totally 
unsuitable for service. It was also remarked by the commanding officer of the 2nd West 
York Regiment that compared to his own surgeons those passed by civilian practitioners 
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A.S.E Somerset to the Officer Commanding, Scots Guards, 15 February 1890. 
     
 132 
were frequently later found to be unsuitable.54 The reason for this was that whereas 
regimental surgeons and their assistants were paid a flat rate for attesting their men ± the 
daily pay for surgeons when examining volunteers amounted to 11s 4d, but only if they 
passed as fit five or more individuals per day, otherwise they would receive an allowance 
of 2s 6d for each man passed ± whereas private civilian practitioners received 2s 6d per 
recruit regardless of whether or not they were attested.55   
In 1876 the Secretary of State for War, Gathorne Hardy, reformed the role of 
regimental surgeons in examining recruits, building upon the reforms of his predecessor 
Cardwell. By royal warrant the regulations were altered so as to prohibit surgeons from 
examining recruits in regiments that now placed their headquarters at a brigade depot. 
Instead this role was to now be undertaken by army surgeons based at the depot which it 
was hoped would not only save the service additional costs, but also relieve the 
difficulties militia surgeons faced in managing their private practice with their role in the 
force. Nevertheless, in regiments which continued to recruit independently the duty of 
inspecting recruits remained with the regimental surgeon and his assistants.56 
Nevertheless, even by the end of the century it was still found necessary to continue to 
rely on civilian practitioners due to the fact that there were simply too few medical 
officers to process recruits in every regiment despite the fact that certain regiments 
retained their own regimental surgeons (as argued in 1889 by the Surgeon-General W.A. 
Mackinnon).57 
The fact that so many militiamen were lost prior to serving their full term of 
enlistment demonstrates how poor the force was at retaining its manpower. What was 
also concerning was that it was increasingly likely militiamen would not re-enlist for a 
further term of service. As Table 3.5 shows, in each year only a relatively small number 
of militiamen chose to further their engagement. Poor rates of re-enlistment were 
particularly concerning as it was widely agreed by militia officers and War Office 
officials that re-enrolled men provided a steadying influence upon often young and 
inexperienced recruits, while they were also less likely to volunteer for the regulars.58  
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Table 3.5: Rates of Re-Enlistment within the Militia of the UK, 1871-1903.59 
 
Year Re-enrolled men 





1.4.1871 - 30.3.1872 7,975 « « 
1.4.1872 - 30.3.1873 5,548 « « 
1.4.1873 - 30.3.1874 3,643 « « 
1.4.1874 - 31.12.1874 2,214 « « 
1877 5,335 « « 
1878 1,825 « « 
1879 1,957 « « 
1880 4,730 « « 
1881 6,000 « « 
1882 9,192 « « 
1883 9,171 29,264 1,496 
1884 7,069 28,778 2,454 
1885 7,354 29,529 3,089 
 
Number re-enlisted 
after completion of 
engagement 
  
1.1.1885 4,174 28,778 2,454 
1.1.1886 5,001 29,529 3,107 
1.1.1887 6,202 31,618 3,990 
1.1.1888 6,838 31,498 4,756 
1.1.1889 6,808 30,763 5,362 
1.1.1890 6,957 31,422 6,008 
1.1.1891 6,631 32,127 6,478 
1.1.1892 7,488 33,108 6,905 
1.1.1893 5,888 34,010 6,866 
1.1.1894 7,446 35,225 7,816 
1.1.1895 6,659 33,588 7,535 
1.1.1896 6,561 33,729 7,745 
1.1.1897 6,214 33,404 7,997 
1.1.1898 6,019 34,014 7,909 
1.1.1899 5,933 34,716 7,851 
1.1.1900 5,797 31,462 7,691 
1.1.1903 5,976 17,712 4,413 
 
Furthermore, it was also cheaper to retain militiamen than to replace them. One War 
Office official estimated that, when pay and additional costs (beer money, lodging 
allowance and clothing) and provisions for the 56 days of preliminary drill were taken 
into account, a recruit cost either £9 3s for artillerymen or £8 2s for infantrymen; by 
comparison a re-enrolled man cost just £5 1s and £4 11s respectively.60 Despite this it 
was widely realised that by increasing the term of engagement and altering the way the 
bounty was paid in 1874 had somewhat diminished the immediate financial attraction of 
re-enrolment. Prior to this all militiamen who re-enrolled were entitled to receive the 
                                                 
59
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remainder of their bounty, amounting to 1s 6d for the final year, in addition to the 10s 
enrolment bounty for their next term of engagement. Added to this was the right to claim 
µEULQJLQJPRQH\¶RIVIRUDFWLQJHVVHQWLDOO\DVWKHLURZQEULQJHUPHDQLQJWKDWXSRQUH-
enrolling each individual received an immediate total of £2 1s before their first training. 
Under the new scheme they would continue to receive 10s as an advance on their first 
year¶V ERXQW\ DOWKRXJK WKH ULJKW WR FODLP µEULQJLQJ PRQH\¶ XSRQ UH-enrolment was 
abolished. On top of this men who would have enlisted after 1873 would only receive £1 
as the remainder of their first bounty, meaning that the immediate financial gain before 
the first training dropped by as much as 11s to just £1 10s. With all this considered there 
was also the additional deterrent of an increase in the term of service from five to six 
years, a key reason why the period of re-enlistment was shortened to just four years in 
1877. Furthermore, there were insufficient financial provisions for men with families 
meaning, in times of embodiment, there was often a loss of married men who could not 
afford to serve indefinitely.61  
On a regimental level, it is clear that a similar pattern, whereby it was increasingly 
difficult to retain manpower, was evident in every unit sampled, although there was some 
variation between units. In 1860 the Hampshire Regiment saw 49.3 per cent of those 
attested that year go on to complete their full term of service or re-enrol for a further 
term. By 1875 this had fallen to just 27.8 per cent and by 1885 to just 10.7 per cent; this 
continued so that by 1905 it measured just 0.4 per cent. As with the national picture, this 
corresponded with a greater proportion of men opting to purchase their discharge, or 
more likely, by opting to transfer to the regular army. Whereas initially, in 1860, 4.9 per 
cent of those attested went on to repay their enrolment expenses (and provide a 
substitute), by 1875 the proportion of those now able to simply purchase their discharge 
rose to 15 per cent and in 1905 fell only slightly to 12.2 per cent. This was matched by a 
corresponding rise in those transferring to the regulars, rising from 5.6 per cent in 1860 to 
22.1 per cent in 1875 and to a high 74.9 per cent by 1905. However, unlike many other 
units, the Hampshire Regiment also struggled with comparably high rates of desertion 
right across the period, remaining as high as 19.8 per cent in 1885, although this dropped 
to just 1.5 per cent in 1905. In the East Kent Regiment, in 1890, just 6.6 per cent of those 
attested in the year served their full term of enlistment or re-enlisted before hand, while 
23.1 per cent had purchased their discharge and 56.6 per cent transferred to the regulars. 
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By 1905 only 0.5 per cent of those attested went on to complete their term of service 
(although 5 per cent were offered a free discharge in 1907, on account RIWKHEDWWDOLRQ¶V
transfer to the Special Reserve), while 11 per cent purchased their discharge and as many 
as 73.8 per cent transferred to the regular army. A similar pattern was seen in the 2nd 
(East) Norfolk Regiment, although the proportion of those transferring to the regular 
army remained no higher than, for instance, the 42.7 per cent of those attested in 1905. 
%\FRPSDULVRQWKHVW.LQJ¶V2ZQ7RZHU+DPOHWV5HJLPHQWDSSHDUHGWRKDYHDQHYHQ
harder time retaining its manpower. Of those attested in 1870, just 21 per cent went on to 
serve their full term of enlistment or to re-enlist for a further term, and although this rose 
to 29.1 per cent by 1880, by 1895 it subsequently fell to just 8 per cent and then again in 
1905 to just 2.2 per cent (as seen above medical rejection rates were, by comparison with 
other units, particularly high). Similar patterns can be seen in Scottish units including the 
Edinburgh Artillery and the Highland (Inverness) Light Infantry. However, the 
Edinburgh Artillery managed to somewhat buck this trend, recording 34 per cent of its 
volunteers attested in 1905 as having previously served in the regiment.62 
 
* * * 
 
In order for recruitment to be effective it needed to allow militia regiments to access as 
wide a pool of potential recruits as possible. Nevertheless, what is clear is that, for many 
regiments, the changing nature of the national and local economy, and the way this 
impacted on those volunteering for service in the militia, was arguably the key factor in 
maintaining their strength and effectiveness. Traditionally it was expected that the militia 
attracted men who normally would avoid service with the regular army, most notably 
agricultural labourers, who were regarded as both physically and morally superior 
compared to their urban counterparts, and less predisposed to the growing radicalism and 
liberalism amongst the urban population.63 It was expected that the local landed gentry, 
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Table 3.6: The Social Composition of the Rank and File within the Militia of the UK, 
1858-1904.64 
 
Year* Agricultural Labourers 
Mechanical 
Labourers Artisans  Others 
Not 
Trained  
1858 43.3 23.4 22.2 11.1 « 
    Miners Fishermen Others « 
1881 28.3 24.0 19.1 « « 28.7 « 
1882 27.6 25.9 18.4 « « 28.1 « 
1883 34.4 28.3 16.5 « « 20.8 « 
1884 31.6 22.7 16.8 7.4 1.9 19.6 « 
1885 31.9 22.2 15.9 7.9 1.8 20.3 « 
1886 31.5 22.2 15.0 7.6 2.0 21.0 0.7 
1887 31.6 22.7 15.2 7.9 2.5 20.0 « 
1888 33.8 20.9 14.6 7.6 2.4 20.0 0.8 
Year Corps        
1904 
Artillery 21 31 10 15 3 20 « 
Engineers 3 27 29 29 3 9 « 
Infantry 22 21 11 10 4 32 « 
Sub. 
Miners 10 11 9 2 47 21 « 
RAMC 5.6 21.9 45.5 « « 27* « 
*Irish regiments were not trained from 1881 to 1882. 
 
who continued in many regiments to officer the force, would use their influence to 
encourage their tenants to enlist into a local regiment. Even the decision to hold the 
annual training of most regiments during the spring was intended to create as little 
disruption for agricultural labourers who were likely to be heavily employed during the 
harvest. However, even during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century this idealistic 
view simply did not match reality. Many recruits were, owing to the use of the ballot, 
substitutes and were, themselves, often manual labourers. Nevertheless, the organisation 
of the militia upon a county basis, which limited recruitment to men from their own or a 
neighbouring county, meant there was still a far higher proportion of agricultural workers 
compared to the regulars. It somewhat complemented the system of recruitment in the 
regular army, which was conducted on a largely ad hoc basis from among the large 
manufacturing towns and through the personal contacts of the officers, by drawing upon 
local recruits that were partially untapped by regular recruiters.65 
Table 3.6 also demonstrates that in 1904 there was a clear difference in the social 
                                                 
64
 NRS, GD224/192/19, War Office summary of the confidential reports of the disembodied militia at the 
training of 1858; PP, Report of the committee, C. 5922, (1890), Appendix V; PP, Royal Commission on the 
Militia and Volunteers. Appendices, Cd. 2064, (1904), Part IV, pp. 192-221.  
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 French, Military identities, pp. 209-11; Western, The English Militia, pp. 256-9, 271-2. 
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FRPSRVLWLRQRIWKHPLOLWLD¶VLQIDQWU\DUWLOOHU\HQJLQHHUVDQGVXEPDULQHVPLQHUV2QWKH
whole, the artillery and infantry recruited from a similar cross-section of society, 
although the former recorded a higher proportion of industrial workers than any of the 
other arms of the service. Unsurprisingly, due to their proximity to the coast, the 
submarine miners recruited a disproportionate number of fishermen and sailors compared 
to the rest of the force, while both engineer regiments saw a roughly equal proportion of 
industrial workers and artisans, which was higher than the national average. For instance, 
the Falmouth Division Royal Engineers (Submarine Miners) Militia recruited from 
among a mixture of urban labourers, boatmen and sailors, although competition from 
other auxiliary units and the unpopularity of militia service meant recruiting was difficult. 
For instance, in 1903 there were only 49 NCOs and men out of an establishment of 70 
due to competition from the Royal Naval Reserve in the town and concerns over the 
quality of uniform issued to the men.66 
 ,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHYDULRXVDUPVRIWKHIRUFHWKHPLOLWLD¶V
social composition also varied upon a regional basis, although that is not to say that there 
were national trends. After 1852 it is clear that although the militia continued to attract 
DJULFXOWXUDO ZRUNHUV DQG GHVSLWH WKLV SHULRG EHLQJ WKH KHLJKW RI %ULWDLQ¶V DJULFXOWXUDO
economy, they were by no means the only source of recruits. The militia was also heavily 
reliant upon skilled and semi-skilled industrial workers, artisans and tradesmen, and an 
increasing proportion of often under-employed and unskilled labourers. Table 3.6 
demonstrates that in each of the years for which national figures are available agricultural 
workers continued to comprise the single largest group within the militia (except for in 
1904). In 1858 it represented by far the largest group of militiamen, although the militia 
also contained a significant minority of mechanical labourers and artisans. By the 1880s 
this had fallen. In 1883 agricultural labourers still accounted for one-third of total 
manpower, the proportion of mechanical labourers remaining broadly the same while the 
proportion of artisans clearly declined when compared to 1858. (The comparatively low 
proportion of agricultural labourers in 1881 and 1882 can be accounted for by the fact 
that Irish regiments were not trained. Compared to the militia as a whole, Irish regiments 
were far more reliant on recruiting in rural areas due to a smaller urban population.) By 
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 PP, Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers. Minutes of evidence taken before the Royal 
Commission on the Militia and Volunteers. (Volume II.), Cd. 2063, (1904), qq. 18672, 18734, 18758-62, 
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1904 the proportion of agricultural labourers had declined even further to a low of just 22 
per cent within the infantry and 21 per cent within the artillery.  
One of the excepted explanations as to why the proportion of agricultural 
labourers serving in the militia declined was due to the declining state of British 
agriculture and the more general shift towards an increasingly urban and industrial 
society. By 1850 the UK was the most urbanised and industrialised country on Earth, 
with approximately 50 per cent of the population already living in urban areas (compared 
to just 30 per cent in France and Prussia, and 10 per cent in Austria and Russia). Despite 
this, the 1850s and 1860s represented the pinnacle of British agriculture. The impact of 
falling international import costs from North America and Russia were initially disrupted 
by the Crimean War and later the American Civil War. However, by the 1870s they 
began to contribute to a growing agricultural depression meaning it became increasingly 
difficult for landowners and tenants alike to make a living from arable farming (not 
without diversifying into other forms of farming).68 This, set against the backdrop of 
increasing urbanisation more generally, had several direct effects upon the ability of the 
militia to attract rural recruits. Firstly, it drew young men from rural areas into the towns 
and cities in order to find work, meaning there was a lessening pool of remaining 
agricultural workers from which to draw recruits. There was a considerable decline in the 
number of farm workers in the UK from 1.4 million in 1861 to just 1 million in 1911, 
with the problem particularly bad in areas with a higher concentration of arable farming 
such as parts of eastern England. Secondly, it had the knock on effect of driving up wages 
(which by 1911 had risen, compared to 1870, as high as 50 per cent) in areas which had 
been depopulated meaning the relatively meagre financial inducements, which may have 
once proved attractive, no longer had the same allure. For instance, the 3rd West 
Yorkshire Regiment was unable to attract agricultural workers because their wages 
averaged 18s per week; by comparison the average infantry recruit would earn 11s 3d per 
week (see above). This also had the knock-on effect of making employers less willing to 
let agricultural workers join the militia for fear of loosing them. As early as 1867 there 
were concerns that agricultural labourers were increasingly being employed on an annual, 
as opposed to a weekly, basis which made it more difficult for recruits to find the spare 
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 E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-75, (London: Abacus, 1975), p. 205; Wawro, Warfare and 
SocietyS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time required to regularly attend the annual training. It was for these reasons that the 
Durham Light Infantry was unable to recruit more than a handful of agricultural workers 
despite the willingness of many to join in the regiment; in fact, it was reported that at 
local hiring fairs a common question asked by potential employers was whether or not an 
individual was engaged with the militia.69 
As a result it is unsurprising that units which struggled to maintain their strength 
were often located in areas in which arable farming had been commonplace, but with 
little means of offsetting a reduction in agricultural recruits from growing urban centres. 
This did not go unnoticed by the government as, in 1904, the Inspector-General of 
Auxiliary Forces commented that the majority of regiments considerably below their 
establishment were those in the south and east of England, with the exception of those 
regiments which recruited in or around London (the example of which given were the 3rd 
Royal West Surrey and 4th East Surrey Regiments, both of which recruited 
predominantly in the metropolitan parts of the county).70 Of the sampled regiments, those 
that struggled to maintain their strength continued to rely on a higher than average 
proportion of agricultural labourers and were, for various reasons, unable to offset their 
declining strength with urban workers. For instance, the Hampshire Regiment had been 
highly reliant upon agricultural workers as a source of recruits. Table 3.7 shows that 
labourers made up a majority of recruits within the regiment across the period, of which 
the vast majority were agricultural workers. In 1865 this accounted for as much as 82.5 
per cent of those attested while in 1885 the proportion fell to 61.6 per cent. In terms of 
the overall social composition of the regiment, records show that in 1891 the proportion 
of agricultural labourers remained as high as 75 per cent, and although, by 1903, this had 
fallen to just 40 per cent of their total strength, this was far above the national average. 
However, the fact that the regiment continued to rely so heavily on agricultural labourers 
came at a price: its overall strength, as shown in Table 3.1, fell from 97 per cent of the 
establishment, in 1885, to just 47 per cent in 1905. The reason for this, aside from 
increases in wastage (mentioned above), was that the regiment was unable to successfully 
recruit in major towns, such as Southampton, to plug the gap from a decline in the 
agricultural workforce. Competition from the local volunteer corps meant many urban 
workers had little reason to enlist, but who might otherwise have been suitable for service 
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 Perren, Agriculture, p. 17; TNA, WO 33/21a, pp. 10, 12; HL Deb., 29 March 1867, vol. 186, cc. 804-13, 
(cc. 811-2). 
70PP, Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, vol. 1, Cd. 2062, (1904), qq. 3809. 3811. 
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with the militia. The commanding officer of the regiment remarked that, during the South 
African War, the recruiting officer in Southampton, who was the adjutant of 2nd 
Hampshire Rifle Volunteer Corps (the headquarters of which was based in Southampton, 
while that of the militia battalion was based in Winchester), admitted to ensuring the 
volunteers were serviced with recruits, leaving only a small proportion of the worst men 
for the militia.71  
A result of the difficulty of recruiting in rural districts was that in the late 1890s 
the government reduced the establishment of 27 infantry battalions and an artillery corps 
by either one or two companies, amalgamated four others into just two battalions while 
increasing the establishment of three battalions in which recruiting remained healthy. For 
instance, in 1897 the 3rd East Kent Regiment saw a reduction in its establishment by two 
companies from 848 NCOs and men to just 652; similarly, the 4th Sherwood Foresters 
also saw its establishment reduced.72 
Other units also relied upon labourers as a source of many of their recruits, 
although not all relied as heavily upon agricultural labourers. Even in the early years after 
reconstitution the 2nd (East) Norfolk Regiment recruited a significant proportion of its 
manpower in major towns, such as Norwich and Great Yarmouth, without a complete 
overreliance upon the agricultural workforce. Table 3.7 shows that, on the whole, the 
proportion of labourers remained relatively unchanged, accounting for 49.2 per cent of 
volunteers in 1855, slightly more at 53.2 per cent in 1875 and 56.2 per cent in 1900. 
More specifically, it can be estimated that roughly 33 per cent of those attested in 1870 
were urban labourers, agricultural workers accounting for 27 per cent.73 Initially there 
were also a high proportion of artisans and tradesmen, although by the end of the period 
this had declined. In 1855 this amounted to 29.4 per cent of those attested in 1855, and 
although afterwards the proportion fell away slightly, as low as 11.1 per cent of 
volunteers in 1885, it remained on average the third largest occupational group until 
1900, after which there was a rise in the proportion of those undertaking some form of 
service. There was also a temporary rise in the proportion of fishermen and sailors from 
1870 to 1890, from just 2.3 per cent of volunteers in 1865, to a high of 25.6 per cent in 
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 PP, Questions sent to commanding officers, C. 288, (1871), pp. 27-8; PP, Royal Commission on the 
Militia and Volunteers, Cd. 2062, (1904), qq. 17665, 17668. 
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1880, before falling away again towards the end of the century.74 A similar trend is also 
evident in the East Kent Regiment, which relied heavily on recruiting men from towns 
such as Canterbury, Chatham, Dover and Maidstone.  In 1853 a total of 71 per cent of the 
enlisted recruits were recorded as labourers, of which, it can be estimated, at least 22 per 
cent were agricultural labourers, while 14 per cent were artisans or tradesmen. By 1870 
the proportion of labourers had fallen only slightly to 67 per cent, of which at least 25 per 
cent were agricultural labourers. Towards the end of the century the proportion of 
labourers declined, somewhat surprisingly replaced by those engaged in some form of 
retail or street selling and those in some form of service: by 1905 only 33.9 per cent of 
recruits were labourers, and of those just 6 per cent were recorded as agricultural 
labourers, while retailers and street sellers, and those in service, rose to 15.5 per cent and 
19.4 per cent respectively. Therefore, it is clear the regiment was increasingly relying on 
a greater proportion of urban recruits although, to an extent, it had always relied on 
recruiting in such areas.75 
Other regiments were instead almost exclusively recruited from urban and 
industrial areas with little or no reliance upon rural communities. Initially the 
Northumberland Light Infantry consisted of a far higher proportion of labourers and 
industrial workers due to the fact that the regiment recruited almost exclusively from in 
and around Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Table 3.7 shows that, in 1852, labourers accounted for 
40.5 per cent of all recruits, most of who ZHUHUHFRUGHGDVµPHFKDQLFDO¶ODERXUHUVZKLOH
a further 15.2 per cent accounted for skilled industrial workers and a further 28.2 per cent 
for light industrial craftsmen and artisans. However, by 1905 the proportion of labourers 
had risen significantly to 74.6 per cent at the expense of the proportion of industrial 
workers and artisans, both of which had fallen to just 6.2 per cent and 3.3 per cent 
respectively.76 Many of those categorised as semi-skilled and skilled industrial workers, 
and deemed a EHWWHUFODVVRIUHFUXLWLQWKHRSLQLRQRIWKHEDWWDOLRQ¶VFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHU, 
were employees at the major heavy industries based on Tyneside, most notably the arms 
manufacturer, Armstrong and Whitworth, and the shipbuilders, Palmers. Such large 
companies were on the whole more willing to permit their employees to take the 
necessary time away from their work to train each year than smaller employers due to the 
                                                 
74
 TNA, WO 68/128-30; WO 96/202-14. 
75
 KHLC, L/M/7/1-3; TNA WO 96/32-44. 
76
 Fusiliers Museum of Northumberland, Northumberland LI Enrolment Book; TNA, WO 96/86-93. 
     
 144 
size of their workforce, the loss of which for a month the latter could not afford.77 What 
is clear is that the regiment was highly reliant upon recruiting from the Tyneside region, 
despite the headquarters of the regiment being located over 30 miles north in Alnwick. 
The reasons for this were, firstly, that the regiment simply had no problem from filling its 
ranks from manufacturing areas alone; there was no need to attempt to recruit in rural 
DUHDV,WZDVWKHFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHU¶VRSLQLRQLQWKDWGHVSLWHHIIRUWWRDWWUDFWWKHP
rural workers were not inclined towards militia service, in Northumberland at least, while 
in 1904 it was remarked that due to the lack of interest they had only sent a recruiting 
party into the countryside on one occasion and with little success.78 Secondly, unlike 
neighbouring Co. Durham, there was difficulty recruiting from growing colliery and 
mining towns such as Ashington. This was because the regiment had to compete with 
other auxiliary forces, most notably the Northumberland Hussars Yeomanry, which 
established troops in many small towns and mining villages across the county, including 
Ashington. As a result the proportion of miners and colliers joining the regiment was 
very small, only 3.1 per cent in 1855 and 1.9 per cent in 1905.79 For similar reasons there 
were no attempts made to enlist sailors or fishermen on the coast as they were largely the 
source of recruits for the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers, established in 1853 (later 
VXSHUVHGHG E\ WKH 5R\DO 1DYDO 5HVHUYH¶V 6HFRQG-Class Reserve and the Royal Naval 
Volunteer Artillery in 1873).80 
,Q/RQGRQVLPLODUSDWWHUQVFRXOGEHREVHUYHGDPRQJUHFUXLWVRI WKHVW.LQJ¶V
Own) Tower Hamlets Regiment, although there were subtle differences. They too were 
heavily reliant upon labourers, principally those working as dock labourers. Nevertheless, 
unlike many other units, the proportion serving with the battalion remained relatively 
stable across the period. Whereas, in 1860, 43.4 per cent of recruits had been labourers, 
by 1905 the proportion had declined to 33.7 per cent, bucking the wider trend evident in 
many other units. Initially the regiment had also been heavily reliant upon artisans and 
craftsmen working in light industries, but not upon those working in heavier industries; 
indeed, the proportion of recruits employed in heavy industries remained comparably 
small, just 8.4 per cent at its height in 1905. Yet although the proportion of artisans and 
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craftsmen declined from a high of 24.5 per cent in 1860 to just 7.9 per cent by 1905, the 
decline was offset by a significant increase in the number of recruits engaged in some 
form of service, many as carters, porters or van guards.81 In terms of the impact of its 
social composition upon its recruitment figures, Table 3.1 shows that the battalion 
somewhat bucked the general trend in that it initially struggled to maintain its strength, 
but improved significantly from 1880 onwards. By 1889 there was such confidence in the 
ability of the battalion to recruit from among the local population that its establishment 
was successfully augmented by a further two companies (see Table 3.1). Two years later 
the commanding officer again expressed his confidence that it could be increased again, 
although his request was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, it is clear that while other units were 
ILQGLQJ LW LQFUHDVLQJO\ GLIILFXOW WR DWWUDFW UHFUXLWV VW .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 7RZHU +DPOHWV
Regiment (now the 7th Rifle Brigade) was able to take advantage of a readily available 
source of manpower. As was recognised by the adjutant, this was despite the difficulties 
of combating relatively high, and increasing, rates of wastage (principally from desertion 
and those rejected upon medical inspection, as identified above).82  
There were also variations in the social composition of Welsh and Scottish units 
when compared to their counterparts in England. In several Welsh counties the militia 
tended to rely more heavily upon industrial workers and miners, whereas the northern 
Welsh counties had a large proportion of agricultural labourers. As Table 3.7 shows, in 
1870 the strength of the Royal Caernarvonshire Rifles was comprised largely of 
labourers, 40 per cent in total, of whom half came from the countryside, while 21.8 per 
cent were employed as miners or quarrymen working predominantly in the slate industry 
(the remainder being artisans and craftsmen). Like many other units, by 1905 the 
battalion saw the proportion of labourers increase, in this case, at the expense of the 
proportion of miners and artisans. Other units in North Wales saw similar patterns. For 
instance, in 1870, the Royal Anglesey Light Infantry was largely comprised of labourers 
(nearly all agricultural), artisans and miners, comprising 39.2 per cent, 19.8 per cent and 
25.6 per cent respectively; similarly the Merionethshire Regiment was also heavily reliant 
upon agricultural labourers and slate miners.83 By comparison, units based in South 
Wales saw a far greater reliance upon industrial workers, many of whom were based in 
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the iron and copper industries, or as colliers, with less reliance upon agricultural 
labourers. As shown in Table 3.7, in 1852 most men enrolled into the Royal 
Monmouthshire Light Infantry were labourers (46.5 per cent), the majority mechanical 
labourers of some sort, while the remainder were principally either colliers, iron workers 
or light industrial artisans. This remained relatively stable, although the proportion of 
industrial workers had increased dramatically ± by 1870 it had reached a height of 26.3 
per cent of those attested that year. However, the conversion of the regiment from light 
infantry to engineers in 1877 meant that, unlike many other units, a greater reliance was 
placed upon men engaged in skilled occupations. This is why, by 1905, the proportion of 
labourers attested had fallen to 24.3 per cent, while the proportion of colliers and 
industrial workers had risen to 18.4 per cent and 17.6 per cent respectively; there also 
remained a smaller, but still significant, proportion of artisans and tradesmen. Such a 
reliance on industrial labour, with very little to no reliance upon agricultural workers, as 
well as the higher rates of pay given to engineers (as detailed above), helps to explain 
why the regiment was able to maintain its strength before and after the South African 
War (as seen in Table 3.1).84 
In Scotland, lowland units recruiting in and around Glasgow and Edinburgh 
unsurprisingly relied more heavily upon an urban workforce compared to those recruiting 
in the sparsely populated highlands and western coast. For instance, Table 3.7 shows that, 
in 1855, the Edinburgh Artillery was heavily reliant on artisans (and craftsmen), and 
industrial workers recruited from within the city and its immediate surroundings, 
accounting for 28.9 per cent and 17.6 per cent respectively (the remainder being either 
unskilled labourers, retailers and street sellers, or those involved in some other service) . 
As in other urban units, the abundance of unskilled labourers helped to maintain the 
strength of the unit as those from more skilled occupations declined. By 1880 the 
proportion of artisans and craftsmen had fallen to just 14.4 per cent and the proportion of 
industrial workers to just 5.3 per cent, whereas those in retail and service remained the 
same. What had changed was that there was a far larger quantity of unskilled labourers, 
rising from just 15.8 per cent in 1855, to 46.8 per cent by 1880. This trend continued so 
that, by 1900, unskilled labourers accounted for 50.2 per cent of recruits while the 
proportion of industrial workers and artisans had fallen to 5.9 per cent and 7.7 per cent 
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respectively (the remainder being principally retailers and street sellers, or those in a form 
of service). The increasing reliance upon unskilled labour meant it was one of a few units 
to buck the general decline in the strength of the militia, as shown in Table 3.1: in fact, its 
establishment increased significantly from 250 NCOs and men in 1865, to 672 by 1895, 
an increase that was met with ease. Other lowland units based in the counties surrounding 
both Glasgow and Edinburgh had a greater reliance upon agricultural workers, although 
they too had to rely on urban workers to find enough recruits. For instance, in 1870, the 
1st Lanark Regiment recruited most of its men in Glasgow, the majority being industrial 
workers (predominantly iron workers and weavers), who accounted for 50 per cent of the 
EDWWDOLRQ¶VVWUHQJWKwith colliers accounting for 20 per cent.85 
Units recruited in the highlands, or in counties situated upon the western coast, 
were far more reliant on agricultural workers. As Table 3.7 shows, the Highland 
(Inverness) Light Infantry (which also encompassed Banff, Elgin and Nairn) was 
primarily comprised of labourers, the vast majority of whom were agricultural workers, 
mainly crofters, representing, for instance, 61.8 per cent of attested men in 1855 and as 
many as 84.5 per cent by 1875; the remainder were predominantly artisans from the 
towns. This balance remained largely unchanged, even after the South African War. 
Although attestation records for this period are lacking, the commanding officer (of what 
was now the 3rd Cameron Highlanders), Colonel N. Macleod, informed the Norfolk 
Committee that the majority of his men were crofters from the Western Isles. In fact, 
most of them were migratory workers who continued to use militia service as a means of 
temporarily maintaining an income: after tending their crofts in early spring, they would 
serve their annual training in June before moving to the east coast as fishermen in early 
July. Later, in winter, many would move to Glasgow to take up casual labour. The 
inflexibility of this working calendar did not prove a difficulty in maintaining the strength 
of the battalion so long as the training remained in June, allowing the men to be on their 
way by July. However, from 1896 onwards, the decision to brigade the battalion outside 
the district meant it became increasingly difficult to maintain its strength.86 
There were various reasons why men decided to join the militia. In regiments with 
a high proportion of recruits from among the urban workforce there were usually two  
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Table 3.8: The Age of the Other Ranks Serving in the Militia of the UK (expressed as a 
percentage), 1875-1908.87 
 











1875 1.8 15.7 43.1 21.2 10.4 7.9 « 107,114 
1880 1.4 18.4 40.9 21.2 10.1 8.0 « 122,342 
1893 0.8 20.9 34.8 17.1 13.9 12.4 « 112,426 
1895 0.7 17.6 37.5 17.0 13.6 13.7 « 112,544 
1900 0.8 19.2 32.2 16.4 13.7 12.9 4.8 102,165 
 Under 18 18 to Under 19       
1905 6.4 11.1 44.5 15.4 10.7 11.9 « 85,814 
1908 (M) 1.1 3.5 47.8 20.7 10.1 16.8 « 8,385 
1908 (SR)  7.3 11.3 38.2 17.4 10.6 15.2 « 61,286 
*Figures from 1875 to 1900 are on 1 January; thereafter 1 October. The year 1908 is split between the 
Militia (M) and Special reserve (SR). 
 
 
Table 3.9: The Average Age of Attested Militiamen in a sample of Nine Regiments, 
1852-1905.88 
 
  1852 1855 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 
East Kent / 3rd East Kent  23 (1853) 
22 
(1857) « « « 
20 
(1874) « « 18 18 19 18 
Hampshire / 3rd Hampshire 22 « 20 21 22 21 20 20 « « « 18 
2nd Norfolk / 4th Norfolk « 20 21 23 23 21 21 21 18 « 18 19 
Northumberland LI /          
3rd (5th) Northumberland 
Fusiliers 
24 23 21 24 22 23 (1874) « « 22 19 19 21 
1st Tower Hamlets /            
7th Rifle Brigade « « 27 24 25 22 23 « « 20 20 19 
Royal Caernarvonshire Rifles 
/ 4th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. « « « « « 
23 
(1874) « « « « 22 21 
Royal Monmouthshire LI / 
Royal Monmouthshire RE 22 « « « « 22 22 23 « « 23 23 
Edinburgh Artillery / 
Edinburgh RGA (Militia) « 23 23 24 24 25 23 « 24 « 23 26 
Highland LI  /                     






                                                 
87
 Table 85, PP, General annual return of the British Army for the year 1875, C. 1633, (1876), p. 78; Table 
78, PP, General annual return of the British Army for the year 1879, C. 2731, (1880), p. 77; Table 12, PP, 
General annual report, Cd. 1496, (1903), p 90; ) Table 12, PP, General annual report on the British army 
for the years ending 30th September, 1908, Cd. 4493, (1909) p. 116. 
88
 For figures for 1874, see PP, Recruiting, C. 1205, (1875), No. 15, pp. 12-4. For all others, refer to 
Appendix 5.  
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reasons for joining. For unskilled labourers, agricultural labourers and those temporarily 
out of work, militia service represented a form of temporary financial relief from 
intermittent employment, as already seen with the case of crofters in the 3rd Cameron 
Highlanders. On the other hand, for those with settled and secure employment working in 
mining, heavy industry or semi-industrial work (and to a lesser degree artisans and 
tradesmen), militia service provided somewhat of a paid annual holiday and a temporary 
release from the toil of their daily work. For instance, even though the average wages of 
miners and industrial workers in the West Riding far outstripped that which could be 
earned serving in the militia ± such individuals could earn between 6s and 8s per day ± 
for many it was worthwhile taking the cut in weekly pay due to the recreational and 
health benefits of replacing life underground or in the factory for fresh air and exercise.89 
However, if the local economy stagnated, the fear of losing employment (or missing out 
on potential future employment) could deter potential recruits from volunteering. For 
instance, a healthy local economy enabled the Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers to 
recruit relatively successfully from 1895 to 1908. In 1898 a widespread and unpaid 
miners¶ strike led to 250 recruits joining the regiment in order to provide some form of 
financial relief, many of whom soon after purchased their discharge once the strike was 
over. Similarly the commanding officer of the 3rd Royal Lancaster Regiment believed 
that the reason why Lancashire was so successful in recruiting was due to the majority of 
recruits coming from manufacturing areas, the motivation behind enlisting that they saw 
militia service as a temporary escape from their work.90 
 In additioQWRWKHFOHDUO\LGHQWLILHGVRFLDOWUHQGVLWLVDOVRRIQRWHWKDWWKHPLOLWLD¶V
rank and file was, much like the regular army, recruited from a young demographic. 
Table 3.8 shows that the majority of militiamen in each of the sampled years were under 
the age of 25. However, what these figures mask is the fact that the average age of 
recruits, in fact, fell over the course of the period, principally due to the increasing 
reliance on young labourers who were encouraged to join the regular army shortly after 
starting their militia service. It is for this reason that the proportion of serving militiamen 
in each age bracket appears broadly the same, such figures masking the increasing 
turnover of recruits and the poor rates of retention (examined above). Examined on a unit 
by unit basis, Table 3.9 clearly shows that the average age at which militiamen were 
                                                 
89
 TNA, WO 33/21a, p. 10. 
90
 PP, Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers¸ Cd. 2063, (1904), qq. 16799-800, 18867-9. 
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attested fell in the majority of the units examined. This was most notable in those units 
increasingly reliant upon the labouring classes for recruits, with units such as the Royal 
Monmouthshire Royal Engineers managing to recruit from an older and, as Table 3.7 
shows, a more skilled demographic. 
 
* * * 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that the militia faced the same problems in managing its 
manpower demands as the regular army. Initially there were fears that abandoning the 
ballot and embracing voluntary enlistment would make it extremely difficult to recruit 
enough men. In many ways such fears were well founded as at no point did the enrolled 
strength of the force meet the establishment voted by Parliament. Nevertheless, one thing 
that has become clear is that although the militia existed as a single force, the 
characteristics of its recruitment and its rank and file could vary significantly upon a unit 
by unit and regional basis; thus it is wrong to speak of the militia in terms of simply its 
success or failure as a whole. Initially there was difficulty in reconstituting the force in 
urban areas due to local political and religious agitation. The fact that recruitment, on the 
whole, could not match the quota laid down hides the fact that many regiments were able 
to recruit quite successfully. Similarly it is important to understand that the embodiments 
of the 1850s had an extremely negative effect on what was in practical terms a force still 
undergoing reconstruction. As a result the strength and efficiency of the force was 
somewhat diminished. However, the militia was able to successfully rebuild during the 
1860s so that until the South African War its strength remained relatively stable, despite 
some fluctuation. Nevertheless, recruitment represented a constant challenge and one 
which, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the force was finding ever more 
difficult to meet. The alteration of recruitment mechanisms had arguably altered the force 
for the worse. The creation of brigade depots not only stripped officers and NCOs in 
many regiments from proper supervision of recruitment, but also encouraged recruiters to 
place the needs of the regulars above that of the militia. Furthermore, the withholding of 
the 10s enrolment bounty upon enlistment may have eventually helped to alleviate the 
worst effects of desertion, yet it had the side-effect of making service less popular to 
those that relied upon the immediate financial relief it brought. On the whole, wastage 
increasingly accounted for the annual loss of manpower as very few militiamen ever 
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completed their term of service, the majority either deserting or transferring to the regular 
army, while a decreasing minority decided to re-enlist. What is also clear is that there was 
a shift in the social composition of the force as, in many rural areas, agricultural workers 
increasingly gave way to urban labourers due to agricultural depression from the 1870s 
onwards. As a result the militia became increasingly urban in nature with a broad 
reduction in the strength of regiments in rural areas in the late 1890s, those units able to 
supplant rural workers with those from the towns and cities able to withstand the worst 
deficiencies. However, one cannot go as far as to say that reliance upon urban workers 
was a wholly new trend. In fact, there was much variation between regiments with some 
recruiting skilled or semi-skilled industrial workers, artisans and tradesmen right across 
the period, with little or no reliance upon agricultural areas, for whom militia service 
acted as a form of annual holiday away from the rigours of working in industry or urban 
areas. One clear trend, however, is that, much like the regular army, it was increasingly 
young unskilled labourers, many of whom went on to transfer to the regular army, that 
were meeting the burden of militia service as rates of pay and financial inducements 
lagged behind those in more skilled professions. This meant that, for many recruits, 
militia service was in essence a temporary refuge from underemployment, although it 
was widely recognised by many connected to the force that such individuals were 
unlikely to see out their full term of service (either deserting or being further induced to 
















Maintaining discipline in what remained a part-time force was a particular challenge for 
the reconstituted militia. Despite this, it is one that scholars have largely ignored when 
examining the discipline of the army more widely.1 What little historiography does 
concern discipline within the militia largely brushes over the issue entirely and fails to 
appreciate that there was variation between units from different parts of the country.2 
Regimental histories provide little more than anecdotal accounts of particular disciplinary 
incidents at best, but usually omit any detailed discussion of them at all. Instead they 
focus upon the mundane yet usually competent experience of regiments whilst 
unembodied, and as most were written by individuals intimately connected with the unit 
in question they have a tendency to portray such in the best light possible.  
Despite this historiographical paucity, the part-time nature of militia service 
meant that instilling and maintaining discipline was hugely important if it was to function 
as a credible military force. However, the militia encountered several problems in its 
ability to maintain discipline, most of which ultimately came down to the part-time 
amateur nature of the force while disembodied. Despite this, and to provide a framework 
for discipline, from 1757 onwards the militia was for the first time brought under the 
remit of military law. This meant that, after reconstitution in 1852, the force was only to 
be liable to the provisions of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War (and, from 1881, the 
Army Act) when embodied or assembled for annual training. Discipline itself was 
maintained by a combination of courts-martial and summary punishment, although in 
practice the vast majority of disciplinary cases were dealt with via the latter, either by 
commanding officers (in the case of minor offences) or by local magistrates (usually in 
cases of desertion when the force was disembodied). Although courts-martial were, in 
peacetime, relatively rare and used for only the most serious of military crimes ± serious 
civil crimes such as murder were dealt with via the civil courts ± their frequency did 
increase as more serious cases of desertion were dealt with in such a manner (opposing a 
general trend within the regular army for a lesser reliance upon courts-martial towards the 
end of the century). In keeping with improving discipline within the regular army and the 
                                                 
1
 Skelly, Victorian Army, pp.125-79; Spiers, Late Victorian Army, pp. 71-5; French, Military Identities, pp. 
180-202; Bowman & Connelly, Edwardian Army, pp. 42-3, 54-5, 58-62. 
2
 $QGHUVRQµ(QJOLVK0LOLWLDLQWKHPLG-NineteeQWK&HQWXU\¶ p. 354; Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW-Time 
Soldiers, pp. 150-1. 
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move towards wider reform of the penal system, it will be shown that the militia saw a 
drop in the total number of offences recorded. However, this did not prevent the harsh 
realities of active service during the South African War, the first time that it was liable to 
the full weight of military law, from causing several units to struggle in maintaining 
discipline, often in cases relating to drunkenness.  
  In terms of the most common disciplinary issues which affected the militia across 
the period, arguably the greatest remained desertion. This was particularly problematic 
during the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny. After this, the government was able to curb 
its worst excesses. Yet, from the 1860s onwards, rates remained well below those 
experienced during the 1850s, desertion remained an ever present concern. Urban units 
reliant on migratory semi-employed labourers, with no fixed address, were particularly 
affected due to the ease with which their men could avoid detection or fraudulently enlist 
into other regiments. Permanent emigration or, in coastal counties, temporary absence at 
sea also prevented many militiamen from attending their training, even if they had no 
intention of permanently deserting. There were also concerns that desertion and 
fraudulent enlistment were difficult to combat due to the inexperience or, in many cases, 
indifference of local constabularies towards tracking down absentees, although it is 
without doubt they were crucial as a means of tracking down many deserters. Another 
major disciplinary concern were the frequent disturbances and riots experienced when 
embodied or assembled for training, most of which had a tendency to spiral out of control 
due to the ease of access to alcohol. On the whole instances of riotous behaviour were 
relatively infrequent when units are examined in isolation, but collectively many across 
Great Britain were, at some stage, involved in such disturbances, while many more minor 
instances doubtless went unreported. Such events were further compounded by the 
necessity of billeting most units, something which generated much animosity among 
local people.  
 
* * * 
 
Ever since its reconstitution in 1757, the militia was progressively brought under the 
remit of military law. Nevertheless, this did not mean in any way that discipline was 
wholly upheld via the implementation of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War: in fact, 
discipline within the militia continued to be only partially regulated by such. Historically 
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section seven of the first Mutiny Act held that the militia was exempt from the authority 
of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War unless such was made applicable by subsequent 
legislation.3 It was not until 1757 that the militia was first brought under their remit. 
Initially this only extended to the force when it was embodied, although in 1762 this was 
soon extended to include the period of annual training, but no punishment could extend to 
µOLIH RU OLPE¶ 7KLV ZDV IXUWKHU DOWHUHG VR WKDW IURP  WKRVH DEVHQW ZLWKRXW OHDYH
who hitherto were only liable to be punished with a fine, could be tried as deserters under 
the Mutiny Act if they absented themselves whilst embodied. It was also in this year that 
members of the permanent staff were first placed under military law while not embodied, 
meaning they were liable to it at all times. All this was reaffirmed by the Militia Act of 
1802, meaning that, immediately prior to reconstitution in 1852, the militia continued to 
be only partially governed by military law.4  
 Little changed regarding the extent to which military law was applied to the 
militia in the years immediately after the 1852 reform. An exception was that, in 1854, all 
those who were absent without leave from the annual training (as opposed to just the 
embodiment) were henceforth to be declared as deserters. Furthermore, it was that year in 
which any militiamen temporarily attached to either the permanent staff or regular army 
were also liable to be tried under military law ± from 1867 this was also extended to 
militia reservists serving with the regulars.5 Nevertheless, the militia remained only 
partially governed by military law as it was not until 1875 that militia recruits were also 
brought under its authority during their preliminary drill. Similarly, despite the fact 
military law applied to members of the permanent staff at all times, it was not until 1877 
that it was also applied at all times to militia officers. From 1879 until 1882 the 
legislation regulating discipline within the regular army and auxiliary forces was further 
consolidated: firstly, through the Army Discipline and Regulation Act of 1879, and 
secondly, through the Army Act, of 1881 and the Militia Act of 1882. As before, officers 
and members of the permanent staff were at all times subject to military law, while the 
rest of the rank and file were only liable whilst embodied, assembled for training, or 
when attached to the regulars. Furthermore, owing to the creation of territorial regiments,  
                                                 
3
 1 W. & M., c. 520. 
4
 30 Geo. II, c. 25, ss. 36-40, 45, 47; 2 Geo. III, c. 20, ss. 99, 116, 121; 4 Geo. III, c. 17. s. 8 [by which 
military law was extended to drummers]; 26 Geo. III, c. 107, ss. 681 881 95, 98-9; 42 Geo. III, c. 90, ss. 89, 
103, 111, 115-6; Manual of Military Law, (1907), pp. 170-1; Western, English Militia, pp. 419-20. 
5
 17 & 18 Vict. c. 105, ss. 45, 53; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 106, s. 58; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 107, s. 28; 30 & 31Vict. c. 
111; Manual of Military Law, (1907), p. 171. 
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Table 4.1: Cases of Courts-Martial, Summary Trial and Minor Punishment, and 
Drunkenness within the Militia of the UK.6 
 
Year Trials by      Court-Martial 
Minor / Summary 
Punishment 
Men fined for 
drunkenness 
1882 486 36,819 3,607 
1883 525 37,966 4,104 
1884 431 32,873 3,753 
1885 551 35,944 3,775 
1886 418 30,254 3,576 
1887 302 24,060 2,665 
1888 336 21,820 2,769 
« « « « 
1892 422 25,831 3,682 
1893 352 26,327 3,495 
1894 1,126 22,117 2,796 
1895 1,035 19,532 2,901 
1896 853 20,690 3,090 
1897 976 21,754 3,412 
1898 846 21,519 3,093 
1899 786 19,218 3,029 
1900 4,647 113,288 13,309 
« « « « 
1902 1,236 « 1,862 
  1903* 610 « 1,455 
1903-1904 510 « 1,868 
1904-1905 369 « 1,829 
1905-1906 283 « 1,632 
1906-1907 309 « 1,740 
1907-1908 299 « 1,344 
  *Figures for 1 January - 30 September. Years hereafter are for the 
  1 October until the 30 September following.  
 
regular officers could now sit on militia courts martial indiscriminately and visa versa.7  
Despite the increasing implementation of military law as a means of more 
effectively maintaining discipline within the militia, an analysis of disciplinary figures 
shows that discipline was just as much a problem for the militia as for the regular army. 
Table 4.1 shows that instances of summary and minor punishments fell by almost half 
when the figures for 1883 and 1899 are compared. This was also accompanied by a 
                                                 
6
 Appendix 6 in PP, Report of the Committee. C. 5922, (1890), p. 316; Appendix 50 in PP, Royal 
Appendices to the Minutes  ¸Cd. 2064, (1904), p. 93; Tables 8 and 9 in PP, General Annual Report¸ Cd. 
1496, (1903), pp. 86-7; Tables 9 and 10 in Ibid, Cd. 1904, (1904), pp. 125-6; Tables 9 and 10 in Ibid., Cd. 
2268, (1905), pp. 123-4; Tables 9 and 10 in Ibid., Cd. 2696, (1906), pp. 120-1; Tables 9 and 10 in Ibid., Cd. 
3365, (1907), pp. 122-3; Tables 9 and 10 in Ibid., Cd. 3798, (1908), pp 112-3; Tables 8 and 9 in Ibid., Cd. 
4493, (1908), pp. 111-2. 
7
 38 & 39 Vict., c. 7, s. 2; 38 & 39 Vict., c. 69, s. 59; 42 & 43 Vict., c. 33; 44 & 45 Vict., c. 58, ss. 46, 175-
6; 45 & 46 Vict., c. 49, ss. 42-3; Lt-Col E. Gunter, Outlines of Military Law and Customs of War with New 
Tables and Examples, (London: William Clowes and Sons Ltd., 1897), pp. 30-8, 65-75, 177-80; Manual of 
Military Law, (1907), p. 171. 
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similar, albeit lesser, drop in the number of men fined for drunkenness. This was a trend 
that was also evident in the regular army: the number of courts-martial fell from 14,290 
in 1872, to just 9,676 in 1898, while, over the same period, the number of fines for 
drunkenness fell from 51,501 to just 26,243 and the number of summary punishments 
(issued by commanding officers) from 249,179 to 217,236. Therefore, discipline appears 
to have been dealt with increasingly effectively in both the militia and regular army, a 
conclusion shared by the Royal Commission examining the militia in 1890.8 What is also 
evident is that instances of indiscipline peaked in years that the militia was embodied, 
although this was perhaps unsurprising as such periods simply afforded militiamen more 
time in which to commit an offence (something which was no doubt compounded by the 
length and monotony of such service). Table 4.1 shows that, in the first full year of the 
South African War, the number of courts-martial, summary and minor punishments, 
including fines for drunkenness, all increased dramatically. A similar trend was evident in 
the 1860s: in 1861 the number of recorded cases of insubordination fell to just 17 from a 
high of 124 the previous year ± this was notable as 1860 was the last full year in which 
just under one-third of the total militia establishment were embodied.9 
Although military law applied to the militia at all times that it was embodied or 
assembled for training, very few offences were ever dealt with by courts-martial. 
National figures are lacking for the entire period, nevertheless Table 4.1 shows that 
courts-martial accounted for only a small proportion of offences in each year from 1881 
to 1908, the vast majority being dealt with summarily either by magistrates or, if less 
serious in nature, by commanding officers. One reason why so few militiamen faced trial 
by courts-martial was that they required the permission of the Secretary of State for War 
to whom each case was referred, something which was often declined.10 It is also 
apparent from Table 4.1 that the use of courts-martial increased in the run-up to the South 
African War, something which runs contrary to the general trend in the regular army 
where the use of courts-martial declined for units stationed in the UK.11 Evidence also 
suggests that this was due to the increased tendency for some units to try aggravated 
cases of desertion by courts-martial, something which had been previously suggested by 
                                                 
8
 PP, General Annual Return of the British Army, C. 1323, (1875), p. 37; Skelley, Victorian Army, pp. 128-
31; Spiers, Late Victorian Army¸ pp. 74-5; PP, Report of the Committee¸ (1890), p. x.  
9
 PP, Army, &c. (insubordination). Returns of the number of cases of insubordination tried or punished, at 
home or abroad, under the Mutiny Act, in the army, militia, and yeomanry cavalry, in each year from 1860 
to 1870 inclusive, 296, (1871).  
10
 PP, Report of the committee, (1877), qq. 4930-2. 
11
 Skelley, Victorian Army¸ pp. 128-9, 140-1. 
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the War Office in 1858.12  
Despite their rarity, within the militia courts-martial were usually reserved for 
those accused of serious military offences such as desertion (although, as will be seen, 
while disembodied, this was commonly dealt with summarily by magistrates in many 
units), fraudulent enlistment, violence and disobedience towards superiors, disgraceful 
conduct, drunkenness, theft and minor insubordination and neglect of orders. Crimes such 
as murder, manslaughter, rape and other serious civil offences could also theoretically be 
tried by courts-martial, although in practice militiamen stationed in the UK would usually 
be tried in civil courts if accessible, just like their regular counterparts.13 In the Royal 
Monmouthshire Light Infantry, most recorded courts-martial were held during the 
embodiments of the 1850s, usually in cases of desertion or absence without leave (which 
when disembodied would have been tried summarily by magistrates, as seen below). In 
RQH UDUH LQVWDQFH D SULYDWH ZDV FKDUJHG DWWHPSWLQJ WR H[FLWH RWKHUV WR µPXWLQRXV
FRQGXFW¶WKHVHYHULW\RIFULPHPHDQLQJWKHFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHUKDGOLWWOHchoice but to 
apply for a general court-martial. To show their rarity in peacetime, between 1877 and 
1878 there were just two courts-martial recorded in the regiment, one such example 
relating to an aggravated case of drunkenness of a member of the permanent staff (due to 
his escape from confinement) which resulted in a district court-martial. Records of 
courts-martial in the North Yorkshire Rifles show that there was just one recorded court-
PDUWLDO SULRU WR WKH UHJLPHQW¶V HPERGLPHQW LQ 'HFHPEHU  <HW Irom January to 
April, the following year, there were eight recorded courts-martial, all involving 
desertion, drunkenness, violence towards superiors, theft, or a combination of the above. 
In the Oxfordshire Light Infantry there were just 50 recorded courts-martial between 
1859 and 1881, two-thirds of which were cases involving desertion or absence without 
leave; the remainder related principally to theft of regimental property or insubordinate 
and violent behaviour.14  Later figures, shown in Table 4.2, demonstrate that, within the 
militia of the UK as a whole, desertion and absence without leave consistently comprised 
the greatest proportion of offences tried, followed by offences relating to drunkenness,  
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 NRS, GD/224/192/19, Memoranda and returns rHODWLQJWRWKHPLOLWLD:2µ6XPPDU\RIWKH&RQILGHQWLDO
5HSRUWRIWKH'LVHPERGLHG0LOLWLDDWWKH7UDLQLQJRI¶ 
13
 Spiers, Late Victorian Army¸ p. 72. 
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 0&50505($GMXWDQW¶VOHWWHUERRN-1854, letters, Vaughan to the Brigade Major, 
Carmarthen, 19 June and 23 August 1854, adjutant to the Brigade Major, Carmarthen, 12 July 1854, and 
DGMXWDQWWR+RUVH*XDUGV-XO\505($GMXWDQW¶VOHWWHUERRN-1878, letters, Col. Payne 
to Commanding Royal Engineer (CRE) South Wales, 6 and 12 June 1878; TNA, WO 68/197, North 
Yorkshire Rifles courts-martial records, [1853-1855], and WO 68/413, 4th Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 
courts-martial records, 1859-1881. 
     
 158 
Table 4.2: Summary of Offences tried by Courts-Martial within the Militia of the UK, 
1902-1908.15 
 
Offence Percentage of Total Offences by Year 
1902 1903* 1903-4 1904-5 1905-6 1906-7 1907-8 
Desertion 21.6 22.9 19 17.9 11.1 13.2 18.3 
AWOL 14.5 28.9 26.4 18.2 27.6 15.1 13.7 
Fraudulent enlistment 2.1 3.1 4.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 4.6 
Offences regarding enlistment 1.1 4.4 4.9 7.6 9.5 2.4 3.6 
Violence & disobedience to superiors 8 4 7 9.4 9.2 10.5 6.5 
Disgraceful conduct 0.9 0.1 2.1 0.5 2.2 1.6 4.3 
Minor insubordination & neglect of orders   4.9 3 3 4.4 3.5 8.9 6.7 
Quitting or sleeping on post 8.2 0.8 0.2 0.2 « « 0.2 
Drunk on duty 9.6 4.8 6.8 7.1 5.1 7 1.9 
Drunkenness 9.2 5.3 4.9 12.6 10.5 12.9 9.6 
Making away with necessities 9.5 12.5 11.7 5.3 2.9 9.7 « 
Wilfully injuring Public Property or Equipment « « « « « « 0.7 
Loss of Equipment, Clothing or Necessaries « « « « « « 19.0 
Misc. 10.6 10.3 9.6 11 12.7 12.9 10.6 
Total Offences 1,453 776 633 435 315 371 415 
Punishments Percentage of Total Punishments by Year 
1902 1903* 1903-4 1904-5 1905-6 1906-7 1907-8 
Penal Servitude  0.1 « « « « « « 
Reduced to a lower rank 17.9 19.0 22.8 33.3 28.4 34.3 31.4 
Reduction and Imprisonment  2.9 1.5 1.2 3.2 8.1 4.5 6.3 
Stoppage from Pay, Fine or Forfeiture 2.9 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.7 2.4 1.6 
Imprisonment with or without hard labour 76.0 78.5 75.8 63.2 62.7 58.8 60.7 
Discharged with Ignominy 0.2 0.5 « « « « « 
Total Punishments 1,189 599 492 348 271 289 560 
Acquitted, Pardoned etc. Number Acquitted, Pardoned etc .by Year 
1902 1903* 1903-4 1904-5 1905-6 1906-7 1907-8 
Acquitted 19 14 10 11 4 8 12 
Pardoned « « « « « «  
Sentence wholly remitted 15 3 3 6 1 4 5 
Sentence quashed 13 6 4 4 7 8 15 
Total Acquitted, Pardoned etc. 47 23 17 21 12 20 32 
*Figures for 1903 are from 1 January to 20 September. Figures for 1 January - 30 September. 
Years hereafter are for the 1 October until the 30 September following. Figures for 1907-8 include 
the Special Reserve. 
 
theft, and violence or disobedience towards superiors, etc. 
The majority of disciplinary offences dealt with by courts-martial saw some form 
of custodial sentence awarded, either imprisonment with or without hard labour or, in 
more extreme circumstances, penal servitude. However, these were by no means the only 
punishments available: courts-martial could also award fines or stoppages from pay, 
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 Table 8 in PP, General Annual Report,Cd.1496, (1903), p. 86; Table 9 in Ibid., Cd. 1904, (1904), p. 125; 
Table 9 in Ibid., Cd. 2268, (1905), p. 123; Table 10 in Ibid., Cd. 2696, (1906), p. 121; Table 10 in Ibid., Cd. 
3365, (19-7), p. 123; Table 10 in Ibid., Cd. 3798, (1908), p. 113; Table 9 in Ibid., Cd. 4493, (1909), pp. 
112-3. 
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reduce an NCO a step in rank, or discharge an offender with ignominy. As in the regular 
army, the ability to award a particular punishment depended upon the type of courts-
martial convened, with only district courts-martial able to try an NCO, while only general 
courts-martial were  able to award punishments of penal servitude or try an officer.16 
Nevertheless, a custodial sentence remained by far the most common punishment 
awarded to privates, with NCOs customarily reduced in rank as an alternative (although 
sometime additional punishments were given in severe cases). In the North Yorkshire 
Rifles all of the eight recorded cases saw those convicted given a term of imprisonment, 
ranging from just ten days, in one instance, to 180 days with hard labour in another. In 
the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 38 of the recorded cases involved custodial terms ranging 
from 14 to 112 days, the remainder being NCOs reduced in rank.17   
Controversially it remained theoretically possible that militiamen tried by courts-
martial could be sentenced to corporal punishment despite the legislation governing the 
PLOLWLD IRUELGGLQJ DQ\ SXQLVKPHQW DJDLQVW µOLIH RU OLPE¶ $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH 0XWLQ\ $FW
PLOLWLDPHQ ZHUH OLDEOH WR EH IORJJHG IRU RIIHQFHV µDV ZHUH FRPSULVHG LQ WKH WHUms 
LPPRUDOLW\GLVREHGLHQFHRUQHJOHFWRIGXW\¶DOWKRXJKDVZLOOEHVHHQWKLVXVXDOO\ZDV
confined to serious cases of desertion and instances of violent disobedience).18 There was 
a great deal of public dissatisfaction with this arrangement, most notably from members 
of the Peace Society for whom the issue played a central part of the wider campaign to 
disrupt militia recruitment (as seen in Chapter 3). This frequently brought them into 
FRQIOLFW ZLWK WKH DXWKRULWLHV 2QH SDUWLFXODU SODFDUG HQWLWOHG µ)ORgging in the New 
0LOLWLD¶ DQG as a result of the accompanying demonstrations, saw their publishers 
prosecuted for seditious libel (a charge which was subsequently dropped). More widely, 
by October 1852 prosecutions had taken place in Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire and 
Suffolk.19 In Parliament there had previously been an attempt by the Liberal MP John 
Bright to introduce an amendment to the Militia Bill of 1852 which would forbid the 
practice on the ground that it would hinder recruitment, and that if there was the need to 
resort to the ballot, men who would have no choice but to serve would be liable to face 
corporal punishment. Although the amendment was defeated by 199 votes to 92, most 
                                                 
16
 Manual of Military Law, (1907), pp. 35-6. 
17
 TNA, WO 68/197 and WO 68/413. 
18
 HC Deb., 7 May 1852, vol. 121, cc. 371-413, (c. 394). 
19
 71$76µ0LOLWLD3ODFDUGVUHODWLQJWRIORJJLQJLQWKH0LOLWLD¶71$+2µ0LOLWLD
Flogging, inflammatory bills, in tKH0LOLWLD¶Leicester Journal, 15 October 1852; London Standard, 1 
October 1852; The Leeds Times, 26 February, 1853. 
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MPs had little affection for the practice and most found it morally reprehensive. 
Nonetheless, they recognised that it had its uses in maintaining discipline and that, 
crucially, unless the issue was also resolved in the army it would be unfair to spare just 
the militia. (A similar amendment, inserted by the Liberal MP Joseph Hardcastle, was 
also later defeated upon similar grounds.)20 There were also fears flogging would 
DGYHUVHO\LPSDFWPLOLWLDPHQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRYROXQWHHUIRUVHUYLFHLQWKHUHJXODUDUP\RU
even for service abroad. For instance, after a regular soldier was flogged at Anglesea 
Barracks, Portsmouth, in January 1858, one private (whose letter was published in 
Reynolds Newspaper, edited by the radical journalist George W. M. Reynolds) in the 2nd 
:HVW <RUNVKLUH 5HJLPHQW ZKR KDG EHHQ VWDWLRQHG WKHUH DVNHG µ'R the authorities 
expect we will volunteer for foreign service, after witnessing the cruel and beastly 
H[KLELWLRQRIDIORJJLQJ"¶,WZDVUHSRUWHGWKDWODWHUZKHQWKHPHQZHUHDVNHGZKRZRXOG
be willing to volunteer for the line, only seventeen stepped forward despite the 
expectation 150 would do so.21  
Despite such concerns, flogging was rarely used as a punishment within the 
militia, and then only whilst the force was embodied, meaning there were no recorded 
cases after 1859. In 1857 there were just five recorded cases: two for disgraceful conduct, 
two for insubordination and one for violence towards a superior. In 1858 this increased to 
13 cases, while in the following year there were fourteen. Nevertheless, this paled in 
comparison to the number in the regular army: in 1857 there were 107 cases, in 1858 a 
total of 205, rising to 498 in 1859.22 In the militia most instances were reserved only for 
serious offences. In November 1857 a private in the Nottinghamshire Regiment was 
sentenced to 50 lashes (reduced to 25 after the intervention of the surgeon) for striking 
two NCOs whilst they attempted to seize him for being out of his billet, the punishment 
taking place in front of the regiment in order to act as a deterrent. Similarly, while 
stationed at Aldershot, in August 1859, a drummer in the Oxfordshire Light Infantry was 
sentenced to 20 lashes alongside 168 days imprisonment with hard labour for striking an 
                                                 
20
 HC Deb., 7 May 1852, vol. 121, cc. 371-413, (cc. 393-413); HC Deb, 20 May 1852, vol. 121, cc. 806-37, 
(cc. 810-17).  
21
 Reynolds's Newspaper, 31 January 1858. 
22
 What is of note is that a high proportion of these cases were in Irish regiments: four in 1857, six in 1858 
and eight in 1859. By contrast, there were no cases in Scottish units. This begs the question whether the 
practice was deemed more acceptable in Irish units, although that is difficult to confirm. PP, Flogging 
(army). Return of the number of persons flogged in the army and militia of Great Britain and Ireland, in the 
year 1857, 519, (1857-58), p. 4; PP, Flogging (army and militia). Return of the number of persons flogged 
in the army and militia of Great Britain and Ireland, in the year 1858, 47, (1860), p. 5; PP, Flogging (army 
and militia). Return of the number of men flogged in the army and militia of Great Britain and Ireland, in 
the year 1859, 366, (1860), p. 9. 
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NCO while drunk. However, certain commanding officers appeared to use flogging 
simply as a form of exemplary justice, as in a few cases offenders received lashes for 
non-YLROHQW RIIHQFHV ,Q $XJXVW  D SULYDWH LQ WKH QG .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 6WDIIRUGVKLUH
Regiment was sentenced to 50 lashes for being drunk at his guard post and for disposing 
of his kit, although official records recorded his offence as desertion. The sentence was 
carried out in full view of the regiment, although the public had been barred from 
entering. Eventually, upon the orders of the surgeon, his punishment was ceased at 33 
lashes. Although in this instance medical concern saw the punishment cease, this was far 
from the norm; only eight out of a total of 32 cases saw the punishment stopped upon 
medical grounds.23  
Growing social revulsion towards corporal punishment within the army more 
widely meant that flogging remained a controversial issue. Spurred on by the death of a 
young regular solider, Private Robert Slim (of the 74th Highlanders) in 1867, the 
JRYHUQPHQW DOWHUHG WKH 0XWLQ\ $FW VR WKDW LQ SHDFHWLPH RQO\ µFDWHJRU\ ,, VROGLHUV¶
(those deemed bad characters) could be flogged. Although the practice continued to be 
used against regulars, increasingly dramatically during the Zulu War, while several 
influential senior officers (including the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Wolseley, Redvers 
Buller and Lord Chelmsford) continued to believe in its necessity in order to maintain 
discipline, the Liberals were eventually able to successfully campaign for its abolition, 
succeeding in getting the maximum amount of lashes halved to just 25, and the practice 
abolished outright in 1881.24  
However, flogging was not the only controversial punishment that some 
militiamen faced in the early years after reconstitution. Courts-martial could also punish 
EDGFKDUDFWHUVDQGGHVHUWHUVWKURXJKEUDQGLQJXVLQJµ%&¶IRUWKHIRUPHUDQGµ'¶IRUWKH
latter). Although rarely used, there were a few instances of militiamen being sentenced to 
what remained, much like flogging, a deeply divisive practice. For instance, while 
embodied, a militiaman from the Edinburgh County Regiment was sentenced to be 
µPDUNHG¶ DV D GHVHUWHU DORQJVLGH D SXQLVKPHQW RI  GD\V LPSULVRQPHQW ZLWK KDUG
labour) in June 1856.25 Similar to flogging, pressure from the press and within Parliament 
PHDQW WKH SUDFWLFH ZDV DOVR DEROLVKHG DV SDUW RI &DUGZHOO¶V ZLGHU reforms of the 
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 Nottinghamshire Guardian, 12 November 1857; Reading Mercury, 6 August 1859; Grantham Journal, 
28 August 1858. 
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 Skelly, Victorian Army, pp. 129, 147-52; Spiers, Late Victorian Army, pp. 73-4.  
25
 NRS, GD224/192/21, Militia Correspondence, May-December 1856, letter, Bowman to Buccleuch, 18 
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recruiting system in 1871.26 Furthermore, concerns were also raised by MPs in 1867 over 
the possibility that courts-martial could potentially punish militia deserters to twelve 
months penal servitude in the army as a means of deterring desertion. Despite its 
insertion into the Militia Reserve Bill, the Secretary of State for War, Sir John Pakington, 
dropped the clause once he realised it would be impossible to get through Parliament due 
to the high levels of opposition.27  
Although most serious military offences were dealt with by courts-martial, cases 
of desertion and fraudulent enlistment were habitually deferred to local magistrates 
during disembodied periods. After 1854, militiamen summarily tried in this manner were 
liable to a fixed fine of between 40s and £10 (raised to £20 in 1859, and to £25 in 1881) 
or, if they could not afford to pay, up to three months imprisonment (raised to between 
two and six months in 1859), usually with hard labour. Upon the suggestion of the Royal 
Commission examining the force in 1859, all deserters were liable to serve an additional 
period corresponding to the length of time they were absent from their unit. Such 
financial penalties were far out of the reach of many militiamen despite the fact that it 
was extremely rare for an individual to receive the maximum sentence; indeed, of all the 
cases examined none were given the maximum sentence. Deserters also forfeited the 
right to any bounty liable to them, while those partially absent (or those guilty of 
misconduct) could have all, or a portion, of their bounty withheld.28 All militiamen found 
to have fraudulently enlisted into another unit, as well as those who re-enlisted in the 
same regiment under a false name, were meant to be treated in the same manner as 
deserters. However, in practice there was a degree of leniency shown towards those who 
were not discovered to have fraudulently enlisted until after they had joined their new 
unit. A War Office circular of November 1853 established that, in order to avoid the 
inconvenience of trying such men, many of whom would have joined the line, as a rule 
all future cases would see 1d stopped from their daily pay for a period of 18 months (as 
permitted by section 57 of the Mutiny Act). It was stressed, however, that such was not to 
apply to those men attempting to fraudulently enlist, but who were discovered prior to 
their attestation. One senior officer, Major-General I. L. A. Simmons, stated that, 
subsequently, the vast majority of cases of fraudulent enlistment were dealt with in such a 
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manner. This no doubt helped the regular army ensure those who joined from the militia 
illegally could remain, yet it meant there was little punitive deterrent to those who were 
tempted to chance fraudulently enlisting for financial gain.29 In 1854 it was recorded that, 
of a total of 11,809 recorded as transferring to the regular army that year, 1,483 did so 
without permission, although in reality the proportion of cases unaccounted for in official 
figures meant the proportion was probably much larger.30 Furthermore, such a small 
stoppage in pay was little to deter individuals from attempting to fraudulently enlist in 
multiple regiments in order to gain as many enrolment bounties as possible.31 Despite 
this, it was eventually reconfirmed in the Militia Act of 1859 that all cases of fraudulent 
enlistment should be treated in the same manner as desertion.32 
Samples of desertion cases in several disembodied militia units demonstrate that 
summary trials by magistrates were the standard way of dealing with such cases. They 
also demonstrate that, in most cases, magistrates often opted for the smallest possible 
sentence, particularly if there was some form of mitigating circumstance. In the Royal 
Monmouthshire Light Infantry (after 1877, as Royal Engineers) cases of desertion were 
dealt with by magistrates, usually drawing the minimum 40s fine with the threat of 
imprisonment upon default. Cases of drunkenness could also be dealt with in a similar 
manner. In one case, in November 1875, a militiaman was awarded a 10s fine with an 
additional 13s 6d of costs, although, due to his default, he was instead imprisoned for 14 
days. Records of desertion cases in Anglesey across the 1870s show that in most cases 
the punishment awarded was again just a 40s fine with between 3s and 12s costs on-top. 
Again if in default of the payment the sentence to be awarded was either two or three 
PRQWK¶V LPSULVRQPHQW ZLWK RU ZLWKRXW KDUG ODERXU DJDLQ WKH PLQLPXP VHW RXW LQ WKH
legislation. A sample of desertion cases in Kent, recorded in the local press between 1859 
and 1883, show a similar degree of leniency, most cases drawing the 40s and between 7s 
and 10s 6d worth of costs The fact that in a coastal county, such as Kent, desertion was 
often the result of militiamen taking work at sea ± indeed, at least six of the 25 recorded 
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 HantsALS, Q30/3/5/102, WO Circular, E/Militia/24, 21/11/53; PP, Second report of the commissioners 
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cases were due to such ± magistrates ensured they stuck to the minimum possible 
sentence. Nevertheless, the fact many others received the same minimum sentence 
questions the extent to which this was truly a measure of compassion.33 It was argued by 
many commanding officers that magistrates were often too lenient in sentencing. Several 
of those called to give evidence before the Royal Commission examining the militia in 
1859 argued that such summary trials tended to let offenders off with too limited a 
punishment, and that in many cases, particularly cases of aggravated desertion, it would 
be better to seek trial by regimental courts-martial.34   
There is also evidence that some magistrates and commanding officers bent the 
rules so as to allow themselves to award sentences below that legally required if they felt 
the individual concerned had mitigating circumstances. This irked the government which 
warned them of the possible consequences of such actions upon the potential deterrence 
of summary punishments. In 1868, a magistrate took leniency upon a militiaman in the 
Royal Lancashire Artillery who had been charged with desertion, but subsequently 
defaulted upon the payment of the 40s fine, by reducing his sentence below the minimum 
permitted by the existing legislation. He justified this by claiming that the Small Penalties 
Act of 1865 allowed him to reduce the sentence of two months imprisonment to just two 
weeks because the man in question had taken a job out at sea, and thus been unable to 
attend his training. This led to the magistrate in question being subsequently 
UHSULPDQGHG ZKLOH WKH UHJLPHQW¶V FRPPDQGLQJ RIILFHU IHOW DQ LQVXIILFLHQW SXQLVKPHQW
had been given. This was not an isolated incident. In Hampshire a similar offender only 
received a 5s fine with the possibility of two weeks imprisonment upon default. In 1870 
the issue of whether the Militia Act should be amended (to allow magistrates such 
discretionary powers) was brought before the Secretary of State for War. Nonetheless, 
Edward Cardwell felt that, referring to a similar case of three men from the Kent 
Artillery, that magistrates were right to apply the minimum possible sentence with little 
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need to give them further powers of discretion.35 Both commanding officers and the lords 
lieutenant were also capable of leniency in their decision on whether or not to prosecute 
militiamen in cases of desertion. There are several examples of such in the Edinburgh 
County Regiment, one, in July 1856, in which a deserteU¶VVHQWHQFHRILPSULVRQPHQWIRU
90 days was remitted due to the fact that he pleaded his family were close to entering the 
poor house. Leniency was also shown when, the following year, the Lord Lieutenant of 
Midlothian, the Duke of Buccleuch, accepted the UHVLJQDWLRQRIWKHUHJLPHQW¶VVHUJHDQW-
major after he was absent without leave (the former not having to provide a reason to the 
:DU2IILFHIRUDFFHSWLQJWKHUHVLJQDWLRQFOHDUO\PLQGIXORIWKHPDQ¶VORQJVHUYLFHDQG
the fact that an ignominious discharge would have prevented him from joining another 
unit (as he subsequently did).36 
Just as in the regular army, minor offences which could be dealt with summarily 
by commanding officers were by far the most common disciplinary offences within the 
militia, making up the bulk of the figures for minor and summary punishments (as seen in 
Table 4.1). Individual units also drew up their own list of minor punishments. Such was 
the case in the Edinburgh County Regiment for militiamen guilty of minor 
misdemeanours. This principally consisted of additional periods of parade and drill or 
fines given to those either missing from, or late to, parade and drill, or for irregularities in 
barracks such as poorly maintained arms and equipment, and instances of minor 
insubordination.37 Records of the 1st Durham Fusiliers (later 3rd Durham Light Infantry) 
show that, for much of the period, minor offences were dealt with through a system of 
summary fines, the most common offence that of being temporarily absent from drill or 
parade, or lateness upon assembly. For instance, in 1882, the vast majority of the 127 
recorded fines were due to militiamen arriving one day late to march with the battalion, 
for which each individual was fined 2s 6d.38 From 1881 commanding officers were 
bolstered in their ability to give out summary punishments as an alternative to courts-
martial under section 46 of the Army Act, including imprisonment with or without hard 
labour, temporary withdrawal of pay for absence up to five days, fines for drunkenness 
up to 10s, and stoppages from pay in lieu of damages and loss of goods and equipment. 




 NRS, GD224/192/21, letters, Bowman to Buccleuch, 3 and 24 July 1857, GD224/192/22, Militia 
correspondence, 1857, letters, Buccleuch to Bowman and replies, 30 September, 1 and 2 October 1857. 
37
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Minor punishments, including confinement to barracks and extra guard duties, could also 
be handed out by commanding officers for minor offences and combined with summary 
punishments as seen fit.39 
Clearly, for much of the period, discipline was maintained in the militia with little 
recourse to courts-martial. For units which served abroad during the South African War, 
however, there was no such luxury. Here the militia was for the first time subject to the 
application of military law whilst on active service. It appears that, for some, maintaining 
discipline was a struggle. Records of district and field-general courts-martial, summarised 
in Table 4.3, show that between July 1900 and November 1901, in a sample of 13 British 
militia units, there were 324 trials held to deal with 455 separate offences. The most 
common offences were those relating to drunkenness (most seriously those whilst on 
duty), being asleep on or quitting a post and, more worryingly, violence or disobedience 
towards a superior. Unlike those units stationed in the UK, courts-martial for desertion 
and absence without leave were less common due to the greater difficulties of doing so 
upon active service (compared to during disembodied periods in the UK). A few 
militiamen were also charged with the most serious of offences, principally murder. 
There was also a degree of variation in the number of courts-martial among different 
units. Some of this can be explained by the fact that several units differed greatly in size ± 
both the Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (Militia) and Edinburgh R.G.A. (Militia) 
had taken just a company each to South Africa. Others were simply stationed in South 
Africa for longer periods before returning home. Nevertheless, certain units experienced 
a greater difficulty in maintaining discipline than others. Both the 3rd East Kent 
Regiment and 3rd South Wales Borderers served in South Africa for approximately the 
same length of time ± from March 1900 until January 1902 for the former, and February 
1902 for the latter. Despite this, the 3rd South Wales Borderers saw more men charged 
by courts-martial than the 3rd East Kent Regiment.40 What is also clear is that militiamen 
brought up before courts-martial had little chance of avoiding a conviction, just 14 having 
been acquitted out of 324 cases. 
Since the abolition of corporal punishment, courts-martial were limited to using 
various forms of imprisonment as a means of enforcing discipline, and during the war the 
same applied to the militia. Most offenders were sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
with hard labour, although some were instead sentenced to penal servitude or one of the  
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Table 4.3: Offences charged by District and Field-General Courts-Martial during the 
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Table 4.3 (continued): Offences charged by District and Field-General Courts-Martial 
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two forms of field punishment. NCOs were almost always reduced either a step in rank 
or, if the offence was of sufficient gravity, straight to the ranks (with many also sentenced 
to a period of imprisonment). On top of this, some militiamen were fined or had 
stoppages taken from their pay, usually used in conjunction with other sentences. Yet 
despite the apparent regularity with which militiamen (who, ultimately, remained amateur 
soldiers) were subjected to the sentence of courts-martial, it was relatively common for 
sentences to be partially (or, in a few cases, wholly) remitted. 
Although all the cases sampled in Table 4.3 related to members of the rank and 
file, there were a few rare cases where militia officers also faced trial. Arguably the most 
notorious case was that of Lieutenant W. Judkins of the 5th Rifle Brigade (former 2nd 
7RZHU +DPOHWV 5HJLPHQW WULHG DV SDUW RI WKH µ&DSH ³5DJJLQJ´ &DVH¶ LQ -XQH 
Alongside six other officers, it was alleged that whilst drunk they had abducted, hazed 
and later beat a local journalist during the early hours of Christmas Day 1901 
(sardonically KROGLQJDµPRFN¶FRXUWV-martial in the process of doing so), all the result of 
a disagreement between them and the victim at a ball held that evening. Despite being a 
militia officer, there is no evidence to suggest Judkins was to be afforded any special 
treatment when a general court-martial was eventually convened. Although all were 
HYHQWXDOO\ IRXQG QRW JXLOW\ RI EUHDFKLQJ VHFWLRQ  RI WKH $UP\ $FW µEHKDYLQJ LQ D
VFDQGDORXV PDQQHU¶ GHVSLWH DOUHDG\ KDYLQJ SDLG GDPDJHV DPRXQWLQJ WR  SOXV
fees) to the victim whilst still serving in South Africa, the scandal became national news; 
it was even raised before the Secretary of State for War in Parliament.42 
 
* * * 
 
Aside from individual cases of indiscipline common to the regular army and other 
auxiliary forces alike, there were three major disciplinary issues which continued to be 
problematic for the militia across the whole period: desertion (as already alluded to), 
riotous behaviour and, linked to the latter, billeting. Clearly efforts to control desertion 
through punitive means largely failed to help curb all but its worst excesses. Yet in reality 
WKHUHZDVOLWWOHWKHJRYHUQPHQWFRXOGGRWRFRQWUROLW7KHµPLJUDWRU\¶QDWXUHRIPXFKRI
the urban workforce which, as seen in Chapter 3, comprised a large proportion of recruits 
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in and around the major towns and cities, meant it was relatively easy for such 
individuals to desert. As already mentioned above, in 1853 it was found that of 5,175 
absentees recorded in 52 militia regiments, a total of 3,924 occurred in just 14 regiments, 
all of which recruited in the µPHWURSROLWDQDQGPDQXIDFWXULQJGLVWULFWV¶%\IDUWKHZRUVW
deficiencies occurred in the 1st and 2nd Tower Hamlets Regiment where 1,221 men were 
recorded as deserters, nearly a quarter of the total.43 Examination of desertion rates 
among a sample of units across the period show that, on average, the units with the 
highest rates of absence were those in urban and industrial areas. For instance, in the 6th 
Lancashire Regiment (later the 3rd and 4th Manchester Regiment) the average rate of 
desertion was 13.3 per cent of the enrolled strength, while in the 1st Tower Hamlets (later 
7th Rifle Brigade) and Edinburgh Artillery (later Edinburgh R.G.A Militia) it was 11.5 
and 10.9 per cent respectively. By comparison, the 2nd (later 4th Norfolk) Regiment had 
an average of just 2.6 per cent across the period although it would be wrong to suggest 
that all predominantly rural counties had small rates of desertion; for instance, the 
Hampshire Regiment saw a period where desertion reached far above the national 
average.44 Unlike in many rural areas, it was less common for urban recruits to have a 
permanent address as such individuals frequently moved to find work, sometimes 
unintentionally failing to inform the authorities of their movements.45 Representatives of 
the 1st Lancashire, Royal East Middlesex, Scottish Borderers and 2nd Tower Hamlets 
Regiments all testified, in 1877, to the high levels of desertion owing to a reliance on the 
floating manufacturing population. For example, Lieutenant-Colonel George G. Walker 
of the Scottish Borderers Regiment noted how desertion rates had increased from an 
average of 20 to around 80 per year as they increasingly relied on recruits from 
manufacturing areas. As a practice, desertion and fraudulent enlistment were more 
difficult in rural areas where agricultural workers made up the bulk of recruits as they 
tended to live at settled addresses, and were thus easier for the authorities to locate. Major 
George Toseland, of the Bedfordshire Regiment, stated that few recruits were absent as 
Bedfordshire was a predominantly rural district in which most men had fixed addresses. 
Similarly, in 1890, Colonel Hugh Pearson, commanding the Twelfth Regimental District 
(Suffolk & Cambridge), stated that the reason for such low levels of desertion was 
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because his men were locally employed and largely agricultural labourers, thus making 
them easier to trace as those that did desert tended to go straight to their homes.46 
 A further cause of desertion was due to permanent emigration or temporary 
absence whilst at sea, identified by the War Office as one of the key causes of desertion 
in 1858.47 Unsurprisingly coastal counties were particularly susceptible to losing 
militiamen in such a manner. Cornish units (especially the Royal Cornwall and Devon 
Miners) lost a higher proportion of men to emigration due to the tendency for miners, 
who comprised a significant proportion of their manpower, to travel domestically and 
internationally in search of work. It was the contention of Major Sir John St. Aubyn of 
the Cornwall Rangers that many had no intention of making off fraudulently, but due to 
the circumstances of their employment had no choice but to do so. As examined above, 
similar difficulties were experienced in Kent. In one instance, four members of the Kent 
Artillery were also found guilty of desertion under similar circumstances in 1870, their 
absence blamed upon their employment aboard a steam ship laying submarine cables, 
which in turn caused them to miss their annual training. By 1890 it had become the 
informal practice of the Northern Division Royal Artillery (former Durham Artillery) to 
exempt absentees from charges of desertion if they could prove that they had been absent 
while working at sea, for instance, with the production of shipping discharges. Instead 
they were required to serve an extra year, although they remained on the strength of the 
regiment. Even as late as 1904 emigration and migration in pursuit of work was blamed 
as the chief cause of desertion in the 77th Recruitment District based at Aberdeen.48 
There were also concerns that desertion and fraudulent enlistment were difficult 
to combat due to the inexperience, and in many cases indifference, of local constabularies 
towards tracking down absentees. During the 1850s rural constabularies had little 
experience in catching absentees, while many were only formed in the preceding years. 
In 1874 the Home Office believed that this was far from an isolated trend. For instance 
there were no reported cased of desertion within the Durham Artillery throughout the 
whole of 1874 despite 42 reported cases of absence without leave that year. Similar 
concerns were evident within the 2nd Tower Hamlets Regiment in which Major 
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Maxwell, before the 1877 commission, argued that the police gave little to no assistance 
in tracing and catching deserters unless pressed to do so, with little success. The situation 
was still patchy by the early twentieth century. In giving evidence to the 1904 Norfolk 
Committee, Lord Raglan, commanding the Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers 
(Militia), stated that there was little effort towards tackling desertion from the local 
police; in fact, only three per cent RI WKH UHJLPHQW¶V GHVHUWHUV RYHU D WHQ \HDU SHULRG
were apprehended by police. Yet the issue of police compliance varied even in 
neighbouring counties. Lord Raglan subsequently stated that in Staffordshire there was 
less absence without leave because the county constabulary took the issue far more 
seriously than in Monmouthshire.49  
Although desertion was consistently the most common serious disciplinary issue 
facing the militia across the period, it was closely followed by the all too often riotous 
behaviour of militiamen while assembled. This was particularly problematic during the 
Crimean War and Indian Mutiny. In early 1855 there was widespread discontent among 
many units over the decision ± a promise Earl Grey had extracted from the Duke of 
Newcastle ± to allow those men enlisted prior to the embodiment to be discharged upon 
completion of 56 days service, this being the maximum statutory length permitted for the 
DQQXDO WUDLQLQJ $OWKRXJK HYHQWXDOO\ 1HZFDVWOH¶V µDFW RI JUDFH¶ SHUPLWWHG VXFK PHQ WR
take their discharge (despite being offered a £1 if they stayed), the initial confusion in 
addition to the anger from those later enlisted DQGWKXVH[FOXGHGIURPWKHµDFWRIJUDFH¶
led to ZLGHVSUHDG GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQ LQ VHYHUDO XQLWV DQG QHDU PXWLQLHV LQ µDW OHDVW QLQH
UHJLPHQWV¶50 For instance, on the morning of 28 March 1855, a total of 260 men serving 
in the 2nd Royal Surrey Regiment refused to be re-enlisted. After being discharged, the 
majority headed straight to several public houses in the immediate vicinity. However, a 
War Office circular received the same day required them to attend the afternoon drill 
before their discharge could be permitted. Unsurprisingly the heavily inebriated men 
turned upon the officers and men (and several civilians) sent to return them to barracks. 
In the end it took 34 of the remaining militiamen to force them back into the drill field at 
bayonet point before the station was brought under control.51  
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Riotous behaviour was also present in regiments stationed aboard during the 
Crimean War. Those based in the Mediterranean during the 1850s came into conflict with 
each other and members of the local populace on several occasions. Four of the regiments 
stationed on Corfu were involved in a brawl after members of the 3rd Middlesex 
Regiment verbally insulted men from the Berkshire, Oxfordshire and Wiltshire 
Regiments (perhaps owing to the fact that the latter three regiments recruited 
predominantly from rural areas; the 3rd Middlesex Regiment recruited within London). 
7KLVFRQIURQWDWLRQOHGWRDµIUHHILJKW¶EHWZHHQWKHWZRJURXSVDIWHUZDUGVQHFHVVLWDWLQJD
court of inquiry. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the regimental history of the Oxfordshire 
Regiment insisted they were not involved, quoting the praise offered by the general 
officer commanding towards the regiment in keeping out of the fray, again illustrating 
how such histories attempted to show the regiment in the best light possible. There was 
also evidence of tension between militiamen and the local populace which, in the case of 
the Wiltshire Regiment, saw a militiaman murdered due to growing hostility (one of the 
many hardships faced by militiamen serving upon the Ionian Islands, explored further in 
&KDSWHU  $FFRUGLQJ WR DQ RIILFHU RI WKH VW .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 6WDIIRUGVKLUH 5HJLPHQW
similar growing antipathy between militiamen and the local populace almost turned to 
violence while stationed on Cephalonia.52 
Despite the specific causes behind the rioting of time expired men, one point is 
clear: riotous behaviour most often resulted from prolonged access to alcohol. When 
combined with the monotonous nature of lengthy embodied service and tensions with 
local civilians, the possibility of riotous disorder was always high. In July 1854 a 
confrontation in a Deptford pub between members of the Lancashire Regiment and a host 
of Irish labourers turned into an all night brawl after several of the militiamen proceeded 
to attack the latter with their bayonets. That November, the commanding officer of the 
Royal Monmouthshire Light Infantry, Colonel H.M. Clifford, lamented how drunkenness 
was rife while the regiment was stationed at Newport. Elsewhere, in May 1856, members 
of the 3rd West York Regiment were attacked after an initial confrontation between 
several militiaman and local civilians, after which the remainder of the regiment were 
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forced back to barracks by the crowd, all the while being pelted with stones.53 
Drunkenness also meant initially isolated quarrels had a tendency to spiral into violent 
riots as militiamen (even if not involved directly) frequently intervened to assist their 
FRPUDGHV)RULQVWDQFHRQWKHHYHQLQJRIWKH-DQXDU\PHPEHUVRIWKHVW.LQJ¶V
Own) Staffordshire Regiment, stationed at Edinburgh Castle, were involved in a drunken 
brawl with local civilians. In turn, the men of the picket sent to retrieve their comrades 
were themselves involved in another fight, this time with two civilians and a policeman, 
the latter of whom was stabbed. The previous weekend, similar scenes erupted in Dublin 
when members of the Shropshire Regiment, alongside men from the Grenadier Guards, 
fought against regulars from the 30th and 50th Regiments on three separate days, all 
originated from a drunken quarrel in a local public house (and causing much damage to 
property in the surrounding streets).54 Such disturbances were not just limited to the 
newly reconstituted force, although instances of riotous behaviour do appear to have 
occurred less frequently by the end of the century. During the South African War 
members of a local regiment stationed in Birmingham were involved in a drunken brawl 
with civilians which saw one man unconscious and six others injured.55  
More worryingly was the alarming regularity that relatively small instances of 
drunken and boisterous behaviour escalated into full blown riots, some involving 
hundreds of militiamen at a time, and many of which the police and pickets struggled to 
control. At Warwick, in 1866, an initially minor quarrel between two militiamen of the 
1st Warwickshire Regiment and a group of gypsies escalated into an armed street brawl 
in which many were seriously injured, one individual surrounded and almost kicked to 
death by a group of up to 20 militiamen. Despite this, no militiaman faced prosecution for 
their part in the riot due, most likely, to the fact that their victims were gypsies as 
opposed to members of the local population.56 It was no coincidence that some of the 
worst examples of rioting usually occurred when militiamen received their bounty which 
was often spent on drink in local public houses. For instance, a particularly serious 
incident occurred on such an occasion at Penicuik, Edinburgh, garrison of the 3rd Royal 
Scots Regiment in July 1881. A fight between the men spiralled into what was described 
as a battle with the few local policemen, and local townspeople, totalling approximately 
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400 individuals. After a series of serious and unprovoked attacks upon civilians, the mob 
forced the militiamen to retreat to the barracks with a full blown rush upon the host only 
prevented by the fixed bayonets of a hastily assembled picket. Similar scenes in Lanark 
upon the disembodiment of the local regiment, in June 1860, saw a drunken mob break 
out into a series of brawls after which 200 of the regiment chased and attacked two of the 
UHJLPHQW¶VVHUJHDQWV57  
A further factor in exacerbating riotous behaviour (already seen in many of the 
examples seen so far) was the often fractious relationship between militiamen and the 
police. In one instance, members of the Berkshire Regiment confronted the police at the 
Reading Races after it was claimed the authorities had interfered with their gambling. In 
other cases resistance against the police was more organised. For instance, members of 
the Northumberland Light Infantry appropriated the grievances of locals during their 
1866 annual training at Alnwick (despite the fact few recruits came from the town) as a 
result of the physical mistreatment of a young tobacconist by the arresting officer. 
Members of the regiment armed with fire pokers, belts and bayonets as weapons, planned 
and carried out a series of violent attacks against police officers resulting in their gaining 
complete control of the town for around three hours. To their credit the men did not 
attack any local persons or property, confirming that this was far from an arbitrary act of 
violence. The response of the commanding officer illustrated the limited means at his 
disposal to punish mass acts of civil disobedience and the difficulty of identifying those 
involved: he simply stated on parade that anybody involved in any subsequent disorder 
would face the withdrawal of their pay and upon disassembly would be handed to the 
police.58    
Many more of these disturbances took place while regiments were stationed at the 
large military camps or when placed into barracks in close proximity to other units. 
Indeed, quartering regulars and militiamen together provided the tinder for antagonism 
between the two (as in the case with the Shropshire Regiment serving in Dublin, seen 
above). In May 1856 several regiments were involved in a fracas with regular soldiers 
stationed at Colchester, but most notably between the Essex Rifles and the 88th 
Regiment, after it was alleged regular soldiers taunted their militia counterparts. Further 
disturbances between both regiments followed including a bloody street fight, while there 
were also reports of minor skirmishes involving other militia regiments. Elsewhere, a 
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particularly serious instance saw one militiaman killed when members of the 24th 
5HJLPHQW DQG QG .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 6WDIIRUGVKLUH /LJKW ,QIDQWU\ FDPH WR EORZV RQ
Christmas Day 1859 while quartered together. After a drunken squabble escalated into a 
fight between parties of the two regiments (armed with broom handles and other blunt 
instruments), some members of the former gathered their rifles and shot dead a 
militiaman while seriously wounding three others. Later, in May 1861, members of the 
Denbighshire Regiment, stationed at Wrexham, broke out into a riot after the band of the 
/LYHUSRRO9ROXQWHHUVSOD\HG WKH WXQH µ%DWWOHRI WKH%R\QH¶DVD VOLJKWDJDLQVW&DWKROLF
members of the regiment.59 As brigading regiments together for the annual training 
became increasingly frequent after the 1870s, inter-regimental feuds were no longer 
predominantly a feature of embodied service. In June 1875, for instance, the 14th and 
18th Regiments fought with members of the 3rd Middlesex Regiment while encamped at 
Aldershot. As a result four men were seriously wounded while many others required 
minor medical care. Likewise large groups from the Royal London and Derby Regiments 
almost came to blows, in June 1885, after the former insulted the latter with offensive 
names.60 During the South African War, in July 1900, men from the 3rd Gloucestershire 
Regiment and 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers, stationed at Bulford Camp in Wiltshire, came to 
blows when members of the latter taunted the former over the surrender of their regular 
battalions at NicholsRQ¶V1HN+RVWLOLWLHVFDPHWRDKHDGWKHIROORZLQJGD\ZKHQVHYHUDO
IXVLOLHUV DORQJVLGH PHQ IURP RWKHU ,ULVK UHJLPHQWV DWWDFNHG WKH *ORXFHVWHU¶V FDPS
armed with knives and various other weapons. Elsewhere, in April 1900, some of the 
worst instances of inter-unit relations occurred among regiments stationed at Portsmouth, 
often involving Irish units. For instance, a mass brawl involving 100 or more militiamen 
and regulars resulted in the serious injury of two militiamen after they were stabbed with 
bayonets. As a result punishments ranging from ten to 90 days imprisonment were given 
to those involved.61  
Indiscipline was also encouraged due to the practice of billeting militiamen upon 
public houses and licensed victuallers during annual training and in periods of 
embodiment. Although from the 1880s the tendency was to camp militiamen if they 
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could not be provided with sufficient barrack space, for the first three decades after 
reconstitution the military authorities were fully aware that a lack of permanent barrack 
accommodation (or space at military camps) meant it was somewhat of a necessary evil.62 
Compared to the sheltered surroundings of the barrack house or large military camps, 
where it was relatively easy to supervise the men, the disperse nature of billets meant it 
was practically impossible for NCOs to ensure militiamen were effectively supervised at 
night. Even though the sergeants were expected to ensure every militiaman was in their 
billets no later than 11pm, there was little to stop them from leaving afterwards, while it 
was also far too easy for men to avoid pickets despatched to ensure the men were not 
loitering in the streets. For instance, during the annual training for 1869 of the 1st Royal 
Lancashire Regiment in Lancaster, the superintendant of police remarked that, on 
6DWXUGD\VWKHUHZHUHµXVXDOO\DWOHDVWDKXQGUHG0LOLWLDPHQWREHVHHQDERXWWKHWRZQWKH
JUHDWHU SDUW RI WKH QLJKW¶ 6LPLODUO\ LQ WKH VDPH \HDU RQH ILVKHUPDQ IURP +DUWOHSRRO
where the Royal Durham Artillery were undertaking their annual training, informed the 
authorities that it was not uncommon for them to find drunk militiamen asleep in their 
boats each morning during the training period. In another instance, only five militiamen 
during a random late night inspection were found to be in their billets, the majority of the 
UHPDLQGHU VSUHDG WKURXJKRXW WKH µORZHVW EDUV LQ WKH WRZQ¶ VWLOO FODG LQ XQLIRUP 7KH
prevalence of drunkenness in billeted units was all too clear when the War Office, 
comparing four regiments records, found that when billeted the recorded rate of 
drunkenness was four and a half times higher compared to when they were previously 
stationed in barracks during the previous embodiment (although they recognised this may 
have also be partially due to the greater discipline found in units that had been embodied 
for a lengthy period).63 It was for this reason that, in 1877, Major St. Aubyn, of the 
Cornwall Rangers, noted his relief that his regiment were relocated to a camp after 
having been consistently billeted, much to the improvement of their discipline and 
sobriety.64  
The poor behaviour of billeted militiamen prompted frequent attempts by local 
people to lobby the government to provide alternative accommodation for what were 
perceived as problem units. In Pontefract local people petitioned for the removal of the 
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West Yorkshire Rifles owing to their frequent drunken and anti-social behaviour. 
Nevertheless, the presentation of the petition to the local MP only exacerbated such 
disturbances as some members of the regiment threatened to damage the property of the 
signatories, leading to an attack on the property of the local mayor and several arrests for 
similar damage throughout the town. In Brighton the town council pleaded with Lord 
Panmure to remove the locally billeted regiment due to their persistent drunken behaviour 
and the corruptive effect upon not just the local population, but also on themselves. Later, 
the town clerk of Newport, Thomas Woullett, pleaded with the Lord Lieutenant of 
Monmouthshire, Lord Llanover, for members of the Royal Monmouthshire Light Infantry 
to be placed into barracks so as to avoid the disciplinary problems associated with 
billeting them in public houses, a request which was later rejected due to its cost to the 
War Office. The same year the Mayor Aldermen and Burgesses of Kingston upon 
7KDPHVSHWLWLRQHG WKH+RPH6HFUHWDU\ IRU WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQRI µSURSHUEDUUDFNV¶ ZKLFK
would ensure men of the 3rd Royal Surrey Regiment, many of whom were young and 
recruited from Lambeth and Bermondsey, were properly supervised so as to prevent the 
DOPRVW GDLO\ RFFXUUHQFHV RI µYLROHQFH DQG ODZOHVVQHVV¶ ZKLFK DFFRPSDQLHG WKHP ,Q
Lancaster the poor behaviour of men from the 1st Royal Lancashire Regiments (detailed 
above) eventually prompted, in 1874, members of the local association of licensed 
victuallers to request an alteration to the law which would see regiments encamped as 
opposed to billeted. Similar concerns were aired at the annual dinner for the association 
representing Loughborough65  
Those upon whom the difficulties of billeting militiamen were most apparent 
often faced little chance of meeting the expectations of the units which they were 
required by law to host, with little chance of escaping the obligation to do so. In one 
instance, in March 1855, the Quartermaster-Sergeant of the West Essex Regiment applied 
for a summons against a landlady for failing to provide four officers with single rooms 
(owing to their being embodied and thus eligible for the same rights as regulars). The 
case was eventualO\ WKURZQ RXW E\ WKH PDJLVWUDWHV DPRQJ ZKLFK VDW WKH UHJLPHQW¶V
Colonel); yet the cheers which sounded throughout the court hinted at the tension the 
issue of billeting could cause within local communities. Similarly, in May 1854, a 
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landlady from Leicester was fined 40s when a property managed by her son was deemed 
QRWILWIRUSXUSRVHGHIDXOWXSRQZKLFKZRXOGKDYHPHDQWRQHPRQWK¶VLPSULVRQPHQW66 
Some landlords attempted to avoid billeting by claiming circumstantial or legal reasons 
as to why they were not liable. For instance, one landlord was fined £2 and costs (albeit 
the lowest amount possible) after refusing to continue to provide accommodation for four 
PLOLWLDPHQRQDFFRXQWRIKLVZLIH¶VLOOKHDOWKDQGWKHFODLPthat they had cheated him out 
of his payment. Elsewhere, an innkeeper offered to pay a fine in lieu of billeting the men 
and horses of the Tower Hamlets Regiment during the Crimean War. Legal precedent 
settled the case through citing that of a similar incident from 1843.67 There were also 
complaints that the billeting system was far from uniformly implemented across 
Scotland. For instance, in Glasgow houses of £3 rental were liable to receive one or two 
militiamen, while elsewhere only houses of £5 rental were liable. There was no 
supervision of the individuals that parcelled out billets, and claims that certain areas 
received favouritism, or conversely were unfairly targeted. Furthermore, there were 
complaints from Paisley stated that only 10,000 of the 60,000 residents were liable to 
provide billets.68 
Initially the disciplinary issues associated with billeting militiamen were a 
particularly sore issue in Scotland as, unlike elsewhere in the UK, soldiers were liable to 
be billeted upon private householders instead of public houses and other licensed 
victuallers. This legislative quirk arose simply due to the fact that prior to the Act of 
Union in 1707 separate legislation had required private houses to provide billets, and 
when, in the following year, the provision of the Mutiny Act was extended to Scotland, a 
clause ensured that the existing laws governing the practice remained in force. It was 
only in 1857 when the practice was banned through the alteration of the Mutiny Act to 
ensure Scotland came into line with the rest of UK.69 Despite this, during the Crimean 
War the system caused a great deal of tension between Scottish communities and the 
militia. In Parliament particular attention was drawn to the situation in Dalkeith by the 
Duke of Buccleuch, the Lord Lieutenant of Midlothian, when approximately 400 men of 
the Edinburgh County Regiment were billeted upon the town. Residents¶ initial fears over 
WKHLUFRQGXFWDSSHDUHGWREHFRQILUPHGRQHUHVLGHQWGHVFULELQJWRDORFDO03µVFHQHVRI
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GUXQNHQQHVVDQGEODVSKHP\¶DVDUHVXOW$IWHUDORQJFDPSDLJn ± this included a series of 
veiled threats that, if necessary, the townspeople would, despite their legal obligation, 
simply refuse to billet the men any further ± to remove the regiment, eventually a 
petition, signed by 513 of the townspeople, was delivered to Buccleuch himself, and in 
November plans were put in place to move as many men as possible into Edinburgh 
Castle. Similar concerns were aired by the residents of Dumfries in October 1855, from 
which part of the regiment were forced to relocate, three companies subsequently billeted 
to outlaying local towns. In Dundee 670 locals signed a petition calling for the end of the 
billeting system, presenting it to their local MP for consideration. Sir James Anderson, 
MP for Stirling Bridge, complained to the House of Commons that members of the 
Stirlingshire Regiment had been billeted upon householders to much disquiet, despite the 
barracks at Stirling Castle remaining largely empty.70  
Yet living conditions for the militiamen could also be difficult whilst billeted and 
hardly conductive to maintaining discipline. In 1855 one private of the Somerset 
Regiment noted that, in his billet, up to three men were forced to sleep in a bed at any one 
time, while many other militiamen were quartered in lodgings that were frequently 
visited by prostitutes. Later, in 1869, the War Office found that in a sample of units, on 
average, the space afforded to each billeted militiaman was less than that considered 
necessary in barracks, or even the workhouse, with nearly every man forced to sleep two 
to a bed. For instance, in Lanark, in one room housing six militiamen, each man had less 
than 150 cubic feet of space each, the minimum accepted amount for a barrack room 
being around 600, or in the workhouse between 300 and 500 cubic feet. It was also all too 
common for militiamen to be quartered in what amounted to little more than brothels, 
such being the case in Durham, Hartlepool and Lancaster in 1869. There is also evidence 
to suggest that, as a result of many militiamen being quartered in (or in close proximity 
to) brothels, and in Scotland with families or single women, promiscuous sexual 
behaviour was rife. There is even evidence to suggest that rates of illegitimate child birth 
matched the times that militiamen were billeted in certain towns. For instance, in Lanark 
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 NRS, GD224/192/9, Miscellaneous militia correspondence, 1854-1855, letter from Buccleuch to Lord 
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the rate of illegitimate births in the first six months of 1868 was one in seven, whereas 
prior to this, in the corresponding months of 1859, a year in which the local regiment was 
embodied permanently away from the town, the rate was just one in 14. By comparison, 
the rate in Rutherglen, a larger town in the same county, but with no associated militia 
unit, the rate was just one in 25.71  
 
* * * 
 
Maintaining discipline in what was, when disembodied, a part-time amateur force proved 
a constant challenge right across the period. Brought increasingly under the remit of 
military law from 1757 onwards, and reconfirmed by the Militia Act of 1852, militiamen 
were under the remit of military law whenever embodied or assembled for annual 
training. Although technically exempted from DQ\ SXQLVKPHQW WR µOLIH RU OLPE¶ WKH
controversy over the application of flogging, albeit in only a few of cases, highlighted the 
concerns at how amateur soldiers were to be treated. When embodied, discipline was 
maintained through a combination of courts-martial and a system of minor punishments, 
much the same as in the regular army. However, when disembodied, it was far more 
common for serious disciplinary offences, most commonly desertion, to be dealt with 
summarily by magistrates, courts-martial only being convened for the most serious of 
military crimes. Serious civil crimes such as murder were already dealt with via the civil 
courts.  One pattern that did emerge was that the frequency of courts-martial increased 
towards the end of the period, most likely due to serious cases of desertion being more 
commonly dealt with in such a manner (opposing a general trend within the regular army 
for a lesser reliance upon courts-martial towards the end of the century). Furthermore, the 
number of disciplinary cases, as a whole, fell across the period, in keeping with a wider 
trend of improving discipline within the regular army and the move towards wider reform 
of the penal system. However, this did not prevent the harsh realities of active service 
during the South African War, the first time that it was liable to the full weight of military 
law, from causing several units to struggle in maintaining discipline, usually in cases 
relating to drunkenness. Despite the disciplinary difficulties experienced on active 
service, arguably the most common disciplinary issue for the militia as a whole remained 
desertion. This was particularly problematic during the embodiments of the 1850s and 
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although, in subsequent years, the government was able to curb its worst excesses, it 
remained an ever present concern. Urban units reliant on migratory semi-employed 
labourers, with no fixed address, were particularly affected due to the ease with which 
their men could avoid detection or fraudulently enlist into other regiments. Permanent 
emigration and, in coastal counties, temporary absence at sea also prevented many 
militiamen from attending their training, even if they had no intention of deserting. 
Furthermore, there were also concerns that desertion and fraudulent enlistment were 
difficult to combat due to the inexperience, and in many cases indifference, of local 
constabularies towards tracking down absentees. Another major disciplinary concern was 
the frequent instances of major disturbances and riots, usually resulting from bouts of 
excessive drinking, made worse by the periodic payment of their bounty and often 
exacerbated by a shared sense of solidarity among militiamen against any external 
threats, be that other regiments, the public or police. This was only compounded by the 
necessity to continue to billet regiments across the period, something which created a 
high degree of animosity between the militia and local people to the extent that many 


















     
 183 
5. Embodied Service and the South African War 
 
Unlike the other auxiliary forces, our understanding of the wartime experience of the 
embodied militia remains incomplete. Much of the existing historiography has simply 
JHQHUDOLVHG WKH PLOLWLD¶V UROH ZLWK YHU\ OLWWOH DFFRXQW RI WKH GD\-to-day experience of 
embodied service in either the Crimean War or Indian Mutiny, or later during the South 
African War. Works by Olive Anderson, Hew Strachan and Edward Spiers have 
considered the debate over the wider military function of the force during the 1850s, but 
fail to investigate the nature or experience of embodied service in any great detail. 
Contemporary regimental histories and other works do provide more details, although 
they largely fail to put the experience of individual units into a wider context.1 Ian 
%HFNHWWKDVJRQHVRPHZD\WRUHFWLI\LQJWKLVDUJXLQJWKDWWKHPLOLWLD¶VSULPDU\UROHZDV
to take over garrison duties within the UK, aside from also providing a direct source of 
manpower for the regular army. He also details how some units served in the 
Mediterranean.2 By comparison, there is a greater degree of scholarship regarding the 
PLOLWLD¶V H[SHULHQFH LQ WKH 6RXWK $IULFDQ :DU 7KH VHYHQ YROXPH KLVtory of the South 
African War by Leo Amery mentions the process by which the militia were embodied as 
well as some of their subsequent movements while in South Africa, but omits any 
discussion of the day-to-day experience of service.3 Later, Colonel John K. Dunlop stated 
that most militia units serving in South Africa were used for garrison work although some 
formed part of the flying columns used in the latter stages of the war. He argued that this 
ZDV WKHIRUFHZDVFDSDEOHRIXQGHUWDNLQJGXH WREHLQJD µD FROOHFWLRQRIXQLWV¶ UDQJLQJ
wildly in efficiency and not capable of taking the field as a unified force; indeed he 
argued that the militia reserve was the only part of the force which could hope to match 
regulars in anywhere near their levels of efficiency.4 More recently Stephen Miller has 
explored the service of citizen soldiers serving in South Africa, although he does so with 
very little discussion of the militia; much of his supporting evidence instead was based 
upon sources regarding the yeomanry.5  
 There is clearly room for a more comprehensive examination of the service of the 
                                                 
1
 Hay, Constitutional Force. 
2
 Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW-Time Soldiers, pp. 152-5. 
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 L. S. Amery, The Times history of the war in South Africa: 1899-1902., vols. I-VII, (London: Sampson 
Low, Marston and Company, Ltd., 1899±1909). 
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5
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embodied militia. As already argued in Chapter 1, upon its reconstitution the militia was 
primarily organised for home defence. Yet when the majority of regiments were 
embodied in 1854 and 1855, after the outbreak of the Crimean War, there was no credible 
threat of invasion. Instead, the primary motive behind the embodiment was the need to 
find additional manpower for the regular army. Most commanding officers complied with 
this liability, some more enthusiastically than others, with few refusing to do so outright. 
However, the embodied militia also had the more practical role of replacing regular units 
stationed in domestic garrisons to enable them to serve abroad. Many militia units also 
volunteered for active duties abroad, ten units doing so in the Mediterranean during the 
Crimean War. Yet for the vast majority of militiamen undertaking domestic duties the 
experience of embodied service was far more mundane, consisting of parade and drill 
upon the barrack square not dissimilar to their disembodied training. Some units were 
camped at the major military stations (such as at Aldershot) or in regular barracks, 
although many remained billeted in local towns (contributing to some of the difficulties 
identified in Chapter 4).  
%\ FRPSDULVRQ WKH PLOLWLD¶V UROH GXULQJ WKH 6RXWK $IULFDQ :DU ZDV
unprecedented. Although initially the government intended to use the militia as garrison 
troops much in the same way as during the 1850s, the scale of the defeats suffered during 
µ%ODFN:HHN¶PHDQWWKH\KDGOLWWOHFKRLFHEXWWRXVHWKHPLOLWLDDVDQDGGLWLRQDOVRXUFHRI
discrete units (and drafts) for service abroad. In the end over 65,000 officers and men 
served abroad in some form, most as part of discrete units (under the command of their 
own officers) garrisoning lines of communication and stations dotted right across South 
Africa. Although this was designed to avoid most militia units having any major role in 
the fighting (a reason perhaps why their service has been largely ignored by historians ± 
by comparison, the other auxiliaries were more involved in active operations), the 
fragmented and increasingly mobile nature of the conflict meant militia units played a 
more active role than has previously been acknowledged. Several units came into direct 
contact with the enemy: although only a few were used in any major active operations, 
many units experienced intermittent skirmishes with Boer commandoes, a consequence 
of so many militiamen serving on the extensive lines of communication crossing the 
veldt, while some trained and detached mounted infantry to serve as part of Lord 
.LWFKHQHU¶VIO\LQJFROXPQV*DUULVRQGXWLHVDWLVRODWHGVWDWLRQVPHDQWHYHU\GD\OLIHFRXOG
be tough, although most were able to bear the strain; some units did so for considerable 
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periods. By contrast, for those serving in units at home (or in the Mediterranean 
garrisons), the embodiment was in many ways similar to those of the 1850s. Once again 
they acted as garrison troops, several units serving in Ireland and a few in the Channel 
Islands, some again sent to relieve regular garrisons in the Mediterranean. However, 
compared to the 1850s, many more were able to take advantage of more comprehensive 
training arrangements (as seen in Chapter 1 during disembodied periods) which meant 
there was a greater focus upon field exercises simulating defensive duties against 
invasion and raiding, despite their being little credible threat of such. There was also far 
less of a need to billet militiamen, many instead serving at military camps. 
 
* * * 
 
When reconstituted in 1852 the militia was a force designed primarily for home defence, 
a decision (explored in chapter one) borne against a backdrop of public and governmental 
paranoia over the threat of French invasion. Yet in March 1854 Britain stood alongside 
France in a war which would challenge this UDLVRQG¶rWUH. The Crimean War exposed the 
fact that the regular army was ill prepared for a continental war, predisposed as it was for 
the maintenance of colonial garrisons. Combined with rural depopulation and widespread 
immigration from Scotland and, particularly, Ireland, the government struggled to find 
WKHLQLWLDOPHQUHTXLUHGIRU/RUG5DJODQ¶VDUP\6 It is therefore unsurprising that 
by the end of April the government were already considering the embodiment of some 
English and Welsh militia units as a means of allowing regular units to serve abroad, 
despite the fact that there was no credible threat of Russian invasion and thus technically 
no legal basis upon which to do so. To circumvent this, Viscount Palmerston, the Home 
Secretary, argued that commercial ports were vulnerable to small-scale raiding parties 
despite there being no clear invasion threat. Therefore, he suggested that the militia 
should be embodied in order to support additional coastal artillery batteries, a measure 
which would be more than adequate to mop up any potential landing parties; indeed, it 
was this decision which led towards the creation of 22 militia garrison artillery corps for 
such a purpose by 1856.7 By acknowledging the remote possibility of coastal raiding, the 
government was able to take a loose interpretation of the existing legislation which 
permitted the embodiment of the militia when the country was threatened with invasion. 
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In May the matter was settled by new legislation (17 and 18 Vict. c. 13) authorising the 
embodiment of the militia whenever a state of war existed.  
Reaction from the militia colonels was generally supportive, although there were 
some concerns. For instance, the commanding officers of the 3rd Royal Surrey, 
Oxfordshire and Sussex Regiments all informed Herbert of their willingness to serve 
wherever required. Similarly, the colonel of the West Essex Regiment felt it a slight on 
the honour of his regiment that the East Essex Rifles had been selected for embodiment 
over his own. By contrast, the colonel of the 3rd West Yorkshire Regiment complained 
WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DVVXPSWLRQ RI KLV UHJLPHQW¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR VHUYH ZDV PHUHO\
implied, while another stated that many of his officers were against permanent 
embodiment owing to the impact upon those engaged in a profession.8 By the end of the 
month seven infantry battalions had been embodied, with a further four in June, three in 
July and four in August, taking over garrison duties from regular units sent to the Crimea. 
Nevertheless, for the majority, including Scottish and Irish regiments which remained in 
a state of suspended animation, the first few months of the war were largely 
indistinguishable from peacetime.9  
It soon became clear that the embodiment of a few militia regiments was 
insufficient to arrest the growing demands for manpower placed upon the regular army. 
Therefore, both Palmerston and Sidney Herbert, the Secretary at War, began to consider 
the embodiment of all English and Welsh regiments despite the fact that there remained 
no credible threat of invasion. They acknowledged that there was insufficient barrack 
accommodation to house the majority of units and that they would be forced to resort to 
the contentious practice of placing men into billets. Yet by November it was clear the 
government were less concerned with what the force could do at home and rather how it 
could be used as an immediate source of recruits for the army. Previously, in March, the 
government dropped the requirement that militiamen discharged prematurely had to 
repay their 10s enrolment bounty and 8s 6d for additional expenses while also procuring 
a substitute to serve in their place, and in April they offered an additional 10s in order to 
make sure no man was at a financial loss if he chose to terminate his enlistment and opt 
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to transfer. Although these measures provided an initial boost to the number transferring 
± 5,703 men transferred by November, despite Herbert¶V DFNQRZOHGJHPHQW more 
probably fraudulently enlisted ± the fact that the burden fell predominantly upon the 
eighteen regiments embodied in the summer meant the rate at which men were 
transferring fell sharply. Therefore, in November, Herbert stated his intention to embody 
the remainder of the force, a decision founded upon the belief that embodied service 
enthused militiamen with martial spirit and made them more likely to enlist for regular 
service. It was also for this reason that the government opted to reconstitute Scottish and 
Irish units as a further means of expanding the available manpower pool. In the same 
month, Herbert issued a further circular authorising that all embodied regiments (except 
those serving abroad) would be required to provide up to 25 per cent of their established 
strength towards the regular army; disembodied regiments were allowed to also permit 
volunteers but were not required to meet this target. To encourage this, the government 
provided the further incentive of an additional £1 on top of the regular recruitment bounty 
and offered each regiment the chance to nominate an officer for a regular ensigncy for 
every 75 men contributed to the army. Furthermore, the circular proposed to give priority 
to regular recruiting parties from regiments with a similar county connection so long as it 
was destined for service in the Crimea, although ultimately militiamen were free to join 
any regiment they pleased so long as they met the basic medical requirements; the 
guards, however, were permitted to recruit nationally due to their more stringent entry 
requirements.10  
As a result of the November circular there was a significant increase in the proportion of 
militiamen transferring to the regular army. Table 5.1 demonstrates that between the date 
of the circular and the end of 1856 29,944 militiamen transferred in addition to the 5,703 
which did so prior to the circular (although the majority before December 1855). 
Proportionally both Scottish and Irish regiments provided a higher proportion of their 
respective strength due largely to the fact that prior to the November circular the vast 
majority of volunteers came from English and Welsh regiments. On the whole the 
commanding officers of most militia regiments accepted the need for their regiments to 
yield to the needs of the regular army, although that is not to say all were happy about 
losing such a high proportion of their men. During the Indian Mutiny the militia was  
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November 1854;  HL Deb., 21 December 1854, vol. 136, cc. 685-732, (cc. 689-90). 
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Table 5.1: Volunteers from the Militia to the Regular Army during the Crimean War and 




Prior to 20 November 1854 20 November 1854 to 31 December 1855 




Strength Transferred Percentage 
Effective 
Strength Transferred Percentage 
Effective 
Strength Transferred Percentage 
England 
& Wales 55,520 5,703 10.3 55,520 13,538 24.4 59,200 3,963 6.7 23,204 
Scotland « « « 7,260 2,306 31.8 10,132 697 6.9 3,003 
Ireland « « « 20,780 6,084 29.3 29,612 3,356 11.3 9,440 
Total 55,520 5,703 10.3 83,560 21,928 26.2 98,944 8,016 8.1 35,647 
Indian Mutiny 
 1858 1859 to 1861 
Total 
 
First Quota Second Quota Third Quota Total 
Transferred 
 
Quota Transferred Quota Transferred Quota Transferred Quota Transferred 
England 
& Wales 3,460 3,320 1,275 924 1,700 672 6,435 4,916 1,745 6,661 
Scotland 426 423 223 87 300 50 949 560 270 830 
Ireland 1,367 1,561 825 451 1,100 184 3,292 2,196 1,100 3,296 
Total 5,253 5,304 2,323 1,462 3,100 906 10,676 7,672 3,115 10,787 
 
again called upon as a source of manpower, temporary enabling legislation passed in 
December 1857 permitting such, although the fact that fewer regiments were embodied 
meant far less men transferred than previously, the vast majority in the first full year of 
the embodiment. 
The proportion of men transferring to the line varied between units and was often 
dependent upon the willingness of the commanding officer. Although most commanding 
officers facilitated the transfer of willing volunteers, some quite willingly, there was a 
natural desire to send no more than they were required for fears that unchecked recruiting 
would significantly damage the efficiency of their regiments. The officer commanding 
the Oxfordshire Regiment, Colonel Bowles, was more than happy to place the needs of 
his own regiment in subservience to the regulars, providing 357 men by the end of 1855 
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 PP, Militia. Return of number of volunteers, 235, (1854-55); PP, Militia volunteers. Return showing, by 
regiments, the number of militia volunteers released from their militia engagement to serve in the regular 
forces of Her Majesty (including the Royal Marines), between 1 January 1854 and 31 March 1861, 
showing also the quota of each regiment., 435, (1861).  
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and a further 341 between 1858 and 1860. Several other officers demonstrated that they 
were happy to co-operate including those commanding the West Essex, 2nd Somerset, 1st 
Royal Lanark, 1st Royal Lancashire and Royal Wiltshire Regiments, contributing 476, 
628, 419, 347 and 465 men respectively during the Crimean War. One officer, Earl 
Fitzhardinge, commanding the South Gloucestershire Regiment, even went as far as to 
initially offer 10s to the first 100 men volunteering in addition to the recruitment bounty, 
an offer which was also matched in the North Gloucestershire Regiment.12 Nonetheless, 
some officers expressed a level of dissatisfaction at the arrangement, even if they felt 
little choice but to allow men to transfer. During the Crimean War the Royal 
Monmouthshire Light Infantry lost 473 men to the regular army, the officer commanding, 
Colonel H.M. Clifford, having willingly pledged to co-operate. Despite this, he resisted 
calls to allow regular recruiting parties to directly recruit where his regiment was 
stationed for fear of demoralising his own men. By December 1855 the 1st Staffordshire 
Regiment had sent 310 men to the regulars despite the fact that the commanding officer, 
Colonel P. Talbot, was furious at the Adjutant-*HQHUDO¶VVXJJHVWLRQKLVUHJLPHQWVKRXOG
EH SURYLGLQJ HYHQ PRUH +H DOVR EHPRDQHG WKH µVXUUHSWLWLRXV SUDFWLFHV¶ RI D UHJXODU
officer who petitioned him with the names of those who wished to transfer (instructions 
which Talbot claimed came directly from Woolwich). The commanding officer of the 
.LQJ¶V2ZQ7RZHU+DPOHWV/LJKW,QIDQWU\ZKRDOORZHGPHQWRWUDQVIHUDFURVVERWK
embodiments, was clear to ensure that individuals who fraudulently enlisted were 
returned and charged with absence without leave. For instance, in March 1855 he also 
chastised the adjutant of the 94th Foot over the conduct of one of his sergeants who had 
enlisted a man without his leave.13 Some commanding officers took more direct action by 
DFWLYHO\UHVLVWLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHPDQGVIRUPDQSRZHU/RUG&DUULQJWRQ&RORQHORI
the Royal Buckinghamshire Regiment, was overtly hostile to the idea. On one occasion 
he attempted to dissuade his men from transferring by informing them that they would 
not only lose their recruitment bounty (in order to provide their kit), but that they could 
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1855, Capt/ Gray to the Adjutant, 94th Foot, 14 July 1855, and Lt.-Col. Grant to Panmure, 29 September 
1855. 
     
 190 
be shipped to the Crimea as early as the following week. Even though a recruiting 
sergeant for the Grenadier Guards believed he would have been able to secure between 
200 and 300 recruits, Carrington permitted just 21 of his shortest to leave, all of whom 
were under the necessary 5ft 6in to join the Guards.14 
Aside from providing manpower to the regular army, Herbert and Palmerston also 
began to consider the militia as a means of providing further expansion abroad by 
allowing entire regiments to volunteer for foreign service. The decision to permit the 
militia to volunteer for service abroad was not without precedent (explored further in 
Chapter 1) as, during the Napoleonic Wars, a militia brigade was formed for service with 
WKH'XNHRI:HOOLQJWRQ¶VDUP\LQ)UDQFHVHUYLQJWKHUHLQ'HVSLWHWKHUHEHLQJQR
intention to send militiamen to the theatre of war, Herbert was well aware even a limited 
form of foreign service was impossible under the existing legislation ± the Solicitor 
General for England and Wales, Sir Richard Bethell, had already made such clear by 
informing him that any such move would require a further act of Parliament.15 Therefore, 
in December the government acted quickly to introduce legislation, passed on to the 
statute book the following January, which laid the foundation for service abroad. The 
Militia (Service Abroad) Act permitted each regiment to volunteer up to three-quarters of 
its established strength for service in the Mediterranean, the remaining cadre to provide 
for the continued training of recruits. Crucially, it was stressed that the offer was to be 
voluntary, although as an incentive those who volunteered were liable for an initial 
bounty of £2 with an additional £1 for extra necessities, and a total of £5 at a rate of £1 
per year for the length of the engagement, or 5s per quarter. Furthermore, all officers and 
men serving abroad were subject to the Mutiny Act meaning they would for all intents 
and purposes be serving as regular troops.16  
It was not until later that year that the first units began to be despatched abroad, 
although during the war as a whole just ten regiments saw service in the Mediterranean: 
six stationed in the Ionian Islands (the majority on Corfu, but with some detachments on 
Cephalonia and Zante), two on Malta and two at Gibraltar. However, although only ten 
units served abroad, 32 English and Welsh, four Scottish and 12 Irish regiments offered 
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to serve overseas, three of them in the Crimea itself.17 Several militia colonels were keen 
to stress the willingness of their officers and men for such service. For instance, Colonel 
Lord Methuen assured Herbert that the Royal Wiltshire Regiment was eager to undertake 
foreign seUYLFHDQGWKDWKLVPHQµORRNIRUZDUGZLWKJUHDWJOHHWRDQHDUO\RFFXSDWLRQRI
&RUIX¶ DOWKRXJK WKHLU DSSDUHQW ZLOOLQJQHVV QR GRXEW KDG D ORW WR GR ZLWK IDFW WKDW
Methuen personally offered additional financial incentives to cover their travel expenses 
in addition to the government bounty. The Royal Monmouthshire Light Infantry had been 
the first regiment to offer its services abroad in January 1854 and did so again in 1857, 
although both times they were refused despite the fact many desired to proceed to the 
Crimea itself and the fact that the officers had together pledged £5,000 to equip the 
regiment with the necessities for such service. Similarly, the colonel of the 1st Derbyshire 
Regiment was able to successfully persuade his officers and two-thirds of his men to 
volunteer for overseas service after an impassioned speech in which he urged them not to 
UHPDLQµIHDWKHUEHGVROGLHUV¶DOWKRXJKWKHRIIHUZHQWXQKHHGHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW18  
However, the decision as to which regiments should be selected for service 
overseas was based largely on their strength and efficiency, not impassioned pleas from 
their commanding officers. Initially Herbert was clear that he would only consider offers 
IURP WKH HLJKWHHQ UHJLPHQWV HPERGLHG IURP 0D\ WR $XJXVW  ZKR ZHUH µZHll 
DGYDQFHG LQ WKHLU WUDLQLQJ¶ DOWKRXJK IRXU ZHUH ODWHU VHOHFWHG IURP DPRQJ WKRVH ODWHU
embodied.19 Each regiment also tended to be some of the strongest: Table 5.2 shows that 
in June 1855 only the Royal Berkshire Regiment possessed less than 600 men. Also of 
note is that large urban regiments tended to take a smaller proportion of their rank and 
file abroad compared to smaller rural county regiments. For instance, the East Kent 
Regiment provided almost, to a man, the same number as the far larger 1st Lancashire 
Regiment. Furthermore, the decision was also decided by difficulties in recruitment. The 
3rd West Yorkshire Regiment had to withdraw its offer (which had been accepted) after it 
became clear there were insufficient recruits to offset the loss of 310 men who refused to 
be re-attested.20 What appears to have played little effect is the proportion of former 
regular officers whose experience of foreign service might have been valuable for units 
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 PP, Militia. Return of the regiments of militia in the United Kingdom, that volunteered for service abroad 
during the late war, c. 286, (1856); Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW-Time Soldiers, p. 153. 
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 WSHC, 2057/F8/III/B, no, 222, Lord Methuen to Herbert, 17 December 1854; The Morning Chronicle, 
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which had never served outside the UK; Table 5.2 shows that only a small proportion of 
those who proceeded abroad had previously served in the regular army. The Royal 
Wiltshire Regiment, with the greatest proportion, although this still only comprised one-
third of the total; by contrast, the 3rd Royal Middlesex Regiment had none except for an 
individual who had served in the Austrian Army.  
On the whole the experience of these regiments tended to be similar regardless of 
the station. Each regiment was expected to take over the role of the regular one it had 
replaced, with their daily duties predominantly involving drill and manoeuvres upon the 
parade ground and the provision of details for guard and picket duty. In many respects the 
duties of the 1st Staffordshire Regiment were typical in that they initially garrisoned Fort 
Neuf in order to maintain and protect it and its artillery which dominated the local town, 
although they were also charged with guarding sick and wounded men returning from the 
Crimea. Similarly, the Oxfordshire Regiment undertook guard duties; for instance, on the 
 -DQXDU\SURYLGLQJRIILFHUV DQGPHQ IRU WKHGD\¶V JXDUG DQG 1&2VDQG
men for picket duty. One problem, however, was that it was often necessary for 
regiments to be split among garrison outposts, particularly those stationed in the Ionian 
Islands. Shortly before the 1st Staffordshire Regiment was ordered to move to garrison 
Cephalonia in August 1855 a detachment of one captain, one subaltern, two sergeants and 
41 privates proceeded to the island of Ithaca. Once on Cephalonia the remainder of the 
regiment was split, one detachment consisting of a captain, subaltern and 50 men sent to 
Luxuri, while on the same day a subaltern and 30 men were to garrison Fort George. As a 
result of this it became difficult to drill the men in anything larger than companies. On a 
few occasions they would be exercised in brigade, although usually only for the purposes 
of parade. For instance, in October 1855 the East Kent Regiment was twice paraded and 
inspected by the officer commanding the forces on Malta, Lieutenant-General Sir John 
Pennefather, alongside the 51st Foot and the Royal Malta Fencibles.21 For the officers, 
service in the Mediterranean was also similar to that within the UK in that it did not stop 
them from furthering many of their favoured pastimes. The proximity to the Albanian 
coast meant officers stationed on Corfu and the Ionian Islands organised frequent hunting 
expeditions. Furthermore, officers continued to organise balls and entertainment with the 
assistance of their families. In the 5R\DO%HUNVKLUH5HJLPHQWILYHRIWKHRIILFHUV¶ZLYHV 
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Table 5.2: Militia units despatched abroad during the Crimean War.22 
 






Strength of the rank & 




Within UK Abroad Total Ex-
regulars 
Royal Berkshire Corfu  1 Jan. 1855 Aug 1855 10 164 « 25 1 
East Kent Malta 25 May 1854 
March 
1855 15 48 557 27 5 




1855 16 374 558 25 6 
3rd Royal Lancashire Gibraltar Dec. 1854 June 1855 12 191 738 35 3 
3rd Royal Middlesex Corfu  6 Feb. 1855 Aug 1855 10 604 « 28 « 
Northamptonshire Gibraltar 8 July 1854 June 1855 12 56 547 32 4 
Oxfordshire Corfu  6 Dec. 1854 June 1855 12 132 552 25 2 




1855 19 390 543 28 5 
Royal Wiltshire Corfu  15 June 1854 May 1855 17 146 606 31 11 
2nd West Yorkshire Malta 29 May 1854 May 1855 12 126 582 30 6 
 
travelled with the regiment, one of whom organised a ball on New <HDU¶V(YH7KH
following month Lord Methuen similarly entertained officers of the fleet, while two more 
balls were later hosted by the Lord High Commissioner to the Ionian Islands, Sir John 
Young. Sport continued as a means through which to bind both officers and men in 
healthy competition against other regiments. For instance the Royal Berkshire Regiment 
competed in two matches on Corfu in June 1856, one against the officers of the garrison 
and the other against members of the Royal Artillery.23 
Service abroad was, nonetheless, fraught with various difficulties and hardships. 
Although most officers and men proceeded to their stations with relative ease, the journey 
by sea of the Oxfordshire Regiment was far from uneventful due to the capture by pirates 
of a small detachment of officers and ladies forced to land on the Tangiers coast after 
their rowing boast almost capsized in rough seas; they had been given permission to row 
ashore while the main vessel was becalmed. Held hostage for the night, their release was 
only secured the following day after the intervention of the British Consul. When the 
                                                 
22
 Hart, New Army List, July 1855; PP, Militia. Returns showing the strength of each English regiment of 
militia on the 30th day of June last, 520, (1854-55). 
23
 E. Thoyts, History of the Royal Berkshire Militia (Now 3rd  Battalion Royal Berks Regiment), (Reading: 
E. Thoyts, 1897), p. 185; Willan, History of the Oxfordshire Regiment, p. 62; Reading Mercury, 7 June 
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militia eventually reached their garrisons they were immediately faced with often 
cramped conditions in facilities which varied greatly in size and condition. For instance, 
the fortifications on Corfu were on the whole regarded as defective. For instance, Fort 
Neuf, in which numerous regiments were temporarily garrisoned, was in a poor state due 
mainly to insufficient drainage. On Gibraltar an officer of the 3rd Lancashire Regiment 
remarked that there was barely enough room to house the men meaning they were forced 
to share accommodation at separate barracks, his alongside those of the 
Northamptonshire Regiment. This overcrowding affected the officers too: all 27 officers 
had to try and fit into just 18 rooms, the result being that some instead were forced to find 
alternative accommodation in hotels over a mile and a half from the parade ground (a 
major disadvantage considering parade started at 5.30 am every morning). More 
worryingly (and explored further in Chapter 4), militiamen stationed on the Ionian 
Islands also faced the potential threat of insurrection from among the Greek and Albanian 
inhabitants who were more likely to sympathise with the Russians due to their shared 
Orthodox faith. This meant that men of the 1st Staffordshire Regiment enjoyed rather 
tense and hostile relations with the local population. Men of the Royal Wiltshire 
Regiment also frequently clashed with locals; tensions even built to the point that one 
militiaman was murdered.24  
It was common for officers and men to become temporarily ill once they landed 
due to the change in climate and diet. When the Royal Berkshire Regiment landed on 
Corfu several men became ill, due partly to the poisoning from local wine.25 However, 
the greatest threat to both officers and men was cholera. While stationed on Zante the 1st 
Lancashire Regiment lost 40 men to the disease. In Gibraltar the majority of the 3rd 
Lancashire Regiment contracted cholera which in turn led to 25 fatalities. Elsewhere, by 
the autumn of 1855 the 1st Staffordshire Regiment, stationed on Corfu, also lost 25 men, 
and by the following year, while stationed on Cephalonia, 140 out of a total of 420 men 
were hospitalised. The Berkshire Regiment also suffered 50 fatalities from an outbreak of 
cholera while stationed on Corfu; in fact, it was commented that the number of men 
volunteering as hospital orderlies often outnumbered those required for garrison duties. It 
was the belief of a regimental captain that such high levels of affliction owed to the initial 
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difficulties faced by the regiment on the rough crossing from Britain. He noted that the 
men had grown tired of the limited salt beef and biscuit rations on board so that upon 
arrival they feasted upon cheap fruit and wine poisoned by copper.26   
The mundane reality of garrison duty abroad did little to dampen celebrations 
when militia regiments returned as often leading local figures took charge of organising 
celebratory events for both the officers and men.  For instance, the return of the service 
companies of the Oxfordshire Regiment prompted the local notables to organise a 
ceremonial dinner for the NCOs and men, followed later in the week by a public banquet 
for the officers. Both were well funded through private subscriptions and organised by a 
committee including the Vice Chancellor and college deans of Oxford University and the 
WRZQ¶V mayor. Similarly, an advertisement placed in the Reading Mercury called for 
subscriptions towards similar entertainments upon the return of officers and men of the 
Berkshire Regiment in June 1856, while a variety of events were also put on to celebrate 
the return of the Northamptonshire Regiment in July 1856. After parading on the race 
course in front of packed stands, the officers, NCOs and men were feasted at a dinner 
paid for and organised by the county elites who included the Marquis of Exeter, Earl 
Spencer, Earl Fitzwilliam and Earl of Euston, all with connection via land or ties to 
Northamptonshire.27  
It was not until the South African War that militiamen again served abroad as 
distinct units. Although the idea was contemplated as a result of the Indian Mutiny, none 
of those embodied served abroad despite the introduction of legislation (21 & 22 Vict, c. 
85) again enabling them to do so. Yet for the majority of militiamen, service represented 
a far more mundane affair. Those embodied were, aside from providing manpower for 
the regulars, expected to take over garrisons vacated by regular regiments dispatched to 
the front. As the recent Militia Act stipulated, while embodied militia regiments were 
liable to serve anywhere within the UK, most ended up spending prolonged periods away 
from their county. In total 81 English and Welsh, 17 Scottish and 45 Irish regiments 
served across Great Britain or Ireland during the Crimean War, while two years later a 
total of 30 English and Welsh, seven Scottish and sixteen Irish regiments again served 
domestically during the aftermath of the Indian Mutiny. It was relatively common for 
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English and Welsh regiments to serve in either Scotland or Ireland but less common for 
either Scottish or Irish regiments to serve outside their respective countries; in fact no 
Scottish regiment served in either England and Wales or Ireland during the Crimean War, 
although ten of the 45 embodied Irish regiments were garrisoned at some stage within 
England and Wales. By contrast, during the Indian Mutiny most Scottish and Irish 
regiments were predominantly stationed outside their home country. Only one Scottish 
unit spent the whole of its embodiment in Scotland (the Edinburgh Artillery). Similarly 
all Irish regiments were stationed at some time in England and Wales (while one also 
served in Scotland and another in both Scotland and England). The reason for this was 
that the government dropped the conditions that Irish regiments could spend no longer 
than two years in England, that no more than one-third of regiments could be stationed 
abroad at one time and that simultaneously no more than one-fourth of English regiments 
could be in Ireland. Also the government was particularly concerned not to have Irish 
militia regiments embodied and armed within Ireland due to the fear that arms could pass 
to Fenian groups.28  
 Approximately half of all embodied regiments spent at least a portion of their 
embodied service stationed at one of the major military camps. Aldershot alone housed 
53 militia regiments totalling 34,500 men across both embodiments. Aside from just 
parade and basic company and battalion drills, Palmerstone argued that the assembly of 
µODUJHERGLHVRIWURRSVDW$OGHUVKRW¶DOORZHGWKHPWRµSUDFWLFHWKRVHPLOLWDU\HYROXWLRQV
ZKLFK WKH\ ZRXOG KDYH WR SHUIRUP LI FDOOHG LQWR WKH ILHOG¶ $V DOUHDG\ DOOXGHG WR LQ
chapter one, this was the first time regiments had such an opportunity (something which 
was not extended to peacetime training until the latter 1860s), a point noted by 
$OGHUVKRW¶V FRPPDQGLQJ RIILFHU /LHXWHQDQW-General W.T. Knollys when he later 
commented that the militia regiments first under his command were lacking in all but the 
basics of training.29  Both the 1st Middlesex and 1st Surrey Regiments were among the 
first to be brigaded at Aldershot in May 1855, although several other regiments were 
encamped once the weather improved; the Bedfordshire Regiment did such between 
August and December. The following year it was joined by the 2nd Royal Surrey 
Regiment which along with the 1st Somerset, Cavan and Royal London Regiments 
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formed part of the 6th Brigade. Regiments continued to serve there during the Indian 
Mutiny, the East Kent Regiment for a year from June 1858 and which gave it the 
RSSRUWXQLW\WRWDNHSDUW LQILHOGGD\VDQGµVKDPEDWWOHV¶ZLWKRWKHUUHJLPHQWV6LPLODUO\
the Bedfordshire Regiment, stationed there in 1858, also took part in a brigade exercise: 
one was of such a scale that it involved the whole of the north and south camps.  Other 
regiments had similar experiences including the 3rd West York Regiment, which formed 
part of the 2nd (and later 3rd) Brigade alongside the 4th Lancashire, Berkshire, Dumfries, 
Nottinghamshire, South Down and Louth Regiments, and later by the City of Dublin and 
Donegal Regiments as well as the cadre of several regular regiments.30 Other camps were 
also garrisoned by militia regiments, most notably that at the Curragh in Ireland. During 
WKH ,QGLDQ 0XWLQ\ WKH .LQJ¶V 2ZQ 7RZHU +DPOHWV /LJKW ,QIDQWU\ was stationed at the 
camp from March 1858 until the following November. Afterwards they also spent a 
period at Aldershot.31 
The main problem resulting from the increased practice of brigading embodied 
regiments was finding the space to house them. In order to provide the additional space 
for more embodied regiments the capacity at many stations, including Aldershot, was 
increased. At Aldershot a new series of wooden huts was constructed meaning many 
militiamen avoided the need to quarter under canvas, enabling more to remain stationed 
there throughout the winter months. Nevertheless, living conditions remained challenging 
even within the newly constructed huts, particularly during the winter months when 
conditions at the camps deteriorated rapidly. For instance, upon arriving at the North 
Camp in Aldershot in February 1856, the 2nd Royal Surrey Regiment was quartered in 
huts so recently erected that wood shavings still littered the floor, while poor weather also 
meant it was difficult to move about the camp as rain turned it into an ankle deep 
quagmire, no lines or paths being set down prior to its arrival. There were also concerns 
that the camp lacked sufficient ground to practice musketry due to the difficulty of 
securing nearby land free of men and livestock.32 Aside from enlarging the major camps, 
the government also took the measure of creating new camps at existing barracks. Such 
was the case in Colchester where the facilities were expanded with new barrack huts, 
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while additional land was also purchased at Middlewick in order to provide a new 
range.33 This gave, for instance, the East Norfolk Regiment its first chance to form part of 
a brigade when it was transferred to the camp in January 1856.34 
Those regiments unable to gain a place at one of the military camps were often 
quartered in the barracks vacated by regular regiments serving abroad. On the whole their 
daily duties were in many regards similar to those stationed in the military camps, 
consisting of guard duties, parade drills and exercises, although there was a greater 
emphasis on maintaining guard pickets. For instance, when the Essex Rifles was 
stationed at the Tower of London, as a relief for the 35th Foot, the regiment conducted 
field exercises in Hyde Park three days per-week, drilling on every other day within the 
dry moat of the Tower. Yet maintaining the garrison meant guard duties were ever 
SUHVHQW HDFKPLOLWLDPDQPDQDJLQJ µOHVV WKDQ IRXUQLJKWV LQEHG WRRQHRXWRIEHG¶SHU
week. The following year the regiment was transferred to the barracks at the Royal 
Ordnance Depot at Weedon Bec, Northamptonshire, although its duties remained largely 
similar.35 In Wales, the Royal Monmouthshire Light Infantry spent the entirety of the 
Crimean War in barracks. In May 1854 it proceeded into the cavalry barracks at Newport, 
although unlike elsewhere there was less of a need for night sentries meaning each man 
could expect upwards of 30 nights in bed before their turn. The following February it 
proceeded to relieve the 31st Foot at Pembroke Dock where it remained until July 1856, 
principally to guard the artillery overlooking Milford Haven manned by the Pembroke 
Artillery. Its stay was largely uneventful, the only exception being that on Christmas Eve 
1855 the regiment was responsible for rescuing a detachment of 75 gunners belonging to 
the Pembroke Artillery serving on Thorn Island. They had become isolated after a storm 
cut all communication with the mainland, and it was only when contact was finally re-
established that it became apparent the detachment had nearly run out of food.36 By 
contrast, other regiments saw service at multiple stations across the length and breadth of 
the UK. For instance, between late August 1854 and January 1855 the Bedfordshire 
Regiment was garrisoned at Berwick-upon-Tweed. Yet after it was forced to return to 
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Bedford for the purposes of recruitment, and a subsequent period spent at Aldershot, in 
December 1855 the regiment proceeded to Ireland for the purposes of garrisoning several 
stations across the country. This meant that until the following April the regiment was 
split between its headquarters consisting of three companies garrisoned at Galway while 
three others were isolated at outlying stations in the surrounding hinterland, two to 
Loughrea and one to Oughterard. Later the regiment reconvened when it was garrisoned 
at both the Richmond and Linen Hall barracks in Dublin from April to June 1856. 
Throughout its second embodiment the regiment again served at multiple locations across 
the county, initially garrisoning and guarding the port at Dover and later those at 
Portsmouth.37 
The duties of embodied militia artillery corps were in some respects similar to 
those of the infantry counterparts, although unsurprisingly a larger portion of their time 
was spent upon artillery drill. On the whole embodied militia artillery corps were seen as 
a means of replacing Royal Garrison Artillery batteries required for the Crimea. During 
the Crimean embodiment the Cornwall and Devon Miners Artillery spent its embodiment 
stationed at Pendennis Castle, Falmouth, with a detachment sent across the bay on 30 
March 1855 to garrison St. Mawes Castle, both guarding the entrance to the port. The 
majority of its time was spent drilling with the field guns and drag-ropes used to move 
them.38  
One of the main benefits of garrisoning regiments in either military camps or 
barracks was that it avoided the contentious issue of billeting them upon local people. Yet 
whereas billeting during peacetime was only a temporary inconvenience (albeit one 
which caused considerable tension with local people, as seen in Chapter four), during 
lengthy embodied periods it became far more damaging. The government was well aware 
of the relative disadvantages of billeting compared to encampment or garrisoning 
PLOLWLDPHQLQEDUUDFNVQRWRQO\ZDVLWGHWULPHQWDOWRWKHPLOLWLD¶VRYHUDOOGLVFLSOLQHEXW
also regiments were more isolated and thus less likely to have any chance of training 
alongside other units. Yet despite the obvious drawbacks it was unavoidable: militia 
regiments lacked any permanent accommodation of their own for the majority of their 
men and there was simply not the capacity at the military stations such as Aldershot and 
the Curragh to encamp them, or for that matter enough vacant barracks. This meant that 
although a total of 25,000 militiamen had been embodied by May 1855, only 6,000 were 
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garrisoned in barracks or encamped at a military station, although the situation was worse 
in Scotland as the existing barracks had a capacity for just 2,000 men (out of an 
establishment of 10,000).39 Therefore, it was not uncommon for regiments to spend at 
OHDVWDSRUWLRQRIWKHLUHPERGLHGVHUYLFHLQELOOHWV)RULQVWDQFHWKH.LQJ¶V2ZQ7RZHU
Hamlets Light Infantry spent all eight months of its first embodiment billeted in East 
London. Such was the case throughout East Anglia where there was initially a lack of 
available accommodation in many of the major towns including Norwich, Yarmouth, 
Ipswich, Bury St Edmunds or Colchester. This meant, for instance, that when the East 
Norfolk Regiment was embodied in late December 1854 there was no choice but to billet 
the men upon public houses throughout Yarmouth until the following October when they 
were eventually transferred into a local Naval hospital. The West Essex Regiment had 
similar difficulties and was forced to billet 650 men at 40 separate public houses and inns 
across Chelmsford.40 One major problem with billeted regiments was that they often 
lacked access to the facilities available to their counterparts in barracks or at the military 
camps meaning they could undertake little more than rudimentary drill or exercises. For 
instance, the 1st Derby Regiment spent the whole of the Crimean embodiment at its 
headquarters; yet owing to the price of land there was difficulty finding suitable grounds 
on which to enable it to train within the £6 allowance. The regiment managed to find 
some open space, but owing to the proximity of a railway on one side and a road on the 
other, it was unable to practise musketry. In fact the only opportunity the men got to fire 
WKHLUZHDSRQVZDVDWDQRIILFHU¶VIXQHUDO7KHUHIRUHPRVWRIWKHHPERGLPHQWZDVVSHQW
drilling in the street.41 
Although billeting was recognised as a necessary evil some limited reform was 
attempted. In order to significantly reduce the proportion of billeted regiments the 
government planned to greatly increase the number encamped once the weather improved 
in the spring and summer of 1856.42 Some attempts were also taken to tackle the issue in 
Scotland specifically due to particularly vehement opposition to the legal necessity of 
billeting upon private households as opposed to public houses. In June 1855 Peel, while 
Under-Secretary of State for War, informed Parliament that some recourse had been 
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attempted by the Board of Ordnance through the hire of additional buildings which could 
be converted into barracks. Nevertheless, it was unable to find anywhere near the 
available capacity. It also deemed the cost of encamping Scottish regiments in temporary 
huts as too high to justify the expenditure meaning that little ultimately could to remedy 
the situation.43 
Embodied service also gave officers and men a chance to break the monotony of 
drill and guard duties. On several occasions militia regiments also provided unique 
ceremonial duties. For instance, on 16 of October 1857, the 3rd West York Regiment 
furnished a guard of honour for the Queen upon her arrival at Doncaster station, 
consisting of a captain, two subalterns, and 100 NCOs and men. Towards the end of its 
first embodiment the Bedfordshire Regiment was involved in a large review of troops 
stationed in Dublin.44 While embodied militia officers also continued to pursue their 
personal and social interests. For instance, upon the presentation of new colours to the 
regiment on 31 October 1854, the officers of the 1st Somerset Regiment attended a ball at 
6W*HRUJH¶V+DOO3O\PRXWKZKLFKZDVQRWHGDVEHLQJµEULOOLDQWO\DWWHQGHG¶DVDUHVXOWRI
the proximity of the embodied regiment to Somerset. While the Bedfordshire Regiment 
was stationed at Weymouth the officers organised a number of theatrical performances. 
Officers were also able to maintain their own sporting interests in addition to facilitating 
sporting events for the benefit of the other ranks. At the Curragh camp officers from both 
the regulars and militia organised inter-regimental cricket matches while stationed there 
during the Indian Mutiny. In April 1858 a team of officers from the 16th Foot took on 
and defeated officers from the Leicestershire Regiment, while earlier that month the 16th 
Foot played against as team of officers from the Surrey, Worcester and Tower Hamlets 
Regiments. Similarly, officers of the West Essex Regiment played a match against a local 
side while stationed at Chelmsford in August 1855, while in the following December the 
officers organised an amateur horse race in which both officers and the other ranks could 
gamble.45  
 
* * * 
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After the disembodiment of the last embodied regiments in 1861 there was no wide-scale 
embodiment of the force until the South African War. The only exception to this came in 
1885 when six infantry battalions and two militia garrison artillery brigades were 
temporarily embodied between March and September 1885 as a reaction to the fall of 
Khartoum, and growing tensions in South Africa and Central Asia.46 Stationed within the 
UK, their main role was once again to replace line regiments which had been stationed 
abroad ± it was established prior to the embodiment that there was no intention to send 
any militia units abroad.47 For instance, the 3rd Durham Light Infantry was embodied on 
9 February and stationed at Colchester, although its service was largely uneventful 
despite some tense relations with the local population. Although only a limited number of 
units were embodied, others had their annual training extended for that year. The 2nd 
Brigade Scottish Division and 3rd brigade Welsh Division, Royal Artillery, alongside the 
Royal Anglesey Engineer Regiment had their training periods extended to 34 days. The 
Royal Monmouthshire Engineer Regiment had its extended even further to 42 days, while 
the Southern Submarine Miners was authorised to train for the maximum of 56 days.48 
The scale of the 1885 embodiment was a far cry from that which the militia would 
undertake during the South African War. In total 170 separate units were embodied, 
while 60 infantry battalions, six artillery companies, three engineer companies and two 
engineer sections served in South Africa, and a further 9 infantry battalions in the 
Mediterranean (one of which subsequently proceeded to South Africa). In total 45,566 
militiamen served in South Africa while 5,922 also served in the Mediterranean. In 
addition to this 13,598 militia reservists served in the line meaning that a total of over 
65,000 men experienced foreign service in some form, most for the first time.49 Such an 
unprecedented degree of participation by the militia was in stark contrast to any 
embodiment the force had previously experienced. In part this was enabled by major 
legislative changes (charted in chapter one) which saw the creation of the militia reserve 
(permitting militiamen to serve with the regulars in wartime), the closer association of the 
militia and line through localisation and territorialisation which encouraged the increased 
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WUDQVIHURIPHQWRWKHUHJXODUVDQGILQDOO\WKHHQVKULQHPHQWLQODZRIWKHPLOLWLD¶VULJKW
when embodied, to voluntarily serve in Malta and Gibraltar, altered in 1898 so that a 
militiaman could voluntarily serve anywhere abroad for up to one year whether or not the 
force was embodied.50 Therefore, by the eve of the South African War the government 
had never been more able to employ the militia in support of the regular army either as 
drafts or by using entire units. 
'HVSLWHWKLVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQLWLDOSODQVIRUWKHGHSOR\PHQWRIWKHPLOLWLDwere 
in fact similar in scale and scope to that of the previous embodiments. At first Arthur 
Balfour requested that the Commons postpone any discussion over the embodiment of 
either the militia or the militia reserve as he believed it was best discussed alongside the 
general mobilisation scheme which was to be explored alongside the army estimates. The 
Under-Secretary of State for War George Wyndham even went as far as to suggest that 
there was little likelihood of the militia reserve being called out, although the government 
still wanted to draw on all potential sources of manpower that might possibly be required. 
Even though the government decided it was prudent to embody some units, these were 
only to be in counties where line battalions had been sent to South Africa. Only a small 
minority within Parliament dissented, limited mainly to those opposed to the Unionist 
government. For instance, John Dillon (MP for East Mayo and future leader of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party) proposed an amendment dropping plans to embody the militia 
reserve entirely, although he gained little support except from among those with Irish 
nationalist sympathies and was defeated 36 votes to 299.51 The culmination of this was 
that, in addition to calling out of the militia reserve, a Special Army Order of 3 November 
formally embodied just 38 infantry battalions while subsequent orders raised three more 
the following day and a further eight on the 28 November.  
This relatively limited strategy was subsequently shattered by the disastrous 
GHIHDWVVXIIHUHGE\WKHDUP\GXULQJµ%ODFN:HHN¶-17 December 1899) which in turn 
forced the government into rethinking its mobilisation strategy once it became clear more 
men were required for service and that the militia would have to play a far more 
extensive role than hitherto expected. One solution advocated by the Earl of Wemyss was 
a return to enlisting militiamen by ballot in order to raise the force to its establishment, 
and thus create a larger pool from which men could be incited to transfer to the regulars. 
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Although he managed to introduce a Parliamentary motion in the House of Lords the 
following February, it was defeated by 69 votes to 49, gaining only limited support 
principally from advocates of national service. The Prime Minister, the Marquis of 
Salisbury, had argued that the political and organisational difficulty of drafting, passing 
and implementing a new bill was highly undesirable in the current circumstances, while 
he was also concerned the ballot would provide national service advocates with a 
stepping stone towards wider conscription.52  
Instead the government decided upon the far less politically divisive measure of 
embodying the remainder of the militia and using it both at home and abroad as garrison 
troops. Limit in the space available in barracks meant this was done in a piecemeal 
fashion in order to avoid billeting large swathes as during the Crimean War. By February 
1900 the government had only been able to increase the number of embodied battalions 
to 73, although Lansdowne was quick to reassure Parliament of his intention to embody 
the remainder as soon as they could be placed under canvas during the spring and 
summer months.53 HowevHU XQOLNH DQ\ SUHYLRXV HPERGLPHQW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SODQV
went far further: not only was it expected that the militia would again be used to relieve 
regular units from stations in the Mediterranean, but in a largely unprecedented move it 
also planned to give men the opportunity to serve in the theatre of war itself. 
Understandably there were some concerns among ministers over their military 
efficiency.54  
There can be no doubt that enthusiasm among the militia for service abroad was 
high. In total 72 battalions were asked to volunteer for foreign service and only four 
failed to find the 75 per cent majority necessary to do so. By January 1900 twelve militia 
battalions had been successfully selected, eight for South Africa, two for Malta and two 
for the Channel Islands. As in the 1850s there was no power to send men abroad against 
their will, meaning that those who failed to volunteer formed part of the details at their 
regimental depot.55 As a general principal those battalions selected for service in South 
Africa had to have enough manpower to make it worthwhile sending them, while it was 
also deemed necessary to spread the burden of service geographically so that one 
particular area would not be disproportionately affected by having the majority of its 
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militiamen serving overseas and with as small a disruption to local trade as possible. For 
instance, it was originally planned to send nine militia battalions abroad: seven from 
England, one from Ireland and the other from Scotland. When one Scottish battalion 
failed to volunteer for foreign service in sufficient numbers, another was selected to go in 
its place. A first it was hoped the minimum age at which militiamen would be permitted 
to serve in South Africa would be nineteen. However, as seen in chapter three, a 
significant proportion of the force comprised young men ages seventeen and eighteen 
meaning up to one-third of the total enrolled strength of the force would be prohibited 
from such service. Therefore, the age was set at just eighteen meaning that only one-tenth 
would be unable to volunteer, although this created the quite extraordinary situation that 
militiamen were permitted to serve in South Africa two years before their regular 
counterparts, the minimum ages being set at 20 years of age.56 
As illustrated in Appendix 6, in total there were five separate waves in which 
those units selected were sent to South Africa. Those initially selected were despatched in 
two groups: the first (consisting of seven infantry battalions) totalled 4,877 men and was 
despatched between 11 and 18 January 1900; soon after a second more substantial wave 
(consisting of 23 infantry battalions, four companies of garrison artillery and two sections 
and two companies of engineers) totalling 13,536 men was despatched between 10 
February and 10 March. These were supported by further drafts, a total of 3,197 more 
militiamen being sent to their battalions throughout 1900. This meant that by December 
there were 21,610 militiamen serving in South Africa (exclusive of militia reservists 
serving with their regular battalions). This far exceeded any of the other auxiliary forces 
serving: across the whole war the Imperial Yeomanry only numbered 10,195 men, while 
the City Imperial Volunteers only 1,667, and volunteer service companies only 9,120; 
this was alongside 11,062 colonial and Indian troops also stationed in South Africa. Even 
after the fall of both Boer republics, when it became increasingly clear the fighting would 
continue, the militia was once again called upon to furnish units. In 1901 two waves of 
reinforcements saw a combined total of 11,043 men sent to relieve those many of the 
units already serving and included, for the first time, a mounted infantry company 
(formed from various battalions), two garrison artillery companies and one engineer 
company. Even in the final months of the war 15 infantry battalions, totalling 9,562 men, 
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embarked to relieve those battalions which had been serving since 1900. Throughout 
1901 and 1902 a further series of drafts helped to keep those units replenished with 
additional manpower, although it became increasingly difficult to replace men through 
wastage. From 1 January until 30 September 1901 only two monthly drafts totalling 57 
men were sent to South Africa, although this improved slightly in 1902 as 1,603 men 
proceeded to their battalions.57  
It was widely believed that the most effective way to use militia units serving in 
South Africa was as a means of relieving regular units of garrison duty and other more 
mundane tasks behind the front line, not at all dissimilar to their role within the UK and 
Mediterranean. Initially Lord Roberts was hopeful that the arrival of the first militia 
battalions would help facilitate his planned advance to relieve Ladysmith by relieving 
regulars of such duties. Therefore, the first seven battalions arriving in January and 
February 1900 were used to replace Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Kelly-.HQQ\¶V
troops along the lines stretching from Naauwport to Steynsburg, while eighteen battalions 
arriving in late February werH H[SHFWHG WR IUHH VXIILFLHQW UHJXODUV IRU5REHUWV¶SODQQHG
thrust against Pretoria.58 The sheer distances involved in guarding the lines of 
communication meant that, compared to those garrisoned in the Mediterranean or the 
UK, militia battalions were often split and distributed over large areas, usually as 
companies, and expected to operate relatively independently of each other. For instance, 
the 3rd Royal West Surrey Regiment spent most of its service, from April to October 
1900, guarding 350 miles of telegraph and railway lines with detachments serving at 
several isolated stations.59 The 3rd Royal Sussex Regiment also manned the lines 
surrounding the town of Volksrust in addition to garrisoning the town and surrounding 
SDVVHVDW/DLQJ¶V1HNDQG,NHWHQL1HN. Similarly, men of the 4th Bedfordshire Regiment 
dug and manned two miles of trenches stretching from Warrenton, a village north of 
Kimberley, to a nearby railway station; others also provided escorts for the artillery 
stationed at the village. The battalion was later again involved in guarding outposts 
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µEHWZHHQWKH0RGGHUDQG2UDQJH5LYHUV¶ZKLOHVWDWLRQHGDW'URQILHOG60  
Once Kitchener sanctioned the construction of thousands of blockhouses and as a 
means of limiting the manoeuvrability of Boer commando parties, militiamen were often 
used as a means of providing the necessary manpower to guard them. Both the 3rd and 
4th East Surrey Regiment garrisoned various blockhouse lines during their time in South 
Africa, the 3rd Battalion, for instance, defending the railway from Victoria West to 
Beaufort West from December 1901 to February 1902, while the 4th Battalion (arriving 
on 10 April 1902) garrisoned those in the Sterkstroom District until July 1902. In both 
instances the battalions were split, each company occupying its own stretch of the line. 
Similarly, a garrison of seven officers and 181 other ranks belonging to the 3rd Royal 
Sussex Regiment took over the blockhouses following the railway between Ingogo and 
Mount Prospect between December 1901 and June 1902, south of the battalion 
headquarters at Volksrust. Even though they had only arrived at Cape Town the 
preceding month, in March 1902 the 3rd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were also 
moved into a line of blockhouses at Victoria West where they served until the end of the 
war.61  
In addition to serving on the lines of communication, many militia battalions were 
also used for the more mundane task of guarding Boer prisoners and interned civilians. 
For instance, from October 1900 to July 1901 the 3rd Royal West Surrey Regiment spent 
the majority of its service at a camp at Green Point just outside of Cape Town. In August 
1901 the 5th Royal Irish Rifles also spent time providing frequent patrols at a camp at 
Vredefort Road, duties which were particularly trying for junior officers acting as orderly 
officers. As the war progressed and Kitchener increasingly looked to the internment of 
Boer civilians as a means of denying the commandos support and supplies, there was 
increased demand upon the militia to provide the necessary guards. Two companies of 
the 3rd Royal Sussex Regiment was stationed in Bloemfontein to guard prisoners and 
supplies from May 1901 until early 1902, while from June to September 1902 the 4th 
East Surrey Regiment were increasingly withdrawn from duties manning blockhouses 
and instead put to use guarding prisoners at Simons Town. One officer serving with the 
3rd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which only arrived in South Africa in February 
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1902, was particularly disappointed to find himself as part of a detachment left behind to 
guard prisoners near Cape Town, although his duties as an orderly officer kept him and 
his men busy despite the monotony of such service.62  
For the militia artillery, service in South Africa was hardly distinguishable from 
that of infantry battalions. When in May 1901 a company of the Norfolk Royal Garrison 
Artillery was despatched to South Africa it was, after quarantine at Kimberley, divided 
and split between garrison duty at the Bulfontein Camp (in Kimberley) and convoy duties 
along the Orange River, its headquarters situated at the latter. Most of their time was 
spent manning armoured trains and, for a period in late 1901, garrisoning local 
fortifications.63 The three companies (and two sections) of militia engineers faced more 
specialist tasks. Most importantly they helped to construct and maintain many of the lines 
of communication and blockhouse that other militiamen were helping to guard. For 
instance, the special service company of Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers Militia, 
deployed in May 1900, spent most of its service building roads, running construction 
trains and maintaining over 420 miles of track and across the Orange Free State.64 
Although garrison duty in some form constituted the mainstay of the militia¶V
service in South Africa, it would be wrong to suggest that meant they were entirely 
isolated from engaging the enemy. The highly mobile nature of Boer commando parties, 
particularly after the summer of 1900, meant the militia came into contact with the enemy 
more frequently than has been previously suggested. In total 175 militia officers and men 
were killed in action, while 402 were wounded. Furthermore, a total of 51 militia officers 
received the Distinguished Service Order, while 92 NCOs and privates were recipients of 
the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Sir Ian Hamilton was, nonetheless, correct in that the 
militia was rarely involved directly in major offensive operations, although there were 
some exceptions. The 3rd East Kent Regiment saw more action than most militia units 
during a lengthy embodiment in which a year and 10 months were spent in South Africa. 
In June 1900 five companies formed part of a column some 2,000 strong, under the 
command of Lieutenant-*HQHUDO.HOO\.HQQ\VHQWWRVXSSRUW3DJHW¶V troops invested at 
Lindley ± in a letter to Lord Roberts he later praised the battalion for distinguishing itself 
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during the fighting. In the following October the battalion formed part of General Sir 
$UFKLEDOG+XQWHU¶VFROXPQVHUYLQJLQWKHQRUWK-west of the Orange River Colony. Two 
companies subsequently distinguished themselves in the fighting at Ventersburg on 2 
1RYHPEHU DIWHU ZKLFK /RUG 5REHUWV KLPVHOI SUDLVHG WKHP IRU WKHLU µFRQVSLFXRXV
JDOODQWU\¶65 On a few occasions militia battalions were forced to fight independently of 
regular support against concerted attacks. Without doubt the most notorious incident was 
the disastrous surrender of the 4th Derbyshire Regiment, in June 1900, after it was 
overrun while defending at Roodevar Station (near Rhenoster Kop, situated between 
Colesberg and Burgersdorp) by a force of Boer commandos estimated at between 3,000 
and 4,000 men. The regiment successfully resisted for several hours, although the arrival 
of Boer artillery and the successful flanking of its position meant the commanding officer 
decided it was best to surrender, after which the whole battalion were taken prisoner. As 
a result the battalion suffered some of the highest casualties of any militia units 
throughout the war: 36 were killed in action while a further 106 were wounded.66 Later in 
the war Major Crofton of the 3rd East Surrey Regiment was killed in action while 
commanding convoy escort at Uitspanfontein in February 1902 after his camp was 
overrun by a party of Boers, resulting in the death of not just himself but also 22 of his 
men. Half of the 4th East Surrey Regiment also formed part of the Namaqualand Field 
Force from April to June 1902. Far from taking a back seat, the battalion took an active 
role in the fighting, frequently helping to drive the enemy back until it reached 
Klipfontein on 20 April. Once mounted troops had arrived from Port Nolloth, on 18 April 
the column marched and attacked Boer positions at Steinkopf during which four men 
were killed, occupying the town once the enemy on 1 May. Subsequently the 
commanding officer offered nothing but praise for the militiamen under his command, 
acknowledging the contribution of all ranks towards the operation.67 
However, it was not just the few militia units involved in major operations such as 
the 3rd East Kent Regiment which came into contact with the enemy, or for that matter 
those unfortunate enough to have been in the wrong place at the wrong time such as the 
4th Derbyshire Regiment at Rhenoster. After the fall of Pretoria in June 1900 the war 
transitioned from a predominantly conventional campaign, bent on annexing the Boer 
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republics and defeating their troops in the field, to one dominated by guerrilla warfare, 
perpetrated by small highly mobile commando parties able to operate right across South 
Africa. This brought the war directly to those troops serving on the lines of 
communication meaning it was relatively common for militiamen to have some 
experience of combat. While at Vredefort Road the 3rd Durham Light Infantry were 
involved in frequent skirmishing. They were also involved in heavier fighting on three 
occasions in which two men were killed and three more mortally wounded. Throughout 
the summer of 1901 outposts manned by the 5th Royal Irish Rifles (also stationed at 
Vredefort Road) frequently saw contact with small groups of Boer commandos 
attempting to move across country. For instance, in August its section of the lines was 
attacked almost every night while in one encounter, comprised of a corporal and six men, 
three were mortally wounded. Similarly, the 3rd East Kent Regiment was involved in 
frequent skirmishes whilst manning blockhouse lines surrounding Kroonstadt and 
Lindley. Also in April and May 1901 the regiment successfully defended a series of 
railway sidings around Kroonstadt, while later that year on the 8 August six men of 
Blockhouse 493/I successfully repelled an attack from 150 Boers. Between December 
1901 and June 1902 the 3rd Royal Sussex Regiment also fought off a Boer commando 
raid while manning the blockhouse line between Ingogo and Mount Prospect, Natal. 
However, not all militia battalions were so successful. In 1902 members of the 4th West 
Yorkshire Regiment were unable to prevent a Boer commando party from capturing a 
convoy they had been escorting, and later one member of the battalion was subsequently 
detained when it was argued he had given up his position too easily.68 
Militia battalions also furnished men as mounted infantry to serve alongside 
regular units. The 4th Bedfordshire Regiment furnished men for a mounted infantry 
FRPSDQ\VHUYLQJ WKURXJKRXW WKH ODWWHUKDOIRIDVSDUWRI/RUG0HWKXHQ¶VFROXPQ
ZKLOHWKHWK1RUIRON5HJLPHQWSURYLGHGµ$ERXWWKLUW\PHQ¶DVDFRPSDQ\RIPRXQWHG
LQIDQWU\ XQGHUWDNLQJ µWKH VDPH ZRUN DV UHJXODUV DOO WKURXJK WKH ZDU¶ 7KH 3rd Royal 
Sussex Regiment trained a large portion of its men as mounted infantry while encamped 
at Spitzkop, four miles west of Bloemfontein, which by August 1901 comprised eight 
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officers and 225 men. On the whole they had no prior experience of riding and so had to 
be trained from scratch. Despite this, an officer serving alongside them believed they had 
SOD\HGDQLPSRUWDQWSDUWLQWKHGHIHQFHRI%ORHPIRQWHLQµSDWUROOLQJEH\RQGWKHRXWSRVWV
DQGRIHVFRUWLQJFRQYR\VWRFROXPQVLQWKHILHOG¶$OWKRXJKWKH battalion was disbanded 
by the end of November 1901, this was not due to its poor efficiency; rather more, there 
ZDVDGHVSHUDWH VKRUWDJHRIKRUVHV IRU.LWFKHQHU¶V µPRYLQJFROXPQV¶69 It was not just 
regiments stationed in South Africa that furnished men as mounted infantry. In December 
1900, while stationed on Malta, the 3rd Northumberland Fusiliers provided a mounted 
infantry section of 20 men for service in South Africa; although 41 had applied for the 
duty, those initially unsuccessful were subsequently trained and sent as a second 
contingent later in the war. Similarly, in January 1901 the 3rd Royal West Kent Regiment 
(also stationed on Malta) sent a detachment of twenty NCOs and men. In the following 
March the 4th East Surrey Regiment, stationed in Ireland, furnished an officer and 35 
rank and file as a mounted infantry section in South Africa, only re-joining the battalion 
in September 1902 (by which time it was itself serving in South Africa). The battalion 
also provided mounted infantry for service with the Namaqualand Field Force from April 
to June 1902.70 
For the majority of officers and men, however, the greatest challenge came not 
from fighting, but instead the demands (and, at times, monotony) of active service, 
particularly when stationed away from major settlements. Even prior to arriving at Cape 
Town militiamen were faced with a lengthy voyage lasting over two weeks, most of 
which was spent in hot and cramped conditions below deck. One officer serving with the 
3rd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders noted that many on board did not even have room 
to erect a hammock and were thus forced to sleep on the deck; this was despite the fact 
only 1,700 men out of a capacity of 2,500 were on board.  Things could become even 
tougher once they arrived in South Africa.  After being stationed at Vredefort Road in 
August 1900, the commanding officer of the 3rd Durham Light Infantry, Lieutenant-
&RORQHO 5% :LOVRQ FRPPHQWHG WKDW VHUYLFH ZDV µKDUG JRLQJ¶ ZLWK PRVW PHQ RQO\
gaining one night of four in bed. He also noted how typhoid began to take hold amongst 
his men ± across its embodiment the battalion lost two officers and 20 men to disease. 
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Similarly, the commanding officer of the 3rd Lancashire Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel 
R.D. Parker, noted that his men were µweary of doing nothing but watch[ing] trains pass 
up and down the line¶ GHVSLWH  GHDWKV IURP µVLFNQHVV¶ E\  $XJXVW  One 
subaltern serving with the 5th Royal Irish Rifles frequently encountered militiamen who 
ZHUHµVLFN¶RIVHUYLFHSDUWLFXODUO\GXULQJWKHKRWVXPPHUPRQWKVZKHQIOLHVEHFDPHµWKH
EDLQRI«H[LVWHQFH¶7KHLUUHJXODULW\RI%RHUDWWDFNVDOVROHGWRDQXQVHWWOHGOLIHRQWKH
lines necessitating constant awareness (and an early rise at 5.30am) in order to watch for 
patrols. Contact with home was also difficult as letters from many blockhouses could 
only be sent once a fortnight. Living conditions were extremely challenging particularly 
when taking over from other long serving battalions. For instance, when in October 1901 
the 5th Royal Irish Rifles took over the blockhouse lines around Rhenoster from the 3rd 
East Yorkshire Regiment, a regiment serving in South Africa since March 1900, 
FRQGLWLRQV ZHUH GHVFULEHG DV µILOWK\¶ '\VHQWHU\ ZDV ULIH DQG DV D UHVXOW WKH GHSDUWLQJ
battalion lost 45 men while stationed there. When the 5th Royal Irish Rifles once again 
relieved the 3rd East Yorkshire Regiment in December 1901, it was described as being in 
DQ µDEVROXWHO\ URWWHQ VWDWH¶ 6LPLODUO\ RQH RIILFHU VHUYLQJ ZLWK WKH UG $UJ\OO DQG
Sutherland Highlanders described the filthy state of his quarters after it had quartered 
men of the 4th West Yorkshire Regiment. Furthermore, the shortage of officers in many 
battalions meant those serving in South Africa could be extremely overworked. For 
instance, Second-Lieutenant Reade, serving with the 5th Royal Irish Rifles, found it 
difficult to manage his responsibility for the defence of a section of railway, which took 
most of the night to patrol, in combination with his role as the local Railway Staff 
Officer; thus he found it almost impossible to gain sufficient sleep.71 
However, many officers were able to maintain a relatively comfortable standard 
of living, especially if they were serving at or near a major settlement. Hunting was a 
common pastime, facilitated by the widespread availability of cheap horses which, 
DFFRUGLQJ WR RQH RIILFHU FRXOG EH SXUFKDVHG DQG NHSW µIRU QRWKLQJ¶ )RU LQVWDQFH
Second-Lieutenant Cavendish of the 3rd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders managed to 
rent a horse and had the opportunity to hunt while stationed near Cape Town in March 
1902. Again, if the facilities and duties permitted officers were able to arrange sporting 
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events including inter-regimental cricket and polo. If the weather became too hot then 
PDQ\RIILFHUVZRXOG µVODFN LW¶SUHIHUULQJ WR UHDGDQG WKHQHLWKHUKXQWRUFRQWLQXHZLWK
their duties when the weather cooled. General living costs were low so that even a modest 
saving could be made out of their pay, while servants were also cheap and readily 
available, that of Second-Lieutenant Reade accompanying him even on patrol duties. If 
the station permitted officers were able to establish a mess at a relatively small expense. 
For instance, those of the 3rd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders stationed near Cape 
Town, in March 1902, were quick to establish a mess once suitable facilities became 
available, requiring 5s per day, by no means a small sum. Furthermore, even for those 
officers posted away from major settlements some comfort could be found in the ability 
to cherry-pick the best locations within a section of the line to settle in.72  
Some units were also able to relieve the monotony of their duties through taking 
on supplementary responsibilities. While stationed at Spitzkop the 3rd Royal Sussex 
Regiment frequently furnished detachments for signalling exercises despite the fact that 
they were not officially sanctioned to do so. Under the supervision of Lieutenant Bidder, 
they progressed in skill to the point that by July 1901, when the regular signallers 
attached to the camp were recalled to their regiment, the battalion took over signal duties 
full time and without any assistance; indeed, they were later mistaken as regulars due to 
their high levels of competency. Furthermore, Bidder was also responsible for training 
those under his command in the use of maxim guns. Although he admitted they would 
DOPRVWFHUWDLQO\QRWEHUHTXLUHGWRXVHLWLQEDWWOHKHFRPPHQWHGµ,WLVUDWKHUIXQEHLQJOHW
loose with a Maxim and team on a boundless range with unlimited cartridges (for we 
hDYHWKRXVDQGVRIURXQGVRIFRQGHPQHGDPPXQLWLRQWRILUHRII¶6LPLODUO\WKHUG5R\DO
West Surrey Regiment also had detachments trained and armed with maxim guns.73 
 South Africa was not the only foreign station in which the militia served. Several 
served on St Helena prior to returning to the UK, primarily responsible for guarding Boer 
prisoners of war. The 3rd East Kent Regiment was stationed there for six months from 
January to June 1902, later relieved by the 3rd Royal Sussex Regiment from June to 
August and who were responsible for guarding over 2,000 prisoners at the Broadbottom 
Camp. Service here seems to have been on the whole more relaxed, compared to similar 
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duties in South Africa itself. For instance, members of the 3rd Royal Sussex Regiment 
freely engaged with their prisoners to the extent that one claimed to have struck up 
VRPHWKLQJRIDIULHQGVKLSZLWKWKH%RHUOHDGHU&KULVWLDQ'H:HWUHPDUNLQJµ>+H@LVQRZ
VWD\LQJ FORVH WR P\ DERGH¶ DQG µZLOO GR DQ\WKLQJ IRU PH¶ ,QGHHG RQ WKH GD\ RI WKH
coroQDWLRQRI.LQJ(GZDUG9,, LWZDV UHFRUGHG WKDW WKHPHQRI WKHEDWWDOLRQ µPLQJOHG
IUHHO\¶ ZLWK WKHLU SULVRQHUV HYHQ VKDULQJ D FHOHEUDWRU\ ERQILUH WR PDUN WKH RFFDVLRQ
Similarly, the Quartermaster-Sergeant of the 3rd East Kent Regiment, George Johnson, 
was presented with a wooden box carved by a Boer as a gift.74  
Furthermore, the militia again saw service within the Mediterranean in order to 
take over garrison duties from their regular counterparts. The 3rd Seaforth Highlanders 
Regiment spent its embodied period garrisoned in Egypt (the only militia battalion to do 
so) from February 1900 until May 1901, at the Citadel Barracks, Cairo. Malta and Gozo 
were garrisoned by the 3rd Royal West Kent Regiment from January 1900 June 1901.75 
Once again its duties predominantly involved providing pickets, drill and ceremonial 
parade, although the battalion was able to conduct firing exercises and field training and 
was LQYROYHGLQWKHµFRPELQHGPDQRHXYUHV¶ZLWKERWKWKHIOHHWDQGRWKHUWURRSVLQ0D\
1900, and again undertook field training in February and March 1901. Ceremonial duties 
were also commonplace, consisting primarily of parade and inspection, and before the 
battalion left for home it formed part of a ceremonial parade in honour of the Duke of 
Cornwall.76 It was not the only battalion that garrisoned Malta during the war, serving 
served alongside the 5th Northumberland Fusiliers, 3rd West Yorkshire Regiment, 3rd 
Yorkshire Light Infantry Regiment, 5th Royal Munster Fusiliers, and the 3rd Loyal North 
Lancashire Regiment (prior to their progress to South Africa in March 1901).77  
Many militiamen also saw service in South Africa as militia reservists. First 
mobilised on 7 October 1899, by the end of the war 13,598 militiamen had served with 
their regular battalions.78 Militia battalions continued to provide a source of militia 
reservists throughout the war. In May 1900 the 4th Essex Regiment sent 62 men for 
service for service with the 1st battalion already serving in South Africa. The 3rd East 
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Surrey Regiment sent an initial draft of 94 men to join the 2nd Wiltshire Regiment on 21 
April 1900. Also, on the 22 May 35 men joined the details of the 2nd East Surrey 
Regiment prior to service in South Africa. The 4th East Surrey Regiment, while initially 
embodied in Ireland, sent its first draft of 52 men to the details of the 2nd battalion prior 
to their embarkation to South Africa on the 8 March 1900, arriving at Cape Town on 22 
March. A further draft of 118 men was transferred to the 2nd Hampshire Regiment for 
service in South Africa on 23 April, and on 29 May 31 men went to the 2nd East Surrey 
Regiment for service in South Africa after which a further draft of 21 left the battalion on 
14 August. Additionally, the 3rd Royal Sussex Regiment sent a draft of 123 men for 
service with the 1st battalion before proceeding to South Africa. Also the 4th Norfolk 
Regiment provided a considerable number of reservists for South Africa. Prior to the 
battalion¶s embodiment, 40 of the reserve proceeded to the 3rd battalion, awaiting 
transport to South Africa on 25 February; another 50 and 65 reservists were later sent on 
8 March and 16 April respectively for service with the 2nd battalion. Once embodied on 
1 May another draft of 35 reservists departed with the 2nd battalion, while six recruits 
made up another draft on 22 September. It was also possible that some men were given 
duties that took them away from their regiment in an administrative ability. During the 
EDWWDOLRQ¶V ILUVW HPERGLPHQW  1&2V DQG PHQ XQGHU WKH FRPPDQG RI /LHXWHQDQW
Stomm weUH VHQW RQ  -DQXDU\ WR WKH 5R\DO 0LOLWDU\ &ROOHJH DW 6DQGKXUVW µIRU GXW\
WKHUH¶79 Similarly militia officers saw service seconded to regular units, something which 
placed even more pressure on a force already short on officers (particularly subalterns). 
For many regular battalions militia officers enabled them to ensure they had a full 
complement of officers. Within the 3rd East Surrey Regiment officers were seconded for 
service while the battalion was stationed in Great Britain. For instance, on 16 May 1900 
Captain Halkett was seconded for service with the 4th Sherwood Foresters. After 
secondment from the 3rd Suffolk Regiment to the 1st battalion, Captain Ronald Dowie 
was killed from wounds received on 20 December 1901 at Kroonstad.80  
Of those officers and men who served in South Africa, many felt that the military 
authorities had undervalued the militia as a fighting force, and largely forgotten at home 
compared to other auxiliaries. The commanding officer of the 3rd Lancashire Regiment 
EHPRDQHG WKDW µWKH 0LOLWLD KDV RQO\ EHHQ EURXJKW KHUH WR GR WKH GLUW\ ZRUN¶ This 
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extended to members of the rank and file as well. For instance, upon his return from 
South Africa, one militiaman, serving in the 4th Bedfordshire Regiment, composed a 
poem in which he vented KLVIUXVWUDWLRQDWWKHUHODWLYHODFNRIUHFRJQLWLRQIRUWKHPLOLWLD¶V
service compared to that of the yeomanry and volunteers.81 
&OHDUO\ WKH PLOLWLD¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH 6RXWK $IULFDQ :DU ZDV XQSUHFHGHQWHG
compared to previous embodiments. Nonetheless, most units, even those which spent a 
period in South Africa, continued to be quartered within Great Britain and Ireland for 
much of their embodied service. As during the 1850s many battalions were organised into 
brigades and stationed at several military camps across the UK. Yet in addition to the 
usual banalities of parade and inspection many battalions were actively trained to meet 
the threat of invasion and raiding, despite the at best tenuous nature of any European 
threat. When the 4th Essex Regiment was encamped at Middlewick camp, Colchester, it 
formed part of a brigade consisting of themselves, the 4th Norfolk Regiment, 3rd 
Bedfordshire Regiment, and the 5th Royal Warwickshire Regiment. These battalions took 
part in several tactical exercises, one of which saw one battalion act as a rear guard 
holding a position against the other three and aimed at preparing them for defensive 
duties in the Thames. Similarly, the 3rd Royal Sussex Regiment moved from barracks at 
Dover into the militia brigade at Shorncliffe, Folkestone, in April 1900, its training 
focussing upon the defence of Dover and its hinterland. For instance, in early August 
1900 the battalion took part in a field day whereby an invading force, under the command 
RIWKHEDWWDOLRQ¶VFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHU, the Earl of March, chased and engaged a second 
force proceeding from Canterbury; it too took part in a simulated attack on the garrison of 
Dover, in September 1900. Similarly, the 3rd East Surrey Regiment spent its first 
embodied period from May to October 1900 as part of a brigade encamped on Salisbury 
Plain, part of one of the largest concentrations of militia units within the UK in which 
7,126 Militia and 1,112 regulars formed three brigades. Aside from parade and 
inspections ± on 24 May they took part LQ FHOHEUDWLRQV RI WKH 4XHHQ¶V ELUWKGD\ ± the 
battalion also took part in two field days in simulating a possible invasion scenario and 
mock battle. There was also a somewhat light-hearted element to training. For instance, 
on 28 September the 3rd East Surrey Regiment, alongside the other ten militia battalions 
stationed at Salisbury Plain, entered men into a competition testing their marching, trench 
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digging and musketry.82 
 Militia battalions were also liable for involvement in ceremonial parade and 
duties, with a focus on drill of various kinds. The 4th Essex Regiment was one of the 
many battalions, alongside the 3rd Royal Sussex and 4th Norfolk Regiment, all of which 
lined the streets for the funeral of Queen Victoria on 2 February 1901, as well as having 
the honour of marching in the procession itself. The battalion also furnished two officers 
DQGPHQDVSDUWRIWKHµ,PSHULDO5HSUHVHQWDWLYH&RUSV¶VHQWWR$XVWUDOLDWRUHSUHVHQW
the militia at the opening of the Australian Federal Parliament. Of the 1,000 officers and 
PHQ RI WKH 'XNH RI <RUN¶V JXDUG RI KRQRXU WKH WK 1RUIRON 5HJLPHQW ZDV WKH RQO\
militia battalion represented.83 
 
Table 5.3: Volunteers posted to and joining the Regular Army, Royal Navy and Marines 
during the South African War.84 
 
 
  1899 1900 1901 1902 Total 
Posted to Regular Army 2,156 12,203 89 0 14,448 
Joined Regular Army 13,518 10,715 14,907 18,379 57,519 
Joined Navy & Marines 722 247 666 615 2250 
Yearly Total 16,396 23,165 15,662 18,994 74,217 
 
Once again many English, Welsh and Scottish units were stationed in Ireland in 
order to replace Irish regiments transferred to Great Britain, the government fearing the 
potential radicalisation and the threat of Fenianism. The 3rd East Kent Regiment was 
stationed at Enniskillen in place of the regular garrison from late January 1900 until 10 
March, prior to its service in South Africa. The 4th East Surrey Regiment spent its first 
embodied period stationed in Ireland after they were no longer required for service in 
South Africa, its headquarters and half the battalion at Enniskillen and the remainder at 
Londonderry. Shortly after, when the battalion moved into the camp at Finner in County 
Donegal, it formed part of a brigade alongside the 3rd York and Lancaster Regiment, the 
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3rd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the regular 1st Royal Irish Rifles.85  
A few militia battalions were also stationed as garrison troops in the Channel 
Islands. Their duties were in many ways similar to those garrisoned on the mainland in so 
much as it consisted primarily of parade, inspection and drill. The 3rd Suffolk Regiment 
spent the majority of their embodiment stationed in the Guernsey and Alderney district 
from January 1900 until April 1901. its main duties involved parading and drill of various 
kinds. The 4th Norfolk Regiment also served on Guernsey and Alderney from May 1901 
until the following July, principally tasked with guarding the entrance to the harbour.86  
Finally, it is also clear from Table 5.3 that the demands of the war upon the 
PLOLWLD¶V PDQSRZHU meant that the militia continued to provide a large proportion of 
recruits for the regular army. Unlike during the 1850s, from the 1870s onwards such a 
relationship was well established (as explored in chapter one), and there appears to have 
been little resistance to the widespread use of the militia to augment the strength of the 
army. Therefore, it is unsurprising the number of men transferring climaxed during the 
South African War. In total 57,519 men transferred from militia battalions to the regulars 
during the war although with a further 14,448 posted on a temporary basis (mostly 
consisting of militia reservists). In contrast to the 1850s, the numbers joining towards the 
end of the war increased so that in 1902 more men joined the regulars than in any single 
year previously. Also of note is that a small proportion transferred into the Royal Navy 
and Marines, although never more than seven per cent of those joining the regulars. The 
effect of this after the conclusion of the war will be explored in the following chapter. 
Suffice to say, it had a damaging effect on the strength of the force as the proportion 
wanting to complete rose from 16.7 per cent in 1899 to a peak of 25.4 per cent in 1901. 
 
* * * 
 
Embodied service was a far cry from the usually mundane experience of training when 
disembodied. This was especially the case during the South African War when the militia 
proceeded abroad for active service for the first time en masse. By comparison, its 
embodied service during the Crimean War and Indian mutiny was far more mundane. 
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The decision of whether or not to embody the force at the outset of the Crimean War was 
far from a straightforward issue. Despite there being no credible threat of invasion to 
justify embodying the force, the government was able to take a loose interpretation of the 
existing legislation which permitted the embodiment of the militia when the country was 
threatened with invasion. By May 1854, subsequent legislation henceforth authorised the 
embodiment of the militia whenever a state of war existed. Yet there can be no doubt that 
their primary motive remained the need to find an additional source of manpower for the 
regular army, a role most commanding officers either willingly or begrudgingly complied 
with (only a few refusing outright). However, the embodiment also served the practical 
purpose of enabling regular units stationed in Britain to serve abroad meaning the 
defence of the UK rested predominantly upon the militia. Some units even had the 
opportunity to serve abroad after legislation was passed in 1854 which allowed units to 
offer to serve abroad; yet, although many offered, just ten were sent to garrison stations 
throughout the Mediterranean. For the many units serving in the UK, the experience of 
both embodiments was not dissimilar to that of the disembodied training.  Their duties 
consisted largely of drill and parade upon the barrack square. Nonetheless, some were 
camped at the major military stations while others served in regular barracks across 
Britain and Ireland. 
By comparison, the militia undertook a more active role during the South African 
War, this despite the government initially intending to use it in a similar domestic role as 
in the 1850s. Eventually over 65,000 officers and men served abroad, most as part of 
their own units. Generally they were used as a means of relieving regular troops from 
garrison duties, only a few ever being used in active operations against the enemy. Yet 
the fragmented and increasingly mobile nature of the conflict meant many units 
experienced some form of fighting, while others were trained as mounted infantry and 
DWWDFKHG WR /RUG.LWFKHQHU¶V IO\LQJ FROXPQV*DUULVRQGXWLHV DW LVRODWHG VWDWLRQVPHDQW
everyday life could be tough, although most were able to bare the strain; some units did 
so for considerable periods. By contrast, for those serving in units at home the 
embodiment was in many ways similar to those of the 1850s. Once again they acted as 
garrison troops, several units serving in Ireland and a few in the Channel Islands, some 
again sent to relieve regular garrisons in the Mediterranean. However, compared to the 
1850s, many more were able to take advantage of more comprehensive training 
arrangements which meant there was a greater focus upon field exercises simulating 
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defensive duties against invasion and raiding, despite their being little credible threat of 
such. There was also far less of a need to billet militiamen, most serving instead in 
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6. Reform and the Special Reserve, 1902-1914 
 
The unprecedented use of the militia in South Africa proved to be somewhat of a turning 
point in its fortunes. After 1902 the militia rapidly declined, the strength of its officer 
corps and rank and file dropping to levels not seen since the 1850s. This, in combination 
with wider concerns over the efficacy of the army and the auxiliary forces more widely 
and the need for financial retrenchment, meant both the Unionists and Liberals 
recognised the urgency of reform. Between 1902 and 1908 three Secretaries of State for 
War, William St John Brodrick, Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster and Richard Burdon 
Haldane, presented three separate reform schemes, all of which proposed to 
fundamentally alter the organisation of the militia. Despite this, scholars have so far 
presented a fragmented narrative of the attempts to grapple with militia reform as part of 
the wider drive for the reorganisation of the army. Much of the existing historiography 
focuses upon the wider nature of Edwardian army reform and, in terms of the auxiliary 
forces, the eventual creation of the Territorial Force (TF). Perhaps unsurprisingly there 
has also been more focus upon the successful reforms of Haldane than those of his less 
successful predecessors. Even those studies which do examine the reforms of Brodrick 
and Arnold-Forster have, by virtue of their breadth, only partially examined militia 
reform.1 6LPLODUO\ WKH FUHDWLRQ RI +DOGDQH¶V 6SHFLDO 5HVHUYH 65 DQG WKH H[WHQW WR
which such a move represented continuity with the militia which preceded it, has been 
overshadowed by concern for the TF. However, this has been partially addressed  in a 
wider examination of the Edwardian Army in which, it is argued, the reform represented, 
for some units at least, a relatively seamless transition from the militia to the SR, 
although others were more disrupted by the experience. Any idea that the militia simply 
transferred en masse to the SR can be challenged by examining statistics over the 
proportion of militiamen and officers transferring. Despite this, much of the source 
material relates to the Irish militia meaning that there is room to test these assumptions in 
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British units.2 
 Clearly there remains a gap in our understanding of how the reforms of the 
Edwardian period affected the militia, while questions remain over the degree of 
continuity between the militia and the SR. The three schemes presented by Brodrick, 
Arnold-Forster and Haldane each recognised that the militia would, in some form or 
other, be a key mechanism for the rapid expansion of the regular army, seen to be vital if 
the difficulties encountered during the South African War were to be avoided. Despite 
this, each of them had different beliefs on how the militia could be reformed in order to 
achieve such a goal. Brodrick believed that only the best elements of the militia were 
worth incorporating into his army corps scheme, while similarly his successor Arnold-
Forster saw the militia as largely ineffective and therefore decided it too should have its 
EHVW XQLWV LQFRUSRUDWHG LQWRKLV SODQQHG µKRPH VHUYLFH¶ DUP\ %\FRPSDULVRQ+DOGDQH
was initially more open to the idea that a large portion of the existing militia would be 
suitable to continue providing its officers were willing to accept an overseas liability and 
the drafting of their men directly into the regular army. Each of the three schemes 
encountered opposition which coalesced around the issue of militia reform. Yet although 
Brodrick and Arnold-Forster were willing to retain portions of the militia alongside their 
own existing schemes, the strength of opposition saw them fail. In both cases this was 
due to a strong lobby of serving and former militia officers within both houses of 
Parliament (although they were arguably more influential in the House of Lords), 
although for Arnold-Forster it was opposition from within the cabinet, most notably from 
the Prime Minister (who like other members believed the militia was capable of being 
transformed into a secondary line through the provision of whole units abroad), which 
prevented him from pushing forward with any portion of his plan. Despite facing 
opposition from members of the radical left wing of the Liberal Party, Haldane managed 
to secure the support of the Unionist front-bench and thus had more freedom to push 
forward with his own scheme despite the concerted opposition of militia officers within 
the Lords and those whose units were marked for disbandment. 
 It is also clear that the creation of the SR represented more of a transitional 
moment that an outright break with the past. When it was formed on 1 October 1908 
most of its manpower simply transferred as part of their existing militia units to take up 
their new roles as reserve battalions, although for those units reorganised or disbanded 
                                                 
2
 For an examination of the militia and SR, as part of an examination of the Edwardian Army more widely, 
see Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army  ¸pp. 106-22. 
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the experience understandably created greater upheaval. Many of the difficulties which 
had afflicted the militia continued to affect the SR. Not only did it struggle to recruit 
enough men to maintain its strength, many of whom were increasingly younger due to the 
ORQJHUSHULRGRI UHFUXLWV¶ WUDLQLQJEXW LW DOVR VWUuggled to retain its existing manpower 
due to high rates of desertion and the continued liability to provide both officers and men 
for the regular army. Therefore, by the eve of the Great War the SR was arguably in a 
more parlous state than it had been prior to the reform. 
 
* * * 
 
For the British Army the South African War had been a somewhat humbling experience, 
clearly demonstrating the urgent need for a more flexible defensive system which would 
make full use of both regular and auxiliary forces for the defence of the UK and the 
empire.  
As Secretary of State for War since 1895, Lord Lansdowne was well aware of the 
calls for reform. Despite this at first he had little intention of bringing forth any scheme 
after war was declared, although by June 1900 he felt the need to clarify his draft 
proposals for militia reform which on the whole were geared towards further binding it to 
the regular army. Firstly, he proposed that all militiamen should in future be liable for 
service abroad without the need for temporary enabling legislation (as required for units 
serving in South Africa), either as whole units or through drafts. Secondly, he advocated 
the abolition of both the existing militia reserve and the special service sections, with the 
aim instead to form a reserve of militiamen which, instead of augmenting the army, 
would allow the rapid expansion of the force during wartime. This would be formed by 
those who had completed at least six years¶VHUYLFH with the offer of a £2 bounty and the 
liability to be drilled six times each year. The fact that the measures would mean the loss 
of the existing reserve, which in 1900 numbered approximately 25,000 men in strength, 
was of little consequence as, in effect, the plans would transform the whole of the militia 
into whDW DPRXQWHG WR D UHVHUYH IRU WKH DUP\7R LQFUHDVH WKHPLOLWLD¶VDELOLW\ WR IXOILO
such a role Lansdowne proposed that recruits should be trained for an additional three 
months (taking the total training period to six months), one month of which was to be 
under their own officers which it was hoped would breed greater familiarity between the 
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officers and men.3 ,QPDQ\ZD\V/DQVGRZQH¶VSURSRVDOVHFKRHGWKRVHRIKLVVXFFHVVRUV
in that they recognised the need for the militia to be further integrated with the regular 
army, although without formally uniting the two and still acknowledging that the militia 
was to remain partially distinct from the line. Nevertheless, the proposals remained just 
WKDW GXH WR /DQVGRZQH¶V SURPRWLRQ WR WKH )RUHLJQ 2IILFH LQ WKH ZDNH Rf the Unionist 
YLFWRU\ DW 2FWREHU¶V µ.KDNL (OHFWLRQ¶ 'HVSLWH WKLV WKH 8QLRQLVW JRYHUQPHQW UHPDLQHG
committed to further reform. Therefore, the Prime Minister, the 3rd Marquess of 
Salisbury, who had one eye firmly upon such, appointed St John Brodrick as 
LDQVGRZQH¶VVXFFHVVRU4  
From the outset Brodrick was aware of the challenges he would face juggling 
both the conduct of the war and reform of the army. He knew that in order to present the 
best chance of success he would have to act before the war was over in order to avoid 
public distaste for increased military spending in peacetime.5 In terms of his plans for the 
auxiliary forces, his proposals were guided by certain beliefs over their future role in 
relation to the army. Firstly, he envisaged the army moving beyond its hitherto rather 
limited raison d'etre of providing garrisons for India and the colonies (as specified by 
Edward Stanhope in 1888), instead arguing that the it should be organised on a basis 
which allowed it as a whole to fight on the continent in the event of a European war. This 
meant that the auxiliary forces would have to play a more central role in supporting the 
army by acting both as a source of additional manpower and through taking over the role 
of home defence. It was hoped such a system would, in the words of Lord Roberts (the 
QHZ&RPPDQGHULQ&KLHIJLYHPRUHµHODVWLFLW\¶WRWKHDUP\DQGQHJDWHWKHQHHGIRUD
large increase upon the regular establishment. Brodrick was also aware that any scheme 
would need to maintain voluntary enlistment as its central principal in light of the 
political and practical inadequacies of conscription ± not only was the issue electoral 
suicide, but also short service conscripts were inadequate for maintaining colonial 
garrisons. Similarly, there was little political support for an ultimately unsuccessful draft 
bill introduced by the Earl of Wemyss on three separate occasions, from 1898 to 1900, 
which called for the reintroduction of the ballot.6 




 6DWUHµ6W-RKQ%URGULFNDQG$UP\5HIRUP¶SS-39 (pp. 118-9).  
5
 TNA, PRO 30/67/6, Brodrick papers, October to December 1900, Brodrick to Salisbury, 18 October 
1900. 
6
 Earl of Midleton, Records & reactions, 1856-1939, (New York (NY): E. P. Dutton and Company Inc., 
1939 ), pp. 138-6DWUHµ6W-RKQ%URGULFNDQG$UP\5HIRUP¶SS-39 (p. 121); Williams, Defending 
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3UHVHQWHG WR 3DUOLDPHQW LQ 0DUFK  %URGULFN¶V DUP\ UHIRrm scheme, aside 
from an increase to the regular establishment, proposed the formation of six army corps 
each consisting of 40,000 men, the first three comprised of regular troops for immediate 
service abroad, while the latter three were formed from a selection of regular and 
auxiliary units primarily tasked with home defence. To make this a reality Brodrick 
intended to invite a selection of the most efficient militia, volunteer and yeomanry units 
to form part of the three home service corps: this included 21 militia artillery batteries 
and 37 infantry battalions in addition to six yeomanry regiments, 15 batteries of volunteer 
artillery and 25 volunteer battalions. Each corps would be based at Colchester, York and 
Edinburgh respectively and would draw upon units from the surrounding counties. This 
meant that the 4th corps was expected to draw upon the largest and most efficient units 
from around London, while the 5th corps would draw those based primarily in Lancashire 
and Yorkshire. The remainder of the militia not invited to form part of the home defence 
corps would be retained aside from the reduction or merger of some of the least efficient 
units. In order for his scheme to be a success, however, Brodrick recognised that the 
militia needed to become more efficient. To achieve this he proposed to give militiamen 
the additional 3d per day (when either embodied or assembled for training) which had 
been granted to the regulars three years prior. He also hoped to induce more men to see 
out their term of service by paying an additional non-training bounty of £3 to each man 
after the completion of their second annual training, payable in three separate instalments 
(on the first day of October, December and February)  throughout the year. Furthermore, 
like Lansdowne KHSURSRVHG WRDEROLVK WKHH[LVWLQJPLOLWLD UHVHUYHDQG IRUP LQVWHDG µD
JHQXLQH UHVHUYHRIPLOLWLD¶FRPSULVHGRI H[SHULHQFHGPLOLWLDPHQZKRKDGVHUYHG IRU DW
least two engagements (totalling a minimum of ten years) and former regulars with a 
minimum of 14 years¶VHUYLFH with the colours and army reserve. Each would be called 
out for a short period of annual musketry and paid 4d per day, but prohibited from 
serving outside of the UK. Brodrick hoped that a 50,000 strong reserve could thus be 
formed which in the event of war would expand the size of the militia without any need 
to find any additional recruits.7  
Although the reform scheme passed through Parliament, it was not without its 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Empire, pp. 10-1; TNA, PRO 30/67/6,  Roberts to Brodrick, 9 November 1900; BL, Add MS 
/DQVGRZQHSDSHUVµ3DSHUVRQSURSRVDOVIRUD0LOLWLD%DOORW«¶WR 
7
  HC Deb., 8 March 1901, vol. 90, cc. 1052-92 (cc. 1063-73); Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV, p. 
207. 
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critics. Most of the debate focussed upon its impact upon the regular army and whether or 
not the money would be better spent on the navy.8 Nevertheless, some concerns were 
raised over the practicalities of militia reform. A small minority of regular and militia 
officers claimed that the scheme was unworkable because there was no way of finding 
the requisite manpower in order to keep the militia at its present strength while also 
establishing his new militia reserve. They were later joined by the Duke of Bedford who, 
not for the last time, bemoaned a scheme which in his view did little to address the 
PLOLWLD¶V ZLGHU VKRUWFRPLQJV SDUWLFXODUO\ LWV VKRUWDJH RI VXIILFLHQW RIILFHUV DQG 1&2V
Displaying his contempt for the efficiency of the volunteers, he also feared the fact that 
%URGULFN¶V VFKHPH VSHOW WKH HQG IRU WKH PLOLWLD¶V ULJhtful place as the senior auxiliary 
force. Therefore, he proposed that the best course of action would be for the militia and 
\HRPDQU\ WR EH WUDQVIRUPHG LQWR D WUXH µILHOG DUP\¶ ZKLFK LQ WKH HYHQW RI WKH UHJXODU
army proceeding abroad would be capable of taking the field against any enemy party 
which might seek an opportunity to mount a raid.9 Nevertheless, by the end of 1901 
Brodrick remained confident that his scheme could be successfully implemented so long 
as it was completed before the public taste for increased expenditure began to lapse, 
although he acknowledged he required not just full cabinet support but also the need to 
µHQWHUWDLQDODUJHUUHFRJQLWLRQRI>WKH@DX[LOLDU\IRUFHV¶10  
It was not long before Brodrick began to implement the first elements of his 
reorganisation of the militia and the auxiliary forces. By August the Militia and 
Yeomanry Act henceforth incorporated the yeomanry under the same legislation as the 
PLOLWLDWUDQVIRUPLQJWKHODWWHULQWRZKDWDPRXQWHGWRDµPRXQWHGPLOLWLD¶%\'ecember 
1902 Brodrick was also successful in passing legislation which authorised the 
establishment of his new reserve of militia alongside a similar reserve for the yeomanry.11 
The same year a committee chaired by the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces 
investigated how best to implement the wider reorganisation of the militia. It concluded 
that on the whole the strength of the infantry should remain the same at 125 battalions (an 
                                                 
8
 Campbell-Bannerman and the Liberal opposition feared the prospect of increased military spending, while 
a small yet vocal group of young Unionist MPs led by Lord Cecil Hugh (including most notably Winston 
Churchill, Arthur Stanley and Lord Percy), who all desired to gain recognition within the House, bemoaned 
WKHIDFWWKDW%URGULFN¶VVFKHPHZDVDQXQQHFHVVDU\H[SHQVHGXHWRWKHSULPDF\RIWKH5R\DO1DY\LQWKH
FRXQWU\¶VGHIHQVLYHDUUDQJHPHQWV6DWUHµ6W-RKQ%URGULFNDQG$UP\5HIRUP¶SS-39 (pp. 122-4); 
Williams, Defending the Empire, pp. 13-7. 
9
  HC Deb., 11 March 1901, vol. 90, cc. 1241-76 (cc. 1241-2); Ibid., 14 March 1901, vol. 90, cc. 1605-69, 
(cc. 1624, 1627-8, 1637, 1667);  HL Deb., 25 June 1901, vol. 95, cc. 1350-86 (cc. 1350-1, 1360-70, 1380-
4). 
10
 TNA, PRO 30/67/8, Brodrick papers, July to December 1901, Brodrick to Roberts, [1901]. 
11
 1 Edw. VII, c. 14; 2 Edw. VII, c. 39; Beckett, %ULWDLQ¶V3DUW7LPH6ROGLHUV, pp. 207-8. 
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addition of just one). However, as part of the reorganisation Irish battalions were to be 
reduced from 38 battalions to just 21 through a reduction in the overall strength of the 
Irish establishment and the merger of units, the total number of companies falling from 
192 to just 158. In stark contrast an additional 22 companies were added to the 
establishment of the militia in the remainder of the UK, and the number of battalions 
increased by eight. These alterations were made along the guiding principal that the size 
of each battalion should be altered depending upon the probable supply of recruits from 
the associated sub-district, and that in each territorial regiment there should where 
possible be one militia battalion for each regular battalion. This meant that many militia 
battalions which were below their establishment were to be retained at a reduced strength 
while others, principally those in urban and industrial areas, were to be augmented or 
even split into additional battalions. For instance, it was proposed that the 3rd 
Oxfordshire Light Infantry would be reduced from eight to six companies on account of 
its strength being just 391 men. By comparison the 5th and 6th Manchester Regiment, 
both with an establishment of eight companies and a strength of 1,383 and 1,190 men 
respectively, were to be augmented by an additional eight companies and form a 7th 
battalion. The committee also established that the total number of Royal Garrison 
Artillery (RGA) (Militia) corps was to be reduced from 38 to 21, while an additional 15 
field artillery batteries were to be raised for the 3rd, 4th and 5th corps of the scheme in 
addition to the three already formed in Lancashire. Again Ireland was to face the brunt of 
the cuts as twelve of its existing RGA (Militia) corps were cut to just four, with those cut 
converted into six batteries of field artillery or merged into the remaining infantry 
battalions. The cuts were less severe in the rest of the UK as although the total 
establishment was reduced by 20 companies the number of corps remained the same with 
the exception of three which were converted into three brigades of field artillery (namely 
the Norfolk, West of Scotland, and Yorkshire RGA) 12 
However, as the South African War drew to a close it was clear elements of 
%URGULFN¶VUHIRUPVZHUHIDFLQJGLIILFXOWLHV1RWRQO\GLGKLVVL[DUP\FRUSVHxist only on 
paper, but aspects of his militia reform were encountering problems. He had based his 
scheme on the assertion that militia recruitment could be maintained at current levels and 
that the additional 50,000 reservists would boost the forces establishment to 150,000 
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 It was agreed that there was room for negotiation for corps unhappy with their conversion so long as an 
HTXLYDOHQWFRUSVIURPWKHVDPHDUHDVZDVZLOOLQJWREHFRQYHUWHGLQVWHDG71$:2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without the need to increase the overall establishment. However, although in 1900 and 
1901 recruitment amounted to approximately 37,000 men in each year this quickly fell 
after the war. Furthermore, the rate at which militiamen and regulars joined the new 
reserve was far less than that required as by October 1903 only 5,052 men had joined, 
while a year later this had only risen to 7,082 men.13 Furthermore, it was increasingly 
clear that others within the Unionist Party had alternative views as to the role of the 
militia and the auxiliary forces within his scheme. Most importantly he struggled to 
convince both Salisbury and Balfour as to the validity of the strategic assumptions his 
UHIRUPV ZHUH EXLOW RQ %RWK EHOLHYHG WKH DUP\¶V SULPDU\ FRncern was the defence of 
India and the colonies and not war in Europe, subscribing to the view of Lord Selborne, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, that the Royal Navy would guarantee the defence of the 
country against invasion. This meant there was little sHQVHLQUHWDLQLQJ%URGULFN¶V ODWWHU
three corps specifically for home defence. Balfour had already developed ideas of an 
alternative role in which the militia would instead provide the means for the expansion of 
the regular army by providing whole units and drafts for service in India and the colonies 
in the event of war, while at home the remaining militia units and the volunteers would 
provide the necessary manpower to defend against raiding. Such a view was later 
supported by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) after Balfour charged it with 
examining the possibility of invasion in July 1903.14  
Towards the end of his tenure it was clear Brodrick was becoming an increasingly 
isolated figure. He encountered growing opposition to his plans for reform of the internal 
organisation of the War Office from the very individuals he needed to make his wider 
scheme a success. At the same time his relationship with Lord Roberts deteriorated over 
his refusal to return more control of the army to the Commander-in-Chief. He also came 
into conflict with Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who 
bemoaned the increased expenditure required to make short service and an increase in the 
basic rate of pay a reality. Similarly, he clashed with Joseph Chamberlain over the nature 
of his army reforms and lost the support of the King. Furthermore, the Peace of 
Vereeniging signed in May 1902 meant that it would be increasingly difficult to gain 
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support for the increased military spending required to implement the scheme. As a result 
he began to encounter renewed opposition from a group of young Unionist rebels led by 
Lord Cecil Hugh and an increasingly unified Liberal opposition over the direction and 
cost of the reforms. Twice in early 1903 the government faced challenges to the reform 
scheme and on both occasions they were unable to stop the Unionist rebels from voting in 
favour of the amendments or abstaining. Crucially, Brodrick also faced continued 
criticism from the auxiliary forces, most notably from volunteers concerned at his 
demands for greater efficiency and longer annual camps. Balfour attempted to address 
some of the concerns voiced by the auxiliary forces with the establishment of a Royal 
Commission, chaired by the Duke of Norfolk, which was charged with examining the 
militia, volunteers and yeomanry in detail. Nevertheless, the respite was only temporary 
DV WKH ILQDO EORZ WR%URGULFN¶VSRVLWLRQFDPHXSRQ WKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI WKH UHSRUWRI WKH
Elgin commission, in August 1903, which criticised the general thrust of his reform 
scheme and the lack of measures to significantly improve the efficiency of the auxiliary 
forces. As a result Balfour took the opportunity for a cabinet reshuffle, resulting from the 
resignation of Chamberlain and three other ministers over the issue of tariff reform, to 
move Brodrick to the India Office.15  
 
* * * 
 
When Arnold-Forster began to formulate his own proposals for army reform the guiding 
principles of his scheme were already well established. A prolific writer on the subject, 
he believed, unlike his predecessor, that the ultimate security of the UK rested with the 
5R\DO1DY\DQGWKDWWKHDUP\¶VSULPDU\GXW\ZDVIRUVHUYLFHLQ,QGLDDQGWKHFRORQLHV16 
Recognising the continued need to cut defence spending, the ongoing naval shipbuilding 
programme meant reductions would have to be found in the army estimates, although 
%URGULFN¶VVKRUWVHUYLFHVFKHPHPHDQWLWZRXOGEHWKHDX[LOLDU\IRUFHVWKDW bore the brunt 
of further cuts (a policy which fit into his preconceived hostility towards the auxiliary 
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forces)+HZDVDORQJVWDQGLQJFULWLFRIWKHPLOLWLDDUJXLQJLQWKDWµ7KH0LOLWLDLV
D SDWHQW DQG UHFRJQLVHG IUDXG¶ +H ODWHU DUJXHG WKDW LW KDG EHHQ WKH YLFWLP RI
mismanagement by the War Office which had simply treated it as a source of officers and 
men for the regular army. As a result the militia was well below its establishment, while 
it also lacked sufficient officers, NCOs and no formal organisation above brigade level. 
He concluded that, as it stood, the militia could neither provide for the defence of the 
realm, nor provide replacements for the regular army abroad, due to there being no 
liability for foreign service. Therefore, as he began to set out his plans between January 
DQG0DUFKKHDUJXHGWKDWµ,WLVHVVHQWLDO«What the question of the Militia should be 
WDNHQDWKDQGDWRQFH¶17  
In essence, Arnold-)RUVWHU¶V UHIRUPV ORRNHG WRELQG WKHEHVWSDUWVRI WKHPLOLWLD
more firmly to the regular army. Firstly, he planned to abandon the principle of linked 
battalions establiVKHG E\ &DUGZHOO E\ DVVLJQLQJ  UHJXODU EDWWDOLRQV IRU µJHQHUDO
VHUYLFH¶DEURDGSULQFLSDOO\LQ,QGLDDQGWKHFRORQLHVEXWDOVRZLWKWKHFDSDFLW\WRIRUPD
strike force in the event of a crisis elsewhere). Secondly, he proposed to take 30 (later 
rising WRRIWKHUHJXODUEDWWDOLRQVDQGIRUPWKHPLQWRWKHQXFOHXVRIDµKRPHVHUYLFH¶
army which, in wartime, would provide for the immediate expansion of the army abroad. 
Controversially, he planned to augment its strength with 60 of the most efficient militia 
battalions. He was initially ambiguous as to the fate of the remaining 64 militia 
battalions, although his personal preference was that they were to be disbanded saving 
£690,000 a year from the estimates. There was little need to retain them for domestic 
defence against possible raiding parties; not only would the home service army be 
capable of meeting such a threat, but also he planned to retain  a reduced volunteer force 
and the  yeomanry for such a purpose. Although he conceded that those battalions 
selected would be able to retain their current titles and separate identities, Arnold-
)RUVWHU¶V SURSRVDOV ZRXOG HVVHQWLDOO\ OHDG WR DEROLWLRQ RI WKH PLOLWLD DV D VHPL-
independent force. This seemed at odds with his initial thinking outlined earlier in 
December and January which demonstrated he was still contemplating the possibility of 
its reformation. However, it appears his position quickly hardened as he became 
FRQYLQFHGWKDWµ7KHJUHDWHUSDUWRIWKH)RUFH«>ZRXOG@EHLPSURYHGE\EHWWHUWUDLQLQJE\
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its association with the Line, by permanent embodiment, by greater responsibilities, and 
E\EHLQJSODFHGXQGHUWKHFRPPDQGRISURSHURIILFHUV¶ ,QDGGLWLRQWRKLVSODQVIRU WKH
PLOLWLD¶VLQIDQWU\$UQROG-Forster proposed that the RGA (Militia) would be retained but 
at a reduced strength, with 72 companies not allotted to any particular stretch of coast 
(predominantly in Ireland) being disbanded, a measure which would see the 
establishment reduced by 7,200 men with a saving of £104,000. The militia engineers and 
submarine miners would remain unaffected.18  
It was not long before opposition from members of the Army Council forced 
Arnold-Forster to alter elements of his scheme. On the whole they supported the general 
thrust of his reforms, although they had a preference for an enlarged home service army 
of 112 battalions, an idea which Arnold-Forster himself had previously put forward as an 
alternative, and which as a result would mean the abolition of just 42 militia battalions. 
However, far from showing any concern for the wellbeing of the militia, the Army 
Council were more concerned with the fact that his scheme involved the disbandment of 
fourteen regular battalions which, they argued, would be better served joining the home 
service army in place of the militia.19 Therefore, in March Arnold-Forster put forward an 
amended scheme which saw the size of each battalion increased from 500 to 600 men, 
although he refused to increase the number of battalions to match the general service 
army. He also altered their terms of service so that they would serve for two years with 
the colours and six years with the second-class reserve (as opposed to just fifteen months 
with the colours and six years nine months with the reserve), while during the later they 
would only be expected to attend two (as opposed to four) periods of refresher training. 
Crucially, in order to assuage supporters of the militia he proposed to transfer 40 (later 
reduced again in April to just 30) battalions to the home service army. Most notably, he 
also temporarily abandoned any plans to disband the remaining battalions with just 24 
(later raised to 34) of the least efficient to be disbanded. Furthermore, he also proposed a 
IXUWKHUVDYLQJWKURXJKWKHDEROLWLRQRI%URGULFN¶VPLOLWLDUHVHUYH20   
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Despite his apparent willingness to compromise, Arnold-Forster in fact made it 
clear he believed the best, and most cost effective, solution was to press forward with his 
original intention to abolish the militia, something he intended to do once parliamentary 
opinion was less hostile to the idea. His belief was only strengthened by the findings of 
WKH 1RUIRON FRPPLVVLRQ¶V LQYHVWLJDWLRQ SXEOLVKHG LQ 0D\ LQWR WKH HIILFLHQF\ RI WKH
militia and volunteers. They found that alone neither force was capable of adequately 
defending the country against invasion unless they were continuously drilled so that they 
could be brought up to a satisfactory level of efficiency. This provided him with all the 
justification he needed to decide to go ahead with his home service army and the decision 
to abolish those militia battalions not required as part of it. However, more worryingly for 
Arnold-Forster, the commission also came to the conclusion that the only means by 
which any substantial invading force could be defeated without regular support would be 
through the creation of an army for home defence raised by conscription. They 
discounted a return to the militia ballot because it would entail exemptions for those 
serving in the volunteers, thus meaning the latter would simply become a refuge for those 
attempting to avoid compulsory militia service.21 Despite this, Arnold-Forster was 
unwilling to accept any form of conscription as part of his army reform scheme. He used 
the fact that the commission could not agree upon what size force was required to 
successfully resist an invasion attempt, or even the likelihood of invasion in the first 
place (due to disagreement between the Admiralty and the War Office which 
subsequently deferred the issue to the CID, itself refusing to provide an estimate until 
their own investigations were concluded) as a way of discrediting the call for 
conscription.22 
7KH1RUIRONFRPPLVVLRQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQVKDGQRQHWKHOHVVJLYHQ LPSHWXV WR WKRVH
who advocated compulsory military service as an alternative to Arnold-Forster¶VUHIRUPV
Notably many of these schemes had the historic concept of a citizen militia at their heart. 
7KHSXEOLFDWLRQRI*HRUJH6KHH¶V7KH%ULWRQ¶V)LUVW'XW\, in 1901, by a later founding 
member (and secretary) of the National Service League (NSL), reaffirmed not only that 
%ULWDLQZDVRSHQWRWKHWKUHDWRILQYDVLRQEXWDOVRWKDWWKHVROXWLRQZDVDµ3DQ-Britannic 
0LOLWLD¶IRUKRPHGHIHQFH%DVHGXSRQWKH6ZLVVV\VWHPRIVKRUW-term term conscription, 
it would be composed of men aged 18 to 22 and trained continuously for one year before 
                                                 
21
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undergoing periods of refresher training in the reserve (based loosely upon the German 
system). His view of the existing militia was sympathetic, but nonetheless scathing in 
WHUPVRI WKHLUPLOLWDU\ZRUWK UHFRJQLVLQJ WKDW µWhe material and the spirit of the Militia 
DUH H[FHOOHQW¶ DOWKRXJK WKHLU ODFN RI VWUHQJWK PHDQW WKH IRUFH ZDV WR TXRWH $UQROG-
Forster, a fraud.23 Therefore, his scheme supplanted the militia as it existed, although it 
retained the wider concept of a citizen militia (a point which much of the NSL literature, 
examined below, would later focus upon). Initially adopted by the newly established 
NSL, its failure to attract sufficient members forced them to adapt the scheme to 
something less radical and more in keeping with the existing militia: instead those aged 
18 to 22 would serve just two months under canvas followed by an annual drill of two 
weeks in each of the following three years.24 A further problem was that their views were 
not necessarily shared by others who desired a compulsorily recruited militia. When, in 
July 1904, the Earl of Wemyss attempted to introduce to Parliament measures which 
ZRXOGUHLQVWDWHWKHPLOLWLD6KHHDUJXHGDJDLQVWLWµRQWKHJURXQGWKDWLWZDVLQYLGLRXV¶
Wemyss responding that the ballot represented a far less burdensome form of compulsory 
service upon the population as a whole.25 Despite the fact that advocates of compulsion 
remained split over how best to achieve their goals, Arnold-Forster was nonetheless 
aware that many senior figures supported some form of compulsory service, noting in 
$XJXVWKRZWKH$UP\&RXQFLOKDGEHHQµVROLGO\FRQVFULSWLRQDOLVWIURPLWVHDUOLHVW
GD\V¶26 
Despite the NSLs calls for conscription, much of the opposition to his militia 
reforms continued to emanate from Parliament. After his original plans for the total 
abolition of the force were leaked from the War Office in May, on the 14th a deputation 
FRQVLVWLQJRIPHPEHUVRIWKH+RXVHRI&RPPRQV6HUYLFH0HPEHUV¶&RPPLWWHHHDFK
of whom was associated with the militia, voiced their concerns directly to Balfour. In 
addition to opposing the total abolition of the militia, they pressed for greater 
representation of the auxiliary forces through the creation of a separate section at the War 
Office accountable directly to the Secretary of State for War. Aside from his annoyance 
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that they had tried to circumvent him by directly approaching the Prime Minister, Arnold-
Forster maintained that a separate department would threaten the unity of military 
administratioQDUJXLQJWKDWDVHSDUDWHµEUDQFK¶KDGDOUHDG\EHHQHVWDEOLVKHGDQGZRXOG
SURYLGH VXIILFLHQW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ $JDLQ KH PDGH LW FOHDU µWKDW WKH 5HJXODU $UP\ LV
LQILQLWHO\PRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQHYHQWKH$X[LOLDU\)RUFHV¶DQGWKDWKHFRXOGWKXVQRWPDNH
an exception for the militia.27 In July Arnold-Forster was able to address Parliament 
directly over his intentions, although division within the cabinet meant he was prevented 
from bringing a bill before the Commons which, in combination with the recent War 
Office leaks, meant many had little idea as to what was to happen to the militia. Captain 
Arthur Griffith-Boscawen of the 3rd Royal West Kent Regiment summed up the concerns 
RIPRVWFULWLFVZKRIHDUHGDEROLWLRQZRXOGGHVWUR\WKHPLOLWLD¶VYLWDOUROHDVµWKHIHHding-
ERWWOH RI WKH OLQH¶ DQG LWV SRVLWLRQ DV D FRXQW\ VRFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQ ,QGHHG KH LQVLVWHG
abolition was unnecessary as an improved militia, shorn of its worst units and made liable 
for service abroad, could provide the means of expansion desired by the government.28 
Similar concerns were also voiced in the Lords, most notably by the Duke of Bedford 
who argued that the more favourable terms within the home service army would dissuade 
potential recruits from enlisting for general service (as those in the latter were enlisted for 
nine years with the colours); retaining the militia was therefore the best alternative as it 
appealed to a wider social base and avoided the worst of such competition. However, 
where he and other more reactionary militia supporters differed from others was that they 
believed compelling militiamen to serve abroad would increase rates of desertion and 
make the service less attractive to those who wanted to avoid regular service.29  
Sustained Parliamentary opposition did not force Arnold-Forster to change tack. 
Spurred on by the general support of the Army Council, who on the whole believed there 
was little point in retaining the militia alongside a home service army, he denounced the 
PLOLWLD¶VVXSSRUWHUVDVµROGZRPHQZKRORRNXSRQWKHLU regiments as a sort of honorary 
addition to their positions as County Magnates or as leading figures in some dull, 
LQHIIHFWLYHVRFLHW\¶30 With such a view in mind Arnold-Forster began to push forward 
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with some of the preparatory steps required for his plans despite their remaining no firm 
consensus over whether the force would be abolished. Firstly, he proposed to halt 
recruitment in all units planned for disbandment, a measure which meant he could avoid 
the need to request from Parliament any further increase to the estimates. Secondly, in 
November, Army Order 207 increased the physical requirements for militiamen so that, 
on the whole, they were almost identical to the line (although chest measurements were 
permitted to be half an inch less than in the regulars), with special provisions allowed for 
recruits aged seventeen. Finally, in December 1904, Arnold-Forster consulted with 
members of the Army Council over which of the least efficient units were to be 
disbanded or amalgamated. By January they agreed that four infantry battalions were to 
EH GLVEDQGHG D IXUWKHU  DPDOJDPDWHG ZLWK WKHLU UHJLPHQW¶V VLVWHU EDWWDOLRQ ZKLOH
fourteen RGA (Militia) corps were to be disbanded outright (with the possibility that, if 
volunteer units were available, a further five could be disbanded also), a decision which 
Arnold-Forster was clear was to be taken without any due regard for the personal 
objections of militia colonels or local magnates. He also began preparation of a bill which 
would make the remaining militia liable for foreign service in case of war or in 
anticipation of hostilities.31  
Parliamentary opposition was something Arnold-Forster had anticipated. 
However, it was clear the main obstacle to his reforms came from within the cabinet. 
Balfour, Selborne and Viscount Cranborne (now the 4th Marquess of Salisbury) ± both 
the latter were active militia colonels in Hampshire and Bedfordshire respectively ± all 
shared the view that a reformed militia was capable of providing the expansionary power 
the army required so long as it acted upon the recommendations of the Norfolk 
commission and was made liable for service abroad. Salisbury even claimed that 
retaining a reformed militia could save as much as £500,000 from the estimates, a figure 
which he later revised upwards to £750,000.32 This view was also supported by the 
Secretary of the CID Sir George Clarke who believed the militia was too ingrained in 
society to warrant abolition. He even went as far as to develop his own alternative 
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scheme for an enlarged militia consisting of a field force of 180,000 men.33 Nevertheless, 
Arnold-Forster remained convinced that the militia could not act as a substitute to the 
home service army, rejecting his colleagues views that  retention of any part was 
incompatible with the Chancellor RIWKH([FKHTXHU¶VGHVLUHIRUDVLJQLILFDQWUHGXFWLRQWR
WKHHVWLPDWHV/DWHUKHODPEDVWHG&ODUNHRYHUKLVODFNRINQRZOHGJHRIµWKHRIILFHUVDQG
PHQ RI WKH $UP\¶ ZKLFK OHG KLP µWR UHJDUG DOO LQGLYLGXDOV LQ WKH«5HJXODU 0LOLWLD RU
Volunteers as practicall\LQWHUFKDQJHDEOHXQLWV¶34  
Arnold-)RUVWHU¶VLQWUDQVLJHQFHEURXJKWKLPLQWRLQFUHDVLQJFRQIOLFWZLWK%DOIRXU
Hitherto the Prime Minister had been hesitant to undermine him by outwardly backing an 
alternative scheme, although mounting pressure to secure further savings from the 
IRUWKFRPLQJ\HDU¶VHVWLPDWHVPHDQWKHEHJDQWRH[SORUHDOWHUQDWLYHV35 Along with Clarke 
and Esher, Balfour began to develop his own alternative scheme which substituted a 
reformed militia for the home service army. Its infantry were to be reduced to just 80 
battalions which were to be distributed across ten divisions, each including a proportion 
RIWKHPLOLWLD¶VHQJLQHHU5$0&DQG$6&XQLWVDORQJZLWKUHJXODUILHOGDUWLOOHU\EDWWHULHV
which would enable the division to serve abroad as a complete formation. Additionally 
the length of training was to be increased and a greater emphasis placed upon musketry, 
WR EH FDUULHG RXW LQ HDFK PDQ¶V VSDUH WLPH36 ,Q WKH PHDQ WLPH DQG DW %DOIRXU¶V
persuasion, Arnold-Forster had agreed to refer the militia issue to a subcommittee of the 
&,' LQ WKH KRSH D FRPSURPLVH FRXOG EH UHDFKHG DOWKRXJK KH IHDUHG WKDW &ODUNH¶V
inclusion meant he would try to press his own proposals for reform. Arnold-Forster was 
right to be suspicious as instead of reconciling the opposing views the subcommittee 
DUJXHGRYHUZKHOPLQJO\LQIDYRXURID%DOIRXU¶VVFKHPH8QVXUSULVLQJO\$UQROG-Forster 
was unwilling to consent. He even went as far as to threaten to resign if any further 
modifications were made, the result that again the cabinet were deadlocked, something 
which continued to agitate the militia supporters in Parliament due to the uncertainty 
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surrounding the future of the force.37  
Clearly Arnold-Forster was unwilling to entertain the idea that his home service 
army could be replaced outright by a reformed militia. However, he remained wedded to 
his amended scheme in which battalions not required as part of the home service army 
would be retained, albeit in a reformed state. In July he met with a deputation of militia 
officers, including MPs and Peers, with the aim of canvassing their opinions on the 
direction of militia reform.38 Most importantly, however, in February he consented to the 
introduction of a bill to the Lords for the purpose of making militiamen liable to serve 
abroad if their units were embodied, despite the fact that he made it clear his personal 
preference remained the amalgamation of the militia into his home service army.39 The 
UHDFWLRQ RI WKH PLOLWLD¶V VXSSRUWHUV ZDV IDU IURP XQDQLPRXV 2QFH DJDLQ WKH PRUH
reactionary elements, spearheaded by Wemyss, criticised the bill on the grounds that it 
would damage recruitment and re-enlistment rates (and in his view put an end once and 
for all to his desire for a reintroduction of the ballot). Yet more moderate peers, including 
Raglan, supported the measure, and eventually the vote was passed with ease by 69 votes 
to 21 after reassurances were delivered that the bill simply aimed to bring the legislative 
basis of the militia into line with the practicalities of its experience during the South 
African War; even Bedford, who was initially sceptical, was won round and voted in 
favour of the bill.40 However, the success was short lived as before it could be read in the 
Commons the bill was withdrawn in August on account of the summer recess.  
By the end of 1905 the government remained deadlocked with neither Arnold-
Forster or Balfour able, or indeed willing, to force a compromise. This state of affairs 
remained largely unchanged until December when the government were forced to resign. 
Balfour could not risk removing Arnold-Forster or forcing him into a change of policy, 
for fear that his resignation would split the party and potentially bring down the 
government. Although (in 1902) just 48 MPs were serving or retired militia officers, 
almost all Unionists. This was magnified in the Lords which despite being a smaller 
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chamber contained 52 militia representatives, again almost all Unionist peers.41 This 
meant the issue of militia reform had the potential to divide the party, a risk Balfour was 
unwilling to take. On the other hand, Arnold-Forster remained a politically isolated figure 
who, despite gaining the broad support of the Army Council, was unable to gain the 
cabinet support he required to formally introduce a bill to Parliament; this was in spite of 
the departure of Selborne and Wyndham which, temporarily at least, gave him some hope 
of a break through.   
 
* * * 
 
The continued failure of army and auxiliary forces reform meant the new Liberal 
Secretary of State for War, Richard Burdon Haldane, was determined to find a solution. 
Although driven by a similar urge to see the militia reformed as part of a wider drive to 
reduce the estimates, unlike his predecessors Brodrick and Arnold-Forster he faced less 
direct pressure from members of his own party over the direction of his reform. A firm 
DGYRFDWH RI WKH µEOXH ZDWHU¶ VFKRRO +DOGDQH HFKRHG WKH FRQFOXVLRQ RI WKH &,' WKDW
invasion was unlikely. As a result he believed that the chief role of the auxiliary forces 
was to provide a second line in support of the regular army, particularly in regards to the 
creation of a striking force which would be ready to serve both throughout the empire and 
on the continent. However, unlike Arnold-Forster, Haldane initially believed that the 
militia could provide such an expansionary role without being subsumed directly into the 
regular army. Therefore, when he began to develop his proposals for an expeditionary 
force in the early months of 1906, Haldane proposed that the militia would contribute 
30,000 men to the overall strength of ten divisions (totalling 154,000 men). To allow this 
he proposed to make all militiamen liable to service abroad, although he did not intend 
for militia infantry battalions to serve overseas as whole unit; instead they would simply 
provide drafts to their territorial regular battalions serving as part of the expeditionary 
force. By contrast most of the RGA (Militia) would, upon mobilisation, form part of the 
expeditionary force, serving as additional manpower upon the ammunition columns. 
Although he discounted any possible threat of invasion, home defence was henceforth to 
be the responsibility of the volunteers and yeomanry, reorganised into a single 
µ7HUULWRULDO )RUFH¶ DOWKRXJK WKH\ WRR ZHUH H[SHFWHG WR SURYLGH D ZD\ WR H[pand the 
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expeditionary force if required).42 
 Like his immediate predecessors, Haldane encountered a significant degree of 
resistance to his proposals. While he was drafting his proposals Haldane was in frequent 
correspondence with Esher and Clarke at the CID, who both had misgivings over his 
proposals. Esher had little love for the militia (or other auxiliary forces) due to his 
support for compulsory military service, while he also had concerns over the uncertainty 
of whether or not Haldane intended for the militia to be placed permanently under the 
Mutiny Act (as opposed to while embodied or assembled for training). However, Clarke 
was far more concerned due to his continued faith in the efficacy of his own reform 
scheme in which the militia would serve abroad as whole units.43 Nevertheless, once 
DJDLQ +DOGDQH¶V PRVW LQWUDFWDEOH FULWLFV ZHUH WKH PLOLWLD OREE\ KHDGHG E\ WKH 'XNH RI
Bedford (including, most notably, Viscount Hardinge, Lord Raglan, Earl of Wemyss, 
Lord Ampthill and the less dogmatic Marquess of Salisbury), whose chief grievance 
centred on whether the liability of the militia for service abroad would be as whole 
battalions or companies, or simply as drafts. They maintained that recruits, many of 
whom they insisted enlisted in the militia as an alternative to service in the line, would be 
dissuaded from entering the militia if they were liable to be directly drafted into the 
regulars and that militiamen would only serve abroad under the command of their own 
officers within their own units. Haldane acknowledged their fears and thus dropped the 
liability for the militia to immediately contribute to the expeditionary force; only 
members of the RGA (Militia) serving in the ammunition columns would face any such 
liability. He also made assurances that if the militia were to be used abroad they would do 
so as units under the command of their own officers. As part of the provision for the 
\HDU¶VHVWLPDWHV+DOGDQHHYHQFRQVHQWHGWRH[SHULPHQWZLWKDSODQXUJHGE\%HGIRUGIRU
20 militia battalions to train under their own officers for six months, while for the first 
year recruits would be prevented from joining the line. However, he was unwilling to 
discount the liability for the provision of drafts. Therefore, on three separate occasions 
(twice prior to introducing his plans to Parliament, in May and June, and again in 
September) he was unable to persuade representatives of the force to agree to his 
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proposals, or for that matter any agreement on their joining the TF.44  
 Haldane subsequently rejected any further attempts at compromise and, in a stark 
contrast to his predecessor, was able to forge ahead with a modified version of his 
original scheme. Instead of attempting to force the militia to accept the liability for the 
provision of drafts directly to the line, Haldane simply circumvented them by effectively 
replacing the militia with an entirely new force, but one which would take over its role as 
a manpower reserve for the line. Under the provision of the Reserve Forces Act, 1882, 
Haldane allowed men who had never served with the regulars to be permitted to join the 
ILUVW FODVV DUP\ UHVHUYH DV µVSHFLDO UHVHUYLVWV¶ 6XFK PHQ ZRXOG EH IRUPHG LQWR 
battalions (66 in England, Wales and Scotland, and eight in Ireland), each one linked to a 
pair of line battalions for the purpose of providing drafts for the latter in wartime 
(formalising a role already provided by the militia). This negated the worst aspect of the 
existing regimental system by providing each pair of regular battalions with a training 
depot which would support them while serving abroad as part of his planned 
expeditionary force (as opposed to one line battalion supporting the other while serving 
abroad, a balance that it had proved almost impossible to manage). These 3rd battalions 
would be limited to an establishment of between 500 and 600 men and were expected to 
contribute up to 60,000 men as direct drafts on the outbreak of war. Special reservists 
would be enlisted for six years as at present in the militia, but crucially they were to be 
trained for six months upon enlistment and for just two weeks annually thereafter. Each 
battalion would also act as a practical training ground for their officers, although it was 
expected that only one-half of all officers serving above lieutenant would come from the 
militia, the remainder being former regular officers. When in February 1907 Haldane 
formally introduced the revised plans, he made it clear that the militia was incapable of 
taking the field as a complete force because it lacked its own cavalry and sufficient field 
artillery, or as individual units because a significant proportion of the rank and file 
consisted of seventeen year old boys who would not be permitted to serve abroad in the 
event of war. In fact, Haldane made it clear no militiamen under the age of twenty would 
be allowed to serve abroad in such an event meaning that most units would be severely 
lacking in manpower.45 
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 Formally introduced to the Commons in March 1907, the Territorial and Reserve 
Forces Bill unsurprisingly drew opposition, although it was far from unified. Bedford and 
the militia lobby continued to fear the loss of their own influence and positions within 
their own units. Yet more broadly there was considerable hostility from the opposition 
Unionist benches. Spearheaded in the Commons by Balfour and Sir George Wyndham, 
and in The Times by the military correspondent Colonel Charles Repington, they argued 
that the SR was a poor alternative to a reformed militia, lacking the ability to rapidly 
expand the army abroad which would be provided by allowing existing militia units to do 
VR DV GXULQJ WKH 6RXWK $IULFDQ :DU  %DOIRXU¶V FRQWLQXHG LQVLVWHQFH WKDW WKH DUP\¶V
primary focus should be the defence of India meant he believed they could quite easily be 
used to free additional regular units from garrison duties, something which had not 
previously been too much to ask of even the youngest militiamen.46 Nonetheless, 
+DOGDQH¶V RSSRQHQWV ZHUH IDU IURP XQLILHG DV %DOIRXU DQG 5HSLQJWRQ EODPHG %HGIRUG
and the militia lobby for their dogmatic opposition to the provision of drafts which had 
originally forced Haldane to abandon any hope of incorporating the militia into his 
VFKHPH IRU WKHP WKH 65 ZDV VLPSO\ WKH µUHVXOW RI D KLWFK DQG IDLOXUH WR DUULYH DW D
satisfactory agreement between the Army &RXQFLODQGWKH0LOLWLDFRORQHOV¶7KLVZDVD
charge they vehemently rejected, both Bedford and Hardinge asserting in Parliament that 
their position had been misrepresented particularly with regards to the widely circulated 
account of their previous meetings with Haldane and their apparent refusal to accept any 
form of direct drafting to the line. In their view they had never rejected the liability to 
provide drafts outright, but simply offered the opinion that the existing Militia Act of 
1882 forbade the transfer of militiamen to any other unit without their consent and that 
any alteration of the clause would not be conductive to getting recruits who would also 
accept the liability to serve abroad.47  
 Even though the opposition was disunited, Haldane failed to get the bill through 
Parliament unchanged. Once again the main sticking point proved to be the militia issue. 
Before it even reached the Lords, where Haldane expected to face his greatest opposition, 
KH ZDV IRUFHG LQWR D FRPSURPLVH GXH WR %DOIRXU¶V H[Sloitation of an anomaly in his 
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proposals which saw twelve Irish militia battalions retained due to the fact there were no 
volunteer units with which to form territorial units. In conjunction with six regular 
battalions held back from the expeditionary force, these battalions would not only be 
expected to provide drafts for units abroad, but would also (like the TF) have the option 
of serving abroad as whole units to provide an additional means of expansion. Although 
Haldane tried to play down the anomaly, Balfour argued that if such a system could be 
applied to Ireland then it could also be applied elsewhere, seemingly backing up the 
8QLRQLVWEHOLHIWKDW+DOGDQH¶V65VFKHPHZDVQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQDUHVXOWRIKLVLQDELOLW\
to come to an agreement with the militia.48 This left him with little option but to 
compromise and on 30 May he summoned Esher, Repington, Colonel Gerald Ellison (his 
military secretary) and Major-General Douglas Haig (the Director of Military Training) 
to the War Office in order to discuss meeting some of the more moderate demands 
previously mooted by Salisbury, which at a subsequent meeting with the latter on 3 June 
Haldane agreed to.49 As a result all but the 23 least effective of the 124 militia infantry 
battalions would be retained and instead used as the foundation of the SR (instead of 
being simply supplanted by it), meaning that most battalions could retain a degree of 
continuity and their distinctive regimental traditions. Although as before 74 battalions 
would become depots for the provision of drafts for their regular counterparts, an 
DGGLWLRQDOEDWWDOLRQVZRXOGDOVREHUHWDLQHGLQDGGLWLRQWRWKHLQ,UHODQGDVµH[WUD
UHVHUYH¶ EDWWDOLRQV RI DURXQG  PHQ 7KLV PHDQW LQ WRWDO  µEDWWDOLRQV ZRXOG EH
available for the immediate expansion of the army (although in wartime they could also 
be expected to provide drafts). The RGA (Militia) was again to be incorporated into the 
SR, all but two units, the Antrim and Cork RGA (Militia), being converted into Royal 
Field Artillery (RFA) Reserve and earmarked for service upon the ammunition columns 
in wartime. Additionally both regiments of militia engineers were to be also incorporated 
into the SR with the intent that they would provide the Royal Engineers with a similar 
capability for expansion. All militia RAMC units, however, were to be disbanded.50 
7KHGHFLVLRQWRFRPSURPLVHSURYHGWREHWKHEUHDNWKURXJKPRPHQWIRU+DOGDQH¶V
militia reforms. Although it was not perfectly amenable to the opposition, and despite 
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Arnold-)RUVWHU¶V DWWHPSW Wo introduce an amendment striking the militia from the 
consideration of the bill entirely, Balfour was willing to back it. Even with the continued 
SURWHVWDWLRQVRI%HGIRUG5DJODQDQG$PSWKLOOZKRODUJHO\VDZ+DOGDQH¶VFRQFHVVLRQV
as giving too little, they were unable to prevent the Under-Secretary of State for War, 
Lord Portsmouth, with the support of Salisbury, Lansdowne and Esher, from negotiating 
the bill through the Lords with only minor alterations. Haldane remained in frequent 
correspondence with Balfour and Salisbury over their attempts to sabotage the bill. The 
last ultimately unsuccessful attempt came on 18 July when Bedford proposed an 
amendment imposing a two year moratorium upon the reforms, subsequently undercut by 
%URGULFN¶V QRZ 9LVFRXQW 0Ldleton) own suggestion of a one year delay which was 
subsequently accepted, forcing Bedford to withdraw his own amendment.51  
The only issue left for Haldane to establish was which militia units would be 
disbanded as part of his scheme. An army order, issued on the 23 December 1907, laid 
out which 23 infantry battalions would be disbanded. Much of the reasoning was based 
on a desire to eliminate the least efficient units, although in reality the selection was also 
guided by several other factors. There is no doubt that many of the disbanded battalions 
were on the whole weaker than their counterparts: only eight of those disbanded were 
recorded as having more than 500 men at the beginning on 1908, with one, the 4th Border 
Regiment, containing just 134 men.52 However, there remained the need to ensure each 
territorial regiment had at least one battalion supporting its two regular counterparts. 
Therefore, in most regiments precedent ensured that if a battalion was to be disbanded it 
was in most cases the 4th battalion, regardless of whether or not the 3rd was in fact the 
weakest of the pair. For instance, the 4th Gloucestershire Regiment were selected for 
disbandment despite the fact that in 1907 they had a higher strength than the 3rd 
Battalion, which was instead retained. It is also clear that such a decision may have also 
been based on the extent to which each battalion was integrated into its wider territorial 
regiment (as argued in the pages of The Times by Repington), as seventeen of those 
disbanded had hitherto maintained their headquarters separately of the regimental 
depot.53  
Unsurprisingly there was considerable hostility to the reforms from those 
                                                 
51
  HL Deb., 18 July 1907, vol. 178, cc. 811-92, (cc. 854-85); Williams, Defending the Empire, pp. 116-7. 
52
 See Appendix 7 for those units disbanded. PP, Militia units. Return showing the establishment of each 
unit of militia in the United Kingdom; and the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete, at the 
training of 1907, Cd. 3932, (1908). 
53
 The Times, 21 January 1908. 
     
 244 
connected to the units selected for disbandment. In Cambridgeshire, officers of the 4th 
Suffolk Regiment (former Cambridgeshire Regiment) convened two public meetings, at 
Ely and Cambridge, both of which were keenly attended by local notables including the 
Lord Lieutenant, chairman of the local County Association, the Dean of Ely and the 
Master of Corpus College, among others. They lamented that the disbandment would 
VHYHUWKHFRXQW\¶VFRQQHFWLRQWRWKHDUP\H[FHSWWKURXJKWKH7)7KH\DOVREHPRDQHG
that the 5th King's Royal Rifle Corps (formerly the Huntingdonshire Rifles) had managed 
to survive despite the fact that it was numerically weaker in strength than the 4th Suffolk 
5HJLPHQWVHHPLQJO\UXEELVKLQJ+DOGDQH¶VFODLPWKDW WKHFXWVZHUHDLPHGRQO\DWXQLWV
which struggled to recruit and prompting claims that somehow he had been influenced 
into sparing them. Later fears were also raised over the economic impact disbandment 
would have in Ely. A similar response was seen in Buckinghamshire with meetings 
convened to discuss how to prevent the disbandment of the 3rd Oxfordshire Light 
Infantry (formerly the Royal Buckinghamshire Regiment), a move which would also 
VHYHU WKDWFRXQW\¶V OLQN WR WKHDUP\ Its officers also stated their dissatisfaction at what 
was perceived as a slight against the honour of the county due to the fact that the 4th 
Oxfordshire Light Infantry survived despite being the junior battalion as well as 
numerically weaker than the 3rd Battalion. As a result members from representatives 
from Cambridgeshire and Buckinghamshire formed part of a deputation alongside 
representatives of the 4th Welsh Fusiliers (former Royal Caernarvonshire Rifles), 4th 
South Wales Borderers (former Royal Montgomeryshire Rifles) and 4th Yorkshire 
Regiment (former North Yorkshire Rifles) which aimed to petition Haldane to spare their 
units. Despite meeting with the representatives on 22 January 1908, Haldane and the 
DUP\FRXQFLOZHUHXQPRYHG7KH\DUJXHGWKDWµHDFKFDVHZDVFRQVLGHUHGLQGLYLGXDOO\RQ
LWVPHULWVPDLQO\RQWKHJURXQGVRILWVVXLWDELOLW\«WRIXOILOWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRQGLWLRQV
which will in future be required of tKHPDMRULW\RIWKH6SHFLDO5HVHUYH¶DGGLQJWKDWµWKH
non-VHOHFWLRQ RI D EDWWDOLRQ IRU UHWHQWLRQ GRHV QRW«UHIOHFW LQ WKH OHDVW GHJUHH RQ LWV
PLOLWDU\HIILFLHQF\¶7KHLURQO\FRQFHVVLRQZDVWKDW WKH\ZRXOGVXSSRUWWKHLGHDIRU WKH
name and traditions of disbanded units to be associated with units in the TF, although this 
would have to meet the approval of the local County Associations.54 
7KHUH DOVR UHPDLQHG D OLQJHULQJ EXW XOWLPDWHO\ LQHIIHFWXDO WKUHDW WR +DOGDQH¶V
                                                 
54
 Cambridge Independent Press, 3, 10, 17, 24 January and 7 February 1908; Bucks Herald, 4, 11, 18, 25 
January, 8 February and 4 July 1908; Letter, E.D.W. Ward (Secretary to the War Office) to the deputation 
of militia officers, 1 February 1908, reprinted in The Times, 4 February 1908. 
     
 245 
reforms from members of the NSL who was becoming more assertive in its attempts to 
establish compulsory military training. However, much of their attention had shifted 
away from establishing a compulsorily recruited militia and towards reforming the newly 
established TF. Although attempts to apply compulsory service to the TF failed to gain 
sufficient support, firstly via an amendment of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill and 
later through two  National Service Bills (in 1909 and 1913), there were some signs that 
the alternate concept of a compulsorily recruited militia was viable.55 Indeed, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd-*HRUJHDUJXHGWKDWµZHPLJKWDLPDWUDLVLQJ
500,000 armed militia to supplement our Regular Army to provide against 
FRQWLQJHQFLHV«WKRVHOLDEOHWRVHUYHFKRVHQE\ ORW¶56 This concept also remained a key 
feature of much of the NSLs printed material in the years prior to and during the First 
World War. Two pamphlets, one published in 1909 and the other in 1915, both touched 
upon the concept, although the latter went further by linking the idea of compulsory 
service to a tradition of compulsory militia service dating back to the Anglo-6D[RQµI\UG¶
and subsequently carried down to the present through the militia.57 
 
* * * 
 
In many respects the creation of the SR represented a moment of transition as opposed to 
an outright break with the past. As a whole the SR continued to be organised into several 
branches, each with a distinct role in support of their regular counterparts. As before, the 
most prominent were the infantry, comprising 74 reserve battalions and 27 extra reserve 
battalions. These were followed, in decreasing order of their established strength, by the 
RFA Reserve (comprising 31 brigades), RGA Reserve (comprising the remaining two 
Irish militia RGA corps) and Royal Engineer Reserves (comprised of both regiments of 
militia engineers). Due to the fact that the TF was not extended to Ireland, two units of 
Irish yeomanry, the North and South Irish Horse, were included upon the strength of the 
SR while, in 1913, King Edward¶s Horse was also  transferred from the yeomanry. In 
subsequent years the SR was expanded with additional branches which would enable it to 
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support a wider variety of regular units. Soon after its creation the establishment of the 
force was expanded significantly by the addition of reserve RAMC units (their militia 
equivalents having been previously disbanded) and, for the first time, reserve Army 
Service Corps (ASC) units, adding 8,000 and 4,500 to the established strength of the SR 
respectively (although the former was soon cut to just 4,000 the following year). At the 
same the Army Veterinary Corps (Special Reserve) was established and by 1 October 
1913 three men and 21 officers were upon its strength. Similarly, in 1913, the SR was 
expanded to support the military wing of the Royal Flying Corps which, on 1 October 
1913, had 31 officers upon its strength.58 
 However, one thing which partially distinguished the SR from the militia was that 
reservists enlisted into different categories of service. Initially Special Army Order issued 
RQ'HFHPEHUFUHDWHGWZRFDWHJRULHVµ$¶FRQWDLQLQJµ7KRVHZKRPXVWEHWUDLQHG
DV VROGLHUV DQG LQVWUXFWHG LQ WHFKQLFDO PHWKRGV SHFXOLDU WR PLOLWDU\ VHUYLFH¶ DQG µ%¶
FRQWDLQLQJ µ7KRVH ZKRVH GXWLHV«ZLOO EH FRJQDWH WR their occupations as civilians and 
ZKRFRQVHTXHQWO\QHHGOLWWOHLQVWUXFWLRQDVVROGLHUV¶$OWKRXJKDWILUVWDOOUHVHUYLVWVZHUH
enlisted under category A, a Special Army Order of 20 November 1908 permitted the 
enlistment of men for category B provided they were members of TF units belonging to 
the branch of the reserve they wished to join (although qualified members of the St. 
-RKQ¶VRU6W$QGUHZ¶V$PEXODQFH$VVRFLDWLRQVZHUHDOVRSHUPLWWHGWRMRLQWKH5$0&
reserve under the same conditions). In April 19DWKLUGFDWHJRU\µ&¶ZDVLQWURGXFHGWR
allow recruits engaged in a specialised occupations the ability to enlist in the ASC reserve 
(serving as mechanical transport drivers) with as little disruption to their personal life as 
possible, meaning they were exempted from attending both the recruit and annual 
training. Nonetheless, those serving in categories B and C were small in number; for 
instance, on 1 October 1913 there were 55,606 special reservists serving in category A, 
compared to 1,283 in B and 2,176 in C. There were also similar distinctions between the 
officers: most served on the strength of their units, but some were also supplementary to 
their units while other served upon a similar line to those men enlisted in category B, 
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therefore belonging but remaining supernumerary to their territorial units.59  
For most units that survived, the transition to the SR was relatively simple, 
enabling them to maintain their existing traditions and honours and involving very little 
upheaval. Such was the case with the 5th Northumberland Fusiliers which was simply re-
GHVLJQDWHGDVWKHUHJLPHQW¶VUGEDWWDOLRQDIWHUWKHUHJXODUUGDQGWK%DWWDOLRQVUDLVHG
during the South African War, were disbanded in order to provide additional savings) and 
it continued to train at Alnwick Castle just as it had before the conversion. The 3rd East 
Kent Regiment continued to train at Shorncliffe camp just as it had during previous 
annual trainings, the recruits having previously assembled for their training. Similarly, 
the 3rd Bedfordshire Regiment continued to train at Ampthill Park just as it had in the 
years preceding the reform. It also seems that for the Royal Monmouthshire Royal 
Engineers (Militia) the transition was largely seamless.60  
However, for others the conversion was more traumatic. Several units saw the 
order of precedence unceremoniously disregarded, such being the case within the 
Durham Light Infantry, the 3rd and 4th Battalions of which swapped numbers, the 3rd 
becoming the 4th Extra Reserve Battalion and the 4th the 3rd Reserve Battalion. The 
principle reason for this appears to have been based simply on whether or not the reserve 
battalions were located in areas conductive to recruitment so that they would more easily 
fulfil their role as draft finding units. The old 4th Battalion (formerly the 2nd North 
Durham Regiment) had been based at the regimental depot in Newcastle, close to the 
industrial and urban areas in Tyneside, whereas the old 3rd Battalion (formerly the 1st 
South Durham Regiment) remained apart at Barnard Castle in the more rural south. Such 
reasoning was also seen in similar cases in Ireland.61 Nonetheless, the transition was 
worse still for the RGA (Militia), several units of which were disbanded immediately 
after the reform, the Cornwall and Devon Miners RGA, for instance, being disbanded in 
1909.62 
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Table 6.1: The Destination of Serving Militia Officers and Other Ranks within the Militia 




1 October 1907 
Enrolled 





Still Serving with 
the Militia on 1 
Oct 1908 
Free Discharge / 
Resigned, up to 
1 Oct 1908 









RFA « 165 234 291 14 131 « 14 2 14 
RGA « 11,686 610 10,303 297 7,425 9 1,369 52 412 
RE « 1,640 201 1,469 72 1,201 3 79 7 50 
Infantry « 67,741 2,178 51,776 1,539 39,905 122 6,411 230 9,183 
RAMC « 1,077 275 841 17 84 4 513 3 159 
Total 2,174 82,331 2,265 64,680 1,952* 48,746 138 8,386 294 9,818 
*Exclusive of the 23 disbanded infantry battalions. Total for officers transferred includes 13 on the 
unattached list. 
 
In order to manage the transition from the militia to the SR, a special Army Order, 
issued on 27 December 1907, set out the means by which serving officers and men were 
to be induced to transfer. Firstly, those who opted to join the SR would receive a one-off 
£2 bounty for accepting the additional liabilities it entailed, either remaining in their units 
or by transferring to another. Secondly, they could opt to remain serving under their 
current terms of service, but without the ability to re-engage or the liability to assemble 
for any further annual trainings; therefore, the old militia would continue to exist in an 
ever dwindling number until the last men were formally discharged. Thirdly, militiamen 
not wishing to transfer were given the option of a free discharge (with those in the 23 
disbanded battalions having their discharge dated to enable them to receive the non-
training bounty due on 1 February), while officers opting not to transfer their services to 
the reserve of officers were expected to resign their commissions. Those that took the 
option of a free discharge were allowed to join the SR later and would also be liable for 
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joined the reserve of officers; (4) the number of militia-men who (A) took a free discharge up to 1st 
October, 1908, (B) remained on that date, Cd. 4608, (1909).  
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Table 6.2: The Establishment and Strength of the Special Reserve and Remaining Militia, 
1907 to 1913.65 
 
  Officers Other Ranks Remaining 
Militiamen 
  Establishment Strength  Percentage Establishment Strength  Percentage 
1 Oct. 1907* 3,374 2,174 64.4 122,787 82,331 67.1 « 
1 Oct. 1908 3,211 1,865 58.1 77,089 61,263 79.5 8,385 
1 Oct. 1909 3,056 1,913 62.6 87,608 68,041 77.7 5,134 
1 Oct. 1910 2,870 1,964 68.4 83,669 61,122 73.1 2,967 
1 Oct. 1911 2,911 2,018 69.3 88,308 58,913 66.7 1,655 
1 Oct. 1912 2,900 2,130 73.4 87,013 56,824 65.3 775 
1 Oct. 1913 2,832 2,362 83.4 75,832 59,063 77.9 143 
*Militia only. 
 
Although most officers and men opted to transfer to the SR, the transition was not 
entirely seamless. Table 6.1 shows that, in total, 1,952 officers and 48,746 men opted to 
transfer. Proportionally speaking, militiamen were less inclined to transfer than their 
officers. An even lower proportion of men serving in the 23 disbanded units opted to 
enlist in the SR (as shown in Appendix 7); only 4,632 out of a total of 10,307 opted to do 
so. There was a greater likelihood that officers would opt to join the SR, Table 6.1 
showing that 86% chose to do so. This was even the case in the units which had been 
disbanded. For instance, when the 4th Norfolk Regiment was disbanded twelve of the 
officers opted to join the 3rd battalion.66 
Unfortunately for the SR, one aspect in which it was too similar to the militia was 
its inability to maintain its strength. Table 6.2 shows that at no point prior to the outbreak 
of the Great War was it able to meet its establishment of officers or men. Between 1912 
DQG WKH IRUFH¶V VWUHQJWK UHDFKHG LWV ORZHVW OHYHO VLQFH DOWKRXJKRQFHDJDLQ
this varied from unit to unit. For instance, in 1913 an officer of the 4th Durham Light 
Infantry commented that the battalion was struggling to maintain its strength.67 The 
situation was barely improved when in February 1913 recruitment to RFA Reserve units 
was closed after it was deemed they were surplus to requirements, with those serving 
given the option to transfer their service to another branch of the service upon the 
termination of their service. A key reason why the SR struggled to maintain its strength  
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was simply that there were too few recruits to make good the yearly total of wastage (a 
point illustrated in Table 6.3). In 1908 the War Office had hoped that the SR would be 
more successful at attracting recruits than the militia due to the fact that the six month 
period of recruit training would be long enough to support unemployed men (principally 
agricultural workers) through the winter. However, for this to work it required a large 
pool of unemployed labour, something which was increasingly threatened by an 
improved labour market and high rates of emigration, thus limiting the availability of 
recruits. The situation was also compounded by the continued manipulation of the 
minimum physical requirements when recruiting improved. For instance, on 30 
September 1909 the decision was taken to raise the minimum height standards for 
recruits in both the infantry and RFA Reserve  by an inch (being raised to 5ft 3in in the 
former and 5ft 6in in the latter) on account of the fact that many units had reached close 
to their established strength. However, this had the knock-on effect of constricting the 
potential pool of recruits the following year, while it did little to help those units which 
had not been as successful in reaching their establishment.70 Furthermore, despite their 
desire to increase the physical standards of recruits, the average recruit was by 
comparison younger than those who had previously joined the militia, usually between 17 
and 19 years of age. This was again a result of the prolonged period of recruit training 
which tended to prevent older men, who were more likely to have at least some form of 
temporary employment, from volunteering.71 
Another problem which continued to afflict the SR in much the same way as 
before was the difficulty with which the force retained its manpower. As both Table 6.3 
and Table 6.4 demonstrate, on average the greatest drain upon the SR remained the 
transfer of men to the regular army, followed by desertion, those purchasing their 
discharge and those discharged as medically unfit. Crucially, no more than one-third of 
the yearly total discharged were those who had completed their full term of enlistment, a 
figure which reached a peak of 29.8% in the year up to the 30 September 1912, but 
quickly plummeted the following year to just 13.8%. There were also similar difficulties 
in encouraging men to renew their period of engagement. Table 6.3 shows that only a 
VPDOO SURSRUWLRQ RI HDFK \HDU¶V LQFUHDVH ZDV DFFRXQWHG IRU E\ PHQ ZKR KDG EHHQ UH-
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enlisted subsequent to being discharged. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that each year 
many of those whose period of service was due to expire failed to re-engage for a 
subsequent term before they were discharged. From 1912 onwards this did begin to 
improve after a re-engagement bounty of £1 was introduced on 1 May as an additional 
inducement. The result was that the proportion of men re-engaging before their discharge 
continued to rise year of year ± in the year up to 30 September 1912 a total of 12,667 men 
came to the end of their service, while in the following year just 5,293 did so; therefore, 
the proportion re-engaged actually increased from 37.7% (4,785) to 46.9% (2,486).72 
 
* * * 
 
Ultimately the creation of the SR did not represent the end of the militia, but rather the 
logical solution to the best means of finally cementing its place as part of the regular 
army. However, as Brodrick, Arnold-Forster and Haldane found out, implementing their 
own separate visions of how best to integrate the militia were far from straightforward as 
militia reform proved to be one of the most divisive issues faced by either the Unionist or 
Liberal governments during the period. Each of their schemes shared the common goal of 
reducing expenditure meaning that the militia would have to play a greater role as a 
mechanism for the rapid expansion of the regular army than before, whether that be as 
SDUW RI %URGULFN¶V WKUHH µKRPH¶ DUP\ FRUSV $UQROG-)RUVWHU¶V KRPH VHUYLFH DUP\ RU
+DOGDQH¶V 65 7KHVH FRPPRQ JRDOV ZHUH QRW HQRXJK WR VWRS HDFK VFKHPH IURP
encountering opposition. Both Brodrick and Arnold-Forster were willing to compromise 
(although the latter became increasingly entrenched in the efficacy of his scheme), both at 
some stage permitting the retention of at least a part of the militia in addition to their 
existing schemes. Nonetheless, the strength of opposition within from the Parliamentary 
militia lobby headed by Bedford and several other peers, plus in Arnold-)RUVWHU¶V FDVH
the criticism of Balfour and other members of the cabinet (who believed the militia was 
capable of being transformed into a secondary line through the provision of whole units 
abroad), meant neither of them were able to make their plans a reality. Haldane also faced 
opposition, although crucially he enjoyed a far greater degree of cross party support than 
his predecessor despite the continued opposition of several high ranking militia officers. 
After his initial scheme was rejected by the militia, Haldane took a firmer line by 
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attempting to impose his desired reforms regardless of their opinion. However, crucially 
he was able to make enough concessions to win over key members of the opposition front 
bench and some of the more moderate militia officers, securing in their view the future of 
the force through the creation of the SR, and thus giving him the necessary support to see 
the plans through Parliament.    
 Although as of 1908 the militia was in name effectively abolished, the creation of 
the SR represented a moment of continuity rather that an outright break with the past. Not 
only was it organised upon largely the same basis as the militia, but it also directly 
inherited most of manpower from the force, many officers and men simply opting to 
continue their service as part of their existing units in order to take up their new roles as 
reserve or extra reserve battalions. However, for those units reorganised or disbanded the 
H[SHULHQFH XQGHUVWDQGDEO\ FUHDWHG JUHDWHU XSKHDYDO SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH PLOLWLD¶V DUWLOOHU\
which faced disbandment in subsequent years. The SR not only continued to function in 
much the same way as the militia, but it also inherited many of their difficulties. Not only 
did it struggle to recruit enough men to maintain its strength, many of whom were 
LQFUHDVLQJO\\RXQJGXHWRWKHORQJHUSHULRGRIUHFUXLWV¶WUDLQLQJEXWLWDOVRstruggled to 
retain its existing manpower due to high rates of desertion and the continued liability to 
provide both officers and men for the regular army. Therefore, by the eve of the Great 
War the SR was arguably in a more parlous state than it had been prior to the reform. 
 






This study set out to undertake a comprehensive investigation of the reformed British 
militia of the Victorian and Edwardian period in order to explore one of the major 
UHPDLQLQJJDSVLQRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH8.¶VDXxiliary forces. It has looked to test the 
claims laid down in the existing, albeit limited, historiography by moving beyond the 
limited top-down approach of several works examining the Victorian army, which base 
their conclusions almost solely upon official records.1 Instead it taps into a more recent 
methodological trend utilising both national and local records as a means of ensuring the 
nuances and local character of the militia are not lost.2 
 ,WLVFOHDUWKDWRYHUWKHFRXUVHRIWKHSHULRGWKHPLOLWLD¶V raison d'être shifted from 
being organised for national defence towards providing a de facto secondary line in 
support of the regular army. Although only a temporary expedient during the manpower 
crises of the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny, from 1866 to 1881 the militia was 
intermittently recast as a more centralised and less independent force for the support of 
the regular army. Not only did it increasingly provide one of the single greatest sources of 
officers and men, but during the South African War it allowed for the expansion of the 
army through the provision of whole units for active service abroad. Furthermore, 
&DUGZHOO¶V HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI EULJDGH GHSRWV DQG WKH OLQNLQJ RI UHJXODU DQG PLOLWLD
battalions, later organised into territorial regiments, meant that for the first time the 
militia and the line were both organisationally and physically linked. Yet although this 
ZRXOGDOOVHHPWRSRLQWWR$QGHUVRQ¶VFODLPWKDW WKHSRVW-Cardwellian militia was little 
PRUHWKDQDQµDQDFKURQLVWLFDX[LOLDU\¶ LQIDFt, his assessment fails to acknowledge that 
the militia remained a localised force.3 Several units bucked the national pattern by 
remaining physically separate from their brigade headquarters meaning that they 
continued to control their own recruitment and recruit training. Also, although the power 
of the lords lieutenant to control their units was severely curbed in 1871, they formally 
retained the power to nominate potential officers for their first commissions. The militia 
also retained a small but influential Parliamentary lobby that was able to cause 
considerable difficulty for those attempting to further reform the force after the South 
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African War (although , it must be concluded, ultimately unsuccessfully).  
On a more specific note, the Militia Act of 1852 reconfirmed the concept of a 
militia for national defence throughout the UK and independent of the regular army, yet 
organised and recruited locally under the authority of the lords lieutenant. Although many 
connected to it argued that a direct link could be traced back to the militia of the Anglo-
Saxon period, the reality was that the militia could trace a direct lineage no further back 
WKDQWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIDµQHZPLOLWLD¶LQ,WZDVWKLVZKLFKIRUPHGWKHEDVLVRIWKH
1802 legislation, in turn providing the template for that reconstituted in 1852. The 
decision to base reform upon the 1802 legislation was, however, far from straightforward. 
From 1845 growing concerns over the threat of French invasion prompted four separate 
ministries to explore the idea of militia reform, although there was little consensus as to 
what form a reconstituted militia should take. Lord Palmerston firmly advocated a regular 
militia based upon the 1802 legislation; conversely, his personal and political adversary 
Lord John Russell wished to recast it as a purely local force for service within each 
FRXQW\ 1HYHUWKHOHVV LW ZDV 3DOPHUVWRQ¶V YLVLRQ ZKLFK ZRQ WKURXJK WKH GHFLVLRQ WR
abandon recruitment via the ballot, the cause of much social upheaval during the 
eighteenth century, meant henceforth recruitment would be based upon the less divisive 
principle of voluntary enlistment (although the ballot would remain upon the statute book 
as a contingency, not finally repealed until 1921). 
 As already noted, the militia became a more centralised force under the control of 
the War Office while its practical role effectively shifted to that of supporting the regular 
army. However, this was not as comprehensive a shift in the forces raison d'être as has 
been previously suggested.4 Although the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny shattered any 
illusion that the militia would be able to maintain itself as an equal and independent 
counterpoint to the regular army, losing over 46,000 militiamen over the course of both 
embodiments, this was far from a new role: it had undertaken a similar function during 
the Napoleonic Wars. Despite calls from individuals, such as Lord Panmure, for the 
greater integration of the militia and the regular army, Sidney Herbert effectively 
reaffirmed the pre-war status-quo by prohibiting the transference of militiamen to the 
line. Although this was not based upon any desire to defer to parochial concerns within 
the militia, illustrated by his willingness to amalgamate those units deemed too small to 
be effective, HHUEHUWKRSHGVXFKDPRYHZRXOGHQVXUHWKHTXLFNUHFRYHU\RIWKHIRUFH¶V
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strength. Once this had been achieved however, his successors not only reopened 
recruitment to the line, but also began to pursue a policy of greater centralisation of 
control over the PLOLWLDZKLFKFXOPLQDWHGLQ&DUGZHOO¶VGHFLVLRQWRWUDQVIHUPDQ\RIWKH
powers of the lords lieutenant to the War Office in 1871. Even more profound was the 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI KLV ORFDOLVDWLRQ VFKHPH ODWHU WUDQVIRUPHG LQWR +XJK &KLOGHUV¶
territorial regiments, which for the first time formerly linked the militia and line through 
the creation of a single brigade depot.  
&DUGZHOO¶VUHIRUPVZHUHQRWVLPSO\PRWLYDWHGE\DGHVLUHIRUWKHHQKDQFHPHQWRI
the regular army; he also hoped to make the militia a more militarily effective force. The 
PLOLWLD¶VWUDLQLQJZDVLQLWLDOO\UDWKHUUXGLPHQWDU\FRQVLVWLQJODUJHO\RIUXGLPHQWDU\GULOO
and parade upon the barrack square). Similarly, many units were forced to make do with 
substandard facilities, arms, uniform and equipment. Over the course of the 1860s and 
1870s this state of affairs improved significantly. Not only were the training periods 
extended, allowing for a better grasping of the basics, but opportunities were taken to 
ensure units had the chance to undertake more complex training by brigading them at 
military camps throughout the country. That is not to say these improvements were 
universal: the benefits of brigade training were not available to all units. Furthermore, 
training away from headquarters could make it harder to attract some recruits. However, 
there can be no doubt that in peacetime, from the 1870s onwards, the militia was better 
trained, armed, equipped and organised than prior. Furthermore, the militia was also re-
organised so that each branch of the regular service could be supported by corresponding 
militia units, each with specialist training. After 1877 the militia consisted of not just 
infantry and garrison artillery units, but also, field artillery, engineers and later submarine 
miners and a small contingent of medical staff to support the RAMC. 
The Militia Act of 1852 did little to radically alter the source and means by which 
militia officers were obtained. Initially the authority to appoint commissions remained 
with the lords lieutenant, although in practise it was often left to commanding officers to 
nominate individuals. Promotion was theoretically based upon seniority, although the 
retention of property qualifications for the rank of captain and above ensured the highest 
ranks were, before 1869, largely out of reach of officers who did not qualify. By 1854 
PRVW VHUYLQJ RIILFHUV KDG EHHQ FRPPLVVLRQHG DIWHU WKH IRUFH¶V UHFRQVWLWXWLRQ DOWKRXJK
there remained a useful nucleus of field officers who were commissioned before and who 
helped to form a nucleus around which regiments were able to reconstruct. County 




connections and patronage remained crucial for successfully securing a commission 
despite attempts to open commissions to retired regulars. Yet throughout the period it 
became ever harder to find enough officers to meet the needs of the force. This was 
largely due to the changing social composition of the force. By the 1870s the traditional 
link between the militia and landed gentry began to weaken (except for in the senior 
ranks) meaning that landed gentlemen found it increasingly difficult to find the time and 
money necessary to maintain oneself as a militia officer. This was largely due to the 
impact of agricultural depression which meant the number of independent landed 
gentlemen, who were reliant largely upon land rents for their income, subsequently 
decreased. Increasingly they were replaced by professionals and businessmen for whom a 
militia commission acted as a means of gaining respectability in local county society. 
Nevertheless, the biggest shift was in the number of young officers simply using the 
µPLOLWLDEDFNGRRU¶DVDPHDQVRIREWDLQLQJDUHJXODUFRPPLVVLRQZLWKRXWDWWHQGLQJHLWKHU
Sandhurst or Woolwich. This led to a high turnover amongst the junior ranks which 
contributed towards the growing deficiency of junior officers (particularly amongst 
captains). However, it is important not to overplay this national trend. There was 
variation in the proportion of gentlemen surviving in different units owing to the 
circumstances of the local economy. Furthermore, the opening of line commissions to 
militia officers failed to foster closer links between the line and militia as officers 
frequently transferred to other units and in some cases even to colonial units.  
The nature and composiWLRQ RI WKH PLOLWLD¶V UDQN DQG ILOH DOVR VKLIWHG RYHU WKH
course of the period. Fears that voluntary enlistment would make it difficult to maintain 
WKHPLOLWLD¶V VWUHQJWKZHUHZHOO IRXQGHGDV DW QRSRLQWGLG WKH HQUROOHG VWUHQJWKRI WKH
force meet the establishment voted by Parliament. Although as whole initial rates of 
recruitment did not match the quotas laid down for 1852 and 1853, many units were in 
fact able to recruit successfully. Recruitment difficulties were largely limited to urban 
areas, compounded by the agitation of peace activists, while in Wales there was hostility 
from among non-conformist communities. Despite a rather mixed start, it was embodied 
service during the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny which did the most damage to the 
PLOLWLD¶VVWUHngth, plummeting to a nadir of just 32,449 men in England and Wales, and 
4,786 men in Scotland, in 1855.5 The militia was able to successfully recover during the 
1860s, aided by the temporary suspension of drafting to the line from June 1860 until 
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May 1866, when subsequently, it remained relatively stable despite never reaching its full 
establishment. Therefore, even at its strongest, recruitment represented a constant 
challenge and one which it increasingly struggled to meet in the wake of the South 
African War. On the whole, wastage increasingly accounted for the annual decrease in 
manpower as very few militiamen ever completed their full term of service, the majority 
either deserting or transferring to the regular army. Only a small and decreasing minority 
ever opted to re-enlist. This was only compounded by the withholding of the 10s 
enrolment bounty upon enlistment which, in helping to alleviate the worst effects of 
desertion, made service less attractive to those who relied upon the immediate financial 
JDLQRIWKHERXQW\6LPLODUO\&DUGZHOO¶VVKDUHGEULJDGHGHSRWVKDGWKHXQIRUWXQDWHVLGH-
effect of enabling regular recruiters to poach the best militia recruits before they ever 
reached the care of their own officers and NCOs. When combined with the increasing 
QXPEHURIPLOLWLDPHQWUDQVIHUULQJWRWKHOLQHWKHPLOLWLDZDVHVVHQWLDOO\µSOXQGHUHGDWRQH
HQGDQGSLOODJHGDWWKHRWKHU¶6 
It is also clear that there was a shift in the social composition of the rank and file, 
agricultural workers increasingly being supplanted by urban labourers. This is evidenced 
in the broad reduction in strength of units in rural areas towards the end of the period. 
Much like the officer corps, this was largely the result of the wider agricultural 
depression which not only reduced the number of agricultural workers, but also drove up 
the wages of the remainder. The militia, the rates of pay and financial inducements of 
which had remained largely stagnant, was unable to compete. Therefore, unskilled urban 
workers became more prevalent, militia service providing many with a temporary refuge 
from unemployment or temporary causal labouring. As a result, its units were able to 
draw recruits from towns and cities which were best able to maintain their strength, 
particularly when the overall strength of the militia fell significantly after the South 
African War. However, national statistics mask the fact that social composition varied 
considerably between different units. Many units raised and trained in urban and 
industrial areas initially recruited high levels of skilled (or semi-skilled) industrial 
workers, artisans and tradesmen, with little or no reliance upon agricultural workers. For 
such individuals militia service acted as a form of annual holiday away from the rigours 
of industrLDO ZRUN )XUWKHUPRUH WKH PLOLWLD¶V UDQN DQG ILOH ZHUH LQFUHDVLQJO\ UHFUXLWHG
from a young demographic. Overall, this demonstrates that the typical militia recruit of 
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the latter period was very similar to his regular counterpart: young, and (at best) 
underemployed. 
First made applicable in 1757, from 1852 the militia was further brought under 
the remit of military law. Although such only applied when the militia was embodied or 
assembled for training, this was later extended to include the recruit training while it was 
also made permanently applicable to officers. Although technically exempted any 
SXQLVKPHQWUHODWLQJWRµOLIHRUOLPE¶VHYHUDOPLOLWLDPHQZHUHIORJJHGGXULQJWKHV
This created considerable controversy over the application of corporal punishment to 
amateur soldiers, peace campaigners using it as a key feature of their anti-militia 
campaigning; however, the issue largely subsided after the last recorded case in 1859. 
Instead, discipline was maintained in the militia through similar means to the regular 
army: either by courts-martial or, for less serious crimes, a system of minor punishments 
given by commanding officers. Courts-martial were relatively rare when the militia was 
disembodied, only being convened for the most serious of military crimes; serious civil 
crimes such as murder were already dealt with via the civil courts. The punishments 
inflicted were generally some form of imprisonment with or without hard labour. Yet 
courts-martial were relatively infrequent because many units deferred cases of desertion 
and absence without leave (still the most common serious peacetime offences) to the 
county magistrates. When courts-martial became more common towards the end of the 
period, this was unsurprising partly due to the decision to try the most serious cases of 
desertion in such a manner; indeed, there were valid complaints from some officers that 
magistrates were often too lenient in their sentencing. Notably this was the opposite of a 
more general trend within the regular army which saw disciplinary offences dealt with 
more commonly by the summary powers of commanding officers. Despite this, the 
overall number of disciplinary cases fell, in keeping with a wider trend of improving 
discipline within the regular army and the move towards wider reform of the penal 
system. However, this did not stop those units serving in South Africa from struggling to 
maintain discipline when on active service for the first time. In just 13 units there were 
324 separate field-general and district courts-martial for 455 separate offences from July 
1900 to November 1901. By far the most common offences were drunkenness and 
sleeping upon (or quitting) ones post, although more worryingly there were also a high 
proportion of more serious cases of violence and disobedience. 
The most common single disciplinary issues within the militia were desertion and 




disobedience caused by the ease of access to alcohol when assembled for training. 
Desertion was particularly problematic during the embodiments of the 1850s, encouraged 
by the financial benefit of fraudulently enlisting into several units.  Although in 
subsequent years the government were able to curb its worst excesses, it remained an 
ever present concern. Urban units reliant on migratory semi-employed labourers who had 
no fixed address were particularly affected, due to the ease with which their men could 
avoid detection or fraudulently enlist into other regiments. Permanent emigration and 
temporary absence at sea also prevented many militiamen from attending their training 
even if they had no intention of deserting permanently. There were also concerns with the 
inexperience and indifference of local constabularies towards tracking down absentees 
which contributed to high rates of desertion in some units. Another concern was the 
frequency of major disturbances and riots which usually resulted from the ease of access 
to alcohol when assembled for training. This was often exacerbated by a shared sense of 
solidarity among militiamen against any external threats, be that other regiments, the 
public, or police. It was also compounded by the continued need to billet units. This 
created a high degree of animosity between the militia and local people to the extent that 
many petitioned for the removal of certain units, most notably in Scotland.  
Embodied service was a far cry from the usually mundane experience of training 
when disembodied. This was especially the case during the South African War when the 
militia proceeded abroad for active service for the first time en masse. By comparison, 
their embodied service during the Crimean War and Indian mutiny was far more 
mundane. The decision of whether or not to embody the force at the outset of the 
Crimean War was far from a straightforward issue. Despite there being no credible threat 
of invasion to justify embodying the force, the government were able to take a loose 
interpretation of the existing legislation which permitted the embodiment of the militia 
when the country was threatened with invasion.  By May 1854, subsequent legislation 
henceforth authorised the embodiment of the militia whenever a state of war existed. Yet 
there can be no doubt that their primary motive remained the need to find an additional 
source of manpower for the regular army, a role most commanding officers either 
willingly or begrudgingly complied with (only a few refusing outright). However, the 
embodiment also served the practical purpose of enabling regular units stationed in 
Britain to serve abroad, meaning the defence of the UK rested predominantly upon the 
militia. Some units even had the opportunity to serve abroad after legislation was passed 




in 1854, which allowed units to offer to serve abroad; yet, although many offered, just ten 
were sent to garrison stations throughout the Mediterranean. For the many units serving 
in the UK, the experience of both embodiments was not dissimilar to that of the 
disembodied training.  Their duties consisted largely of drill and parade upon the barrack 
square. Nonetheless, some were camped at the major military stations while others served 
in regular barracks across Britain and Ireland. 
By comparison, the militia undertook a more active role during the South African 
War, despite the government initially intending to use them in a similar domestic role as 
in the 1850s. Eventually over 65,000 officers and men served abroad, most as part of 
their own units. Generally they were used as a means of relieving regular troops from 
garrison duties, only a few ever being used in active operations against the enemy. Yet 
the fragmented and increasingly mobile nature of the conflict meant many units 
experienced some form of fighting, while others were trained as mounted infantry and 
DWWDFKHG WR /RUG.LWFKHQHU¶V IO\LQJ FROXPQV*DUULVRQGXWLHV DW LVRODWHG VWDWLRQVPHDQW
everyday life could be tough, although most were able to bare the strain; some units did 
so for considerable periods. By contrast, for those serving in units at home, the 
embodiment was in many ways similar to those of the 1850s. Once again they acted as 
garrison troops, several units serving in Ireland and a few in the Channel Islands, some 
again sent to relieve regular garrisons in the Mediterranean. However, compared to the 
1850s, many more were able to take advantage of more comprehensive training 
arrangements, which meant there was a greater focus upon field exercises simulating 
defensive duties against invasion and raiding, despite their being little credible threat of 
such. There was also far less of a need to billet militiamen, most serving instead in 
barracks or military camps. 
Such a level of unprecedented service during the South African War was to be of 
little long term benefit to militia. In the immediate years after its disembodiment its 
strength declined rapidly to levels not seen since the 1850s. Therefore, it was clear to 
both the Unionists and Liberals that militia reform would have to form part of the wider 
drive for army reform, itself motivated by the desire for financial retrenchment. Yet as 
William St. John Brodrick, Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster and Richard Burdon Haldane 
found out, ultimately to the cost of the former two, militia reform was a particularly 
divisive issue. Each of their three separate schemes shared the intention of integrating the 
militia more firmly to the regular army so that it could provide it with a more effective 




means of rapid expansion. Brodrick believed only the best elements of the militia were 
worth incorporating into his army corps scheme, while similarly Arnold-Forster, who saw 
the militia as largely ineffective, decided its best units should be incorporated into his 
SODQQHG µKRPH VHUYLFH¶ DUP\ %RWK HQFRXQWHUHG RSSRVLWLRQ IURP WKH PRUH UHDFWLRQDU\
members of the militia lobby within Parliament, headed by the Duke of Bedford and 
several other influential peers with personal connections to the militia. Yet, although both 
Brodrick and Arnold-Forster were willing to accept the retention of at least a part of the 
militia as part of their existing schemes, their critics were able to stifle their plans. In 
Arnold-)RUVWHU¶V FDVH WKH Friticism from the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, and other 
members of the cabinet (who believed the militia as it existed was capable of being 
transformed into a secondary line so long as it accepted the liability to serve abroad) 
meant he was blocked from even formally introducing his plans into the Commons. 
Haldane also faced opposition. Firstly, his initial scheme, which saw a large portion of 
the existing militia retained, so long as its officers were willing to accept an overseas 
liability and the drafting of their men directly into the regular army, was rejected by the 
PLOLWLD¶VVXSSRUWHUV6HFRQGO\KLVDWWHPSWWRFLUFXPYHQWWKHPWKURXJKWKHFUHDWLRQRIDQ
alternate force, the Special Reserve, was derailed by Balfour and other Unionist militia 
advocates who argued the retention of the militia in Ireland could be applied across the 
whole of the UK. Therefore, Haldane was forced to compromise by using the militia as 
the basis for the Special Reserve. Yet this ensured he had a far greater degree of cross 
party support than his predecessors and thus giving him the necessary support to see the 
plans through Parliament despite the continued opposition of militia officers within the 
Lords and the protestations from units marked for disbandment. 
 Finally, it is also clear that the creation of the Special Reserve represented a 
moment of continuity rather than an outright break with the past. Although most units 
were organised simply as training units for their linked line battalions, much of the 
PLOLWLD¶VIRUPHU manpower opted to continue their service as part of their existing units, 
either as reserve or extra reserve battalions. However, for those units reorganised or 
disbanded, the experience understandably created greater upheaval, particularly the RGA 
(Militia) which faced subsequent disbandment (except for Irish corps). Continuity was 
also evident in the fact that the Special Reserve faced many of the same difficulties as its 
predecessor. Many Special Reservists continued to be young and in casual employment; 
in fact the increased SHULRGRIUHFUXLWV¶WUDLQLQJ meant service was even less attractive for 




those from other occupational backgrounds. Like the militia, desertion rates in the Special 
Reserve remained high, as did the proportion transferring into the regular army, both 
among officers and men. Finally, it can be concluded that by the Great War the Special 
Reserve was a smaller and less efficient force than the militia it had replaced. 
Nevertheless, the reorganisation finally put an end once and for all to any serious doubts 
as to whether the µFRQVWLWXWLRQDO IRUFH¶Zas to maintain any independent role for home 











































Appendix 1: The Representation of Militia Officers within Both Houses of 
Parliament, 1852 to 1908.7 
 





Conservative Whig Liberal Other  Unknown 
1852 
Lords 50 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Commons 43 26 2 15 « « 
1859 
Lords 37 23 « 10 4 « 
Commons 59 23 3 27 5 1 
1870 
Lords 23 13 « 6 2 2 
Commons 64 39 3 19 3 « 
    Liberal   
1881 
Lords 24 15 6 2 1 
Commons 28 19 7 2 « 
    
Liberal 
Unionist Liberal   
1902 
Lords 52 30 9 1 « 12 
Commons 48 36 3 7 2 « 
1908 
Lords 66 44 15 6 « 1 










                                                 
7
 All figures are derived from Charles Dod, Parliamentary Companion, published in each year (as detailed 
in the bibliography).  


























1862  3,050 1,951 1,656 1,099  432 280 232 152 
1863  3,053 1,928 1,619 1,125  432 265 223 167 
1864  3,053 1,921 1,629 1,132  432 270 222 162 
1865  3,053 1,878 1,601 1,175  432 264 255 168 
1866  3,053 1,868 1,606 1,185  432 260 227 172 
1867  3,053 1,867 1,325 1,186  432 271 234 161 
1868  3,053 1,841 1,608 1,212  432 265 228 167 
1869  3,053 1,857 1,607 1,196  432 271 235 161 
1870  3,051 1,882 1,605 1,169  431 276 242 155 
1871  3,051 2,116 1,924 935  431 300 269 131 
1872  3,051 2,179 1,936 872  442 311 275 131 
1873  3,051 2,110 1,971 941  442 310 270 132 
1874  2,494 2,118 1,854 376  373 318 239 55 
1875  2,494 2,173 1,957 321  373 320 286 53 
1876  2,416 2,227 1,948 189  375 341 294 34 
1877  2,499 2,269 2,001 230  399 338 301 61 
1878  2,506 2,335 2,088 171  395 346 313 49 
1879  2,529 2,239 1,918 290  401 345 294 56 
1880  2,357 2,203 1,932 154  373 329 284 44 
1881  2,371 2,249 1,897 122  374 350 296 24 
1882  2,369 2,094 1,757 275  373 327 278 46 
1884  2,351 1,858 1,584 493  386 289 243 97 
1885  2,330 1,939 1,720 391  398 306 262 92 
1886  2,328 2,022 1,738 306  398 314 268 84 
1887  2,329 2,095 1,902 234  398 302 262 96 
1888  2,360 2,167 1,930 193  400 349 299 51 
1889  2,372 2,196 1,990 176  400 367 310 33 
1890  2343 2,190 1,952 153  410 362 332 48 
1891  2,349 2,131 1,840 218  406 370 315 36 
1892  2,326 2,099 1,831 227  406 351 293 55 
1893  2,334 2,079 1,836 255  402 344 287 58 
1894  2,335 2,054 1,785 281  404 322 278 82 
1895  2,339 2,021 1,773 318  404 323 274 81 
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 PP, Militia (training establishments). Return showing the training establishment of each regiment of 
militia in the United Kingdom, 1870-1881; PP, Militia units. Return showing the establishment of each unit 
of militia in the United Kingdom, 1863-1869, 1882-1907. Detailed references can be found in the 
bibliography. 




Appendix 2 (continued): The Strength of the Officer Corps in the English, Welsh 
and Scottish Militia, 1862-1908. 
 
Year* 


















1896  2,335 1,993 1,610 342  404 328 281 76 
1897  2,321 1,874 1,639 447  404 331 285 73 
1898  2,297 1,912 « 385  404 331 297 73 
1899  2,235 1,906 1,630 329  404 318 282 86 
1900  2,307 1,983 1,982 324  420 352 352 68 
1901  2,335 1,909 « 426  417 322 « 95 
1902  2,323 1,776 « 547  416 306 « 110 
1903  2,265 1,843 1,258 422  406 311 217 95 
1904  2,265 1,711 1,507 554  406 290 242 116 
1905  2,255 1,656 1,426 599  406 273 227 133 
1906  2,261 1,610 1,377 651  408 256 227 152 
1907  2,204 1,463 1,279 741  408 251 216 157 
1908  2,351 1,858 1,584 493  386 289 243 97 


































Appendix 3: Notes Regarding the Methodology used for analysing the Officer 
Corps. 
 
$VWKHEDVLV IRU WKHDQDO\VLVRI WKHPLOLWLD¶VRIILFHUFRUSV LQ&KDSWHU VHYHUDOVRXUFHV
have been used as a means RIGHWHUPLQLQJWKHGHWDLOVRIHDFKRIILFHU¶VVHUYLFHDQGZKHUH
possible) his social background (or in the case of young officers, their father or the head 
of their immediate family). These included regimental histories, lists of officers in county 
record RIILFHVDQGWKHVHYHUDODSSURSULDWHHGLWLRQVRI+DUW¶VAnnual Army List. Detailed 
breakdowns of the sources used are as follows: 
 
Cornwall and Devon Miners Artillery Cavenagh-0DLQZDULQJ ³The Royal Miners, 
pp. 1-129 
East Essex Rifles    +DUW¶V Annual Army List, 1854-1908 
 
Royal London Regiment   +DUW¶V Annual Army List, 1854-1908 
 
3rd North Staffordshire Regiment C. C. W. Troughton, Historical Records of 
WKHUG.LQJ¶V2ZQ6WDIIRUGVKLUH5LIOHVUG
K.O. Stafford Militia), now the 4th 
Battalion, The Prince RI :DOHV¶V 1RUWK
Staffordshire Regiment, (Litchfield: A. C. 
/RPD[¶V 6XFFHVVRUV  SS -145; 
+DUW¶V Annual Army List, 1854-1908. 
 
 
Northumberland Light Infantry Scott, Northumberland Light Infantry, pp. 
74-8, 145-52 
 
Royal Caernarvonshire Rifles    +DUW¶V Annual Army List, 1854-1908 
 
Royal Monmouthshire LI/RE    +DUW¶V Annual Army List, 1854-1908 
 
 
Royal Aberdeenshire Highlanders T. Innes, The Aberdeenshire Militia and the 
Royal Aberdeenshire Highlanders, now the 
Third Battalion, the Gordon Highlanders, 
1798 to 1882, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Journal 
Office, 1884), pp. 1-38 
 
Edinburgh Artillery    +DUW¶V Annual Army List, 1854-1908 
 
 


























1852  50,000 33,714 « 16,286  « « « « 
1853  80,000 66,280 51,561 13,720  « « « « 
1854  83,798 69,807 « 13,991  « « « « 
1855  80,000 32,449 « 47,551  10,000 4,786 « 5,214 
1856  « « « «  « « « « 
1857  80,000 76,762 « 3,238  10,000 8,059 « 1,941 
1858  « « « «  « « « « 
1859  « « « «  « « « « 
1860  « « « «  « « « « 
1861  « « « «  « « « « 
1862  86,863 68,538 59,796 18,325  10,863 10,076 8,806 787 
1863  86,513 70,278 9,271 16,235  10,893 9,946 9,271 947 
1864  86,784 71,653 9,223 15,131  10,893 9,958 9,223 935 
1865  86,784 63,822 58,089 22,962  10,893 9,237 8,644 1,656 
1866  86,784 61,193 55,887 25,591  10,893 9,183 8,566 1,710 
1867  86,784 61,934 58,211 24,850  10,893 9,201 8,661 1,692 
1868  86,789 68,018 62,631 18,771  10,883 9,880 9,259 1,003 
1869  86,789 72,614 67,382 14,175  10,883 10,429 9,780 454 
1870  86,785 72,853 65,524 13,932  10,880 10,391 9,760 489 
1871  86,785 72,434 65,348 14,351  10,880 10,595 9,800 285 
1872  86,785 76,847 68,953 9,938  11,155 11,625 10,373 « 
1873  86,785 75,266 64,541 11,519  11,155 11,428 9,640 « 
1874  90,085 71,605 62,859 18,480  12,385 11,664 8,824 721 
1875  90,092 72,962 63,873 17,130  12,385 11,731 10,207 654 
1876  86,876 73,516 63,972 13,360  12,701 11,835 10,273 866 
1877  87,363 75,815 63,836 11,548  13,739 12,332 10,178 1,407 
1878  87,686 76,091 52,727 11,595  13,457 11,639 8,121 1,818 
1879  88,355 81,107 71,748 7,248  13,676 13,129 12,185 547 
1880  89,547 83,326 74,078 6,221  13,910 13,848 12,211 62 
1881  89,813 82,519 72,951 6,870  13,910 13,772 12,069 138 
1882  89,747 76,658 67,594 13,089  13,913 12,901 11,250 1,012 
* Figures prior to 1860 are for privates only. Thereafter the figures include NCOs and members of the 
permanent staff (as does that for 1854). 
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 WSHC. 2057/F8/3B/136-163(a), Memorandum on the regiments of militia inspected, 1847-1852; PP, 
Militia. Return of the quota of militia men for each county in England and Wales for the year 1852, 74, 
(1852-53); PP, Militia. Return of the quota of militia for each county in England and Wales for 1853, 153, 
(1854); PP, Militia. Return of the number of volunteers actually serving in each regiment of militia in the 
United Kingdom on the 1st March 1855, 353, (1854-5); PP, Militia. Return of all regiments of militia in the 
United Kingdom who shall not have completed their respective quotas, (1857-8); PP, Militia (training 
establishments). Return showing the training establishment of each regiment of militia in the United 
Kingdom, 1870-1881; PP, Militia units. Return showing the establishment of each unit of militia in the 
United Kingdom, 1863-1869, 1882-1907. Detailed references can be found in the bibliography.  


























1883  88,990 74,902 65,689 14,088  14,155 12,576 11,180 1,579 
1884  88,671 74,752 65,431 13,919  14,363 13,875 11,894 488 
1885  87,799 79,173 69,418 8,626  14,793 14,699 12,556 94 
1886  87,799 81,211 69,094 6,588  14,793 14,585 12,455 208 
1887  87,905 79,915 68,785 7,990  14,793 14,316 12,288 477 
1888  88,606 77,846 65,594 10,760  14,894 13,821 11,797 1,073 
1889  88,205 75,716 66,683 12,489  14,892 13,360 11,513 1,532 
1890  87,545 72,736 63,950 14,809  15,292 13,193 11,312 2,099 
1891  87,762 72,020 61,482 15,742  15,183 13,434 11,288 1,749 
1892  86,742 75,492 63,506 11,250  15,183 14,004 11,781 1,179 
1893  86,760 82,237 69,326 4,523  15,173 15,115 12,453 58 
1894  86,855 79,651 66,835 7,204  15,273 14,591 12,239 682 
1895  86,884 76,302 67,366 10,582  15,273 14,508 12,461 765 
1896  86,762 75,629 61,599 11,133  15,273 14,437 12,223 836 
1897  86,306 72,807 62,838 13,499  15,273 13,778 11,440 1,495 
1898  85,433 71,649 61,259 13,784  15,273 13,334 11,209 1,939 
1899  83,031 68,582 57,737 14,449  15,273 12,652 10,404 2,621 
1900  86,705 62,986 56,519 23,719  15,940 10,583 9,612 5,357 
1901  85,720 72,252 « 13,468  15,586 10,979 « 4,607 
1902  85,029 79,299 « 5,730  15,596 12,456 « 3,140 
1903  84,134 72,254 46,956 11,880  15,371 11,568 8,444 3,803 
1904  84,134 65,924 57,730 18,210  15,371 11,232 10,051 4,139 
1905  83,698 63,042 55,842 20,656  15,371 11,308 10,234 4,063 
1906  83,898 59,974 53,303 23,924  15,471 11,256 10,068 4,215 
1907  83,119 58,664 52,196 24,455  15,471 11,824 10,355 3,647 
* Figures prior to 1860 are for privates only. Thereafter the figures include NCOs and members of the 
















Appendix 5: Notes Regarding the Methodology used for analysing the Rank and 
File. 
 
As the basis for the comparative analysis of several militia units used in Chapter three, 
several sources have been used in order to gain the details of a sample of attested 
militiamen over several years (where possible, every five years). In total, this sample has 
examined nine units in detail and totals over 13,000 individuals. Providing the source 
material for Tables 3.7 and 3.9, PRVWGHWDLOVFDQEHIRXQGLQHDFKXQLW¶VHQUROPHQWERRNV
and returns, principally held either at county record officers or at TNA.  For years where 
these are missing, the attestation forms held at TNA as part of WO 96 have been used, 
principally for the 1890s and 1900s due to the fact that many returns for earlier years are 
missing or damaged. Detailed breakdowns of the sources used are as follows: 
 
East Kent Regiment  KHLC, L/M/7/1-3, East Kent Regiment enrolment 
books, 1852-1860; TNA, WO 96/32-44, East Kent 
Regiment attestation forms, 1874-[1905]. 
 
Hampshire Regiment HantsALS, Q30/4/5/1-10, Return of volunteers 
enrolled for the South Hampshire Regiment, 1852; 
TNA, WO 68/379, Hampshire Regiment enrolment 
books, 1803-1888; TNA WO 96/641-53, Hampshire 
Regiment attestation forms, 1876-1914. 
 
2nd (East) Norfolk Regiment TNA, WO 68/128-30, 2nd (East) Norfolk Regiment 
enrolment, 1852-1893; TNA, WO 96/202-14, 
Norfolk Regiment attestation forms, 1882-1906. 
 
Northumberland Light Infantry FMN, Northumberland L.I. enrolment book, 1852-
1871; TNA, WO 96/86-93, Northumberland 
Fusiliers attestation forms, 1880-1908. 
 
1st Tower Hamlets Regiment TNA, WO 68/407, 436, 1st Tower Hamlets 
Regiment enrolment books, 1860-1880; TNA,  WO 
96/1239-81, Rifle Brigade attestation forms, 1873-
1911.   
 
Royal Caernarvonshire Rifles PP., Questions sent to commanding officers¸ C. 288, 
(1871), p. 10; TNA, WO 96/445-8, Welsh Fusiliers 
attestation forms, 1892-1908. 
 
 




Royal Monmouthshire LI/RE Gwent Archives, LLMISC P5-0026, Return of 
volunteers enrolled in the Royal Monmouthshire 
Light Infantry, 23 September to 31 December 1852; 
CRM, RMRE/4/3-4, Registers of Enlistments, 
1872-1887 and 1889-1915; TNA, WO 96/1297-
1307, Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers 
attestation forms, [1905]. 
 
Edinburgh Artillery TNA, WO 68/35-40, Edinburgh Artillery enrolment 
books, 1854-1890; TNA, WO 96/1344-51, 
Edinburgh R.G.A. (militia) attestation forms, 1882-
1915. 
 
Highland (Inverness, etc) Light  
Infantry (Militia) TNA, WO 68/378, Highland (Inverness) Light 
Infantry, 1854-1882. 
 
With regards to the way in which the various occupational titles have been sorted and 
categorised, the aim has been to make as clear as possible the various demographics from 
which the militia was recruited. Some occupational titles are relatively self-explanatory, 
for instance, those related to mining and quarrying, whereas others, such as the rather 
JHQHULF WHUP µODERXUHU¶ FDQSURYHKDUGHU WR FDWHJRULVH&RPSRXQGLQJ WKLVGLIILFXOW\ LV
the fact that each return, written by separate individuals, can be more detailed than others 
in attempting to distinguish between different occupations, most notably between 
agricultural labourers and general labourers, which generally are referred to under the 
same title. Therefore, every effort has been taken to try and accurately place each 
individual into the relevant category, with those unable to be reliably placed, or if lacking 
any occupational titles whatsoever, marked simply as unknown. Nevertheless, due to the 
inherent difficulties of classifying a diverse range of occupations, such figures should be 
taken as representative of the general proportions and trends involved and not as a means 















Labourers This comprises both unskilled general labourers and 
agricultural labourers (including ploughmen, farm servants, 
etc.). Every effort has been made to use residential 
information, where available, to distinguish between the 
two, in addition to cross referenced information in other 
sources, details of which are presented in the text.10 
Miners and Quarrymen Relatively self-explanatory, this category includes anyone 
working in the mining profession, or in open air quarries.  
 
Industrial Workers This includes both skilled and, where specified, non-skilled 
LQGXVWULDO ZRUNHUV ZRUNLQJ LQ VRPH IRUP RI µKHDY\
LQGXVWU\¶ IRU LQVWDQFH LQ WKH VPHOWLQJ RI PHWDOV RU WKH
production of metal goods.  
 
Tradesmen This category principally includes painters, plasterers and 
bricklayers. 
 
Artisans and Craftsmen This comprises skilled and semi-skilled craftsmen and 
those engaged in light industries focussed upon the 
production of goods, including (as one of the most common 
examples) those involved in making shoes and boots. 
 
Retailers and Street Sellers On the one hand, this includes anyone involved in the 
selling of food and goods, including, for instance, bakers 
and fishmongers and their employees. It also includes street 
VHOOHUVPDLQO\µKDZNHUV¶DQGFRVWHUPRQJHUV 
 
Service This includes those involved in providing some form of 
service. Primarily this includes domestic servants, carters, 
grooms and porters.  
 
Sailors and Fishermen This is relatively self-explanatory. 
 
Other This encompasses those not included in the above category, 
including clerks, musicians and boys taken below the age 
of 17 onto the permanent staff as drummers and buglers,  
 
Unknown This includes those with no stated occupation or those 




                                                 
10
 The main point of cross reference has been with material present in Parliamentary Command Papers, 
most notably in PP., Questions sent to commanding officers¸ C. 288, (1871). 




Appendix 6: Militia Units Serving in South Africa and the Dates they were 
































                                                 
11
 µ$SSHQGL[¶33Appendices to the minutes of evidence, Cd. 2064, (1904), pp. 55-75.  




Appendix 7: Militia Battalions Disbanded upon the Creation of the Special 
Reserve.12 
 







4th Royal Lancashire  383 118 89 113 
4th Norfolk  525 146 132 96 
4th Lincolnshire  489 257 71 103 
3rd Devonshire 470 261 44 72 
4th Suffolk  537 257 89 178 
4th Somersetshire Light Infantry  380 183 33 140 
3rd Royal Irish  621 287 164 124 
4th Yorkshire  492 198 57 121 
4th Cheshire  474 132 78 220 
4th Royal Welsh Fusiliers 408 172 68 105 
4th South Wales Borderers 339 205 32 39 
5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 439 255 74 76 
4th Gloucestershire  548 252 114 151 
4th Border  183 99 60 8 
3rd Oxfordshire  560 243 86 161 
4th Essex  522 207 64 160 
4th Shropshire  344 118 98 73 
8th King's Royal Rifle Corps 351 187 164 7 
9th King's Royal Rifle Corps 600 300 102 110 
6th Royal Irish Rifles 594 174 176 93 
5th Royal Irish Fusiliers 229 116 38 33 
3rd Connaught Rangers 383 187 57 61 
6th Rifle Brigade 436 278 85 34 
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 PP, Army, Cd. 3935, (1908), p. 3. 
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